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2012 DIGILAW 239 (CHH)

BIKAU SINGH v. STATE OF C. G.

2012-09-20

RADHE SHYAM SHARMA, SUNIL KUMAR SINHA

body2012
JUDGMENT As per Hon'ble Shri Radhe Shyam Sharma, J.- 1. This appeal is directed against judgment dated 28-11-2008 passed by Sessions Judge, Surguja (Ambikapur) in Sessions Trial No.370/2007. By the impugned judgment, accused/appellant Bikau Singh has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner with a direction to run the sentences concurrently:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 IPC Imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months Under Section 201 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 1 year and to pay fine of Rs. 200/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 1 month 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under:- Deceased Niru was wife of the appellant, and Azad Singh (PW-4) is son of the deceased and the appellant. On 11-8-2007, the appellant came to his house at about 7:30 p.m. and told the deceased to prepare food. She refused. At that time, she had consumed liquor. The appellant gave her beating, which caused injury on the person of the deceased and she became unconscious. Ultimately, she died. The appellant hanged the body of the deceased on the guarder to show that the death of the deceased was suicidal and made impression that the deceased committed suicide by way of hanging. The body of the deceased, showing all innocence, was taken to the hospital on 11-8-2007, where she was declared dead. A written intimation was sent to Police Station, Ambikapur where Merg Intimation (Ex.P-8) was recorded. The Investigating Officer reached District Hospital, Ambikapur, gave notice (Ex.P-2) to Panchas and prepared inquest (Ex.P-3) on the dead body of the deceased. The dead body of the deceased was sent for post mortem examination vide Ex.P-9. Crime No.372 of 2007 for the offences under Sections 302 and 201 IPC was registered vide regular First Information Report (Ex.P-12). Dr. The Investigating Officer reached District Hospital, Ambikapur, gave notice (Ex.P-2) to Panchas and prepared inquest (Ex.P-3) on the dead body of the deceased. The dead body of the deceased was sent for post mortem examination vide Ex.P-9. Crime No.372 of 2007 for the offences under Sections 302 and 201 IPC was registered vide regular First Information Report (Ex.P-12). Dr. K.R. Tekam (PW-7) conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased and gave his report (Ex.P-9), in which, he found- (i) bluish injury mark, 2 x 2 cms, right side of the forehead (ante mortem in nature), (ii) bluish injury mark on left side of forehead, 2 x 2 cms (ante mortem in nature) and (iii) transverse dark brown discolouration lying on neck just above the larynx (thyroid cartilage) extending from just below left ear to right ear which was post mortem bruise in nature. He opined that the cause of death of the deceased was head injury leading to coma and the death was homicidal in nature. In further investigation, site map (Ex.P-6) was prepared by Revenue Inspector Hanuman Singh (PW-3). Another site map (Ex.P-11) was prepared by Inspector N.L. Shrivastava (PW-6). After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambikapur, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge, Surguja (Ambikapur), who conducted the trial and convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above. 3. Smt. Indira Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the finding of guilt recorded on the basis of evidence of last seen together is not reasonable. She further argued that the appellant was not present in the house at the time of incident, therefore, he is not responsible for the death of the deceased. She further argued that the circumstantial evidence is not conclusive and it is well settled law that strong suspicion is no substitute for a proof, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge is not sustainable and the appellant deserves to be acquitted. She placed reliance on State of Kerala Vs. Anilachandran alias Madhu & ors. 2009 AIR SCW 3340. 4. Smt. Madhunisha Singh, learned Panel Lawyer for the State/respondent, supporting the impugned judgment, submitted that the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge do not warrant any interference by this Court. 5. She placed reliance on State of Kerala Vs. Anilachandran alias Madhu & ors. 2009 AIR SCW 3340. 4. Smt. Madhunisha Singh, learned Panel Lawyer for the State/respondent, supporting the impugned judgment, submitted that the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge do not warrant any interference by this Court. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the record of Sessions Trial No.370/2007. Admittedly, there is no eyewitness to the incident and the case of the prosecution is based on the circumstantial evidence. 6. It is a settled principle of law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all the pieces of incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt has to be drawn, should be fully established. It is also well settled that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot be substitute for a proof and the Court should take utmost precaution in finding the accused guilty on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 7. In Jagroop Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 2012 SC 2600 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "13. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 , a three-Judge Bench has laid down five golden principles which constitute the "panchsheel" in respect of a case based on circumstantial evidence. Referring to the decision in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622 : (1973) 2 SCC 793 , it was opined that it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to lay down that the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; that the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; that they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 14. In Pad ala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, this Court held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, the following tests must be satisfied: (SCC pp. 710-11, para 10) "(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence." The similar view has been reiterated in Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy and another v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172 . 15. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 607 , it has been laid down that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and those circumstances must be conclusive in nature to connect the accused with the crime. All the links in the chain of events must be established beyond reasonable doubt and the established circumstances should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. All the links in the chain of events must be established beyond reasonable doubt and the established circumstances should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the Court has to be on its guard to avoid the danger of allowing suspicion to take the place of legal proof and has to be watchful to avoid the danger of being swayed by emotional considerations, however strong they may be, to take the place of proof. 16. In Harishchandra Ladaku Thange v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC 2957 , while dealing with the validity of inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence, it has been emphasised that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person and further the circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. 17. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SCW 640 , emphasis has been laid that it is the duty of the Court to take care while evaluating circumstantial evidence. If the evidence adduced by the prosecution is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. That apart, the circumstances relied upon must be established and the cumulative effect of the established facts must lead to a singular hypothesis that the accused is guilty. 18. In Ram Singh v. Sonia and Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1218 , while referring to the settled proof pertaining to circumstantial evidence, this Court reiterated the principles about the caution to be kept in mind by Court. It has been stated therein that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. 19. In Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 90 , after referring to the aforesaid principles pertaining to the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, this Court stated that it must nonetheless be emphasized that whether a chain is complete or not would depend on the facts of each case emanating from the evidence and no universal yardstick should ever be attempted." 8. Now, we shall proceed to examine the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in order to prove the offence against the appellant and shall see whether the prosecution has been able to prove the offence against the appellant in conformity with the above principles. 9. So far as the question regarding the circumstance that this is a house murder is concerned, it is not disputed that the dead body of the deceased was found in the house of the appellant. Dr. K.R. Tekam (PW-7), who conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, deposed that bluish injury mark of 2 x 2 cms was found on the left and right side of the forehead (ante mortem in nature). He further deposed that transverse dark brown discolouration was lying on neck just above the larynx which was post mortem bruise in nature. Looking to the evidence of Dr. K.R. Tekam (PW-7), it is established that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. 10. Smt. Maina Devi (PW-1l), Karfu Sahu (PW-2) and Azad Singh (PW-4) deposed that the deceased was wife of the appellant and Azad Singh (PW-4) is son of the deceased and the appellant. They further deposed that the appellant and the deceased were residing together in the house of the appellant. Azad Singh (PW-4) and Karfu Sahu (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident, they had gone to visit Kailash Caves and they returned at about 4-4:30 p.m. Thereafter, they went to Mahamaya Temple. They further deposed that the appellant and the deceased were residing together in the house of the appellant. Azad Singh (PW-4) and Karfu Sahu (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident, they had gone to visit Kailash Caves and they returned at about 4-4:30 p.m. Thereafter, they went to Mahamaya Temple. Azad Singh (PW-4) deposed that he returned his house from Mahamaya Temple at about 8:00 p.m. and when he reached the house he saw that the door of his house was closed from inside. Then, he went to the house of Smt. Maina Devi (PW-1) and took meals there. Smt. Maina Devi (PW-1) and Karfu Sahu (PW-2) also deposed that Karfu Sahu (PW-2) and Azad Singh (PW-4) had gone to Mahamaya Temple and they returned from there at about 8:30 p.m. At that time, the house of the appellant was closed. The appellant came to the house of the Smt. Maina Devi (PW-1) at about 8:30 pm and he tried to open the door but the door was not opened by anybody. Thereafter, Nitesh entered the house from its rear side and opened the front door. Azad Singh (PW-4) deposed that he entered the house and saw that his mother (the deceased) was sleeping on bed and a piece of saree was tied up on her head. His father (the appellant) entered the house and tried to get up the deceased. Thereafter, they took the deceased to hospital where she was declared dead. 11. Smt. Maina Devi (PW-1) deposed that the appellant was residing along with his wife Niru (deceased) and two sons, Azad Singh (PW-4) and Chhotu, in her house as a tenant. On the date of incident, in the night, the appellant asked his younger son to open the door of the house. The door was closed from both sides. On opening the door, she did not enter the room. Sons of the deceased and, the appellant began to shout that the deceased had sustained injury on her head. At that time, the deceased was at her house. Sons of the deceased and the appellant took the deceased to hospital in a rickshaw. She had seen the deceased being taken in the rickshaw. At that time, the deceased was unconscious. The time was getting 10-10:15 P.M. when the deceased was being taken to the hospital in the rickshaw. At that time, the deceased was at her house. Sons of the deceased and the appellant took the deceased to hospital in a rickshaw. She had seen the deceased being taken in the rickshaw. At that time, the deceased was unconscious. The time was getting 10-10:15 P.M. when the deceased was being taken to the hospital in the rickshaw. On the next morning, she came to know that the deceased had died. In cross-examination, she deposed that the rented portion of the house consisted of a room, front courtyard and rear courtyard. A door was fixed in the front courtyard. In the rear courtyard also, a door was fixed. On the date of incident, in the night, her two sons and the two sons of the deceased were taking dinner in her house. The dinner was being served by her daughter-in-law and she was also present there. It is true that at that time itself, the appellant came to her and told that his wife (the deceased) was not opening the door and he asked his younger son to open the door, from rear side. It is wrong to say that at the time when the two sons of the appellant were taking dinner at her house, both, the appellant and the deceased were present in the tenanted premises. She further deposed that at that time, the appellant returned from his duty to her house, told her sons that door of the house was closed from inside and asked to go and open the door. It is true to say that she saw the appellant at that time only when he came to her house and asked his sons to open the door. Before that time, she had not seen the appellant on that day. She further deposed that when she was going to sell vegetables, she saw that the deceased had consumed much liquor and had sustained injury on the head. The deceased was habitual to consume liquor always. 12. Karfu Sahu (PW-2) deposed that the appellant was residing along with his wife Niru (deceased) and two sons in his house as a tenant. She further deposed that when she was going to sell vegetables, she saw that the deceased had consumed much liquor and had sustained injury on the head. The deceased was habitual to consume liquor always. 12. Karfu Sahu (PW-2) deposed that the appellant was residing along with his wife Niru (deceased) and two sons in his house as a tenant. Two days prior to the date of incident, he and the two sons of the appellant, namely, Azad (PW-4) and Nitesh had gone to visit Kailash Caves and returned home on the date of incident at about 4-5 P.M. When they returned home, at that time, the deceased was alone at the house. She had sustained injury on the head and consumed liquor. They had no talk with the deceased. At about 6 P.M., he, Azad Singh (PW-4) and Nitesh Singh went to visit Mahamaya Temple and returned home from there at about 8:30 P.M. Thereafter, all of them were taking dinner in his house. At that time, the appellant came there and was getting the door of his house opened. On non-opening of the door, he, Azad (PW-4) and Nitesh went to the rear side and opened the door. Nitesh entered the house from rear side and opened the front door. He did not enter the room. Later on, he entered the room from front door and saw that the deceased was, having tied up a cloth on her head, lying on a cot. The appellant was making her get up, but she did not get up. Then, the deceased was immediately taken to the hospital in a rickshaw. In cross-examination, he deposed that after returning from Mahamaya Temple, Azad (PW-4) and Mukesh did not enter their house. Instead, they were, sitting in the rear courtyard of his house, taking dinner along with him. The door of the rear courtyard of the house of the appellant was not visible from the place where they were taking dinner and the door of the front courtyard of the house of the appellant was also not visible. It is wrong to say that when they were taking dinner, noise of quarrelling by the appellant and the deceased was being heard to them from the house of the appellant. 13. Azad Singh (PW-4) deposed that the appellant is his father. Deceased Niru Singh was his mother. It is wrong to say that when they were taking dinner, noise of quarrelling by the appellant and the deceased was being heard to them from the house of the appellant. 13. Azad Singh (PW-4) deposed that the appellant is his father. Deceased Niru Singh was his mother. His mother died in the month of August in the last year. At that time, they were residing in the house of Smt. Maina Devi (PW-1) on rent. Two days prior to the date of incident, he, his younger brother Nitesh, Karfu Sahu (PW-2) and 2-3 boys of the locality had gone to visit Kailash Caves. On the date of incident, at about 4-4:30 P.M., they returned their house. At that time, his mother (the deceased) met at the house. No talk was done between him and his mother. His father (the appellant) had gone out to work. They, after taking bath and pulling the door, had gone to Mahamaya Temple. At that time, his mother was walking in the locality. He saw his mother walking in the locality about 100 feet away from their house. At that time, she had consumed liquor. At that time, she had sustained injury on the head and swelling was present there. He had seen his mother walking in the locality before going to Mahamaya Temple. At about 8 P.M., they returned from Mahamaya Temple and saw that the house was closed from inside. They supposed that their mother (the deceased) would have been sleeping in the house after consuming liquor. They did not make any effort to get the door opened. Thereafter, he and his brother Nitesh went to the house of Smt. Maina Devi (PW-1), situated adjacent to their house, for taking dinner. At about 9 P.M., they were sitting for taking dinner, at that time, his father (the appellant) returned from his duty. He further deposed that his father was working as an agent in the bus stand. When his father returned from duty, they told him that their mother had consumed liquor, therefore, they were sitting there. Then, his father tried to get the door opened, but it was not opened. His father asked them to open the door. Thereafter, he and his younger brother Nitesh went to the rear side of the house and opened the door of the rear courtyard of their house. Then, his father tried to get the door opened, but it was not opened. His father asked them to open the door. Thereafter, he and his younger brother Nitesh went to the rear side of the house and opened the door of the rear courtyard of their house. His father did not go along with them to the rear side of the house. After opening the door, they entered the house and saw that their mother (the deceased) was sleeping on the bed. She had tied up a piece of saree on her head. Thereafter, they called their father. Their father tried to make the deceased wake up, but she did not get up. In cross-examination, he deposed that his mother was not working outside and she had no source of individual income. His mother used to consume liquor daily. After returning from the duty, his father used to keep the money got in his duty in a trunk at the house. His mother used to consume liquor from that money. His father used to ask his mother not to consume liquor, but she did not stop consuming liquor. On non-giving of money by his father to his mother, she used to mortgage household articles of the house and consume liquor from that money. His mother had mortgaged her anklet with maternal uncle of Karfu Sahu (PW-2) and her Jivitiya with Jagdeo Sahu. He further deposed that it is wrong to say that his father had also entered the house along with Nitesh. It is also wrong to say that his mother was hanging on the ceiling. It is also wrong to say that his mother was brought down and was lain on the cot. 14. Though, Smt. Maina Devi (PW-1), Karfu Sahu (PW-2) and Azad Singh (PW-4) turned hostile and they did not support the case of the prosecution, but they deposed that the deceased was lying on the cot and had sustained injury on her head. It is also established that the deceased was wife of the appellant, she was residing with him and her dead body was found in his house lying on the cot when the door was opened. That means, she was not seen in hanging condition by them. 15. Inspector N.L. Shrivastava (PW-6) deposed that he prepared site-map (Ex.P-11) of the place of occurrence. That means, she was not seen in hanging condition by them. 15. Inspector N.L. Shrivastava (PW-6) deposed that he prepared site-map (Ex.P-11) of the place of occurrence. Revenue Inspector Hanuman Singh (PW-3) deposed that he visited the place of occurrence and prepared site-map (Ex.P-6). He further deposed that the place which is mentioned in red ink in Ex.P-6 is the place where the dead body of the deceased was found. Looking to Ex.P-6 and P-11, it appears that the place of occurrence is a room of the house of the appellant and the deceased was residing there with him. 16. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions 1--quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh). The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. ........." 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. ........." 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. 17. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kashiram (2006) 12 SCC 254 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "19. ..........whether an inference ought to be drawn under Section 106 Evidence Act is a question which must be determined by reference to proved. It is ultimately a matter of appreciation of evidence and, therefore, each case must rest on its own facts. 23. ............ The principle is well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his epical knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. ........." These principles have been further reiterated in the matter of State of Rajasthan Vs. Parthu AIR 2008 SC 10 . 18. In the instant case, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that at the time of incident, the appellant was not present at the place of occurrence. He used to go to the bus stand at about 6 A.M. daily, return home at about 11 A.M., take meals and again go to the bus stand at about 12:30 P.M. and return home at about 8-8:30 P.M. The appellant took specific defence of alibi, therefore, it was for him to prove the same under Sections 11 and 103 of the Evidence Act. 19. The incriminating circumstances, which point towards the guilt of the appellant, were put to the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 20. 19. The incriminating circumstances, which point towards the guilt of the appellant, were put to the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 20. The defence taken by the appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is as follows: ^^eSa funksZ”k gw¡A eSa izfrfnu lqcg 6 cts ?kj ls cl LVSaM pyk tkrk Fkk vkSj 11 cts okil vkrk Fkk fQj Hkkstu djds 12½ cts iqu% cl LVSaM pyk tkrk Fkk vkSj jkr 8-8½ okil vkrk FkkA ?kVuk fnukad dks Hkh eSa mDr fnup;kZ ds vuqlkj lqcg 6 cts cl LVSaM x;k vkSj 11 cts ?kj okil vk;k vkSj Hkkstu fd;kA esjh iRuh ?kj esa Fkh fdarq og ‘kjkc fi, gq, FkhA og ges’kk ‘kjkc ihrh FkhA Hkkstu ds mijkar okil tkrs le; esjh iRuh us ijNh dk njoktk Hkhrj ls can fd;kA eSa jkr 8-8½ cts okil vk;k rks njoktk can FkkA eSaus njoktk [kksyus gsrq vkokt nh rFkk njoktk HkM+HkM+k;k fdarq njoktk ugha [kksyk] Hkhrj ls can FkkA rc eSa eSukckbZ ds ;gk¡ tkdj vius iq=ksa ls crk;k fd njoktk Hkhrj ls can gS] [kksy ugha jgh gSA rc esjs iq=ksa us fiNokM+s dh ijNh es yxs njokts dks fdlh rjg [kksykA rc eSaus ckgj ls ns[kk fd dejs esa esjh iRuh Qkalh ij yVdh gqbZ FkhA eq>s irk ugha mldh e`R;q dSls gqbZA** 21. In the instant case, Dr. K.R. Tekam (PW-7), who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased, deposed that cause of death of the deceased was head injury leading to coma. But, the appellant took the defence that the deceased was hanging on the ceiling. According to medical evidence, the death of the deceased was due to head injury, but the appellant took the defence that the death of the deceased was due to hanging on the ceiling. According to prosecution witnesses Smt. Maina Devi (PW-1), Karfu Sahu (PW-2) and Azad Singh (PW-4), the deceased was lying on the cot, when for the first time all of them saw her after opening the door. According to all the witnesses, the appellant had also seen the dead body of the deceased for the first time along with the above witnesses. But, contradicting them, he took the defence that the dead body of the deceased was seen by him in hanging condition. According to all the witnesses, the appellant had also seen the dead body of the deceased for the first time along with the above witnesses. But, contradicting them, he took the defence that the dead body of the deceased was seen by him in hanging condition. The above statement of the appellant appears to be a false explanation in light of the evidence of all other prosecution witnesses, who saw the dead body lying on the cot. 22. Had the deceased used to consume liquor as stated by the appellant, presence of alcohol would have been found in her post mortem examination. But, the doctor, who conducted autopsy, did not find presence of alcohol. 23. The appellant was not able to prove his defence, which was falsified by the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses. The appellant failed to offer reasonable and proper explanation in discharge of burden placed on him under Section 106 of the Evidence Act and he did not throw any light upon the facts which were in his knowledge. He has given false explanation as to the death of the deceased. He has not thrown any light as to how the deceased received injuries and in what circumstances the incident took place in which the deceased died a homicidal death. On the contrary, he took the false defence of hanging. 24. In the light of above discussion, we do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge that it was the appellant who caused the injuries on the body of the deceased and the deceased died on account of the injuries caused by the appellant. 25. The appeal is devoid of merit; it deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.