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2012 DIGILAW 24 (CHH)

RAMAYAN v. STATE OF M. P.

2012-01-17

RAJEEV GUPTA, SUNIL KUMAR SINHA

body2012
JUDGMENT Sunil Kumar Sinha, J 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26th of November, 1993 passed in Sessions Trial No. 345/93 by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge Bilaspur. By the impugned judgment, the appellant has been convicted u/s 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are as under:- Deceased- Rajan Bai was the wife of the appellant. She was residing with the appellant and mother of the appellant. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant used to extend monitory help to his sister and brother-in-law (Jija), therefore, the deceased was unhappy and she used to quarrel with the appellant. The allegations are that on account of this, on 12.12.1992 at about 12:00 in the noon the appellant assaulted the deceased by an axe and ran away. The deceased succumbed to the injuries sustained by her. The case of the prosecution was based on circumstantial evidence. Following are the circumstances on which the learned Session Judge held that the appellant was liable for conviction under Section 302 IPC: "1. When the witnesses reached to the house of the appellant, mother of the appellant did not tell them that who caused injuries to the deceased. 2. The appellant did not give any explanation as to how the deceased died homicidal death in his house. 3. The appellant had motive to kill the deceased because she used to stop the appellant to give monitory help to his sister and brother-in-law. 4. The appellant ran away from his house immediately after the incident. 5. A Tangiya was seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P-17) on the memorandum statement (Ex-P-16) of the appellant recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act." 3. Mrs. Savita Tiwari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has not disputed the homicidal death of the deceased. She argued that the above circumstances were not sufficient to hold the appellant guilt of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Jameel Akhtar Lohani, learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the State, opposed these arguments and supported the judgment passed by the Sessions Court. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the records of the Sessions case. 6. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Jameel Akhtar Lohani, learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the State, opposed these arguments and supported the judgment passed by the Sessions Court. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the records of the Sessions case. 6. Admittedly, there is no direct evidence in this case and the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn have to be fully established and all the circumstances so established should be of conclusive nature and tendency. They must point only towards the guilt of the accused. The circumstances should not be capable of being explained and the chain of the circumstantial evidence must be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the belief consistent with the innocence of the accused. This is what the Supreme Court said in many cases. Therefore, we ought to be satisfied that the circumstances on which the prosecution relies leave no option but to hold that the crime imputed to the appellant has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 7. Firstly, we shall consider the above motive. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive has greater relevancy or significance, however, the principle is that when positive evidence against the accused is clear in relation to the offence, motive is not of much importance. Mere absence of motive even if assume, will not per-se entitle the accused to acquittal, if otherwise, the commission of the crime is proved by cogent and reliable evidence. In the instant case, though the above motive has been set-forth by the prosecution, but there is absolutely no evidence about the same. There is no evidence that the appellant used to give monitory help to his sister and brother in law; and on this account the deceased used to quarrel with him. Even, otherwise, in our opinion, such small events between husband and wife would hardly become the motive for the husband to kill his wife. We are of the view that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove motive in this case, which assumes importance being a case based on circumstantial evidence. 8. Even, otherwise, in our opinion, such small events between husband and wife would hardly become the motive for the husband to kill his wife. We are of the view that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove motive in this case, which assumes importance being a case based on circumstantial evidence. 8. The main circumstance on which the Session Judge relied is the circumstance that the appellant did not give any explanation as to how his wife died homicidal death in the house. In Nesar Ahmed And Another Vs. State of Bihar (2001) 9 SCC 736, the deceased died of burn injuries in the house of the appellants. The Supreme Court, while considering the matter, held that in such a case it is absolutely essential to first consider whether the prosecution has led any unimpeachable evidence to show that the appellants were present in the house where the deceased died as a result of burn injuries at the crucial time. If it is found that the presence of the appellants at the crucial time has not been established in the house, all other circumstances would not complete the chain of circumstantial evidence to lead to any irresistible conclusion consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the appellants and inconsistent with their innocence. 9. In the instant case, the incident took place at bout 12:00 in the noon. The learned Session Judge has held that Bhuvanlal (P.W.13) and Mangal (P.W.5) had seen the appellant running away from his house. Mangal (P.W.5) has deposed that when he received the information that the deceased has been murdered, he went to her house and found her in dead condition. He also saw injuries on her person. The appellant was not present in the house. Villagers told him that the appellant has run away. Therefore, the above evidence of Mangal (P. WS) was "hear-say" evidence and was not admissible. Bhuvanlal (P.W.13) also deposed in similar fashion. He also did not see the appellant running away from his house. He deposed that when he went to the house of the deceased, he found that the appellant was not there. On a close scrutiny of the entire evidence, we find that Puniram (P.W.10), who immediately reached to the house of the deceased clearly deposed that appellant- Ramayan was not present in his house. He deposed that when he went to the house of the deceased, he found that the appellant was not there. On a close scrutiny of the entire evidence, we find that Puniram (P.W.10), who immediately reached to the house of the deceased clearly deposed that appellant- Ramayan was not present in his house. It is not a case in which the incident took place in the night. It was a day time incident, therefore, unless it is proved that the appellant was present in the house at the relevant time, only finding the deceased in dead condition in the house of the appellant, in the present facts and circumstances, would not be incriminating against him. The learned Session Judge has recorded a perverse finding that on the basis of evidence of Mangal (P.W.5) & Bhuvanlal (P.W.13), it was established the appellant was present in the house at the time of the incident. 10. When the villagers reached to the house of the appellant, the mother of the appellant did not explain as to how the deceased sustained the above injuries. The Session Judge has held that, if any other person would have caused injuries, the mother must have told his name to the villagers. We are of the view that only on account of above conduct of the mother of the appellant, it cannot be held proved that the appellant must have caused injuries to the deceased, in absence of any positive proof against the appellant. The said finding of the learned Session Judge appears to be hypothetical. Moreover, there were 3 inmates in the house, therefore, even drawing such presumption against one of the two alive was unjustified. 11. Seizure of Tangia at the instance of appellant would also not be incriminating against him because the prosecution could not file any FSL report to prove that the Tangia was stained with blood much less the human blood. 12. For the forgoing reasons, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellant on the above set of circumstantial evidence. 13. In the result the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 302 IPC are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The appellant was taken into custody on 13.12.1992 and was released on bail by order dated 25.09.2001. 13. In the result the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 302 IPC are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The appellant was taken into custody on 13.12.1992 and was released on bail by order dated 25.09.2001. Presently he is on bail, his bail bonds are cancelled and surety stands discharged. Appeal Allowed.