ORDER 1. Heard. 2. This is an application filed by the appellants under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, pointing out certain typographical errors with minor modifications in the order dated 27.07.2012 passed in Second Appeal No. 141 of 1993. 3. I have perused the application and also order dated 27.07.2012 and accordingly, have made minor corrections in the order along with modifications. 4. The certified copy of the corrected order be now supplied to all the parties concerned as per rules. 5. Accordingly, the application (MCC) is disposed of. JUDGMENT 1. Heard. 2. This is a second appeal filed by the plaintiffs under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 25.11.1992 passed by Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Rajnandgaon (Link Court at Khairagarh) in Civil Appeal No. 13-A/1987 which in turn arose out of judgment and decree dated 16.12.1986 passed by Civil Judge, Class-I, Kawardha in Civil Suit No. 97-A/1984. 3. By impugned judgment/decree, the first appellate Court reversed the judgment/decree passed by the trial Court, which had decreed plaintiff's suit for declaration and partition in relation to suit property (agricultural land and residential house) and while partly allowing the appeal set aside that part of the judgment/decree of the trial Court which related to agricultural lands and in consequence dismissed plaintiff's suit but upheld part of the judgment/decree relating to residential house. In this way, the plaintiff's suit was held decreed in part in so far as it related to residential house whereas it was dismissed in so far as it related to agricultural lands. In this appeal, I am concerned with the decree of dismissal of plaintiff's suit in so far as it relates to agricultural lands. 4. So the question arises for consideration in this appeal is whether lower appellate Court was justified in partly modifying the judgment/decree passed by the trial Court as mentioned above. 5. In order to appreciate the issue involved in the suit, it is necessary to state the facts as pleaded by the parties and how they were dealt with by the two courts below. 6. The dispute in this appeal centres around family members, original ancestor being one Sadwa. 5. In order to appreciate the issue involved in the suit, it is necessary to state the facts as pleaded by the parties and how they were dealt with by the two courts below. 6. The dispute in this appeal centres around family members, original ancestor being one Sadwa. It is between his two grand daughters and two great grand daughters on the one side as plaintiff No. 1 to 4 and another grand daughter and her husband as defendant No. 1 and 2. 7. The family tree of Sadwa would be useful to appreciate the issue. lnok&¼e`r 1950½ ijlknh :ikckbZ ¼iq=&e`r 1940&45½ ¼iRuh&e`r 1982½ nq[khn;h ckbZ lksubZCkkbZ lksuer erhckbZ jkeyky ¼iq=h oknh ua-1½ ¼iq`=h oknh ua-2½ ¼iq=h&e`r 1960½ ¼iq=h izfroknh ua- 1½ ¼izfroknh ua- 2½ lsfBu ckbZ esfBu ckbZ ¼iq=h okfnuh ua-3½ ¼iq=h okfnuh ua-4½ 8. The suit property consists of agricultural land admeasuring 18.75 acres situated at village Boldakala, district Rajnandgaon and a residential house. It belonged to Sadwa. He died somewhere in 1950. He had a son namely Parsadi who predeceased him in 1945. Parsadi had a wife Rupabai. This couple had four daughters, namely Dukhdayi (plaintiff No. 1) Sonai (plaintiff No. 2), Sonmat (mother of Sethin and Methin - Plaintiffs 3 & 4) and Matibai (defendant No. 1). Ramlal (defendant No. 2) is the husband of Matibai. 9. On the death of Sadwa, name of Rupabai, i.e. widow of his predeceased son Parsadi was recorded in the agricultural lands. Rupabai then sold the suit properties (agricultural lands and residential house) to her son-in-law Ramlal-(defendant No. 2) by executing sale deed on 23.6.55 (Ex-D/4). Rupabai died in the year 1982. 10. The plaintiffs filed a suit in the year 1982, out of which this appeal arises against the defendants claiming a declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs are joint owners of the suit properties to the extent of 3/4th share in it and hence their 3/4th share be partitioned between the parties (amongst the four sisters). 10. The plaintiffs filed a suit in the year 1982, out of which this appeal arises against the defendants claiming a declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs are joint owners of the suit properties to the extent of 3/4th share in it and hence their 3/4th share be partitioned between the parties (amongst the four sisters). The plaintiffs also claimed a declaration that the sale deed executed by Rupabai - their mother in favour of her son-in-law (defendant No. 2) (Ex-D/4) is bad in law being void and not binding on them inter alia for the reasons that firstly their mother had no right to sell the suit properties to anyone because she had acquired only limited interest in the suit properties after the death of their grand father (Sadwa): secondly, and assuming that the mother could sell her limited share in the suit properties yet in the absence of any legal necessity for sale of such properties, the sale in question was bad in law and not binding on the plaintiffs: thirdly, and in any event, the sale was not bona fide, because it was made by Rupabai in favour of her own daughter for all practical purpose through her husband who got the same accomplished in his favour taking advantage of Rupabai's old age and staying under one roof. The plaintiffs thus claimed declaration, partition and separate possession of their 3/4th share in the suit properties. 11. The defendants denied the claim of the plaintiffs in their written statement. According to them, firstly, the suit was barred by limitation. Secondly, the suit land on the death of Sadwa came to Rupabai not by inheritance directly through Sadwa or her late husband-Parsadi but essentially through State of Kawardha because, Parsadi and Rupabai had no son except four daughters and daughters did not have any right in the properties except life interest in widow and widowed daughter-in-law and hence, the suit properties on his death stood vested in the State by virtue of the provisions of Wajib - Ul - Urz (for short called WUU) which was in force at the relevant time in State of Karwdha where the land was situated and then the head of State called "gotia" in turn gave the suit land to Rupabai. This is how according to defendants, Rupa Bai became the exclusive owner of the suit lands to the exclusion of all her daughters. Thirdly, the sale in favour of the defendant No. 2 made by Rupabai was, bona fide and legal, because it was made by her for legal necessity of the family and its members. These were essentially the grounds taken in the written statement by the defendants for opposing the claim of the plaintiffs. Parties adduced evidence. 12. The trial Court decreed the suit in its entirety in favour of the plaintiffs and accordingly granted the decree as claimed by them. It was held that Rupabai had limited rights in the suit property on the death of her father-in-law - Sadwa, because at the time of his death, she was alive as widow of his predeceased son, that there was no legal necessity to sell the suit lands to defendant No. 2, that sale in favour of defendant No. 2 was sham and not binding on the plaintiffs, that suit was within limitation having been filed within three years from the date of death of Rupabai (1982) as her reversioners, that defendants failed to prove that the suit property was a self acquired property of Rupabai having been acquired through the intervention of State. On these findings, the suit stood decreed in plaintiff's favour. The defendants appealed. 13. The first appellate Court by impugned judgment and decree, allowed the defendant's appeal in part. The first appellate Court accepted the defence of the defendants in part. It was held that at the relevant time, the devolution was governed by (WUU) in force which inter alia provided that if a holder of the land had no son alive then the land will vest in the State because the daughters and widow had life interest in such properties. It was held that since Parsadi and Rupabai had no son except daughters and further Sadwa had only one son - Parsadi, who too had predeceased him and therefore, on the strength of the relevant clauses of (WUU), the agricultural land stood vested in the State. It was held that since Parsadi and Rupabai had no son except daughters and further Sadwa had only one son - Parsadi, who too had predeceased him and therefore, on the strength of the relevant clauses of (WUU), the agricultural land stood vested in the State. It was held that since the name of Rupabai was entered in the revenue records as Maurisi Krishak and hence by virtue of provisions of M.P. Land Revenue Code 1954, she became the exclusive owner of the land to the exclusion of all other legal representatives i.e. her own daughters. It was also held that sale deed (Ex-D/4) dated 23.6.55 was good in so far as it related to transfer of the agricultural lands to defendant No. 2 because there was legal necessity for sale of suit lands for the family but there was no such legal necessity proved so far as sale of residential house was concerned. It was also held that since Rupabai had limited interest in the residential house and hence it was bad in law to that extent and hence was not binding on the plaintiffs. It was held that so far as Ramlal (defendant No. 2) is concerned, since he was not the member of the family and hence no decree can be passed against him. With these findings, the lower appellate Court partly allowed the defendant's appeal and declared the sale made vide sale deed dated 23.6.55 (Ex-D/4) as bad in law in so far as it related to the residential house, whereas, it upheld the sale as being good in so far as it related to sale of agricultural lands. It is against this judgment/ decree; the plaintiffs have felt aggrieved and filed this second appeal. 14. This second appeal was admitted for final hearing on following two substantial questions of law:- "(1) Whether Rupabai was competent to transfer suit property absolutely on 23/6/55 and what will be effect of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 on sale which was executed on 23/6/1955? (2) Whether on a true construction of the provisions of M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act and the Estate Wazib-ul-arz, Rupabai became a Marushi Kashtakar and thereby held the suit property in her independent and absolute right?" 15. (2) Whether on a true construction of the provisions of M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act and the Estate Wazib-ul-arz, Rupabai became a Marushi Kashtakar and thereby held the suit property in her independent and absolute right?" 15. Having heard the learned counsel for parties and on examining the controversy in its per perspective and further keeping in view the provisions of section 100 (5) of Civil Procedure Code, which enables this Court to frame additional questions of law at the time of hearing of the appeal provided they arise out of the case, I am of the view that following additional questions of law in addition to aforementioned two questions also need to be framed because they do arise for consideration in this appeal. In any event, this Court would be able to examine the issues involved in the appeal only when the questions arising out of such findings are framed. 16. The following additional questions are accordingly framed by taking recourse to powers conferred by Section 100 (5) ibid for proper decision of this appeal. "(3) Whether lower appellate Court was justified in partly declaring the sale deed dated 23.6.55 (Ex-D/4) relating to agricultural lands as being good whereas it was held bad for residential house without there being any legal basis and evidence? (4) Whether lower appellate Court was justified in holding that there existed legal necessity for selling only the agriculture lands whereas it did not exists for selling the residential house? (5) Whether finding of the lower appellate Court that there was evidence to prove the partial legal necessity for sale of agricultural lands is legally sustainable and if so can the Court of its own make out a case which was not pleaded by the defendants for upholding the sale in part for agricultural lands and declaring the remaining as bad for residential house. (6) When admittedly Sadwa died in 1950 leaving behind his widowed daughter-in-law (wife of Parsadi) to acquire limited interest in his property by virtue of the provisions of Hindu Woman's rights to Property Act 1937, could Rupabai sell her limited interest as an absolute interest on 23.6.55 before Hindu Succession Act came in to force? (7) Whether lower appellate Court was justified in properly interpreting the clauses of (WUU) for holding that daughters are not entitled to succeed any Interest in the property left by Sadwa ? (7) Whether lower appellate Court was justified in properly interpreting the clauses of (WUU) for holding that daughters are not entitled to succeed any Interest in the property left by Sadwa ? (8) Whether lower appellate Court was justified in holding that agricultural land stood vested in State by virtue of (WUU), and State Revenue laws and then it vested in Rupabai as her self acquired property through State?" 17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, I am inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside of the impugned judgment/ decree restore that of the trial Court in toto for the reasons mentioned infra. Indeed, my reasonings are based without undertaking any appreciation of evidence. 18. It is not in dispute, that Sadwa died somewhere in 1950. The succession for inheriting his interest in the suit properties thus opened in the year 1950 in favour of his legal representatives. It is not in dispute that he had only one son - Parsadi who predeceased him in 1945 leaving behind his wife Rupabai as his widow and four daughters. Since at the time of his death, Hindu Woman's Rights to Property Act 1937 (for short called "the Act of 1937") was in force and hence the devolution of his interest was governed by the provisions of the Act of 1937. 19. Section 3 of the Act read as under :- "Section 3.-(1) When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law dies intestate leaving any property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu law or by customary law dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there is more than one widow, all his widows together, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son : Provided that the widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and shall inherit in like manner as a son's son if there is surviving a son or son's son of such predeceased son; Provided further that the same provisions shall apply mutatis mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. (2) When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had. (3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu women's estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. (4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to an estate which by a customary or other rule of succession or by the terms of the grant applicable thereto descends to a single heir or to any property to which the Indian Succession Act, 1925 applies." 19A. In terms of Section 3(1) First Proviso, since Sadwa's wife had predeceased him so also his son - Parsadi and hence his widowed daughter-in-law Rupabai (widow of predeceased son) became entitled to inherit the suit properties like a son as provided in first proviso to Section 3 ibid. 20. Rupabai therefore, acquired a limited right of interest in the suit properties as provided in Section 3(3) of the Act. It is this right which Rupabai sold to defendant No. 2 by sale deed dated 23.6.55. (Ex-D/4). Since this sale was made on 23.6.55 which was prior to the Hindu Succession Act 1956, (for short herein after called "the Act of 1956") coming into force (it came into force on 17.6.56) and hence Rupabai's limited rights in the suit properties remained a limited rights and did not enlarge and blossomed into an absolute rights by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, till they were sold on 23.6.55 by her to defendant No. 2. In other words, if the sale would have been made by Rupabai after 17.6.56 then by virtue of Section 14 her limited interest and right in the suit properties would have been enlarged in to her absolute rights to the exclusion of others and in this way, she would have become entitled to sell her absolute right to defendant no. 2 in place of her limited rights. 2 in place of her limited rights. However since on the date of sale (23.6.55), the rights of Rupabai were governed by the provisions of The Act of 1937, which enabled her to enjoy only limited interest in the suit properties, these rights alone could be transferred by Rupabai to defendant No. 2 and that too subject to any restrictions, if any, recognised in law for making such sale. 21. It is a settled principle of law that a person could only transfer that right title and interest in the property which he had and which he was capable of to transfer to his purchaser. In other words, he could not confer better rights than what he himself did not have on the date of sale to his purchaser who stepped in to his shoes to enjoy such rights. Indeed when admittedly Rupabai was neither owner of the suit lands and nor was she in possession of such lands with any rights in suit properties on the date when the Act of 1956 came into force, she having parted with all her rights prior to Act of 1956 coming into force, there did not arise any occasion in favour of anyone to take benefit of Section 14 ibid – a fortiori - her successor in interest also. 22. In the light of this admitted legal position emerging from the undisputed facts on record, I am clearly of the view that the provisions of "The Act of 1956" in this case had no application for determining the inheritance of the parties and in particular the rights which Rupabai had much less defendant No. 2 (purchaser of the suit properties) had and both were not entitled to take advantage of Section 14 ibid for defending their title in the suit properties qua plaintiffs. 23. 23. This legal position is beautifully summarised by Mulla in his classic treaties on Principles of Hindu law, (19th edition) at page 390 and 391 while explaining the object and scope of Section 14 of the Act of 1956 with reference to case law on the subject as laid down by the Supreme Court as under :- "This section can have no application where a female Hindu never acquired any property at all or where having acquired it she happened to have lost her title thereto by alienation, surrender or otherwise and of which she was not or could not be in juridical possession at the commencement of the Act. It has been held in a series of cases that the section can have no application in a case where a female Hindu has sold or otherwise alienated the property and parted with possession before the Act came into force. The sale of property by a widow who had a limited interest in the same before the commencement of this Act, will not confer any advantage on the purchaser as the sale itself was invalid. The property would vest in the reversioners of the widow after her lifetime. As explained by the Supreme Court in order that the female Hindu can be said to be 'possessed' of the property two things are necessary: (a) she must have had a right to the possession of the property; and (b) she must have been in possession of that property either actually or constructively." 24. In the light of foregoing discussion, I have no hesitation in holding that Rupabai had inherited only a limited right of interest in the suit properties on the death of her father-in-law Sadwa. As a consequence, the defendant No.2 also received the same limited interest in the suit properties by sale-deed (Ex D/4) dated 23.6.55, which Rupabai had with her on the date of such sale. 25. Similarly, I am of the considered view that the plaintiffs being the daughters of Rupabai were enjoying the status of her "reversioners" and hence after Rupabai's death in the year 1982, they became entitled to seek enforcement of their rights in the suit properties qua the purchaser of the suit properties and against other reversioners including laying challenge to any alienation made by widow/mother to their detriment. 26. 26. Mulla in his treaties on principle of Hindu law has also explained this legal position at page 392 as under :- "The right of a reversioner to repudiate the alienation made without legal necessity or other transaction in any such case, effected before the Act came into operation and his claim to possession thereof from the transferee on the death of the female Hindu, or on the extinction of the limited estate otherwise has not been adversely affected or taken away by this section: There was a difference of opinion among various High Courts as to who would be the reversioners entitled to challenge for any alienation of the nature mentioned above and made before the Act came into operation till the decision of Supreme Court in Daya Singh v. Dhan Kaur, AIR 1974 SC 665 . The Supreme Court held that the reversioners entitled to maintain the suit in case of any such alienation by a widow would be those who would be the heirs of the husband at the time of the death of the widow according to the law in force at such date and not those who would have been heirs of the husband according to the law in force at the time of his death. The heirs would be ascertained by applying 8 of the Act as if the husband had died at the time of the widow's death." 27. The aforesaid principle of law justifies my conclusion reached above. 28. This takes me to the next question as to whether there existed any case of legal necessity which compelled Rupabai to sell her limited interest in the suit properties to defendant No. 2 on 23.6.55 (Ex-D/4) and whether it could be held to be a sale for the benefit of family and its members? 29. Mulla has explained as to what constitutes "legal necessity "and on whom burden lies to prove it. Section 241 defines the legal necessity whereas Section 242 defines on whom the burden of proof lies to establish. These sections read as under:- "241. 29. Mulla has explained as to what constitutes "legal necessity "and on whom burden lies to prove it. Section 241 defines the legal necessity whereas Section 242 defines on whom the burden of proof lies to establish. These sections read as under:- "241. What is legal necessity:-The following have been held to be family necessities within the meaning of Sec. 242 : (a) payment of government revenue and of debts which are payable out of the family property; (b) maintenance of coparceners and of the members of their families; (c) marriage expenses of male coparceners, and of the daughters of coparceners; (d) performance of the necessary funeral or family ceremonies; (e) costs of necessary litigation in recovering or preserving the estate; (f) costs of defending the head of the joint family, or any other member against a serious criminal charge; (g) payment of debts incurred for family business or other necessary purpose. In the case of a manager other than a father, it is not enough to show merely that the debt is a pre-existing debt (Sec. 246) The above are not the only indices for concluding as to whether the alienation was indeed for legal necessity, nor can the enumeration of criterion for establishing legal necessity be copious or even predictable. It must therefore depends on the facts of each case. When, therefore, property is sold in order to fulfil tax obligations incurred by a family business, such alienation can be classified as constituting legal necessity. It has been held by the Patna High Court that the mortgage of joint family property by the managing member to defray the marriage expenses of his daughter's daughter, when the father of the daughter was not indigent, is not justified by legal necessity. The expenses of the second marriage of a member of the family have been held not to constitute legal necessity by the Madras High Court. Gift of a small portion of the property for educational purposes is not legal necessity. The selling of joint property by the karta or manager for the purpose of migrating to a new place for a better living has been held to be a sale for legal necessity. 242. Gift of a small portion of the property for educational purposes is not legal necessity. The selling of joint property by the karta or manager for the purpose of migrating to a new place for a better living has been held to be a sale for legal necessity. 242. Burden of proof of necessity:-Where the manager of a joint Hindu family sells or mortgages joint family property, the purchaser or mortgagee is bound to inquire into the necessity for the sale or mortgage, and the burden lies on the purchaser or mortgagee to prove either that here was a legal necessity in fact, or that he made proper and bona fide enquiry as to the existence of such necessity and did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of such necessity." 30. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of this case, it is clear that it was for the defendants to have pleaded and proved existence of legal necessity in support of the sale made by Rupabai in favour of defendant No. 2. In my view, the defendants have failed to discharge this burden as would be clear from the undisputed facts on record. 31. Firstly, the defendants did not plead much less cited any specific reasons for sale of the suit properties. Second, the sale was between the family members and hence it apparently lacked bona fides. In other words, when the sale was between the family members living under one roof then it was necessary for the defendants to have explained as to why it was sold to family members and why it was not sold to any outsiders to fetch the best marketable price? Third, no attempt was made to prove the market price of the suit properties prevailing on the date of sale. (Extensive agricultural lands and house were sold for Rs. 800/-). And lastly, mere use of the words in the sale deed that it was being sold for the benefit of family was not sufficient. It was more so when the plaintiffs had challenged the sale on the ground of want of legal necessity. 32. In my opinion, in such circumstances, the lower appellate Court committed an error in holding that there existed partial legal necessity for selling the part of the suit properties (agricultural lands). It was more so when the plaintiffs had challenged the sale on the ground of want of legal necessity. 32. In my opinion, in such circumstances, the lower appellate Court committed an error in holding that there existed partial legal necessity for selling the part of the suit properties (agricultural lands). As a matter of fact, even a plea of partial legal necessity was not pleaded by the defendants in their written statement. 33. A plea of partial legal necessity was based on facts and evidence and hence so long as such plea was not taken by the defendants specifically in the written statement and no issue was framed on such plea, the lower appellate Court should not have proceeded to give any finding of its own on such plea. It was all the more when no finding was recorded by the trial Court on this issue and indeed rightly. On the other hand, the trial Court in clear terms had recorded a finding that there was no case of any legal necessity made out for sale of suit properties. 34. In the right of foregoing discussion, I have no hesitation in recording a finding that no case was made out by the defendants for proving the existence of any legal necessity for sale of suit properties. In this view of the matter, the findings of the lower appellate Court on this issue, deserves to be set aside and that of the trial Court restored. 35. This takes me to the last question as to whether Rupabai could be said to have acquired the agricultural lands through State with the aid of provisions of the (WUU) after the death of Sadwa so as to treat the suit property to be her self acquired property. 36. With respect, in my view this question also has to be answered against the defendants and in favour of plaintiffs. 37. In my view, finding of the lower appellate Court on this issue was based on incorrect reading of (WUU). Clause 28 of the (WUU) (whether applicable to this case or not) itself suggests as quoted in the impugned judgment that if holder dies without leaving any son but leaving his widow or his son's widow then widow or widowed daughter-in-law will get limited interest. Clause 28 of the (WUU) (whether applicable to this case or not) itself suggests as quoted in the impugned judgment that if holder dies without leaving any son but leaving his widow or his son's widow then widow or widowed daughter-in-law will get limited interest. Since in this case, on the date of death of Sadwa in the year 1950, Rupabai was alive and hence she being Sadwa's widowed daughter-in-law (wife of Parsadi) became entitled to receive limited interest in the suit properties. It is clear from the impugned finding of the court below on this issue in para 17. ^^17- mHk;i{k ds e/; ;g fookn ugh gS fd fookfnr d`f”k Hkwfe do/kkZ jkT; ds varxZr Fkh vkSj ml Hkwfe dk iz’kklu do/kkZ jkT; ds okftcqyvtZ 1937 ds vuqlkj iz’kkflr gksrk FkkA bl okftcqyvtZ ds fu;e 28 lh ds varxZr fdlh d`”kd ds iq:”k mRrjkf/kdkjh ugh gksus ij mldh laifr mldh fo/kok vFkok fo/kok ds ugh gksus ij mlds iq= dh fo/kok dks vius thou rd mi;ksx ds fy, U;kxr gksrh FkhA blh fu;e ch ds vuqlkj iqf=;ks dks mRrjkf/kdkj dk dksbZ vf/kdkj ugh Fkk ,oa mrjkf/kdkj dh pwd es laifr xkSfB;k dks pyh tkrh FkhA bl fu;e ds vuqlkj laifr dk v/kZ [kkrk ¼gksfYM+x½ vFkkZr~ d`f”k Hkwfe gSA bl fu;e es ikSf=;ka dks Hkh dksbZ mrjkf/kdkj dk vf/kdkj ugh gS ;g ,d fo’ks”k fu;e gS tks lkekU; [kaM vf/kfu;e ¼tujy Dyklsl ,DV½ ds /kkjk 6 ds izdk;k es iwoZ fgUnw vf/kfu;e ij d`f”k Hkwfe ds lac/k es vf/kHkkoh gksxk vkSj d`”kd Hkwfe ds lac/k es mRrjkf/kdkj dk iz’kklu bl okftCkqyvtZ ds vuqlkj gksxk u fd lkekU; fgUnw mRrjkf/kdkj vf/kfu;eA bl lac/k es ,d egRoiw.kZ rF; ;g Hkh gS fd lu~ 1959 es vf/kfu;e e-iz- Hkw&jktLo lafgrk fnukad 21&4&59 dks izHkko’khy gqvk ftles /kkjk 164 ds varxZr mRrjkf/kdkj ds fy, fo’ks”k mica/k cuk;k x;k Fkk ftls fnukad 8-12-61 fujflr fd;k x;k bl fo’ks”k izko/kku ds izdk’k es ml vof/k ds mRrjkf/kdkj ds fy, rkRdkyhu /kkjk 164 ds izko/kku gh izHkko’khy gksrs gS mls lkekU; mRrjkf/kdkj vf/kfu;e dh ifjlhek es ugh yk;k tk ldrk gSA^^ 38. So in substance such provision in (WUU) appears to be on the same lines as that of the provisions contained in the Act of 1937 so far as rights of widow and widowed daughter-in-law were concerned. So in substance such provision in (WUU) appears to be on the same lines as that of the provisions contained in the Act of 1937 so far as rights of widow and widowed daughter-in-law were concerned. Assuming therefore, that daughters were excluded from claiming the properties during the life time of their mother (widow) by virtue of certain clauses of (WUU) then also after the death of mother/widow in the year 1982, the daughters being the heirs of their mother became entitled to claim their share in the suit properties by virtue of provisions of Hindu Succession Act of 1956. In this view of the matter, the daughters being the reversioners were entitled to claim their share in the suit properties left by their mother. I am, therefore, of the view that none of the provisions of (WUU) took away the rights of plaintiffs (daughters) either prior to the Act of 1956 or/ and thereafter. 39. In this view of the matter, Rupabai received only limited interest in the suit properties even by virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1937 or by virtue of the clauses of (WUU). 40. I, therefore, fail to appreciate as to how the status of suit property "agricultural lands" was altered from "limited interest" to that of "self acquired interest" in the hands of Rupabai and how it came to be vested in the State after the death of Sadwa and how it then reverted back to Rupabai as her self acquired property through State? Assuming that the agricultural lands stood vested in the State (though it is not proved by pointing out any provision of law), yet in the absence of any document filed by the defendants to show that the agriculture lands were given to Rupabai by the State through lease deed or grant or patta or sanad or any document of title, in her favour, the agricultural lands, in my opinion, could have never come to Rupabai from the State. 41. So far as recording of name in the revenue records under State revenue laws operating at the relevant time was concerned, the same did not result in enlargement of her interest in the lands as owner thereof, as the same was already determined by virtue of provisions of "the Act of 1937" in the year 1950. 41. So far as recording of name in the revenue records under State revenue laws operating at the relevant time was concerned, the same did not result in enlargement of her interest in the lands as owner thereof, as the same was already determined by virtue of provisions of "the Act of 1937" in the year 1950. This limited right of interest in the agricultural land could be altered in her favour only by the applicability of Section 14 of the Act of 1956 but not by virtue of any provisions of State Revenue laws which inter alia allowed a particular class of tenure holder to defend their title and possession as being a lawful against the State or/and any other claimants claiming any right in such lands. In other words, the defendants could not rely upon any provision of State Revenue law to claim better rights than what they had received from Rupabai to defend their title. 42. In the light of foregoing discussion, I hold that lower appellate Court was not right in holding that agricultural lands had become the self acquired property of Rupabai. 43. Before parting with the case, I may mention that it is not necessary for me to examine the issue of limitation if the suit was barred by limitation or not, because it has been answered by two Courts in plaintiff's favour. Since the respondents did not prefer any cross objection to challenge this finding, the same has attained finality. 44. In the light of foregoing discussion, I am unable to concur with any of the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court and answer all the questions framed supra in appellants favour and against the respondents. 45. As a consequence, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment/ decree of the first appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored with cost throughout. Appeal Allowed.