Judgment :- NAGARATHNA. J 1. The Karnataka Government Insurance Department (hereinafter, referred to as the "KGID” for the sake of brevity) has assailed the order of the learned Single Judge dated 07/01/2002 passed in W.P.No.29154/99. By the said order, it has been held that the appellant herein, who was the petitioner before the learned Single Judge, is an "Industry", within the meaning of Section unamended 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter, referred to as the “I.D.Act", for the sake of brevity). 2. The relevant facts leading up to the filing of this appeal are that the Government of Karnataka being of the opinion that an industrial dispute existed between the workmen and management of the KGID, by order dated 26/10/1994, referred the following points of dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, for adjudication under Section 10(1) of the I.D.Act:- 1) Whether the withholding of payment of bonus from 1980 to the workers of the Karnataka Government Insurance Department Workers Association working with the Director, Karnataka Government Insurance Department, Bangalore, is in accordance with law? 2) If not, to what relief the workers in question are entitled to? Subsequently, a corrigendum was issued on 07/12/1994 as follows:- "Whether the withholding of payment of bonus from 1980 to the workers of the Karnataka Government Insurance Department working with the Director, Karnataka Government Insurance Department, Bangalore, is in accordance with law? 3. The reference was registered as I.D.No.32/94. After recording evidence, the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, passed an award on 26/09/1997. The same was however, set aside in W.P.No.3018/98, with a direction to re-examine the case on merits. Subsequently, the Tribunal examined the matter and allowed the reference by holding that the workmen are entitled to bonus as prayed for in the reference. The said order was assailed by the appellant before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge placing reliance on an unreported judgment of this Court in W.P.No.20613/80, disposed of on 15/04/1981 and order passed in W.A.No.839/81 dated 21.01.1987, filed by KGID against the order dated 15.04.1981, held that the award of the Tribunal did not call for any interference and accordingly, dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved by the said order, the Insurance Department of the State Government has filed this appeal. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. They have also filed their synopsis of arguments and list of authorities, which we have perused. Being aggrieved by the said order, the Insurance Department of the State Government has filed this appeal. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. They have also filed their synopsis of arguments and list of authorities, which we have perused. 5. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the appellant herein is the erstwhile Mysore Government Industrial Department, established by the Princely State of Mysore on 20/08/1889. The scheme of Insurance was initially confined to only male Government servants but was later extended to women employees also w.e.f. 11/07/1894. The Life Insurance Scheme was extended to general public on 15/7/1895. With the Nationalisation of the Life Insurance business in India, the public branch of the Department was bifurcated and merged with the Life Insurance Corporation of India on 01/09/1956 and the KGID is confined to the Insurance Scheme for the Government servants only. It is also stated that the appellant Department is functioning under the exemption Clause (c) of Section 118 of the Insurance Act, 1938 and that the Karnataka Government Servants (Compulsory Life Insurance) Rules 1958, have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Thus, it is contended that the employees of the KGID are not workmen within the meaning of the I.D.Act, but are Government servants as defined in Section 2(3) of the Karnataka State Civil Services Act, 1978 and other allied rules; that the method of Recruitment Service Conditions, Retirement and Pension, are all governed by various Rules and Regulations framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. Therefore, the argument proffered is that the officers of the department are employees of the State Government. This is predicated on the fact that KGID is rendering 'sovereign functions' and as such, it is out of the purview of the definition of the industry under Section 2(J) of the I.D.Act. Hence, the respondents are not entitled to bonus. Therefore, the argument proffered is that the officers of the department are employees of the State Government. This is predicated on the fact that KGID is rendering 'sovereign functions' and as such, it is out of the purview of the definition of the industry under Section 2(J) of the I.D.Act. Hence, the respondents are not entitled to bonus. It is also brought to our notice that though the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board versus A. Rajappa and Others [ AIR 1978 SC 548 ], has held that a department concerned with the welfare activities of the Government, falls within the definition of the "Industry", the said judgment has been doubted by a Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court, in the case of State of U.P. versus Jai Bir Singh [ 2005 (5) SCC 1 ] and the matter has been referred to a larger Bench to pronounce on the correctness of the judgment in the case of Bangalore Water Supply. It is therefore, argued that this Court ought not to pronounce any judgment in the present case till the correctness of the decision of the Bangalore Water Supply is decided. In this context, reliance has been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of D.K. Trivedi & Sons and others versus State of Gujarat and Others [1986 (sup) SCC 20]. 6. Per contra, it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the Mysore Government Life Insurance Fund created in the year 1891, was converted into a Government Department in the year 1926 as "Mysore Government Insurance Department" (now KGID), which is run on commercial lines and is a commercial undertaking with the funds required for carrying out its activities being generated through collection of Insurance Premia and interest thereon. No budget allocation is made by the State Government from its revenue for the KGID. On the contrary, all the surplus funds of the KGID are remitted to the State Government Treasuries on which, interest at the rate of 12% p.a. is paid to KGID. The KGID earns interest at 9% p.a. on the loans and advances given by it to insured persons. The accounts of the KGID are audited by the State Government. On the contrary, all the surplus funds of the KGID are remitted to the State Government Treasuries on which, interest at the rate of 12% p.a. is paid to KGID. The KGID earns interest at 9% p.a. on the loans and advances given by it to insured persons. The accounts of the KGID are audited by the State Government. Thus, the KGID cannot be compared to a Government Department discharging sovereign or regal functions, which qualify for exemption under Section 2(j) of the I.D.Act. On the other hand, it is a commercial department earning profits and has sufficient capacity to meet its expenses. Thus, it was contended that the appellant is an 'Industry', within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D.Act. 7. With regard to the actual dispute between the parties it was contended that payment of bonus to the policy holders is inherent in the very scheme of Life Insurance and after allocation of bonus to the policy holders on their policies, the surplus premium income is distributed to the policy holders as Bonus, which had been an established practice in KGID since the year 1918 that is, to grant one or two months pay as "Bonus" or "Honorarium" to the employees of the KGID both Gazetted and non-Gazetted and the same has been paid since 1918 to 31/03/1980. The said Bonus can also be construed as "Customary Bonus", which is saved by the payment of Bonus Act. However, the said practice of payment of Bonus has been discontinued after 31/03/1980. Therefore, the dispute was raised and the State Government made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal; that both the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have rightly concluded that KGID is an 'Industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D.Act and that the employees are entitled to Bonus, The same would not call for any interference in this appeal. In support of his submission, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Bangalore Water Supply and other cases. 8. From the records, we have perused the order of the Division Bench dated 21.01.1987 passed in W.A.No.839/1981 which is an appeal filed by the appellant herein. In support of his submission, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Bangalore Water Supply and other cases. 8. From the records, we have perused the order of the Division Bench dated 21.01.1987 passed in W.A.No.839/1981 which is an appeal filed by the appellant herein. In the said order, an express concession, made by then the learned Advocate General to the effect that the appeal has to be dismissed in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply case has been recorded and accordingly, the appeal has been dismissed. Despite the said order, counsel for the appellant has tried to persuade us to take a different view in the matter, on the premise that the correctness of the decision in Bangalore Water Supply has been referred to a Larger Bench in the State of U.P. Versus Jai Bir Singh [2005 (5) SCC I]. In that view of the matter, and having regard to the fact that there has not yet been any pronouncement of the Apex Court on the correctness of the decision in Bangalore Water Supply, we proceed to consider the issue as to whether KGID is an industry or not in this appeal. 9. In that view of the matter, and having regard to the fact that there has not yet been any pronouncement of the Apex Court on the correctness of the decision in Bangalore Water Supply, we proceed to consider the issue as to whether KGID is an industry or not in this appeal. 9. The original definition of 'Industry' in Section 2(J) of the I.D.Act, reads as follows:- "Industry" means any business, trade undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen;" The substituted definition which is yet to be enforced reads as follows:- "Industry" means any systematic activity carried on by co-operation between an employer and his workmen (whether such workmen are employed by such employer directly or by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not,- (i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; or (ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit, and includes- (a) any activity of the Dock Labour Board established under Section 5A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948); (b) any activity relating to the promotion of sales or business or both carried on by an establishment, but does not include- (1) any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is referred to in the foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the predominant one. Explanation;-For the purposes of this sub-clause, "agricultural operation" does not include any activity carried on in a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951); or (2) hospitals or dispensaries; or (3) educational, scientific, research or training institutions; or (4) institutions owned or managed by organisations wholly or substantially engaged in any charitable, social or philanthropic service; or (5) khadi or village industries; or (6) any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government including all the activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with defence research, atomic energy and space; or (7) any domestic service; or (8) any activity being a profession practiced by an individual or body of individuals, if the number of persons employed, by the individual or body of individuals in relation to such profession is less than ten; or (9) any activity, being an activity carried on by a co-operative society or a club or any other like body of individuals, if the number of persons employed by the co-operative society, club or other like body of individuals in relation to such activity is less than then; 10. Subba Rao J., has pithily summarised the definition of "Industry" in the case of The Corporation of the City of Nagpur versus Its employees [AIR I960 SC 675] in the following words:- "(1) The definition of "industry" in the Act is very comprehensive. It is in two parts: one part defines it from the standpoint of the employer and the other from the standpoint of the employee. If an activity falls under either part of the definition, it will be an industry within the meaning of the Act, (2) The history of industrial disputes and the legislation recognizes the basic concept that the activity shall be an organized one and not that which pertains to private or personal employment, (3) The regal functions described as primary and inalienable functions of State though statutorily delegated to a corporation are necessarily excluded from the purview of the definition. Such regal functions shall be confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power. Such regal functions shall be confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power. (4) If a service rendered by an individual or private person would be an industry, it would equally be an industry in the hands of a Corporation (5) If a service rendered by a corporation is an industry, the employees in the departments connected with that service, whether financial, administrative or executive, would be entitled to the benefits of the Act, (6) If a department of a municipality discharged many functions, some pertaining to industry as defined in the Act and other non-industrial activities, the predominant functions of the department shall be the criterion for the purpose of the Act”. 11. In Bangalore Water Supply, the Supreme Court considered at length a catena of precedents right from Banerji’s case [(1953) S.C.R. 302], The Corporation of the City of Nagpur versus Its Employees, [1960-I L.L.J. 523] and State of Bombay and Others versus The Hospital Mazdoor Sabh and Others [1960-I L.L.J. 251] and overruled Safdarjung, Solicitors' case, Gymkhana, Delhi University, Dhanrajgirji Hospital and rehabilitated the principles enunciated in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case. 12. At Paragraph 91 of the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply, a triple criteria has been enunciated: (a) the paramount and predominant activity criterion; (b) the specific service being an integral, non-severable part of the same activity and (c) the irrelevance of the statutory duty aspect. 13. After an elaborate discussion of the precedents and having regard to the nature of activity of various entities, the Supreme Court has formulated the principles, deducible from the precedents, which are decisive, positively and negatively of the entity of "Industry" under the Act. A caveat is also sounded by stating that the principles are not exhaustive, but are authoritative until overruled by a larger bench or superceded by the legislative branch. At Para 161, the Supreme Court has succinctly summarised as follows: "161. 'Industry', as defined in S.2(j) and explained in Banerji ( AIR 1953 SC 58 ) has a wide import. A caveat is also sounded by stating that the principles are not exhaustive, but are authoritative until overruled by a larger bench or superceded by the legislative branch. At Para 161, the Supreme Court has succinctly summarised as follows: "161. 'Industry', as defined in S.2(j) and explained in Banerji ( AIR 1953 SC 58 ) has a wide import. (a) Where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organised by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical) (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated o satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss i.e., making, on a large scale prasad or food) prima facie, there is an industry' in that enterprise. (b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector. (c) The true focus is functional an the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations. (d) If the organisation is a trade or business it does not cease to be one because of philanthropy animating the undertaking. II Although Section 2(j) uses words of the widest amplitude in its two limbs, their meaning cannot be magnified to overreach itself. (a) ‘Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and associational shrinkage as explained in Banerji and in this judgment; so also, service, calling and the like. This yields the inference that all organised activity possessing the triple elements in I (supra), although not trade or business, may still be 'industry' provided the nature of the activity, viz., the employer-employee basis, bears resemblance to what we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold ‘industry’ undertakings, callings and services, adventures ‘analogous to the carrying on of trade or business’. All features, other than the methodology of carrying on the activity viz., in organising the co-operation between employer and employee, may be dissimilar. It does not matter, if on the employment terms there is analogy. III. Application of these guidelines should not stop short of their logical reach by invocation of creeds, cults or inner sense of incongruity or outer sense of motivation for or resultant of the economic operations. It does not matter, if on the employment terms there is analogy. III. Application of these guidelines should not stop short of their logical reach by invocation of creeds, cults or inner sense of incongruity or outer sense of motivation for or resultant of the economic operations. The ideology of the Act being industrial peace, regulation and resolution of industrial disputes between employer and workmen, the range of this statutory ideology must inform the reach of the statutory definition. Nothing less, nothing more. (a) The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) Clubs (iii) educational institutions (iv) cooperatives, (v) research institutes (vi) charitable projects and (vii) other kindred adventures, if they fulfill the triple tests listed in I (supra), cannot be exempted from the scope of Section 2(j). (b) a restricted category of professions, clubs, co-operatives and even gurukulas and little research labs, may qualify for exemption if, in simple ventures, substantially and, going by the dominant nature criterion, substantively, no employees are entertained but in minimal matters, marginal employees are hired without destroying the non-employee character of the unit (c) If, in a pious or altruistic mission many employ themselves, free or for small honoraria or like return, mainly drawn by sharing in the purpose of cause, such as lawyers volunteering to run a free legal services clinic or doctors serving in their spare hours in a free medical centre or ashramites working at the bidding of the holiness, divinity or like central personality, and the services are supplied free or at nominal cost and those who serve are not engaged for remuneration or on the basis of master and servant relationship, then, the institution is not an industry even if stray servants, manual or technical, are hired. Such eleemosynary or like undertakings alone are exempt not other generosity, compassion, developmental passion or project IV. The dominant nature test: (a) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify for exemption, others not, involves employees on the total undertaking, some of whom are not 'workmen' as in the University of Delhi case ( AIR 1963 SC 1873 ) or some departments are not productive of goods and services if isolated, even then, the predominant nature of the services and the integrated nature of the departments as explained in the Corporation of Nagpur ( AIR 1960 SC 675 ) will be the true test. The whole undertaking will be 'industry' although those who are not 'workmen' by definition may not benefit by the status.(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign functions, strictly understood, (alone) qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by government or statutory bodies. (c) Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within S.2(j). (d) Constitutional and competently enacted legislative provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act categories which otherwise may be covered thereby. 14. Indubitably, till date, there has been no pronouncement on the correctness or otherwise with regard to the decision of Bangalore Water Supply. In the absence of any authoritative decision by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court or any amendment being enforced by a legislative fiat, this Court is bound by the dictum in Bangalore Water Supply, particularly in view of the express observations regarding the binding nature of its decision. Therefore Reliance placed by the appellant on D.K.Trivedi & Sons and others versus State of Gujarat and Others [1986 (sup) SCC 20] is of no assistance. At paragraph 83 of the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court has no doubt opined that the High Court ought to have stayed the hearing of the writ petitions since similar matters were pending before the Supreme Court. The said observations cannot be applied to the present case, since pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply case is already holding the field and it is not brought to our notice that a larger Bench has been constituted in the Supreme Court to consider the correctness of the decision in the case of Bangalore Water Supply. 15. Therefore while applying Bangalore Water Supply, the question as to whether KGID is performing a sovereign function needs to be considered since it is the sanguine expectation of the appellant that the definition does not include sovereign functions within its sweep which is also excluded in Bangalore Water Supply. In this context, it would be useful to refer to the definition of sovereign functions or sovereign powers. The 'Sovereign Powers' of the Government include all the powers necessary to accomplish its legitimate ends and purposes. Such powers must exist in all practical governments. They are the incidents of sovereignty, of which a state cannot divest itself. In this context, it would be useful to refer to the definition of sovereign functions or sovereign powers. The 'Sovereign Powers' of the Government include all the powers necessary to accomplish its legitimate ends and purposes. Such powers must exist in all practical governments. They are the incidents of sovereignty, of which a state cannot divest itself. (Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition Volume 39-A). In United States Versus Douglas-William Sartoris Co., (22 PP, 92, 96, 3 wyo, 287), it has been held that in all Governments of constitutional limitations 'sovereign power' manifests itself in but three ways, by exercising the right of taxation; by the right of eminent domain; and through its police power. The expression 'sovereign power of the State' is some times misapplied. The sovereignty of the State does not reside in the persons who fill the different Departments of the Government but in the people from whom the Government emanates and they may change it at their discretion. 16. Therefore, while trying to find out the dichotomy between sovereign and non-sovereign functions, one of the tests that could be adopted is whether a private person or a body could undertake a particular function, in other words whether the function is an inalienable function of the Government. In this context, what has to be noted is that any monopoly of the state in a particular activity or enterprise would not make it sovereign in nature. If in other words, if an activity which is performed by a Department of the Government or a statutory body could also be performed by a private entity, then such an activity would cease to be sovereign in nature. The definition excludes only an activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government. Hence, what is or is not a sovereign function of the Government becomes relevant for the purposes of the definition. Therefore, while construing the entities or activities excluded from the meaning of the definition "Industry" a strict interpretation of the exclusion clause, would have to be made, having regard to the object and purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act. Keeping in mind a purposeful interpretation of the definition of "Industry", we have to give a strict interpretation to the parameters of sovereign functions vis-a-vis non-sovereign functions as the definition excludes all sovereign functions. 17. Keeping in mind a purposeful interpretation of the definition of "Industry", we have to give a strict interpretation to the parameters of sovereign functions vis-a-vis non-sovereign functions as the definition excludes all sovereign functions. 17. In the case of Agricultural Produce Market Committee Versus Ashok Harikuni & another [ (2000) 8 SCC 61 ], the Supreme Court while considering as to whether an Agricultural Produce Market Committee constituted under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 is an industry as contemplated under the I.D. Act, discussed the issue in the context of sovereign functions of the state and opined as follows: "21. In other words, it all depends on the nature of power and the manner of its exercise. What is approved to be "sovereign" is defence of the country, raising armed forces, making peace or war, foreign affairs, power to acquire and retain territory. These are not amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. The other functions of the State including welfare activity of State could not be construed as "sovereign" exercise power. Hence, every governmental function need not be "sovereign". State activities are multifarious, from the primal sovereign power, which exclusively inalienably could be exercised by the sovereign alone, which is not subject to challenge in any civil court to all the welfare activities, which would be undertaken by any private person. So merely if one is an employee of statutory bodies would not take it outside the Central Act. If that be so then Section 2(a) of the Central Act read with Schedule I gives large number of statutory bodies which should have been excluded, which is not. Even if a statute confers on any statutory body, any function which could be construed to be "sovereign" in nature would not mean every other functions under the same statute to be also sovereign. The court should examine the statute to sever one from the other by comprehensively examining various provisions of that statute. In interpreting any statute to find if it is “industry” or not we have to find its pith and substance. The Central Act is enacted to maintain harmony between employer and employee which brings peace and amity in its functioning. This peace and amity should be the objective in the functioning of all enterprises. This is to the benefit of both the employer and employee. The Central Act is enacted to maintain harmony between employer and employee which brings peace and amity in its functioning. This peace and amity should be the objective in the functioning of all enterprises. This is to the benefit of both the employer and employee. Misuse of rights and obligations by either or stretching it beyond permissible limits have to be dealt with within the frame work of the law but endeavour should not be in all circumstances to exclude any enterprise from its ambit. That is why courts have been defining "industry'' in the widest permissible limits and "sovereign" functioning within its limited orbit" 18. It was also stated that merely because an enterprise being a statutory corporation or a creature under a statute, would not take it outside the ambit of "Industry" as defined under the Central Act. The mere fact that some employees of the entity are Government servants would make no difference as the true test to find has to be gathered from the dominant object for which the functionaries are working. In the said case it was held that the Market Committee was an undertaking performing its duties in a systematic and organised manner, regulating the marketing and trading of agricultural produce, rendering services to the community. It was held that none of the activities of the Agriculture Produce Market Committee could not be construed to be sovereign in nature and therefore, it fell within the definition of "Industry" under Section 2(j) of the Central Act. In saying so, the Supreme Court placed reliance on an earlier decision in the case of Chief Conservator of Forests Versus Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (1996) 2SCC 293) wherein it has been stated as follows: "12. We may not go by the labels. Let us reach the hub. And the same is that the dichotomy of sovereign and non-sovereign functions does not really exist it would all depend on the nature of the power and manner of its exercise, as observed in para 23 of Nagendra Rao case. As per the decision in this case, one of the tests to determine whether the executive function is sovereign in nature is to find out whether the State is answerable for such action in courts of law. As per the decision in this case, one of the tests to determine whether the executive function is sovereign in nature is to find out whether the State is answerable for such action in courts of law. It was stated by Sahai, J. that acts like defence of the country, raising armed forces and maintaining it, making peace or war, foreign affairs, power to acquire and retain territory, are functions which are indicative of external sovereignty and are political in nature. They are, therefore, not amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary civil court inasmuch as the State is immune from being sued in such matters. But then, according to this decision the immunity ends there. It was then observed that in a welfare State, functions of the State are not only the defence of the country or administration of justice or maintaining law and order but extends to regulating and controlling the activities of people in almost every sphere, educational, commercial, social, economic, political and even marital. Because of this the demarcating line between sovereign and non-sovereign powers has largely disappeared. 13. The aforesaid shows that if we were to extend the concept of sovereign function to include all welfare activities as contended on behalf of the appellants, the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply case would get eroded, and substantially. We would demur to do so on the face of what was stated in the aforesaid case according to which except the strictly understood sovereign function, welfare activities of the State would come within the purview of the definition of industry; and, not only this, even within the wider circle of sovereign function, there may be an inner circle encompassing some units which could be considered as industry if substantially severable". 19. Similarly in the case of All India Radio Versus Shri Santosh Kumar & Others ( 1998 (1) LLJ 817 (SC), it has been held that the functions which are carried on by All India Radio and Doordarshan cannot be said to be confined to sovereign functions as they carry on commercial activity for profit by commercial advertisements, telecast or broadcast by charging fees and therefore, the state of All India Radio was held to be an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. 20. 20. In fact, in Chief Conservator of Forest & others Versus Jagannath Maturhi Kondhare, supra, the Supreme Court has cautioned by stating that if the concept of sovereign function is to be extended to include all welfare activities, the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply would get eroded substantially. In the aforesaid case, it is stated that except the strictly understood sovereign function, all welfare activities of the State would come within the purview of the definition of industry; even within wider circle of sovereign function, there may be an inner circle encompassing some units which could be considered as industry if substantially severable. 21. Reliance has been placed by the appellant on the order passed in the case of State of U.P. Versus Jai Bir Singh, supra. In the said case, the question was whether "Social Forestry Department" of the State of U.P., which is a welfare scheme undertaken for improvement of the environment, would be covered by the definition of 'industry' under Section 2(j) of the Act. The Constitution Bench of five Judges noted that a bench of three Judges in the case of Chief Conservator of Forest & others Versus Jagannath Maturhi Kondhare (supra), had held that Social Forestry Department is covered by the definition of 'industry', whereas the two Judges Bench decision in State of Gujarat Versus Pratham Singh ( 2001(9) SCC 713 ) had taken a different view. On account of the difference of opinion, the matter was referred to a larger bench for reconsideration of the judgment in the case of Bangalore Water Supply. As already stated, there is no pronouncement by a larger bench of the Apex Court on the correctness of Bangalore Water Supply. The same holds the field and is binding on us. Therefore, the submission made on behalf of the appellant that this Court has to await a pronouncement of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court on the correctness of the decision of Bangalore Water Supply does not appeal to us. 22. Having regard to the fact that the said decision is holding the field for over three decades and on an application of the same to the facts of the present case, we are of the considered view that the appellant department is an 'Industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. 22. Having regard to the fact that the said decision is holding the field for over three decades and on an application of the same to the facts of the present case, we are of the considered view that the appellant department is an 'Industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. We have narrated in some detail the genesis of the KGID department, the nature of its activities, the purpose for which it has been established and the manner of its functioning. Having regard to the dicta in the case of Agricultural Produce Market Committee and the All India Radio and Chief Conservator of Forest and Others versus Jagannath Maturthi Kondhare, we are of the considered view that the appellant has to be included within the definition of ‘Industry’. The appellant is not rendering any sovereign function, so as to fall within the exception Clause. 23. In this context, the reliance could also be placed on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.4271/98 and connected matters dated 16/12/1998 wherein, it has been held that Horticulture Department has been held to be 'Industry', within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D.Act. In the said order reference has been made to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, Telecom versus S. Srinivasa Rao [ AIR 1998 SC 656 ], wherein it has opined that it is not permissible for any Bench of lesser strength, to take a view contrary to Bangalore Water Supply or to by-pass that decision so long as it holds the field, which was rendered over two decades ago and it is also rendered that judicial discipline also mandates that the decision in Bangalore Water Supply case must be followed till a contrary view is expressed by the Supreme Court. 24. More over, in Des Raj etc. versus State of Punjab & Others [1998 (2) LLJ 149], It has been held that the State Irrigation Department is an 'Industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D.Act on the basis of 'dominant nature test' evolved in the case of Bangalore Water Supply. 25. 24. More over, in Des Raj etc. versus State of Punjab & Others [1998 (2) LLJ 149], It has been held that the State Irrigation Department is an 'Industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D.Act on the basis of 'dominant nature test' evolved in the case of Bangalore Water Supply. 25. It is also significant to note In the case of Coir Board Ernakulam Kerala State and another versus Indira Devai P.S. and Others [ (2000) 1 SCC 224 ], wherein a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court has opined that the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply case does not require any re-consideration, on a reference being made by a two Judge Bench of the Court, which infact was bound by the judgment of the larger Bench. 26. In the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India versus D.J. Bahadur and others [ 1981 (1) L.L.J. 1 ], it is opined that "sense and sensibility, not mechanical rigidity, gives the flexible solution. Further, it is difficult to think that when the entire industrial field even covering municipalities, universities, research councils and the like is regulated in the critical area of industrial disputes by the I.D.Act, Parliament would have provided an oasis for the Life Insurance Corporation, where labour demands can be unilaterally ignored". Infact, in Surendra Kumar Gyani versus State of Rajasthan and another [ AIR 1993 SC 115 ], the Supreme Court was considering the validity of termination of temporary employees on regular appointments being made by the Department of State Insurance and Provident Fund of Government of Rajasthan. The High Court of Rajasthan had held that the State Insurance Department was an "Industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act. Though the correctness of the said decision was not considered by the Supreme Court in the said case, nevertheless, a direction was issued to consider sympathetically the terminated temporary employees against the available vacancies while examining the case under Section 25-F of the I.D.Act. 27. Having regard to the aforesaid reasoning we are of the considered view that the appellant Department falls within the scope of the definition of 'industry'. 28. 27. Having regard to the aforesaid reasoning we are of the considered view that the appellant Department falls within the scope of the definition of 'industry'. 28. As far as the entitlement of bonus to the employees of KGID is concerned, in the case of Mumbai Kamgar Sabha versus Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others [1976 II LLJ 186], it has been held that Bonus Act as it stood in the year 1965, does not bar claims to customary bonus or those claims based on conditions of service. 29. Delineating on the concept of "Bonus", the Apex Court held that the word "Bonus" is a word of many generous connotations. There is profit-based Bonus, which is one specific kind of claim but there is also Customary or Traditional Bonus, which has its emergence from long, continued usage leading to a promissory and expectancy situation materialising in a right. There are also other types of Bonus, such as Attendance Bonus, Production Bonus etc. When Customary Bonus is sought as in the present case. The Payment of Bonus Act is not applicable. 30. In the instant case, the employees of the KGID were receiving two months pay as Bonus at the end of each valuation period and the said practice had been implemented for over six decades. Thus, it gave a vested right to the employees toclaim the said Bonus as a 'Customary Bonus’, which is saved under the provisions of the Bonus Act. The said payment has no nexus toprofit sharing Bonus. Infact, even after the enforcement of the Bonus Act, 1965, KGID has continued to pay Bonus till 31/03/1980. In that view of the matter, the Industrial Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge were right in holding that the respondent -employees are entitled to the said Bonus, on the basis of the legal evidence and material on record, which we have also perused from the original records. 31. In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed. No costs.