Judgment :- 1. Heard Mr. E. Somasundaram, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. M. Govindan, learned Special Government Pleader, who takes notice on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. T. K. Gopalan, learned counsel, who takes notice on behalf of respondents 3 to 8. By consent, the Writ Petition is taken up for final disposal at the stage of admission itself. 2. The petitioner has come up with the present Writ Petition challenging the impugned order passed by the second respondent dated 07.03.2012 and for a direction to the first respondent to investigate the complaint of the petitioner dated 18.08.2011 and pass orders. 3. The facts of the case, in a nutshell, are as follows:- (i). The petitioner, being the wife of the third respondent, made a complaint on 18.08.2011 not only against the third respondent – husband, but also against the other family members alleging that they demanded dowry. On 16.08.2011, at about 06.30 PM, when she was returning from her matrimonial home, respondents 5 to 7 waylaid her to enter into the house and scolded her in a filthy language. Respondents 3, 4 and 6 also scolded her in a bad and filthy language and threatened her life. The third respondent – husband slapped on her ear. The fifth respondent – mother-in-law brought a vegetable cutter and threatened her that she will be murdered. (ii). On 18.08.2011, she made a complaint before the first respondent against respondents 3 to 8. In the meanwhile, respondents 3 to 8 moved an application for Anticipatory Bail in Crl.O.P.(MD).No.11119 of 2011 before this Court and the parties were directed to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre, attached to this Bench on 05.09.2011. However, the mediation could not succeed. (iii). The first respondent, instead of investigating the complaint made by the petitioner, has forwarded the same to the second respondent. The first respondent called the petitioner over phone and directed her to appear before the second respondent on 09.11.2011. However, she has not received any communication from the second respondent. On 09.11.2011, she appeared before the second respondent and stated that she has made a complaint before the first respondent and the same could be enquired into. The first respondent called the petitioner over phone and directed her to appear before the second respondent on 09.11.2011. However, she has not received any communication from the second respondent. On 09.11.2011, she appeared before the second respondent and stated that she has made a complaint before the first respondent and the same could be enquired into. But, the second respondent, in collusion with the accused, stated that the petitioner was not tortured by the accused and also stated that on 09.11.2011 and 05.02.2012, summons sent to her are totally false and no summons have been sent by the second respondent. On the basis of a report submitted by the second respondent, this Court, by order dated 07.04.2012, granted Anticipatory Bail to respondents 3 to 8. (iv). Rule 4 of the Tamil Nadu Dowry Prohibition Rules, 2004, [for brevity, "the Rules"] says that a complaint may be filed by any aggrieved person or a parent or other relative of such person by any Recognized Welfare Institution or Organization in writing to the Dowry Prohibition Officer, either in person or through a messenger or by post. The petitioner made a complaint before the first respondent alone. While so, the second respondent has no locus standi to investigate the complaint made by the petitioner. Rule (2)(e) of the Rules says that Police Officer means "Deputy Superintendent of Police". Hence, the first respondent ought to have forwarded the said complaint to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. 4. Thus, alleging those facts, the petitioner sought for setting aside of the impugned order passed by the second respondent dated 07.03.2012 and for a direction to the first respondent to investigate the complaint made by the petitioner dated 18.08.2011 and pass orders. 5. Though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner originally contended that the second respondent has no jurisdiction under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, [Act 28 of 1961], [for brevity, "the Act"], to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner, as a second thought, he contended that though the second respondent may have jurisdiction to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner, since the complaint has not been lodged by the petitioner to the second respondent directly and has been lodged only before the first respondent, the second respondent, who has not received any complaint straightaway from the petitioner, cannot enquire into the complaint. 6. 6. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as per Rule (2)(e) of the Rules, Police Officer means, "Deputy Superintendent of Police" of the Division concerned, and hence, on a complaint made by the petitioner to the Inspector of Police, All Women Police Station, Madurai South, Madurai District, the first respondent herein, the second respondent should have forwarded the same to the Deputy Superintendent of Police concerned. Instead of doing so, she has referred to the matter to the second respondent, who has no competency to enquire into the matter. 7. Thirdly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as per Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in-charge of the Police Station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant, and thereafter, shall investigate the same. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 3 to 8 contended that the second respondent has got competency to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner and she has rightly conducted an enquiry and found that the complaint made by the petitioner is false. 9. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2 also contended that the second respondent has got competency to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner and she has rightly conducted an enquiry and found that the complaint made by the petitioner is false. 10. I have considered the above submissions made by the respective learned counsels. 11. At first, the first and foremost submission, that has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the second respondent has no competency to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner has to be answered. Before answering the said question, it would be useful to refer to Section 8-B of the Act, which reads as follows:- "(i). The State Government may appoint, as many Dowry Prohibition Officers as it thinks fit and specify the areas in respect of which they shall exercise their jurisdiction and powers under the Act." 12. The learned Special Government Pleader reports that the State Government has notified that the District Social Welfare Officer, the second respondent herein, is the Dowry Prohibition Officer. The State Government may appoint, as many Dowry Prohibition Officers as it thinks fit and specify the areas in respect of which they shall exercise their jurisdiction and powers under the Act." 12. The learned Special Government Pleader reports that the State Government has notified that the District Social Welfare Officer, the second respondent herein, is the Dowry Prohibition Officer. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of Section 8-B of the Act, the Governor appointed the District Social Welfare Officers of the Districts concerned as Dowry Prohibition Officers, as per G.O.Ms.No.39, Social Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme, (S.W.3), dated 21.03.1998. When such is the position, it cannot be heard to say by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the District Social Welfare Officer, the second respondent herein, has no jurisdiction to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner. Hence, the said contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected and accordingly rejected. 13. The second submission, that has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that even assuming that the second respondent has got jurisdiction to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner, since the complaint has not been lodged directly to the second respondent, she ought not to have enquired into the matter and passed the impugned order. He has further added that the petitioner has made complaint to the first respondent alone, and therefore, the first respondent should have decided the matter and ought not to have forwarded the same to the second respondent to enquire into the matter. The said submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected, for the reason that since the first respondent has no jurisdiction to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner, she has rightly forwarded the same to the second respondent, who has enquired into the matter and passed the impugned order. Hence, the said submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected. 14. Hence, the said submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected. 14. The third contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that before passing the impugned order, no opportunity whatsoever was given to the petitioner is also liable to be rejected, for the simple reason that on a reference to the impugned order would show that in the impugned order, it is stated that the complaint of the petitioner was enquired into by the second respondent. The impugned order further clearly says that the petitioner has appeared before the second respondent. 15. The fourth contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Clause (e) of Rule (2) of the Rules stipulates that the Police Officer means "Deputy Superintendent of Police" of the Division concerned. Hence, the Deputy Superintendent of Police alone is competent to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner to the first respondent. Even the said contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is also liable to be rejected, since clause (e) of Rule (2) of the Rules does not say that the competent person to enquire into the complaint made by the petitioner under the Act is the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Clause (e) of Rule (2) of the Rules only stipulates that Police Officer means, "Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Division concerned and it does not say that under the Act, the Dowry Prohibition Officer means, "Deputy Superintendent of Police". Hence, the said contention is also rejected. 16. In view of the discussion made above, I am of the considered view that the impugned order dated 07.03.2012 passed by the second respondent does not require any interference by this Court, and hence, the Writ Petition stands dismissed, regarding challenge to the same. As far as the second limb of the prayer, viz., seeking a direction to the first respondent to investigate the complaint dated 18.08.2011 is concerned, she is at liberty to take appropriate legal proceedings as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed.