Judgment Vikramajit Sen, CJ. 1. The present Appeal was admitted on 29.10.2003. The Appellant died on 16.06.2006 at the age of 71 years. The application seeking impleadment of the legal representatives of the Appellant came to be filed on 04.08.2011. It is undisputed that on 20.07.2011, it was the Respondent, who had filed a memorandum bringing these facts to the notice of the Court. It is also beyond cavil that the Appeal was not listed before Court for almost five years until 09.09.2010. By means of this application, the Appellant seeks condonation of delay of 1630 days in taking steps from impleadment of the legal representatives of the deceased Appellant. The deceased Appellant has left behind his widow aged 71 years and two sons aged 48 years and 39 years respectively. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that in addition to these two sons, the deceased Appellant has also one daughter and two other sons. 2. Although ordinarily, we would not venture on to the merits of the dispute, until the application for condonation of delay is allowed and the legal representatives are impleaded, we propose to do so for the reason that there is a perceptible practice of delaying litigation in the Courts in cases covered by the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘PTCL’ Act for the sake of brevity). Briefly stated, the land has been allotted to depressed sections of the society including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on certain terms. In the present case, the grant was made in favour of the deceased Respondent No.3 on 27.09.1957 followed by the execution of a saguvali chit on 10.10.1957, containing a non-alienation clause for 15 years. The Grantee, Respondent No.3. made the first sale to one Srinivasa Rao on 17.04.1965: Srinivasa Rao sold in favour of Siddappa, by sale deed dated 21.01.1967 and eventually the Appellant purchased the land from Siddappa on 24.02.1971. These transactions are not only contrary to the terms of the saguvali chit itself, but also to the enactment, which came in subsequently, i.e., PTCL Act, Section 4 of which declares these transactions to be null and void. There is enormous litigation pending in Courts. Which are for several decades unended. It obviously serves the interest of the purchaser to even seek a remand, so that a litigation starts de novo. There is enormous litigation pending in Courts. Which are for several decades unended. It obviously serves the interest of the purchaser to even seek a remand, so that a litigation starts de novo. This is what has happened in the present case also, as is manifestly clear from a reading of the impugned order. The decision in Writ Petition No.4567/2000 eludes to the previous litigation in Writ Appeal No.115/1993 which ended, by the matter being remitted back to the Assistant Commissioner, Shimoga Sub-Division, restricted only to the question of whether the grantee belonged to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the date of the grant. The proceedings commenced in the year 1982-83 in terms of Case No.PTCL.CR.538/82-83. 3. Keeping this factual matrix in mind, we will now consider whether any proper cause has been disclosed in the application for persuading us to condone the delay in preferment of the application itself. 4. Our attention has been drawn to the observations made by their Lordship in State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 2000 SC 2306 which reads as follows: “13. In Nand Kishore Vs. State of Punjab (1995) 6 SCC 614 : this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31 years, in N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties ad to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been putforth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context, it was observed: “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. In this context, it was observed: “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay, in such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to tome to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court.” 5. So far as the widow and the two sons mentioned in the application are concerned, it is the Applicants’ case that they were residing with the deceased Appellant. The sons are not minors, but are in their middle age and therefore it is incredible to put to us that they were not aware of the pending litigation. The Court is bound to adopt a common sense approach in matters, where it is called upon to condone delay. While we respectfully follow the dictum laid down in Kameshwar Prasad Singh, it appears plain to us that is does not state that no matter what cause is put up, it must be accepted by the Court. We also find it irrelevant that the Appeal had not been listed before court for a period of five years. Even if the proceedings were totally dormant, law requires the legal representatives of a party to approach the Advocate, if not vis-à-vis, so that requisite steps are taken within the time prescribed by law. We also find it irrelevant that the Appeal had not been listed before court for a period of five years. Even if the proceedings were totally dormant, law requires the legal representatives of a party to approach the Advocate, if not vis-à-vis, so that requisite steps are taken within the time prescribed by law. In any event the stand taken by the legal representatives, which we cannot accept, is that they were totally ignorant of the pendency of the Appeal, the position would have remained the same, regardless of whether the Appeal was actually listed for consideration for any purpose. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellant states that in cases where a dispute revolves around immovable property, the proper course is to impose costs and condone delay. As we have mentioned at the commencement of this order, we perceive a strategy to keep litigation pending in Court especially, where the PTCL Act are cognate issues fall for consideration. This is because of the uniform decision of the Courts that a transgression or violation of a grant or a saguvali chit does not call for any pardon or deviation. We, therefore, think that imposing of costs will defeat the very purpose of the grant or the saguvali chit or the statute, since the sections of society, whose plight is sought to be alleviated, would continue to be beyond the pale of relief. It is in these circumstances that we dismiss the application for condonation of delay. 7. There is also a prayer for condoning the delay in impleadment of the legal representatives of deceased Respondent No.3, who had passed away on 18.02.2007. Learned Counsel for the Respondent had intimated the Appellant’s Counsel of this event by a memo dated 20.07.2011. Unlike in the case of impleadment of the Appellant, it is the duty of the Respondent’s Counsel to inform the opposite Counsel of the particular demise. Delay would therefore not occasion or result in this case. But, since we have already declined to condone the delay in impleadment of the legal representatives of the Appellant, we are not called upon to proceed any further. 8. The Appeal stands abated and is dismissed as such. All pending Misc. W. applications are accordingly dismissed.