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2012 DIGILAW 2449 (MAD)

M. Arjunan v. Mahesh

2012-06-14

R.MALA

body2012
Judgment :- 1. The Criminal Appeal arises out of the dismissal of the complaint preferred by the appellant/complainant which was taken on file in C.C.No.209 of 2002 on the file of the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate's Court, Perundurai. 2. The appellant/complainant has preferred a private complaint stating that there was a property dispute between the first accused/first respondent and the appellant/complainant for past 10 years and a case was also registered in Chennimalai police station in Crime No.10/2002, which is pending. The second accused/second respondent is Panchayat Board President. The appellant herein was canvassing for a party against A2. So there was an enmity between the appellant and A1 & A2/respondents herein. On 14.11.2001, at 7.30 p.m., when appellant and his sister Kulandaiammal were proceeding in their Moped, at the time, the first accused drove his Bajaj M80 bearing Registration No.TN33Q9974 in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the Moped. Due to the said impact, the appellant had sustained injury on his right leg, right arm and right shoulder. Likewise, his sister Kulandaiammal also sustained injury on her left hand and left thigh. At the time, the second accused, who was proceeding behind the first accused in a bullet motor cycle, stated that the first accused had wantonly dashed against the appellant. Further, A1 threatened appellant that if he would give police complaint, A1 would be killed him. Hence, the appellant returned to his house and gave complaint to Chennimalai police station on 15.11.2001. But the police sources have not taken the complaint on file and gave a letter to appellant for taking medical treatment in Erode Government Hospital. He gone to that hospital and took treatment. Since the police had not taken any steps, appellant was constrained to file a private complaint against the accused. 3. The learned Judicial Magistrate taking cognizable of offence after recording sworn statement and issued summons for the appearance of the accused and on appearance, copies have been furnished. Since the accused pleaded not guilty, the trial Court examined P.W.1 to P.W.3 and marked Exs.P1 to P3 and placed the incriminating evidence before the accused, the accused denied the same. On the side of the accused, second accused was examined as D.W.1 and Ex.D1/Receipt of Angalamman Exports, was marked. 4. Since the accused pleaded not guilty, the trial Court examined P.W.1 to P.W.3 and marked Exs.P1 to P3 and placed the incriminating evidence before the accused, the accused denied the same. On the side of the accused, second accused was examined as D.W.1 and Ex.D1/Receipt of Angalamman Exports, was marked. 4. The trial Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence, acquitted the accused stating that the appellant herein failed to prove that the above said occurrence had taken place and the delay in preferring the complaint and the appellant did not prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Since the trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused, the present Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the appellant/complainant. 5. Mr. A.K. Kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the above said incident, the appellant and his sister sustained injury, which was proved by examining the Doctor, who gave treatment and marking of Exs.P2 and P3/wound certificates. That factum has not been considered by the trial Court. The trial Court has erroneously held that the documents related to the vehicle, which involved in the accident was not produced before the Court. He further submitted that non compliance of Section 154(3) of Cr.P.C. is not fatal to their case. Hence, he prayed for allowing of this appeal. 6. Resisting the same, Mr. N.Manokaran, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/accused submitted that there is a delay in preferring the complaint and the appellant ought to have invoked the provision of Section 154(3) of Cr.P.C., then only, he entitled to give a private complaint. To substantiate the same, he relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in 2003 (2) CTC 270 (M/S.Pasumai Irrigation Limited, a company registered under the Companies Act. vs. M/S. Mansi Finance (Chennai) Ltd. rep. by Care D'Monte formerly M/S.Mansi Finance Limited). He further submitted that once the case was ended in acquittal, the appellate Court has not entitled to interfere with the findings of the trial Court unless there was serious illegality or error in arriving at its own conclusions without properly appreciating the same and the findings are perverse. To substantiate the same, he relied upon the Apex Court judgments reported in (2011) 1 SCC 24 (Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh) & (2011) 7 SCC 421 (Bhajan Singh Alias Harbhajan Singh and others v. State of Haryana). To substantiate the same, he relied upon the Apex Court judgments reported in (2011) 1 SCC 24 (Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh) & (2011) 7 SCC 421 (Bhajan Singh Alias Harbhajan Singh and others v. State of Haryana). He further submitted that due to the personal vengeance and enmity, a false case has been foisted against the accused after nine months, the alleged occurrence was said to have been taken place (i.e.) on 14.11.2001. The private complaint has been given on 19.08.2002 nearly after 9 months. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the appeal. 7. Considered the rival submissions made on both sides and the materials available on record. 8. Now this Court has to decide as to whether judgment of acquittal is sustainable? Admittedly, there was an enmity between the appellant and the first & second respondents. Hence, the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 has to be scrutinized very carefully. As per the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, alleged occurrence was said to have been taken place on 14.11.2001, at 7.30 p.m. Admittedly, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were treated by the Doctor/P.W.3 only on 16.11.2001, at 10.05 a.m. and 9.50 a.m. respectively. At that time, appellant stated that the injury was sustained on 14.11.2001, at 7.30 p.m., due to knock down by the bike M-80 near his house. But there is no reason has been given as to why the appellant has not given complaint on that day and as to why he has not come to the hospital on that date itself. While perusing the complaint of appellant, he never stated that in which place the said occurrence had taken place. But only in Exs.P2 and P3-Wound certificates of P.W.2 and P.W.1, it was mentioned that the occurrence was taken place near his house. But the reason assigned by him for delaying in preferring complaint is not sufficient, since there was an enmity between the appellant and the accused in respect of civil dispute. Delay in taking treatment is one of the reasons for disbelieving the version of P.W.1 and P.W.2. Furthermore, P.W.3/Doctor in his cross-examination, he stated that the injuries sustained by P.W.1 and P.W.2 are possible, if a person fell down on the earth. He fairly conceded that he has not mentioned the age of the injuries. Delay in taking treatment is one of the reasons for disbelieving the version of P.W.1 and P.W.2. Furthermore, P.W.3/Doctor in his cross-examination, he stated that the injuries sustained by P.W.1 and P.W.2 are possible, if a person fell down on the earth. He fairly conceded that he has not mentioned the age of the injuries. Therefore, I am of the view, in a criminal jurisprudence, prosecution/complainant must prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 9. In the instant case, appellant/complainant has miserably failed to prove that when he sustained injury and as to how and where. Except ipse dixit of own brother and sister (i.e.) P.W.1 and P.W.2, no other independent witness has been examined. In Exs.P2 and P3, it was stated that occurrence had taken place near his house. But in his cross-examination, he stated that there is no other independent witness evidenced the same. So the appellant has miserably failed to prove that the occurrence had taken place on 14.11.2001. Even though the appellant stated that he along with his sister were travelling in the moped, he had not given the vehicle number of the Moped. Furthermore, in his evidence, he stated that he gone to the police station on the very next day (i.e.) on 15.11.2001, but the case has not been taken on file. But he had not shown single scrap of paper that he filed a complaint on 15.11.2001. 10. Admittedly, the complaint was given only on 19.08.2002. There is no convincing explanation has been given by the appellant as to why it was preferred after such a delay. But the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in 2003 (2) CTC 270 (M/S.Pasumai Irrigation Limited, a company registered under the Companies Act. vs. M/S. Mansi Finance (Chennai) Ltd. rep. by Care D'Monte formerly M/S.Mansi Finance Limited), is not applicable to the above facts. There is no bar for preferring any private complaint at the first instance without prior complaint to the police. But here, P.W.1 himself stated that he preferred a complaint but it was not taken on file. It is true, he fairly conceded that he has not invoked Section 154(3) of Cr.P.C., but it is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. 11. It is the duty of the appellant to prove that the occurrence had taken place on 14.11.2001. It is true, he fairly conceded that he has not invoked Section 154(3) of Cr.P.C., but it is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. 11. It is the duty of the appellant to prove that the occurrence had taken place on 14.11.2001. Appellant, in his evidence, stated that A2 came behind A1 and made criminal intimidation. But A2 was examined as D.W.1 and filed Ex.D1 to prove that on the date of occurrence (i.e.) on 14.11.2001, he was at Karur not at Seerangapalayam, Chennimalai. So Ex.D1 and D.W.2's evidence are falsified the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2. Hence, I am of the view, appellant herein has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 12. It is appropriate to consider the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents/accused. In (2011) 11 SCC 24 (Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh), it was held that in the appeal against acquittal, scope of interference with the Appellate Court. If the case is ended in acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. It is also well settled principle of dictum laid down by the Apex Court that if two views are reasonably possible, on the state of evidence: one supporting the acquittal and the other indicating conviction, then and in that event, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal, merely because it feels that it, sitting as a trial Court, would have taken the other view. While re-appreciating the evidence, the rule of prudence requires that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the views of the trial Judge. But if the judgment of the Sessions Judge was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on a wrong appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of acquittal, recorded by the Sessions Judge, as otherwise, there would be gross miscarriage of justice. 13. But if the judgment of the Sessions Judge was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on a wrong appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of acquittal, recorded by the Sessions Judge, as otherwise, there would be gross miscarriage of justice. 13. In the judgment reported in (2011) 7 SCC 421 (Bhajan Singh Alias Harbhajan Singh and others v. State of Haryana), it was held that the appellate Court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Where it is possible to take only one view (i.e.) the prosecution evidence points to the guilt of the accused and the judgment is on the face of it perverse, the appellate Court may interfere with an order of acquittal. The appellate Court should also bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. 14. Considering the dictum of the Apex Court, since the respondents are declared as innocents, the appellant must prove the non consideration of evidence and findings are perverse. But here, the learned trial Judge considering all the aspects came to the correct conclusion and acquitted. Because of the previous enmity, complaint has been given by the appellant after nine months; the injuries are possible, if any person fell down on the earth; the registration number of the Moped travelled by the appellant was not given; no independent witness was examined, hence, I am of the view, the trial Court considered all the aspects in proper perspective and came to the correct conclusion that the appellant herein has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, I am forced to concur with the findings of the trial Court and hence, it does not warrant any interference. So the Criminal Appeal is dismissed on devoid of merits. 15. In fine, Criminal Appeal is dismissed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.