JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—U.P. State Handloom Corporation and its Regional Manager have filed this petition for quashing the order dated 16th March, 2012 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (City), Allahabad by which a direction, with the approval of the District Magistrate, Allahabad, has been issued to the petitioners to remove their goods, documents and structures from the shop shop bearing No. 5-A at Sardar Patel Marg, Allahabad and give vacant possession of the shop to respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna. A direction has also been issued to Ashok Kumar Khanna to assist the petitioners in this work and not to claim commission as an agent from the petitioners. 2. It transpires from the records that Chintamani Ghosh Trust is the owner/landlord of the aforesaid shop which was allotted to respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna by the order dated 23rd September, 1968 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. An Agency Agreement was executed between the petitioners U.P. Handloom Corporation (Principal-Ist Party) and respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna (Agent-IInd Party) on 10th December, 1981 for a period from 15th December, 1981 to 14th December, 1986 and the relevant portion of the agreement is as follows : “And whereas the second party has offered to carry on the agency business in his show room No. 5A, Sardar Patel Marg, Civil Lines, Allahabad having total covered area of 1170 sq. ft. including mazien floor out of which 400 sq. ft. is furnished for display and sales of products of the first party and the first party has approved the show room. Whereas the second party has approached the first party for agency of the handloom products for Allahabad and the first party has agreed to give the same. And, whereas it becomes expedient to reduce the terms and conditions of this Agency Agreement in writing. NOW THIS AGREEMNT WITNESSES AS FOLLOWS : 1. That the Principal shall at its cost furnish the show-room with furniture, light etc. according to the requirement of the said agency business. 2. That the Agency shall commence from 15.12.1981 (15teenth December, 1981). 3. That the Principal shall pay minimum commission Rs. 4,500/- per month or 1% on retail sales whichever is more. 4. That the Principal shall at its cost furnish the show-room with furniture, light etc. according to the requirement of the said agency business. 2. That the Agency shall commence from 15.12.1981 (15teenth December, 1981). 3. That the Principal shall pay minimum commission Rs. 4,500/- per month or 1% on retail sales whichever is more. 4. That the principal has paid to the Agent interest free advance equivalent to 18 months commission to be adjusted in 42 installments by the principal. 5. That the Agent shall use his best endeavours to sell and dispose of all the Handloom goods of the principal to the best advantage and at prices as may from time to time be fixed by the principal. The Agent shall also fully co-operate with the Principal as may be necessary, for furthering the sale and marketing of the handloom goods of the principal. 6. That the Principal shall appoint its own staff and salary and emoluments shall be borne by the Principal. The staff as appointed shall act under the guidance of agent as well. 7. That the principal shall arrange for necessary furnishing and fixtures for proper display of its products as per suggestion of the Agent. 8. That the Agent shall not give credit for any goods of products of the principal to any person without the express written consent of the principal. 9. That the agent shall not without the consent in writing of the principal pledge any goods or products. 10. That the agent shall throughout the subsistence of agency agreement give all possible co-operation to the principal as may be necessary for furthering the business and shall work deligently and faithfully in his endeavours for sale promotion and marketing of the handloom goods of the principal. 11. That the electricity charges, telephone charges, sales tax, maintenance, insurance charges and water charges shall be borne by the Principal. 12. That the rent of the show-room, Municipal and water taxes as be levied on the Show room from time to time and shall be payable by the Agent. 13. That this agreement is from 15th December, 1981 to 14th December, 1986 and may be renewed with mutual consent. 14. 12. That the rent of the show-room, Municipal and water taxes as be levied on the Show room from time to time and shall be payable by the Agent. 13. That this agreement is from 15th December, 1981 to 14th December, 1986 and may be renewed with mutual consent. 14. That the agent shall at all times during the continuance of Agency, obey and observed all reasonable directions and instructions, which may be given to him by the principal, concerning the sale and disposal of the products of principal or otherwise relating to the business of Agency. 15. That on the termination of Agency by efflux of time the Agent shall deliver to the Principal, all or such of the products of the Principal, and all books of accounts and documents relating to the Agency which may be in his possession, control or superintendence. 16. That on termination of Agency, the Principal shall be entitled to remove their fixtures etc. installed by him. 17. That in case of any suit filed by the landlord, the cost of the suit in respect of the Corporation who are the principal has to be borne by the Agent. 18. That if any dispute regarding the interpretation meaning or effect of any clause of the agreement or any claims or right or liabilities of the party under the agreement shall arise at any time between the Principal and the Agent the same shall be referred to the Arbitration of Managing Director, U.P. State Handloom Corporation Ltd., Kanpur whose award shall be conclusive and binding on both the parties.” 3. This Agency Agreement was subsequently extended on 25th August, 1986 with effect from 15th December, 1986 for a period up to 14th December, 1996. It was further extended by the Agency Agreement dated 13th May, 1999 from 15th December, 1996 to 14th December, 2002 and then by the Agency Agreement dated 29th January, 2004 from 15th December, 2002 to 14th December, 2007. It is further stated that respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna sent a letter dated 11th November, 2010 to the petitioner that he was no longer interested in extending the Agency Agreement and so the petitioner should remove the stock from the shop and vacate it. It is further stated that respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna sent a letter dated 11th November, 2010 to the petitioner that he was no longer interested in extending the Agency Agreement and so the petitioner should remove the stock from the shop and vacate it. With this letter, a copy of the letter dated 22nd May, 2010 said to have been sent by the petitioners in which it was stated that if Ashok Kumar Khanna was ready to forgo the arrears of rent of the shop, the petitioners may take a decision for vacating the shop was also enclosed. It is further asserted that respondent No. 5 started creating hindrances in the running of the shop and a letter dated 24th November, 2011 was also sent by the Special Secretary, State of Uttar Pradesh to the District Magistrate, Allahabad in connection with the aforesaid shop to take a decision at his level and inform the Government. The District Magistrate entrusted the matter to the Additional District Magistrate (City), Allahabad and during the course of the proceedings before the Additional District Magistrate, respondent No. 4-Chintamani Ghosh Trust informed the Additional District Magistrate (City) that the shop had been allotted to Ashok Kumar Khanna by the order dated 23rd September, 1968 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and Ashok Kumar Khanna was paying rent of Rs. 200/- per month to it but the Trust had no idea of any dispute between the petitioners and Ashok Kumar Khanna. Ashok Kumar Khanna also wrote a letter dated 14th December, 2011 to the District Magistrate that he was the tenant of the shop and an Agency Agreement was executed with the petitioners on 10th December, 1981 which was subsequently renewed from time to time. He also stated that by his letters dated 7th December, 2007 and 29th November, 2010, he had informed the petitioners that he was no longer interested in continuing with the Agency and so the petitioners should remove their materials as the period of the Agreement had expired. He, therefore, requested the District Magistrate to issue necessary directions to the petitioners to remove their materials from the shop and handover vacant possession. 4. He, therefore, requested the District Magistrate to issue necessary directions to the petitioners to remove their materials from the shop and handover vacant possession. 4. The Additional District Magistrate has mentioned in the impugned order that on examination of the factual position it transpired that the owner of the shop was Chintamani Ghosh Trust and by the order dated 23rd September, 1968 the shop was let out by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to Ashok Kumar Khanna who initially was carrying on an independent business from the shop but later on executed an Agreement with the petitioners for running the show-room and after the expiry of the period mentioned in the Agreement, Ashok Kumar Khanna was not interested in renewing the agreement and wanted vacant possession of the shop. The order further mentions that the petitioners had expressed a desire that in case Ashok Kumar Khanna did not make any claim for payment of Rs. 7 lacs, they would vacate the shop but the petitioners did not vacate the shop. The Additional District Magistrate (City), Allahabad, in view of the directions issued by the State Government and the approval given by the District Magistrate, directed the petitioners to remove the materials from the shop by 22nd March, 2012 and handover the vacant possession to respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna as the petitioners had no claim over the shop. 5. Sri K.N. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the order passed by the Additional District Magistrate (City), Allahabad is without jurisdiction and, therefore, deserves to be set aside. It is also his submission that in any view of the matter the Additional District Magistrate (City) could not have decided the complicated civil dispute regarding Agency and then issue directions to the petitioners to vacate the shop, particularly when there was an Arbitration Clause in the agreement. 6. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Sri Anil Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna have submitted that the order was passed by the Additional District Magistrate (City) with the approval of the District Magistrate pursuant to the directions issued by the Principal Secretary as the petitioners and respondent No. 5 had approached the State Government and, therefore, the petitioners cannot object to the matter being decided by the District Magistrate. They have also submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order which may call for interference by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Sri Ram Kaushik has made submissions on behalf of respondent No. 4-Chintamani Ghosh Trust and has submitted that the Trust is the owner/landlord of the shop which had been let out to respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna by the order dated 23rd September, 1968 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad and the Trust is not aware of any arrangement between the petitioners and Ashok Kumar Khanna. 7. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. The issue that arises for consideration in this petition is whether the District Magistrate, Allahabad could have issued directions to the petitioner U.P. State Handloom Corporation to remove their goods and structures from the shop and handover vacant possession of the shop to respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna. It is not in dispute that owner/landlord of the shop is Chintamani Ghosh Trust. The said shop was allotted to respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna by an order dated 23rd September, 1968 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. However, an Agency Agreement was executed between respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna and the petitioner U.P. State Handloom Corporation on 10th December, 1981 for a period commencing from 15th December, 1981 upto 14th December, 1986. It mentions that the second party Ashok Kumar Khanna had offered to carry on the agency business in the shop for the sale of products of the first party U.P. State Handloom Corporation and the Principal (U.P. State Handloom Corporation) shall pay the minimum commission of Rs. 4,500/- per month or 1% on retail sales, whichever was more, to the Agent Ashok Kumar Khanna. The Agreement further provides that the Principal should appoint its own staff and the salary and the emoluments should be borne by the Principal. The Principal should also arrange for the necessary furnishing and fixtures for proper display of its product and the electricity charges, telephone charges, sales tax, maintenance, insurance charges and water charges should also be borne by the Principal. The Principal should also arrange for the necessary furnishing and fixtures for proper display of its product and the electricity charges, telephone charges, sales tax, maintenance, insurance charges and water charges should also be borne by the Principal. The Agreement further provides that on termination of the Agency by efflux of time, the Agent shall deliver to the Principal all or such of the products of the Principal and all books of accounts and documents relating to the Agency. The Agreement also contains an Arbitration Clause and it provides that if any dispute regarding the interpretation, meaning or effect of any clause of the Agreement or any claims or right or liabilities of the party under the Agreement arises at any time between the Principal and the Agency, the same shall be referred to the Arbitration of Managing Director, U.P. State Handloom Corporation Ltd. Kanpur whose award shall be conclusive and binding on both the parties. 8. The aforesaid Agency Agreement was extended from time to time and was last extended on 29th January, 2004 from 15th December, 2002 to 14th December, 2007. Ashok Kumar Khanna claims that he is no longer interested in extending the Agency Agreement and, therefore, requires the Principal - U.P. State Handloom Corporation to vacate the premises. The District Magistrate, by the impugned order, has accepted the claim of respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna and directed the petitioner to vacat the premises and give possession to Ashok Kumar Khanna. Repeated queries were put to Sri Anil Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No. 5 and the learned Standing Counsel to point out under which provision of law the District Magistrate had assumed jurisdiction and issued such directions but they have not been able to place any provision and have merely stated that the District Magistrate decided the matter as per the directions issued by the State Government and the State Government had issued such directions because the parties had approached the State Government. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that for resolution of the dispute that had arisen between the parties, respondent No. 5 Ashok Kumar Khanna could have either got the dispute referred for Arbitration under clause 18 of the Agency Agreement or could have filed a civil suit but the District Magistrate could not have decided the dispute. The submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners deserves to be accepted. The submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners deserves to be accepted. When there is a specific Arbitration Clause contained in the Agency Agreement, the dispute was required to be resolved by the Arbitrator whose award, under the Agreement, has been declared to be conclusive and binding on both the parties. In the alternative, respondent No. 5-Ashok Kumar Khanna, could have filed a civil suit for resolution of the dispute. 10. In Bishan Das and others v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1961 SC 1570 , the Supreme Court observed that even if the State Government thought that the constructions should be removed or that the condition as to resumption of the land should be invoked, it could take appropriate legal action for the purpose but could not do so by issuing an executive fiat as that would be destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law and that the Executive Officer cannot interfere with the rights of the parties unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. The relevant observations are : “11. ............ A trustee even of a public trust can be removed only by procedure known to law. He cannot be removed by an executive fiat. ................. If the State thought that the constructions should be removed or that the condition as to resumption of the land should be invoked, it was open to the State to take appropriate legal action for the purpose. Even if the State proceeded on the footing that the trust was a public trust it should have taken appropriate legal action for the removal of the trustee as was opined by the State’s Legal Remembrancer. It is well recognised that a suit under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, may be brought against persons in possession of the trust property even if they claim adversely to the trust, that is, claim to be owners of the property, or against persons who deny the validity of the trust. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to the statement of Ramji Das made in 1925, and the order of the Revenue Minister dated December 13, 1954, and has contended that Ramji Das himself admitted that he was a mere trustee. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to the statement of Ramji Das made in 1925, and the order of the Revenue Minister dated December 13, 1954, and has contended that Ramji Das himself admitted that he was a mere trustee. Be that so; but that does not give the State or its executive officers the right to take the law into their own hands and remove the trustee by an executive order. We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order. ....................... 14. Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. The facts and the position in law thus clearly are (1) that the buildings constructed on this piece of Government land did not belong to Government, (2) that the petitioners were in possession and occupation of the buildings and (3) that by virtue of enactments binding on the Government, the petitioners could be dispossessed, if at all, only in pursuance of a decree of a Civil Court obtained in proceedings properly initiated. In these circumstances the action of the Government in taking the law into their hands and dispossessing the petitioners by the display of force, exhibits a callous disregard of the normal requirements of the rule of law apart from what might legitimately and reasonably be expected from a Government functioning in a society governed by a Constitution which guarantees to its citizens against arbitrary invasion by the executive of peaceful possession of property. As pointed out by this Court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 1955(1) SCR 408 ( AIR 1954 SC 415 ), the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. As pointed out by this Court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 1955(1) SCR 408 ( AIR 1954 SC 415 ), the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. In Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. The State of Bihar, 1953 SCR 1129 ( AIR 1953 SC 215 ), this Court said that nothing is more likely to drain the vitality from the rule of law than legislation which singles out a particular individual from his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is not imposed upon the others. We have here a highly discriminatory and autocratic act which deprives a person of the possession of property without reference to any law or legal authority. Even if the property was trust property it is difficult to see how the Municipal Committee, Barnala, can step in as trustee on an executive determination only. The reasons given for this extraordinary action are, to quote what we said in Sahi’s case (supra), remarkable for their disturbing implications. (emphasis supplied) 11. The Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh etc., AIR 1989 SC 997 , also observed that the question whether the purported forfeiture and cancellation of lease were valid or not should not have been allowed to be agitated in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was further observed that the lessor with best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise and possession can be resumed only in a manner known to or recognised by law. The observations are : “14. On a consideration of the matter, we think, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court should have abstained from the examination of the legality or correctness of the purported cancellation of the lease which involved resolution of disputes on questions of fact as well. In Express Newspapers v. Union of India, 1985 Supp (3) SCR 382 ( AIR 1986 SC 872 ) (at page 953) Venkataramiah, J. in a somewhat analogous situation observed: “The rest of the questions relate truly to the civil rights of the parties flowing from the lease deed. In Express Newspapers v. Union of India, 1985 Supp (3) SCR 382 ( AIR 1986 SC 872 ) (at page 953) Venkataramiah, J. in a somewhat analogous situation observed: “The rest of the questions relate truly to the civil rights of the parties flowing from the lease deed. Those questions cannot be effectively disposed of in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The questions arising out of the lease, such as, whether there has been breach of the covenants under the lease, whether the lease can be forfeited, whether relief against forfeiture can be granted etc. are foreign to the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution. They cannot be decided just on affidavits. These are matters which should be tried in a regular civil proceeding. One should remember that the property belongs to the Union of India and the rights in it cannot be bartered away in accordance with the sweet will of an officer or a Minister or a Lt. Governor but they should be dealt with in accordance with law. At the same time a person who has acquired rights in such property cannot also be deprived of them except in accordance with law. The stakes in this case are very high for both the parties and neither of them can take law into his own hands.” Accordingly, we hold that the question whether the purported forfeiture and cancellation of the lease were valid or not should not have been allowed to be agitated in proceedings under Article 226. 15. Sri Sorabjee submitted that great hardship and injustice would be occasioned to the respondents if the State Government, on the self-assumed and self-assessed validity of its own action of cancellation of the lease, attempts at and succeeds in, a resumption of possession extrajudicially by physical force. Sri Sorabjee referred to the notice dated 19.11.1985 in which the Government, according to Sri Sorabjee, had left no-one in doubt as to its intentions of resorting to an extrajudicial resumption of possession. Sri Sorabjee referred to paras 3.10 and 4 of the order dated 19.11.1985. A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extrajudicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression ‘re-entry’ in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume possession. A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extrajudicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression ‘re-entry’ in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a ‘legal pedigree’. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab, (1962) 2 SCR 69 : ( AIR 1961 SC 1570 ), this Court said: “We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order.” “Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law.” Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extrajudicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law.” (emphasis supplied) 12. In Nitin Gunwant Shah v. Indian Bank and others, (2012) 8 SCC 305 , the Supreme Court observed that a person entitled in law to possession of any immovable property, which is in the occupation of some other persons whether a tenant, licensee or trespasser can evict such tenant, licensee or trespasser by obtaining a decree for eviction from the competence Civil Court. 13. 13. It is seen from the order passed by the District Magistrate that he has referred to the claim of the party and the Agency Agreement and has decided the dispute by directing the petitioner to vacate the premises and handover the possession to respondent No. 5 even though the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute and decide it. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the District Magistrate had the jurisdiction to decide the dispute as the State Government had asked him to decide the dispute, cannot also be accepted. In the first instance, the State Government had no jurisdiction to issue such directions and secondly, the District Magistrate should also have examined whether he could issue such a direction. As noticed above, even learned counsel for the respondents have not been able to place any provision which may authorise the District Magistrate to decide such a dispute. 14. Thus, for the reasons stated above and in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, it is not possible to sustain the order dated 16th March, 2012 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (City), Allahabad with the approval of the District Magistrate. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed and the order dated 16th March, 2012 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (City), Allahabad is set aside. ——————