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2012 DIGILAW 249 (AP)

N. S. Ramanjaiah Setty v. T. Krishna Bhagavan

2012-03-07

C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY

body2012
Judgment : This Civil Revision Petition arises out of order dated 6-1-2012 in I.A.No.95/2011 in O.S.No.7/2008 on the file of the learned Additional District Judge, Hindupur. Respondent No.1 filed the above mentioned suit for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 29-9-2007 against respondent No.2. Respondent No.1/plaintiff has produced the said document on 27-4-2010 and the same was marked as Ex.A-1. Initially, the suit was filed against respondent No.2 as the sole defendant. As respondent No.2 has stated in his written statement that the suit schedule property was sold to the petitioner, the latter was impleaded as defendant No.2 in the suit. By the time the petitioner was impleaded, the suit document was marked as Ex.A-1. After his impleadment, the petitioner has filed the above mentioned I.A. for impounding Exs.A-1 and A-4 as the said documents require payment of stamp duty and penalty. The lower Court, while holding that Ex.A-1 is only an agreement of sale and not a bond as pleaded by the petitioner/defendant No.2, also held that Ex.A-4 could be admitted into evidence for collateral purpose. The present Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner/defendant No.2 feeling aggrieved by the order of the lower Court to the extent it relates to Ex.A-1. At the hearing, Sri K. Sitaram, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Court below has committed a serious error in construing Ex.A-1 as an agreement of sale and not as a bond. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the definition of bond in Section 2(5) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899(for short "the Act") and relied upon the Judgment of this court in P. Srinivasa Babu Vs. M/s.A.M.R. Consultants Limited 2008(4) ALT 759 . Sri R.V. Nagabhushana Rao, learned counsel appearing for Sri R. Prasad, learned counsel for respondent No.1, stated that while the lower Court has not committed any error in construing Ex.A-1 as an agreement of sale, he has however stated that since under Section 36 of the Act there is an absolute bar on the raising of any objection over a document which is admitted in evidence, the petitioner is not entitled to raise the objection. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Let me first consider the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No.1 relating to Section 36 of the Act. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Let me first consider the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No.1 relating to Section 36 of the Act. Under the said provision, where an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in Section 61 of the Act, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. Admittedly, in the present case, the provisions of Section 61 of the Act are not attracted. The question therefore is whether the petitioner is entitled to raise objection with respect to the admissibility of Ex.A-1? The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when Ex.A-1 was admitted in evidence, his client was not on record and that since he had no opportunity of raising the objection at the time of admission of the said document, he is entitled to raise the objection after his impleadment. This submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner appears convincing at the first blush. However, the provisions of Section 36 of the Act are in peremptory terms and they do not admit of any exceptions except to the extent of Section 61 of the Act. A statutory provision requires to be reasonably construed keeping in view the object with which the same is made. The obvious object behind Section 36 of the Act is to see that the parties do not raise objections as to the admissibility of the instruments already admitted in evidence again and again. However, in the present case, the petitioner was not on record when Ex.A-1 was admitted in evidence. Therefore, ordinarily, the petitioner would have been entitled to raise the objection despite the admission of Ex.A-1 in evidence, provided, he, as defendant No.2, is asserting his right dehors respondent No.2/defendant No.1. Admittedly, the petitioner/defendant No.2 is the purchaser from respondent No.2/defendant No.1 and hence he cannot have a better right than what his vendor had even while defending the suit. When respondent No.2/defendant No.1 has not raised objection to the marking of the document, the petitioner, who stepped into the former’s shoes and is claiming title through him, cannot plead that he is entitled to raise an objection with respect to the admissibility of Ex.A-1 once again. When respondent No.2/defendant No.1 has not raised objection to the marking of the document, the petitioner, who stepped into the former’s shoes and is claiming title through him, cannot plead that he is entitled to raise an objection with respect to the admissibility of Ex.A-1 once again. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the bar under Section 36 of the Act is squarely attracted in the case of the petitioner. Since the petitioner is not entitled to raise the objection regarding the admissibility of Ex.A-1, it is not necessary for this Court to delve into the aspect relating to the nature of the said document. For the above mentioned reasons, the Civil Revision Petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. As a sequel, C.R.P.M.P.No.651/2012 is disposed of as infructuous.