JUDGMENT Both these appeals have been preferred under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. A.O. No. 511/2011 has been filed with a delay of 631 days whereas A.O. No. 291/2011 has been filed with a delay of 690 days. Delay condonation applications have been filed under Section 5 of Indian Limitation Act, accompanied by affidavits seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeals. 2. Since reasons for delay in both the applications are common both the delay condonation applications are being decided by this common order. 3. It is stated in the affidavits of delay condonation applications that against the judgment and order dated 31.07.2009, legal opinion was obtained from the District Govt. Counsel (Civil) on 24.08.2009. Thereafter, the matter was sent to the office of Chief Engineer, Yamuna Valley Projects, Dehradun for seeking further instructions who referred the matter to the Chief Engineer/Head of the Department, Irrigation, Dehradun for further action. The Chief Engineer/ Head of the Department wrote to Addl. Secretary, Irrigation for seeking permission to file an appeal and the Secretary, Irrigation vide letter dated 05.02.2010 directed the Chief Engineer/Head of the Department to file an appeal before High Court, Uttarakhand. Thereafter, official of Superintending Engineer, Lakhwar Byasi Construction Circle contacted the office of Chief Standing Counsel for filing an appeal, where it was informed that appeal could be filed only after permission from the Law Department is granted. On the basis of advice of Chief Standing Counsel for the State, the Superintending Engineer requested the Chief Engineer, Yamuna Valley Projects to obtain required permission from the Law Department. It is further asserted that since the project was transferred to Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., some delay was also caused communicating them. Thereafter, the State Govt. vide order dated 08.09.2010 directed the Chief Engineer/Head of the Department to file an appeal before the District Judge, Dehradun. The matter was again referred to D.G.C. (Civil), Dehradun, who on 15.09.2010 opined that appeal is to be filed before the High Court and not before the District Judge. The State Govt. insisted to prefer appeal before the District Judge. Since, the D.G.C. (Civil), Dehradun expressed his inability to file appeal before the District Judge, Dehradun, a letter was written by the Executive Engineer to the Superintending Engineer on 15.10.2010 seeking permission to file appeal before the High Court. The State Govt. insisted to prefer appeal before the District Judge. Since, the D.G.C. (Civil), Dehradun expressed his inability to file appeal before the District Judge, Dehradun, a letter was written by the Executive Engineer to the Superintending Engineer on 15.10.2010 seeking permission to file appeal before the High Court. Thereafter, the Chief Engineer/Head of Department, Irrigation vide letter dated 18.11.2010 directed the Chief Engineer, Yamuna Valley Projects to file appeal before the District Judge, Dehradun. Thereafter, the Chief Engineer/ Head of Department was informed about the opinion of D.G.C. (Civil) regarding the forum, before whom an appeal was to be filed, who vide letter dated 04.12.2010 asked the Chief Engineer, Yamuna Valley Projects to obtain written opinion from D.G.C. (Civil), Dehradun. On 06.05.2011, the Superintending Engineer, Lakhwar Byasi Construction Circle requested to Executive Engineer to supply written opinion of the D.G.C. (Civil) and the D.G.C. (Civil) gave his opinion on 10.05.2011, which was sent to the Chief Engineer. On the basis of the opinion of D.G.C. (Civil) the Chief Engineer/Head of the Department vide letter dated 24.05.2011 requested the Addl. Secretary, Irrigation for seeking permission from the State Govt. to file appeal before this High Court. Thereafter, vide order dated 30.06.2011, the Law Department granted permission to file appeal before the High Court. Permission dated 30.06.2011 was received by the office of Head of the Department, Irrigation on 02.07.2011 and after receiving said permission the Pairokar of the Department contacted the office of Chief Standing Counsel at Nainital and the case file was allotted to State Law Officer on 04.07.2011 for preparing appeal, who also required some more information and documents. Thereafter, all the documents were collected and supplied to the State Law Officer, who prepared the appeal. Appeal was filed on 22.07.2011. 4. Shri T.A. Khan, Deputy Advocate General, for the applicant submitted that the delay in filing the appeals has been caused because of movement of papers through proper channel as also queries sought at different level, hence no wilful delay has been caused and whatever delay has been caused is unintended and is not deliberate. Relying upon paragraph-10 of the judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1623 learned Dy. Advocate General for the applicant/State contended that the Court should decide the matters on its merits. Relying upon paragraph-10 of the judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1623 learned Dy. Advocate General for the applicant/State contended that the Court should decide the matters on its merits. He also relied on the judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court, reported in (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 752 : ( AIR 2005 SC 2191 ), wherein the Hon’ble Court has held that The State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Hence, it cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. Public interest suffers if appeals by the State are lost because of such default. Court to decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. State should constitute legal cells to examine whether cases involve legal principles for decision by Court or require adjustment at governmental level. Officer concerned should be made personally responsible for the delay in filing the appeal. Learned Dy. Advocate General also relied paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 of the judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court, reported in (2008) 14 Supreme Court Cases 582 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 695). 12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh, ( AIR 1984 SC 1744 ) a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) a Bench of two Judges considered the question of limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The sufficient cause is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law expression in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court every days delay must be explained does not mean reiterated that the expression that a pedantic approach should be made. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court every days delay must be explained does not mean reiterated that the expression that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense, pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. 13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one is in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay was accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Prakash Kalra, (1987 SCC (Supp) 339) this Court had held that the Court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law. 5. The respondent has filed objection/ counter affidavit to the affidavit filed by the applicant/State in support of their delay condonation application in which it has been asserted sthat appeal ought to have been filed within 90 days from the date of order. It is asserted that D.G.C. (Civil) in his letter dated 24.8.2009 (annexure No. 1 to the delay condonation application) had specifically brought to the notice of the authorities that appeal against the order of the lower Court was to be filed within 90 days, even then the applicant did not make any sincere efforts in order to file an appeal within the period stipulated under law, moreover, act of the applicant/State clearly establishes that they moved papers from one authority to another in a most lack-luster manner without caring for the requirement of law. 6. Shri V. K. Kohli, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent contended that it is admitted to the applicant/State that the D.G.C. (Civil) gave his opinion on 24th August, 2009, but it is not mentioned as to when the order was sent to the Chief Engineer. He contended that no justification has been given for sleeping over the matter till 30th September, 2009 and there is no explanation in the intervening period w.e.f. 24th August, 2009 to 30th September, 2009. Similarly, there is no explanation in between 30th September, 2009 to 12th October, 2009. He contended that no justification has been given for sleeping over the matter till 30th September, 2009 and there is no explanation in the intervening period w.e.f. 24th August, 2009 to 30th September, 2009. Similarly, there is no explanation in between 30th September, 2009 to 12th October, 2009. He contended that the applicant has alleged that the Secretary (Irrigation) has directed the Chief Engineer to file an appeal before the high Court and the date of letter is 5th February, 2010, however, it has not been shown as to where the matter was lying from 14th October, 2009 to 4th February, 2010 and what action was taken during this period. He contends that Officers of Irrigation Department met the Standing Counsel for the State on 9th March, 2010, however, no explanation has been given for the period commencing from 6th February, 2010 to 8th March, 2010 and from 9th March, 2010 to 20th March, 2010. Similarly, there appears no explanation commencing from 21st March, 2010 to 7th June, 2010 and 9th June, 2010 to 7th September, 2010. He contended that when opinion of D.G.C. (Civil) dated 24.08.2009 was available with the Chief Engineer, Yamuna Project, hence re-reference dated 04.12.2010 by Chief Engineer Project was not required. He contended that period from 04.12.2010 to 10.05.2011 was wasted for obtaining the opinion of D.G.C. (Civil) and the period so lost is untenable in the eyes of law. He further contended that no cogent explanation has been given for the period from 3rd July, 2011 to 25th July, 2011. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent further contended that the delay was not bona fide and the grounds as set up, are not covered under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the delay condonation applications deserve to be rejected on this sole ground. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, reported in 2004 (55) ALR 539 : (2004 All LJ 2011) wherein the Division Bench has held that officials of State Government treat such matters leisurely and in a casual and cavalier manner, hence no indulgence can be shown by the Court for this. Learned Senior Advocate then relied upon paragraph 32 of the judgment of Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, reported in AIR 1991 Allahabad 229, wherein it has been held out that Every one seems to have taken the matter casually and at no stage did anyone show the least regard for the period of limitation as prescribed. What could this be called? It is not negligence? Will it not be inaction? The Division Bench has further held that The Supreme Court has said that no negligence or inaction ought to be imputable to the party which seeks condonation of delay. We find in this case that at every stage the Government officials have been negligent and guilty of inaction and, therefore, in our opinion the State is not entitled to any relief in this matter. Learned Senior Advocate then relied on the judgment of Allahabad High Court, reported in 1995 (26) ALR 584, wherein the Allahabad High Court has held out that State which was seeking condonation and not a private. The fact that it was the party was is altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay treatment when the 7. I have considered the rival contention of the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the law cited by respective parties. This is a peculiar case, where I have no hesitation to say that a casual and deliberate attempt was made to delay the filing of the appeals for a considerable period of 631 and 690 days respectively. On 24.08.2009 the D.G.C. (Civil) had specifically brought to the notice of the authorities that appeal against the order of the lower Court was to be filed within 90 days before the High Court, even then the applicant did not make any sincere efforts in order to file an appeal within the period stipulated under law and file was being moved from one place to another. In spite of clear opinion of D.G.C. (Civil) the State Government wrote to Chief Engineer on 08.09.2010 for filing appeal before the District Judge, Dehradun. It is not known why this was done. In spite of clear opinion of D.G.C. (Civil) the State Government wrote to Chief Engineer on 08.09.2010 for filing appeal before the District Judge, Dehradun. It is not known why this was done. From reading the correspondence available on record it is clear that papers were moved from one authority to another in a most apathetic manner without caring for the requirement of law. At every stage, delay was caused. It appears that this was done deliberately. In such facts, the law cited by the learned counsel for appellant does not help the appellant. The applicant/State cannot claim privilege. They are to be treated at par with the private individuals. In the case of condonation of delay the Court cannot exercise the jurisdiction in arbitrary, vague or fanciful manner, but on the established judicial principles. After expiry of the period of limitation, a right accrues to the other side and the Court ought not to be light hearted so to disturb the legal right. Considering the facts mentioned above, the delay condonation applications have no legs to stand, which are liable to be rejected. 8. Accordingly, the delay condonation applications (CLMA No. 7466/11 in A.O. No. 511 of 2011 and CLMA No. 7493/11 in A.O. No. 291 of 2011) are hereby rejected. 9. Consequently, the A.O. No. 511 of 2011 and A.O. No. 291 of 2011 are also dismissed being barred by time. 10. Stay applications (CLMA No. 7467/11 and CLMA No. 7494/11) also stand rejected. 11. Let a certified copy of this order be also placed on the connected A.O. No. 291 of 2011. Appeal dismissed.