JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Supplementary affidavit filed today, is taken on record. 2. Heard Sri Rakesh Pandey alongwith Sri Rishi Kant Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri K.R. Sirohi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Yogesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and Sri R.D.Singh, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 6 to 9. 3. Through this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 4.10.2012 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur in Revision No. 1210 (Naresh v. Mukhram), Revision No. 1297 (Mukhram v. Prabhu) and Revision No. 1298 (Surendra v. Prabhu). 4. Sri Rakesh Pandey alongwith Sri Rishi Kant Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the Revisions No. 1297 and 1298 were barred by time and there were also applications for condonation of delay but without issuing notice and without condoning the delay, revisions have been entertained and impugned order has been passed. In the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners, unless the delay is condoned, there could be no revision and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in allowing the revisions. 5. On a specific query made by the Court, from the learned counsel for the respondents, as to whether the submission of Sri Pandey is correct or incorrect, it has been stated that it appears, delay has not been condoned and the revision has been allowed. 6. The counsel for both the parties agreed for disposal of the writ petition, without any further exchange of affidavits, only on the basis of legal points involved in this case. 7. For appreciating the controversy involved in this case, it has to be seen as to whether, without condoning the delay, the revision could be allowed. Section 53 (b) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) which was brought in the Statute vide U.P. Act No. 38 of 1958, provides that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the applications, appeals, revisions and other proceedings under the Act or the Rules made thereunder. 8. Here in this case, the revisions were accompanied with applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for extending the period of limitation in preferring the revisions. 8. Here in this case, the revisions were accompanied with applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for extending the period of limitation in preferring the revisions. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides bar of limitation subject to provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Meaning thereby, if the limitation has been provided for approaching the Court and that period has expired, in that circumstance, Section 5 of the Limitation Act will to rescue of those who approaches the Court after expiry of the period of limitation, by making an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for extending the period of limitation or to condone the delay in approaching the Court. Once an application is filed for condonation of delay extending the period of limitation, then general principles has to be followed in consonance with the provisions contained under Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein it is provided that if the appeal is filed beyond the period of limitation, then it has to be accompanied with an application for condonation of delay and the Court dealing with such matter can reject the application if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and in case the Court finds that there is some substance, then, in that eventuality, notice has to be issued to otherside for having his version for disposal of Section 5 application and in no case, without issuing notice and without condoning the delay, the appeal can be decided. Although, in the Act, the provisions of Order 41, Rule 3-A of C.P.C. are not made applicable but I am of the view that the same analogy should be adopted here also. 9. Here in this case, admittedly, the revision was barred by time and it was accompanied with an application for condonation of delay, therefore, unless the delay was condoned, the revisions could not have been decided on merit as in the eye of law, unless the delay is condoned, there could be no revision. 10. 9. Here in this case, admittedly, the revision was barred by time and it was accompanied with an application for condonation of delay, therefore, unless the delay was condoned, the revisions could not have been decided on merit as in the eye of law, unless the delay is condoned, there could be no revision. 10. The view taken by me finds support from the decision of the Apex Court in Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. Jagdalpur, 2008 (14) SCC 445 , where the Apex Court has held as under : “ 32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation a Court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. 33. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: “3. Bar of Limitation.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not be set up as a defence.” Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up. In other words, even in the absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, the Court or authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation.” In V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and another, 2005 (4) SCC 613 , following observation has been made by the Apex Court. 20 “ The mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act is that it is the duty of the Court to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact that limitation has not been set up as a defence. 20 “ The mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act is that it is the duty of the Court to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact that limitation has not been set up as a defence. If a suit is ex facie barred by the law of limitation, a Court has no choice but to dismiss the same even if the defendant intentionally has not raised the plea of limitation.” In the case of Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup and others, (2009)6 SCC 194 , in paragraph 70, the Apex Court has held that in absence of any application for condonation of delay, the Court has no jurisdiction in terms of Section 3, Limitation Act, 1963 to entertain the application filed for setting aside of decree after expiry of period of limitation. In Ragho Singh v. Mohan Singh, 2001 (9) SCC 717 , the Apex Court has held as under : (6) “ We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Since it is not disputed that the appeal filed before the Additional Collector was beyond time by 10 days and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not filed for condonation of delay, there was no jurisdiction in the Additional Collector to allow that appeal. The appeal was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. The Board of Revenue before which the question of limitation was agitated was of the view that though an application for condonation of delay was not filed, the delay shall be deemed to have been condoned. This is patently erroneous. In this situation, the High Court was right in setting aside the judgment of the Additional Collector as also of the Board of Revenue. We find no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.” 11. In view of foregoing discussions, the controversy can be summarised as under: (i) When the statute provides limitation for approaching the Court and a person approaches the Court after the expiry of the period of limitation, then he has to approach the Court alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying extension of period of limitation or to condone the delay in approaching the Court. (ii) Once the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is filed and unless the delay is condoned, no order can be passed on merit. (iii) The delay cannot be condoned without having the version of otherside and for that, otherside is required to be noticed and heard. 12. Here in this case, admittedly, the revision was filed alongwith an application for condonation of delay and without condoning the delay, the revision has been decided, therefore the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in deciding the revision on merit without condoning the delay and the impugned order dated 4.10.2012 passed by him cannot be sustained, hence, it is hereby quashed. 13. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 14. The Deputy Director of Consolidation is directed to consider the applications for condonation of delay first and in case the delay is condoned, the revisions itself be decided expeditiously, but not later than six months from the date of decision on Section 5 applications. In case the application under Section 5 is rejected, the reason for the same may also be recorded. ——————