JUDGMENT 1. The appeal, in a matrimonial case, by the wife is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17.01.2000 passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Raipur in Civil Suit No. 13-A/1998 whereby and whereunder the appellant's petition filed under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act of 1955') for grant of divorce has been dismissed. 2. Facts of the case in brief are as under:- (i) Marriage between the appellant- Smt. Mamta Vaishnav and respondent - Govinddas Vaishnav was solemnized on 9.5.1993 at village Kirna, Raipur, as per Hindu Rites and Customs. Out of the wedlock, the couple was blessed with a daughter namely Rashim. (ii) According to the appellant, during her stay at her matrimonial home, she was subjected to cruelty by the respondent, his mother and sister; her mother-in-law and sister-in-law (respondent's sister) used to harass and torture the appellant for not bringing sufficient dowry; at their instance, the respondent also used to beat the appellant; in addition, the appellant was not provided adequate food, as a result of malnutrition, the appellant and her daughter fell ill; since there was a threat to the appellant and her daughter, she was constrained to leave the matrimonial home with her father on 4.8.1995. (iii) The respondent filed his written statement alleging therein that in fact the appellant left her matrimonial home on the eve of Tija festival on 4.8.1995 and even after a period of 15 days, she did not come to join her matrimonial home; when respondent approached her father repeatedly, he was merely assured that the appellant would join his company in the matrimonial home very soon, his repeated attempts to bring back the appellant proved futile; on this, the respondent sent a registered notice to the appellant asking her to join in his company in the matrimonial home and thereafter a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed for restitution of conjugal rights; the appellant was never subjected to cruelty by him or even by his family members; since she belongs to an urban background, therefore, she does not want to join his company in village Kirna. 3. 3. The trial Court framed the following issues: okn fo”k; ¼1½ D;k] vkosnd vukosnd ls dzwjrk ds vk/kkj ij ls fookg foPNsn dnus dk ik= gS \ ¼2½ D;k vkosnd vukosnd ls L=h/ku izkIr djus dh ik=rk j[krh gS\ ¼3½ lgk;rk ,oa okn&O;\ 4. The trial, vide its order dated 13.08.1999, has struck off the defence of the respondent as the respondent failed to deposit the amount of maintenance despite the order of the Court dated 29.01.1999. 5. The appellant examined herself as (A.W.l), Bharat Lal Vaishnav (A.W.2), Narendra Prasad Vaishnav (A.W.3) and Murli Das Vaishnav (A.W.4). The respondent did not examine any witness. 6. The trial Court, vide judgment and decree impugned, dismissed the divorce petition filed by the appellant/wife finding inter alia: appellant failed to establish cruelty on the part of the respondent. 7. Shri Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit: the trial Court did not appreciate the evidence of the appellant and of her witnesses in its proper perspective and the fact that respondent's defence has been struck off while dismissing the appellant's petition for divorce. According to the appellant's counsel, appellant has duly proved her case for grant of decree of divorce. 8. On the other hand, Shri H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate with Smt. Meera Jaiswal, learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment and decree and contended that averments made in the divorce petition itself are not sufficient to grant decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty, and therefore, despite fact that respondent's defence has been struck off, the trial Court has rightly dismissed the divorce petition filed by the appellant. 9. I have heard counsel for the parties, perused the record of the trial Court including judgment and decree impugned. 10. The question falls for consideration of this Court is whether the appellant/wife has mode out a case for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act? 11. Section 13 of the Act, which is useful for our present purpose, reads as under: "13. Divorce.- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party (i) xxxx (ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or" 12. Divorce.- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party (i) xxxx (ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or" 12. The Supreme Court, in the case of G.V.N. Kameswara Rao Vs. G. Jabilli (2002) 2 SCC 296, while interpreting cruelty within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Act of 1955, has held: cruelty can be said to be an act committed with the intention to cause sufferings to the opposite party, and observed in paras 9 and 10 of its judgment as under: "9. Under Section 13 (1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, on a petition presented either by the husband or the wife, the marriage could be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. "Cruelty" is not defined in the Act. Some of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act were amended by the Hindu Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. Prior to the amendment, "cruelty" was one of the grounds for judicial separation under Section 10 of the Act. Under that section, "cruelty" was given an extended meaning by using an adjectival phrase viz. "as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party". By the Amendment Act of 1976, "cruelty" was made one of the grounds for divorce under Section 13 and the relevant provision reads as follows: "13. Divorce.- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party- (i) * * * (i-a) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (i-b) * * * (ii)-(ix) * * * 10. The omission of the words, which described "cruelty" in the unamended Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, has some significance in the sense that it is not necessary to prove that the nature of the cruelty is such as to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful for the petitioner to live with the other party. English courts in some of the earlier decisions had attempted to define "cruelty" as an act which involves conduct of such a nature as to have caused damage to life, limb or health or to give rise to reasonable apprehension of such danger. But we do not think that such a degree of cruelty is required to be proved by the petitioner for obtaining a decree for divorce. Cruelty can be said to be an act committed with the intention to cause sufferings to the opposite party. Austerity of temper, rudeness of language, occasional outburst of anger, may not amount to cruelty, though it may amount to misconduct." 13. The existence of cruelty depends not on the magnitude but rather on the consequences of matrimonial offence of cruelty actual or apprehended. Personalities of the parties are an important element for the decision as to whether the status between the two spouses had been cruel. Cruelty as envisaged under the Act is not restricted to acts of physical violence and may extend to behaviour which may cause pain and injury to the mind as well as to render the continuance in matrimonial home an ordeal where it becomes impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress. The expression "cruelty" as envisaged under Section 13 of the Act clearly admits in its ambit and scope such acts which may even cause mental agony to aggrieved party. Cruelty may result where the complaining spouse establishes his/her being treated with cruelty whether physical, mental, social or otherwise but the acts complained of must be more serious than the ordinary wear and tear of marriage falling in the category of conscious acts cruel in nature as that is the underlying requirement of the provision. 14. The intention to be cruel is not an essential element of cruelty as envisaged under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act. If bitter waters are flowing it is not necessary to enquire from which source they spring. 14. The intention to be cruel is not an essential element of cruelty as envisaged under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act. If bitter waters are flowing it is not necessary to enquire from which source they spring. The intention or motive behind the cruelty has lost significance in the changed society and the social atmosphere of the present day. It is sufficient that if the cruelty is of the type which indicates that the relations between the spouses had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of one or the other that it has become impossible for them to live together without mental agony. In marital matters, the feelings and attitudes of minds are material. 15. Test of cruelty to be inferred by any conduct of spouse in its ordinary and natural meaning. Cruelty is not defined specifically. It is Courts responsibility to interpret analysis and define it. The allegations of ill-treatment, abusing indulgence in undesired activities, neglect of matrimonial obligations and driving out the wife out of her matrimonial home by her husband is mental cruelty. Mental cruelty causes grievous injury and creates reasonable apprehension of unsafe. 16. The Supreme Court in case of N.G. Dastane (Dr.) Vs. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326, observed in paras 24 to 26 as under: "24. The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason that under the Evidence Act, Section 3, a fact is said to be proved when the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies. Important issues like those which affect the status of parties demand a closer scrutiny than those like the loan on a promissory note: "the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue (2002) 2 SCC 296"; or as said by Lord Denning, "the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear". But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged. 25. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trials or trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi-criminal nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance of probabilities. If the probabilities are so nicely balanced that a reasonable, not a vascillating, mind cannot find where the preponderance lies, a doubt arises regarding the existence of the fact to be proved and the benefit of such reasonable doubt goes to the accused. It is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature. 26. Neither Section 10 of the Act which enumerates the grounds on which a petition for judicial separation may be presented nor Section 23 which governs the jurisdiction of the court to pass a decree in any proceeding under the Act requires that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 23 confers on the court the power to pass a decree if it is "satisfied" on matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of the section. Section 23 confers on the court the power to pass a decree if it is "satisfied" on matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of the section. Considering that proceedings under the Act are essentially of a civil nature, the word "satisfied" must mean "satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities" and not "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt". Section 23 does not alter the standard of proof in civil cases." 17. The High Court of Calcutta in case of Broja Kishore Ghosh Vs. Smt. Krishna Ghosh AIR 1989 Calcutta 327 observed in para 10 as under : "10. What acts would constitute mental cruelty depend upon the circumstances of each case e.g. environment, status in society, education, cultural development, local customs, social condition, physical and mental conditions of the parties. Each case depends upon a variety of facts and circumstances. Reference may be made among a host of decisions to one of our court reported in AIR 1978 Cal 87, Bijoli Chowdhury v. Sukomal Chowdhury. In fact, there is unanimity of judicial opinion that to constitute cruelty the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to make cohabitation virtually unendurable. It must be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of the married life" as Lord Asquith observed in Buchler v. Buchler, (1947) 1 All ER 319. Again the conduct complained of "must" be such that no reasonable person would tolerate it or consider that the complainant shall be called upon to endure it. Before conduct can be called cruel, it must touch a certain pitch of severity." 18. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in case of Gangadharan Vs. T.K. Thankam AIR 1988 Kerala 244, has held in para 19 as under : "19. In the statement of objects and reasons of the Amending Act of 1976, the object was stated to be liberalise the provisions relating to divorce (vide Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II Jan-April 1976 page 780), and therefore, it is difficult to agree with the view that the amendment was intended to restore the law as to cruelty as interpreted by English Courts. Therefore, the intention in brining the amendment could not have been to reintroduce the concept of danger of life or limb. Therefore, the intention in brining the amendment could not have been to reintroduce the concept of danger of life or limb. According to the amended provision, the courts have to interpret and analyse and define what would constitute cruelty depending upon many factors such asocial status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs, and traditions and come to its own conclusion that acts proved would amount to cruelty in a given case. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give an exhaustive description of the circumstances which would constitute cruelty. The amendment was brought on the basis of the 59th report of Law Commission which was prior to Dastane's case to the effect that it is sufficient to prove cruelty as a ground for divorce and leave it to the court on the facts of each case to decide whether the conduct amounts to cruelty. In our view the cruelty should be of such a nature as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress to entitle the party to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduce inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party." 19. The Supreme Court, in the case of Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddy (1988) 1 SCC 105, has held: the demand for dowry is prohibited under law. That by itself is a bad enough. That amounts to cruelty entitling the wife to get decree for dissolution. 20. The Supreme Court, in the case of Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddy (1988) 1 SCC 105, has held: the demand for dowry is prohibited under law. That by itself is a bad enough. That amounts to cruelty entitling the wife to get decree for dissolution. 20. Now reverting to the facts of the present case, it is crystal clear that as per the averments made in the divorce petition by the appellant and also the evidence adduced by the appellant as well as her witnesses, she was subjected to cruelty by the respondent, his mother and sister; her mother-in-law and sister-in-law (respondent's sister) used to harass and torture the appellant for not bringing sufficient dowry; at their instance, the respondent also used to beat the appellant; in addition, the appellant was not provided adequate food, as a result of malnutrition, the appellant and her daughter fell ill. 21. It is also pertinent to note that defence of the respondent has been struck off by the trial Court for non payment of maintenance; respondent did not adduce any evidence in support of the defence taken by him in the written statement. The statement of the appellant as well as her witnesses remain unrebutted. As per the submission of the appellant's counsel, which was also not controverted by the respondent's counsel, the petition filed by the respondent for restitution of conjugal rights has already been dismissed. The letter Ex.P.20 written by the appellant to her father and the letter of appellant's father to respondent's father also go to show, the respondent and his family members used to ill-treat the appellant. 22. The averments made in the petition with regard to demand of dowry and beatings by the husband and his family members to the appellant and the fact that appellant used to be kept without food are sufficient averments within the meaning of Order 6 Rule 4 of the C.P.C. and it cannot be said that the petition was bad for non-compliance of Order 6 Rule 4 of C.P.C. The Supreme Court in the case of Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddy (1988) 1 SCC 105 (supra) has already held: the demand dowry itself amounts to cruelty. Madhukar Reddy (1988) 1 SCC 105 (supra) has already held: the demand dowry itself amounts to cruelty. Further, if the appellant was given beatings by husband and her in-laws in lieu of demand of dowry, she was not provided adequate food and as a result malnutrition, the appellant and her daughter fell ill during the period of her stay with respondent, then the above facts itself amount to harassment and cruelty. 23. In the light of the fact that respondent's defence has been struck off during trial and again he has not paid the amount of maintenance to the appellant in accordance with the order passed by this Court on 16.10.2002, it can be reasonably inferred, appellant succeeded in discharging her initial burden to prove the ground of cruelty for grant of divorce. 24. The parties are living separately for a period of 17 years. The appellant was ill-treated by the respondent and his family members in lieu of demand of dowry. The above fact leaves no manner of doubt in my mind that the respondent is bent upon treating the appellant with cruelty. It is abundantly clear that the marriage between the parties is broken down irretrievably and there is no chance of their coming together or living together again, all efforts of reconciliation failed. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the marriage between the parties should be dissolved under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Act of 1955. 25. In view of foregoing, in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Court has erred in dismissing the petition filed by the appellant. 26. In the result, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed and the marriage between the parties is dissolved. The appellant is free to recover the amount of interim maintenance granted in her favour till decision of this appeal in accordance with law. 27. A decree be drawn accordingly. 28. No order as to costs. Appeal Allowed.