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2012 DIGILAW 251 (HP)

Pramod Kumar v. Ishwari Devi Justa

2012-05-04

RAJIV SHARMA

body2012
JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. Material facts necessary for the adjudication of this Civil Revision Petition are that the respondent-landlady (hereinafter referred to as "the landlady" for the sake of convenience) had filed an eviction petition against the petitioner-tenant (hereinafter referred to as "the tenant" for the sake of brevity) on 07.01.2003. It was assigned registration No. 7-2 of 2003. The petition was filed on the ground that the suit premises were urgently and bonafide required by the petitioner for her married son Sh. Rajiv Jasta, as the accommodation in the use and occupation of the petitioner at the ground floor of the building in question was not sufficient and the set occupied by the tenant is I Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. most convenient and suitable for the residence of her married son. It was also pleaded that Shri Rajiv Jasta was not occupying any accommodation in urban area of Shimla nor he vacated any accommodation in the said area. The petition was contested by the tenant on the ground of maintainability, cause of action, suppression of facts, non identification of premises in dispute and for want of verification and identification of the petition. The tenant has denied the relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. The tenant has also denied that the accommodation in question was required by her for bonafide requirement of her son. It was also denied that the accommodation in occupation of the landlady was insufficient and inadequate. During the pendency of the eviction petition, an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC for amending the reply was filed by the tenant. The same was allowed by the learned Rent Controller on 21.08.2006. According to the averments made in the amended reply, during the pendency of the petition, one of the tenants of the landlady, Sh. Jeet Ram has vacated the premises in the month of March, 2005 and handed over the vacant possession to the landlady. It was alleged that the said accommodation was suitable for the landlady. 2. Learned Rent Controller (V), Shimla framed the issues on 18.07.2003. Jeet Ram has vacated the premises in the month of March, 2005 and handed over the vacant possession to the landlady. It was alleged that the said accommodation was suitable for the landlady. 2. Learned Rent Controller (V), Shimla framed the issues on 18.07.2003. He allowed the eviction petition on 08.01.2007 and the tenant was ordered to be evicted from the premises, i.e., First Floor, Anand Bhawan, Anandale, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh The tenant was directed to handover the vacant possession of the demised premises to the landlady within a period of 90 days from the date of the order. The tenant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority (II), Shimla, Himachal Pradesh The same was dismissed by the learned Appellate Authority on 05.05.2010. Hence, this Civil Revision Petition against the judgment dated 05.05.2010. 3. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the tenant has strenuously argued that both the Courts below have mis-construed and mis-read the oral as well as documentary evidence. According to him, the landlady has failed to prove that the premises in question were required for her own occupation. He then argued that since one of the tenants, Shri Jeet Ram has vacated the premises in the month of March, 2005, the requirement of the landlady for additional accommodation was satisfied. He also argued that the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC and u/s 24(2) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act could not be rejected by the learned Appellate Authority. 4. Mr. Subhash Punshi, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the judgment dated 05.05.2010. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings and record carefully. 6. Husband of the landlady has appeared as PW-1. According to him, the family comprised of himself, his wife, his two sons, his daughter-in-law and one grand daughter. The premises in their occupation consist of three rooms (one dining, one drawing room and one bed room) one store room, two kitchens and two bath rooms-cum-toilets. According to him, the aforesaid accommodation is not sufficient for them as one of his son is married having one child. He has also testified that PW-4 neither owns nor occupying any tenanted residential premises in Shimla Urban area. 7. PW-2 Shri T.R. Sharma has also testified that the accommodation available with the landlady was insufficient for the family. 8. According to him, the aforesaid accommodation is not sufficient for them as one of his son is married having one child. He has also testified that PW-4 neither owns nor occupying any tenanted residential premises in Shimla Urban area. 7. PW-2 Shri T.R. Sharma has also testified that the accommodation available with the landlady was insufficient for the family. 8. Shri Rajeev Justa has appeared as PW-4. He has supported the version of PW-1. He has also testified that he is residing with his parents and other family members in the premises. The accommodation is not sufficient for their family. He has also testified that neither he owns nor in occupation of any tenanted residential premises. 9. Tenant has appeared as RW-1. He has testified that accommodation in possession of the landlady was sufficient and adequate for her family. He also deposed that one of the tenants, Shri Jeet Ram has vacated his tenanted premises and handed over the vacant possession to the landlady. 10. RW-2 Shri Om Parkash and RW-3 Shri Naresh Kumar have also supported the version of tenant. 11. What emerges from the evidence discussed hereinabove, is that the landlady is in possession of three rooms. The premises in occupation of the tenants comprises of three rooms. The landlady is living with her husband, one married son, daughter-in-law, grand daughter and an adult son. 12. The tenant, as noticed above, has also moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking amendment of the reply. The same was allowed by the learned Rent Controller on 21.08.2006. The tenant has taken an additional plea in the amended reply that one of the tenants of the landlady, namely, Shri Jeet Ram has vacated the premises and handed over the possession to the landlady in the month of March, 2005. 13. Shri Jeet Ram was only in occupation of one room. The sufficiency and adequacy of the premises has to be seen from the perspective of the landlord/landlady, the manner in which they have to use the accommodation to their suitability. The landlady has duly proved that additional accommodation was required for occupation of her son. The accommodation available with the landlady, including the premises vacated by Shri Jeet Ram is inadequate. The landlady cannot be forced to live in three rooms with her husband, married son and daughter-in-law and a grown up son. The landlady has duly proved that additional accommodation was required for occupation of her son. The accommodation available with the landlady, including the premises vacated by Shri Jeet Ram is inadequate. The landlady cannot be forced to live in three rooms with her husband, married son and daughter-in-law and a grown up son. The Courts below have correctly appreciated the evidence in right perspective while coming to the conclusion that the premises were bonafide required by the landlady for her son. 14. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, for the tenant has placed strong reliance on a judgment rendered by this Court in Miss Kamlesh Khanna Vs. Smt. Rupwanti, (1995) 1 ShimLC 93 . The facts of this case are distinguishable. In this case, son of the landlady Shri Kartar Singh was already residing in a tenanted house in Sital Niwas, Sanjauli. He was not residing with the landlady. In the instant case, it has come in the statement of PW-1 that PW-4 neither owns nor he is in occupation of any tenanted residential premises. It has also come in the statement of PW-1 that PW-4 resides with the landlady. It has also been pleaded by the landlady that PW-4 was dependent on the landlady, as far as residential accommodation is concerned. 15. Similarly, the judgment relied upon by Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the tenant, rendered by this Court in R.C. Verma Vs. Smt. Pushpa Rani and Another, (2001) 3 ShimLC 224 is also distinguishable, since in the instant case, it has also been specifically pleaded by the landlady that the petitioner was not occupying any other accommodation in the urban area of Shimla, except the accommodation mentioned in the plaint. This has been specifically stated in the petition and proved by the landlady. 16. The Apex Court as per the judgment dated 14.12.1994, rendered in Ishwari Devi (Smt) Vs. Sarla Devi (Smt) and Others, (1994) 5 SCALE 291 has held that the landlady was owner of the entire building known as "Anand Bhawan". A copy of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court was also placed on record. 16. The Apex Court as per the judgment dated 14.12.1994, rendered in Ishwari Devi (Smt) Vs. Sarla Devi (Smt) and Others, (1994) 5 SCALE 291 has held that the landlady was owner of the entire building known as "Anand Bhawan". A copy of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court was also placed on record. The Apex Court, as noticed above, has held that since Churu Ram, being the owner of the entire property, i.e., Anand Bhawan, has transferred the same in favour of landlady, the possession passed to her over the entire area whether it falls under Khasra No. 613 or Khasra No. 491. The finding recorded by both the Courts below about the landlady and tenant's relationship are affirmed. 17. According to Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, learned Appellate Authority has committed illegality in rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned Appellate authority has rightly rejected the application in view of the issue being finally determined by the Apex Court with regard to ownership of the landlady in S.L.P.) No. 14398 of 1994. The property has been correctly described in the decision. 18. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mrs. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar Vs. M/s. Traders and Agencies and another, (1996) 5 SCC 344 have held that landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. Their Lordships have further held that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live. Their Lordships have held as under: 20. As regards the 'Olympus' flat the evidence discloses, and it is not in dispute, that Eknath left that flat in October, 1972, and since then only Sridhar and his family members have been staying in that flat. It is a two bed room flat having an area of 1100 sq. ft. Sridhar has a wife and two children and the family of the appellant also consists of four persons. In the suit for eviction filed by the landlady of that flat a partial decree has been passed and Eknath has been ordered to hand over half the portion of that flat. Both Eknath and landlady have challenged the said partial decree and their respective appeals are pending before the Appellate Court. In the suit for eviction filed by the landlady of that flat a partial decree has been passed and Eknath has been ordered to hand over half the portion of that flat. Both Eknath and landlady have challenged the said partial decree and their respective appeals are pending before the Appellate Court. In this context the Courts had to consider whether it can be said that the appellant and Eknath are having suitable alternative accommodation and, therefore, the appellant's claim that she requires the suit premises for her occupation is not reasonable and bona fide. The Appellate Bench and the High Court considered the possibility of Eknath going back to that flat and occupying it along with Sridhar and also the possibility that in case the landlady's appeal is dismissed and Eknath's appeal is allowed the flat, in its entirely, will become available to Eknath and on that basis held that the appellant's claim that she requires the suit premises reasonably and bona fide is not true. As pointed out by this Court it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of residential requirement. If the landlord desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by his as a tenant or on any other basis either insecure or inconvenient it is not for the Courts to dictate him to continue to occupy such premises. Though Eknath continues to be the tenant of the 'Olympus' flat, as a matter of fact, it is being occupied exclusively by Sridhar and his family since October 1972. For this reason and also for the reason that because of the partial decree passed against him Eknath is now entitled to occupy the area of 550 sq. ft. only, it is difficult to appreciate how the Appellate Bench and the High Court could record a finding that the 'Olympus' flat is readily available to the appellant's husband and that the said accommodation will be quite sufficient and suitable for the appellant and her family. 19. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. ft. only, it is difficult to appreciate how the Appellate Bench and the High Court could record a finding that the 'Olympus' flat is readily available to the appellant's husband and that the said accommodation will be quite sufficient and suitable for the appellant and her family. 19. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507 their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that once the Court is satisfied of the bonafides of the need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court and the Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the Court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his need. Their Lordships have held as under: 13. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean 'in good faith : genuine'. The word 'genuine' means 'natural : not spurious : real : pure : sincere'. In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean 'good faith, without fraud or deceit'. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bona fide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the Court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the Court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. The Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the Court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. 20. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., (2000) 1 SCC 679 have held that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement for residential or business purposes and has complete freedom in the matter. Their Lordships have held as under: 10. The learned single Judge of the High Court while formulating first substantial question of law proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff-landlord admitted that there were number of plots, shops and houses in his possession. Their Lordships have held as under: 10. The learned single Judge of the High Court while formulating first substantial question of law proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff-landlord admitted that there were number of plots, shops and houses in his possession. We have been taken through the judgments of the Court below and we do not find any such admission. It is true that the plaintiff-landlord in his evidence stated that there were number of other shops and houses belonging to him but he made a categorical statement that his said houses and shops were not vacant and that suit premises is suitable for his business purpose. It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. [See. Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 . In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted. 21. In M.L. Prabhakar Vs. Rajiv Singal, AIR 2001 SC 522 their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that the suitability of the alternative accommodation has to be determined on the basis of convenience of the landlord and the members of his family, as well as the totality of their circumstances, including their professions, vocation, lifestyle, habits and background. Their Lordships have further held that the alternative accommodation must be suitable in the sense of size also and the landlord's family cannot be forced to split up. Their Lordships have held as under: 8. It is thus to be seen that the suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the totality of the circumstances including their profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background. 22. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Siddalingamma and Another Vs. Mamtha Shenoy, (Rent) 539 : (2001) 8 SCC 561 have held that the law does not demand that landlord be prevented from living in comfort in his own house and be forced to live in inadequate premises in order that tenant's occupancy of tenancy premises may be protected. Their Lordships have held as under: 9. Mamtha Shenoy, (Rent) 539 : (2001) 8 SCC 561 have held that the law does not demand that landlord be prevented from living in comfort in his own house and be forced to live in inadequate premises in order that tenant's occupancy of tenancy premises may be protected. Their Lordships have held as under: 9. Rent Control Legislation generally leans in favour of tenant: it is only the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of bond fide requirement of landlord for his own occupation or use of the tenanted accommodation which treats the landlord with some sympathy. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507 this Court has held that a bond fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere, honest desire in contra-distinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts, by placing himself in the place of the landlord, is, whether in the given facts proved by material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest? If the answer be in the positive the need is bona fide. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. If the landlord wishes live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself and dwell into lesser premises so as to protect the tenant's continued occupation in tenancy premises. In Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 this Court has held that bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 23. In Joginder Pal Vs. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 this Court has held that bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 23. In Joginder Pal Vs. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 , their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that the expression "for his own use" covers the requirement not only of the landlord but also of his normal "emanations". Their Lordships have held as under: 24. We are of the opinion that the expression for his own use as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. The expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation and to fulfil the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependant or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use. In the several decided cases referred to hereinabove we have found the pan materia provisions being interpreted so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband, sister, children including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and her son, nephew, coparceners, members of family and dependants and kith and kin in the requirement of landlord as "his" or "his own" requirement and user. Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. !f the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the Court shall with circumspection inquire: (i) whether the requirement of such person can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close inter-relation or identity nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the above said tests to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord's son who is a chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent. The landlord is not going to let out the premises to his son and though the son would run his office in the premises the possession would continue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the son would be the occupation by the landlord himself. It is the landlord who requires the premises for his son and in substance the user would be by landlord for his son's office. The case squarely falls within the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Savitri Sahay Vs. Sachidanand Prasad, (2002) 8 SCC 765 have held that the landlord can choose either or any of two or more tenanted premises and the choice of landlord not to be questioned by tenant. Their Lordships have held as under: 9. The next question which, however, arises is whether the conclusion of the High Court that the findings of the trial court were perverse can be said to be correct. Under normal circumstances if a landlord during the trial gets vacant possession of some other premises which are equally suitable and chooses to let them out on higher rent then it may be arguable that the need of the landlord, made out in the eviction petition, was not reasonable or in good faith. Under normal circumstances if a landlord during the trial gets vacant possession of some other premises which are equally suitable and chooses to let them out on higher rent then it may be arguable that the need of the landlord, made out in the eviction petition, was not reasonable or in good faith. However, as seen above, the said Act provides specifically, in explanation II, that even though a landlord may have two or more premises which have been let out, it is for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him or her and the tenant could not question such-preference. In this case, the appellant had indicated a preference for the flat occupied by the respondent. She had given a reason why she preferred this flat. She was an old lady. She therefore could not climb to the first floor and thus the two flats on the first floor were not suitable to her. The other flat on the southern side of this building faced a road which was a very busy road and would therefore be noisy. This particular flat faced the bungalow in which she has been residing for so many years and also faced an open piece of land belonging to her husband. The trial court accepts these reasons. The High Court has merely set aside the decree on the ground that the appellant had chosen not to occupy the three other flats which became available in the same building. In our view, explanation II to section 11(1)(c) permitted the landlord to ignore other premises and to prefer a particular premise. The appellant having made a preference cannot be forced to occupy other premises which may become available. Further the appellant was not required to keep those premises vacant because her eviction suit was pending, nor was there any duty cast on the appellant, under any provision of law, to offer those other premises to the respondent. If the respondent had so desired, he could have offered to vacate the flat preferred by the landlady and move into one of those other premises. If the appellant had refused to accept such an offer, it possibly could have been said that the landlady was merely seeking to get vacant possession in order to get higher rents. If the respondent had so desired, he could have offered to vacate the flat preferred by the landlady and move into one of those other premises. If the appellant had refused to accept such an offer, it possibly could have been said that the landlady was merely seeking to get vacant possession in order to get higher rents. In that case it could have been inferred that the need of the appellant was not genuine and/or in good faith. No such case has been made out. In view of the specific provision in the said Act the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have again reiterated in Akhileshwar Kumar and Others Vs. Mustaqim and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 462 that once the landlord proves his bonafides to the objective satisfaction of the court of facts, the choice of accommodation which would satisfy his requirement should be left to landlord's subjective choice and the Court cannot impose its own choice. Their Lordships have held as under: 4. So is the case with the availability of alternative accommodation, as opined by the High Court. There is a shop in respect of which a suit for eviction was filed to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2. The suit was compromised and the shop was got vacated. The shop is meant for the business of plaintiff No. 2. There is yet another shop constructed by the father of the plaintiffs which is situated over a septic tank but the same is almost inaccessible inasmuch as there is a deep ditch in front of the shop and that is why it is lying vacant and unutilized. Once it has been proved by a landlord that the suit accommodation is required bona fide by him for his own purpose and such satisfaction withstands the test of objective assessment by the court of facts then, choosing of the accommodation which would be reasonable to satisfy such requirement has to be left to the subjective choice of the needy. The court cannot thrust upon its own choice on the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. The alternative accommodation which have prevailed with the High Court are either not available to the plaintiff No. 1 or not suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. The court cannot thrust upon its own choice on the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. The alternative accommodation which have prevailed with the High Court are either not available to the plaintiff No. 1 or not suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. The approach of the High court that an accommodation got vacated to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2, who too is an educated unemployed, should be diverted or can be considered as relevant alternative accommodation to satisfy the requirement of plaintiff No. 1, another educated unemployed brother, cannot be countenanced. So also considering a shop situated over a septic tank and inaccessible on account of a ditch in front of the shop and hence lying vacant cannot be considered a suitable alternative to the suit shop which is situated in a marketing complex, is easily accessible and has been purchased by the plaintiffs to satisfy the felt need of one of them. 26. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pratap Rai Tanwani and Another Vs. Uttam Chand and Another, (2004) 8 SCC 490 have explained the term "bona fide requirement". Their Lordships have held as under: 12. One of the grounds for eviction contemplated by all the rent control legislations, which otherwise generally lean heavily in favour of the tenants, is the need of the owner landlord to have his own premises, residential or non-residential, for his own use or his own occupation. The expressions employed by different legislations may vary such as "bona fide requirement", "genuine need", "requires reasonably and in good faith", and so on. Whatever be the expression employed, the underlying legislative intent is one and that has been demonstrated in several judicial pronouncements of which we would like to refer to only three. 14. In Gulabbai v. Nairn Narsi Vohra reiterating the view taken in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan it was held that the words "reasonable requirement" undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. 15. Recently, in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. 15. Recently, in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta AIR 1999 SC 2507 this Court in a detailed judgment, dealing with this aspect, analysed the concept of bona fide requirement and said that the requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant refers to a state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of peeping into the mind of the landlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by placing himself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to himself- whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. We do not think that we can usefully add anything to the exposition of law of requirement for self-occupation than what has been already stated in the three precedents. 27. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chand and Another Vs. Dharam Das, (2005) 5 SCC 375 while interpreting the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control, Act, 1987 have held that Courts not to ordinarily deny relief to landlord who genuinely and bona fide requires tenanted premises for occupation by himself or members of his family. Their Lordships have also explained the terms "his own occupation", "for his own use" and "for occupation by himself. Their Lordships have held that these phrases are not to be assigned a narrow meaning and these phrases include requirements of members of family of landlord or those dependent on him. Their Lordships have held as under: 24. The expression 'his own occupation' as occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 3) is not to be assigned a narrow meaning. It has to be read liberally and given a practical meaning. 'His own occupation' does not mean occupation by the landlord alone and as an individual. Their Lordships have held as under: 24. The expression 'his own occupation' as occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 3) is not to be assigned a narrow meaning. It has to be read liberally and given a practical meaning. 'His own occupation' does not mean occupation by the landlord alone and as an individual. The expressions "for his own use" and "for occupation by himself as occurring in two other Rent Control Acts, have come up for the consideration of this Court in Joginder Pal Vs. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 and Dwarkaprasad Vs. Niranjan and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 549 . It was held that the requirement of members of family of the landlord or of the one who is dependent on the landlord, is the landlord's own requirement. Regard will be had to the social or socioreligious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region to which the landlord belongs, while interpreting such expressions. The requirement of the family members for residence is certainly the requirement by the landlord for 'his own occupation'. 25. Undoubtedly, the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 has been enacted for the purpose of providing for the control of rents and evictions because of paucity of accommodation in urban areas. The Rent Control Legislations, generally aim at preventing rackrenting and resorting to evictions by unscrupulous and greedy landlords, who take advantage of the shortage in availability of accommodations in cities and dictate their terms to the tenants and if they do not follow the dictates, subject them to eviction. The Rent Control Legislations are generally heavily loaded in favour of the tenants and the provision dealing with which the courts at times lean in favour of the landlords is the one which permits the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for his own occupation, residential or nonresidential. There are weak amongst the tenants as also amongst the landlords. There are weak amongst the tenants as also amongst the landlords. (See Joginder Pal's case, supra, paras 9 and 32) Take the case of a landlord knocking the doors of the court seeking its assistance for a roof over his head or for a reasonably comfortable living, when he is himself either in a rented accommodation or squeezing himself and his family members in a limited space, while the tenant protected by the Rent Control Law is comfortably occupying the premises of the landlord or a part thereof. Provisions like Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Act should be so interpreted as to advance the cause of justice instructed by the realities of life and practical wisdom. While the tenant needs to be protected, the courts would not ordinarily deny the relief to the landlord, who genuinely and bona fide requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for occupation by himself or for the members of his family, unless they feel convinced that the so-called requirement of the landlord was a ruse for getting rid of an inconvenient tenant or was otherwise mala fide and did not fall within the four corners of the ground for eviction provided by the law. 28. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment Dinesh Kumar Vs. Yusuf Ali, AIR 2010 SC 2679 have held that the landlord is best judge of his need, however, it should be real, genuine and not a pretext to evict tenant only for increasing rent. Their Lordships have held as under: 24. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even on question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of the courts below were vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter. (Vide Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 , Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 , Smt. Satya Gupta Alias Madhu Gupta Vs. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423 , Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., (2000) 1 SCC 679 and Molar Mal (Dead) Through L.Rs. Vs. M/s. Kay Iron Works(P) Ltd., (2000) 4 SCC 285 . 30. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 , Smt. Satya Gupta Alias Madhu Gupta Vs. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423 , Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., (2000) 1 SCC 679 and Molar Mal (Dead) Through L.Rs. Vs. M/s. Kay Iron Works(P) Ltd., (2000) 4 SCC 285 . 30. The High Court reached the conclusion that the landlord, in spite of the fact that he was owner of the suit premises could not be forced to continue his business in a shop of negligible area in a 'Gumti' made on platform on Nalla. Mere continuation of long tenancy could not be a ground to reject the case of bona fide need. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. No costs.