Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has filed the present Writ of Mandamus, praying for issuance of an order by this Court in directing the respondents to pay back wages from 28.10.2002 to 20.01.2005, Gratuity, Provident Fund amount, Pension and other terminal benefits. 2. According to the petitioner, he joined the services of the second respondent as Conductor during the year 1973. He was dismissed in the year 1983. He was reappointed by virtue of Section 18(1) Settlement of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on 27.04.1984. 3. The petitioner was charge sheeted on 19.01.2000 for alleged irregularities in issuance of tickets, when he was employed as Conductor in Tirupathur Depot. The allegation against him was that he failed to issue ticket to six passengers and misappropriated the collected amount. Though he furnished his explanation on 08.02.2000 and denied the charges, a domestic enquiry was conducted and the Enquiry Officer submitted his findings on 07.06.2002 holding that all the charges were proved against him. Finally, he was dismissed from service on 28.10.2002 based on the report of the Enquiry Officer. 4. It is not in dispute that as per Section 18(1) Settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 entered into between the petitioner and the Transport Corporation, he was reinstated in service as a fresh entrant on 09.04.1984 subject to the following conditions:- "(a). This appointment will be treated as a fresh one only for all purposes, and will be treated as a new entrant in the Pattukottai Azhagiri Transport Corporation Ltd. from the date on which he joins duty; (b). He is not entitled for the continuity of service for any purposes; and (c). He is not entitled for any backwages." 5. The petitioner reported for duty on 27.04.1984 and performed his duties till the date of dismissal on 20.10.2002. During the aforesaid period, he absented from service during the months of November 2001, March, May, June, July and August 2002 etc. He was also under suspension from service during the month of February 1999, January and February, 2002 in connection with ticket irregularities. Lastly, he was dismissed form service for the grave charges involving ticket resale and other ticket irregularities. 6. He was also under suspension from service during the month of February 1999, January and February, 2002 in connection with ticket irregularities. Lastly, he was dismissed form service for the grave charges involving ticket resale and other ticket irregularities. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contends that a Bonus Dispute relating to the period 2000-2001 of the respondents/Transport Corporation was pending before the Labour Commissioner, Chennai-600 006 and the Conciliation commenced on 30.03.2002 and at the time of dismissal of the petitioner on 28.10.2002, the dispute was pending. Therefore, the learned counsel submits that the petitioner is a concerned workman in the Bonus Dispute. As per Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in law, an approval should have been sought from the Commissioner of Labour, where the dispute is pending. 7. To lend support to the contention that 'if the approval from the competent authority is not obtained in terms of the ingredients of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act in regard to the dismissal of the petitioner on 28.10.2002, then the dismissal is ineffective and inoperative', the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2002(1) L.L.N. at Page 639 in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. -vs- Ram Gopal Sharma and others, wherein it is held as follows:- "The two Benches consisting of three learned Judges in (1) Strawboard Mfg. Co. v. Govind2 and (2) Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. S.N. Modak3 have taken the view that if the approval is not granted under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’), the order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date it was passed and, therefore, the employee becomes entitled to wages from the date of dismissal to the date of disapproval of the application. Another Bench of three learned Judges in Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand4 has expressed the contrary view that non-approval of the order of dismissal or failure to make application under Section 33(2)(b) would not render the order of dismissal inoperative; failure to apply for approval under Section 33(2)(b) would only render the employer liable to punishment under Section 31 of the Act and the remedy of the employee is either by way of a complaint under Section 33-A or by way of a reference under Section 10(1)(d) of the Act. It may be stated here itself that there was no reference in this decision to the two earlier decisions aforementioned. It is clear from the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) that the employer may pass an order of dismissal or discharge and at the same time make an application for approval of the action taken by him. If the approval is not granted under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date it was passed and failure to make application under Section 33(2)(b) would not render the order of dismissal inoperative. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if the order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33-A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33-A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33-A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33-A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of the statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2) (b), Section 33-A would be meaningless and futile. The said section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted. [1978 (1) L.L.N. 655 .....Overruled.]" 8. It is to be pointed out that though the petitioner originally was dismissed from service on 28.10.2002, an approval was not obtained from the competent authority for his dismissal. According to the petitioner, he attained superannuation on 20.01.2005 after completion of 58 years. [1978 (1) L.L.N. 655 .....Overruled.]" 8. It is to be pointed out that though the petitioner originally was dismissed from service on 28.10.2002, an approval was not obtained from the competent authority for his dismissal. According to the petitioner, he attained superannuation on 20.01.2005 after completion of 58 years. Even after his retirement on 20.01.2005, his Employer/Transport Corporation had not settled his legal dues. As such, he issued notices dated 24.04.2004 and 02.04.2005 to the Respondents/ Transport Corporation calling upon them to settle all the legal dues and pay pension to him. 9. The plea of the petitioner is also that the Trustees of the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Employees Pension Fund are to pay his pension as per Rules. In fact, he has sought for the payment of back wages to him from 28.10.2002 to 20.01.2005, gratuity, Provident Fund and other terminal amounts. 10. Conversely, the learned counsel for the Second Respondent/Transport Corporation, repelling the contentions of the petitioner's side, contends that ordinarily, in law, dismissed employee is not entitled to claim back wages and other benefits like Pension and Gratuity and in the instant case on hand, the petitioner is entitled to get the quantum of his share in respect of settlement of Provident Fund amount, if at all any amount is pending to his credit and also that he has to submit his retired check slip stating that 'no due is pending'. 11. A cursory glance of the counter filed by the second respondent does not expressly or impliedly mention or refer to any permission being sought for and obtained by the Transport Corporation in regard to the dismissal of the petitioner from service as per Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 from the competent authority, viz., the Commissioner of Labour, when there has been a Bonus Dispute relating to the period 2000-2001 has been pending before the Office of the Labour Commissioner, Chennai-6. 12. This Court, to prevent an aberration of justice and to promote substantial cause of justice, cites the following decisions:- i. In Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation-vs-Neethivilangan (AIR 2001 Supreme Court at Page 2369), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that 'while the employer has the discretion to initiate department enquiry and pass an order of dismissal or discharge against the workman, the order remains in an enquired state till the employer obtains order of approval from the Tribunal. ii. ii. In Kameshwar Rai, Son of Sri Sheonarayan Rai, Vinay Shankar Prasad, S/o. Sri Ayodhyaya Prasad, Rajesh Kumar, S/o. Sri Radha Sao and Braj Nandan Prasad, S/o. Late Laxmi Narayan Shrivastava -vs-The State of Bihar through Additional Secretary to the State Government, Welfare Department, Government of Bihar, Bihar State Scheduled Caste Co-operative Development through its Secretary, Administrator, Bihar State Scheduled Caste Co-operative Development Corporation Ltd. and Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Bihar State Schedule Caste Co-operative Development Corporation Ltd. and Sri A.C. Biswas, Administrator, Bihar State Schedule Caste Cooperative Development Corporation Ltd. -vs-The State of Bihar and Others [2009 (122) FLR 511], it is held that 'an employer will be required to seek approval/permission of authority, where dispute is pending'. iii. In the decision, Management of Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. -vs-Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (2007 L.L.R. at Page 35), this Court has held that 'a dismissal of an employee becomes non-est if the employer fails to take its approval during pendency of bonus dispute. iv. In Bhanvar Singh Pukhraj Singh Chauhan -vs-Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. (2008 L.L.R. at page 147), it is held that the dismissal of workman is rightly set aside when approval was not taken during the pendency of dispute. 14. In law, the relationship of an employer and employee is not legally terminated till approval of dismissal or discharge is granted by the competent authority under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By passing an order of dismissal or discharge, the de-facto relationship of an employer and employee might have come to an end, but not the de-jure relationship and in law, that can take place only when the competent authority/Tribunal accords its approval, in the considered opinion of this Court. 15. In order to seek umbrage of Section 33(2)(b), the workman should not only be a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but also he must be 'concerned in the dispute' pending before the authority referred to therein. As a matter of fact, every workman need not necessarily be a workman of concerned in the pending Industrial Dispute. As a matter of fact, every workman need not necessarily be a workman of concerned in the pending Industrial Dispute. In the present case on hand, when the seal of approval/permission admittedly has not been obtained from the Commissioner of Labour, Chennai-600 006, being the competent authority, in regard to the dismissal of the petitioner from service dated 20.10.2002, then his dismissal from service is inoperative and ineffective in the eye of law. Therefore, he is entitled to get all the consequential benefits as if he is deemed to be in service for the period from 27.04.1984 till his superannution on 20.01.2005 (original age of retirement at 58 years). Therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner succeeds. 16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The respondents are directed to pay backwages to the petitioner for the period from 28.10.2002 to 21.01.2005, Gratuity, Provident Fund amount, Pension and other terminal benefits, to which, he is legally entitled to, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.