Judgment :- 1. By consent of both sides, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 2. Petitioner is challenging the order of transfer dated 18.5.2012 issued by the first respondent transferring the petitioner from the first respondent Office at Neyveli to the second respondent office at Tuticorin. 3. The petitioner is working as Additional Chief Manager (Mechanical) i.e., Management Gr. I. The transfer order is challenged on the ground that the petitioner having been appointed in the first respondent office by order dated 15.7.1986 and the second respondent is the sister concern of the first respondent which has been established in the year 2008, petitioner cannot be transferred to the second respondent office without the consent of the petitioner. In the impugned order of transfer dated 18.5.2012, no relieving time is given and only reporting date is mentioned, whereas while passing the transfer orders on 26.4.2011 and 9.9.2011 to similarly placed persons, not only joining time was given, but also not less than ten days relieving time was given. It is the further case of the petitioner that being the General Secretary of the NLC Graduate Engineers Association, he filed W.P.No.30039 of 2011 and challenged the lateral induction to E6 to E8 A Grade as it reduces the chances of promotion to all officers. The first respondent has issued the transfer order due to which the petitioner is unable to conduct the case filed before this Court as General Secretary of the Association. The transfer order has been passed contrary to the appointment order given to the petitioner. 4. First respondent has filed counter affidavit contending that the petitioner is not transferred by way of punishment. The allegation of mala fide is only illusory i.e, without any proof and there is no protection for an officer bearer of the Association in seeking exemption from transfer, as the petitioner is serving in the Officer cadre, for whom Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has no application. In the writ petition filed by the petitioner as General Secretary of the Association, counter affidavit has been filed and the matter is listed for hearing and therefore he need not be in Neyveli as the case is being conducted at Chennai, which is a far of place and the petitioner can still conduct the case while serving at Tuticorin. In the writ petition filed by the petitioner as General Secretary of the Association, counter affidavit has been filed and the matter is listed for hearing and therefore he need not be in Neyveli as the case is being conducted at Chennai, which is a far of place and the petitioner can still conduct the case while serving at Tuticorin. The transfer order dated 18.5.2012 is not only transferring the petitioner but also transferring 29 other persons on similar grounds, i.e, without giving any relieving time and giving only 10 days time for reporting in the transferred place. There is no discrimination as alleged in the affidavit filed by the petitioner in granting relieving time. Further, the petitioner was not given any financial dealings to settle it for the grant of relieving time. 5. It is also contended that in the appointment order issued to the petitioner dated 15.7.1986 it is clearly stated that the headquarters of the petitioner will be normally at Neyveli and the petitioner will be subject to further such other terms and conditions of service, as may be prescribed by the company from time to time. In Clause 8(4) of the order it is stated that the petitioner is liable to be posted in any of the units of the integrated projects of NLC and the request for posting in any particular Unit of his choice will not be generally entertained. The petitioner was given promotion/higher scale of pay with effect from 1.7.2008 at the rate of Rs.17400-400-22300 and in the said order it is clearly stated that the petitioner is liable to be transferred to any Branch/Department/Unit/Subsidiary/Undertaking/Joint Venture of the Corporation situated anywhere in India. Petitioner having accepted the promotion/order fixing higher salary and receiving higher salary all these years, he cannot contend that he is not liable to be transferred to the second respondent Unit, which is a Subsidiary Unit of the first respondent Corporation. Now the petitioner is drawing over Rs.1.00 lakh per month as emoluments and he is disobeying the order of transfer to the second respondent Unit, which is only 400 kms away from Neyveli. The impugned order has been issued on public interest and on administrative reasons and there is no violation of any law or orders. The allegation of vindictiveness and mala fide are denied in the counter affidavit. The impugned order has been issued on public interest and on administrative reasons and there is no violation of any law or orders. The allegation of vindictiveness and mala fide are denied in the counter affidavit. Several decisions of this Court and the judgments of the Supreme Court are relied on in the counter affidavit to justify the order of transfer. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the second respondent being a separate entity, though with substantial share of the first respondent, petitioner cannot be transferred to the second respondent, which is contrary to the conditions of appointment. The order of transfer is tainted with mala fide i.e., without giving any time to get the petitioner relieved he was prevented from challenging the order of transfer before he was relieved and the said action of the first respondent is also discriminatory. The petitioner can be transferred to the second respondent unit on deputation that too only after getting his consent. The learned counsel heavily relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1970 (1) LLJ 492 (P.K.P.Bidi Factory v. O.L.Thenge) and other judgments in support of his contentions. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the impugned order dated 18.5.2012 was issued not only against the petitioner but also transferring 29 others on same condition stating that they will be relieved immediately and they shall report before the second respondent within ten days i.e, on or before 29.5.2012. Earlier orders dated 26.4.2011 and 9.9.2011, which the petitioner is relying on to show the discrimination of not granting relieving time has no application as the petitioner was not given any financial power to settle the same to get relieving time. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner having filed writ petition on 22.5.2012 even before the last date fixed for joining in the second respondent office, is not justified in contending that he was prevented from approaching this Court. The mala fide alleged against the first respondent is vague and unless specific plea of mala fide is made and established, transfer order cannot be interfered by the courts and the said issue is settled by the judgments of the Supreme Court and of this Court. The learned counsel also submitted that the appointment order dated 15.7.1986 empowers the first respondent to effect transfer of the petitioner. The learned counsel also submitted that the appointment order dated 15.7.1986 empowers the first respondent to effect transfer of the petitioner. The appointment order also states that the terms and conditions of the appointment is subject to variation as may be prescribed by the Company from time to time and the promotion order given to the petitioner specifically states that the petitioner is liable to be transferred to any Branch/Unit or Subsidiary situated anywhere in India and the petitioner having accepted promotion order and received higher salary from 1.7.2008 accepting the terms and conditions, he is estopped from challenging the order of transfer dated 18.5.2012. The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of this Court made in W.P.No.26640 of 2009 dated 10.2.2010 and submitted that similar transfer order transferring the petitioner therein to the second respondent Subsidiary Unit was already upheld by this Court giving a clear finding that the second respondent is a Subsidiary Unit of the first respondent and the said findings given by the learned Judge has become final and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief. 8. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned standing counsel for respondents. 9. The order dated 18.5.2012 was issued transferring 30 persons including petitioner from the first respondent Unit to the second respondent Subsidiary Unit. In the order it is stated that all the 30 persons will be relieved from the present Unit immediately and they shall report to the Chief Executive Officer of the second respondent at Tuticorin within a period of ten days i.e, on or before 29.5.2012. The petitioner has not given any reason as to why the petitioner is entitled to get relieving time. 10. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for petitioner is that due to the non-granting of relieving time petitioner was prevented from challenging the order of transfer. In the order of transfer it is stated that the petitioners and others should report before the second respondent on or before 29.5.2012. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, this writ petition was filed on 22.5.2012 i.e, seven days prior to expiry of the time to report for duty at the second respondent office. In the order of transfer it is stated that the petitioners and others should report before the second respondent on or before 29.5.2012. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, this writ petition was filed on 22.5.2012 i.e, seven days prior to expiry of the time to report for duty at the second respondent office. Thus, there is no justification on the part of the petitioner to contend that the petitioner was prevented from approaching this Court from challenging the transfer order. 11. The order of appointment issued to the petitioner on 15.7.1986 contains a clause for transfer and that the petitioner shall abide all other terms and conditions of service as may be prescribed by the Company from time to time. Clauses 7(1) to (3) and 8(4)(a) of the appointment order deals with the conditions of service, which read as follows: "7.1 Your Headquarters will be normally at Neyveli. 7.2 There is acute shortage of housing accommodation and it will not be possible to provide housing accommodation. However, subject to availability, you may be provided with accommodation in any of the hostels or unfurnished quarters for which rent and other charges, if any, will be recovered from you, besides charges for power and water, at the prescribed rates. 7.3 You will be subjected further to such other terms and conditions of service as may be prescribed by the Company from time to time. 8.4(a) As the Neyveli Lignite Corporation is an integrated project comprising the Mines, the Thermal Station, the Chemical Plants and the Common Servicing Units, you are liable to be posted in any of these units. Request for posting to any particular Unit of your choice will not be generally entertained." From the above clauses contained in the order of appointment which deal with conditions of service of the petitioner it is evident that the petitioner is liable to be transferred. It is the contention of the petitioner that the second respondent Unit was established only in the year 2008, therefore the petitioner cannot be transferred to the second respondent Unit and as such the petitioner cannot be transferred by applying clauses contained in the appointment order. 12. This court in W.P.No.26640 of 2009 order dated 10.2.2010 (TSSJ) when similar challenge was made, held that the second respondent is a Subsidiary of NLC, which came into existence from 26.5.2008. 12. This court in W.P.No.26640 of 2009 order dated 10.2.2010 (TSSJ) when similar challenge was made, held that the second respondent is a Subsidiary of NLC, which came into existence from 26.5.2008. The said finding given by this Court has become final. 13. Promotion was given to the petitioner on 30.4.2009 i.e, after establishment of the second respondent Subsidiary Unit of the first respondent. In the said order it is clearly stated in clause 4 that the petitioner is liable to be transferred to any Branch/Department/ Unit/Subsidiary situated anywhere in India. Petitioner was given such promotion with higher scale of pay from 1.7.2008. The said promotion order was accepted by the petitioner without any demur and he has been receiving the higher salary from 1.7.2008 all these years. Even now the petitioner has not challenged the clause contained in the said promotion order empowering the first respondent to transfer the petitioner to its Subsidiary Units. In the absence of any challenge and more particularly when the petitioner having accepted the promotion order and availed the benefits pursuant to the said order, he is not entitled to now contend that without his consent he cannot be transferred from the first respondent Unit to the second respondent Unit. If there is no such clause in the promotion order as well as in the appointment order dated 15.7.1986, petitioner may be justified in contending that without his consent he cannot be transferred from the first respondent Unit to the second respondent Unit. 14. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in 1970 (1) LLJ 492 (P.K.P.Bidi Factory v. O.L.Thenge) is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the said case the issue decided was that whether an employer can unilaterally transfer an employee to one Beedi factory to another Beedi factory without his consent. In paragraph 8 of the said judgment it is held that transfer of service from one employer to another employer can only be effected by a tripartite agreement between the employer, employee and the third party, the effect of which would be to terminate the original contract of service by mutual consent and to make a new contract between the employee and the third party. In para 9 of the judgment it is further held that if there is a consent expressed or implied, the employee can be transferred. 15. In para 9 of the judgment it is further held that if there is a consent expressed or implied, the employee can be transferred. 15. In this case, while issuing the order of promotion the petitioner was specifically informed that he is liable to be transferred to any Branch/Department/Unit (or) Subsidiary/Undertaking/Joint Venture of the Corporation situated anywhere in India. The petitioner accepted the said order of promotion and is availing the benefit. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner accepted the change of conditions of service by giving implied consent and the said promotion order given to the petitioner and the condition contained therein empowering the first respondent to transfer the petitioner is not challenged. 16. As stated supra, in W.P.No.26640 of 2006 dated 10.2.2010 this Court has given a categorical finding that the second respondent Unit is a Subsidiary Unit of NLC. The said finding has become final. 17. In the decision reported in (2001) 8 SCC 574 (National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd v. Shri Bhagwan) the Honourable Supreme Court considered the validity of transfer and the said challenge was dismissed by holding that the transfer order was made consistent with the terms and conditions embodied in the letter of appointment, which clearly states that every employee is liable to be transferred and posted at any place within its service and the contention that the employee can be posted at Corporate Office only and not to be posted in different Units was not accepted by the Honourable Supreme Court. In para 5 of the judgment it is held that unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of the statutory provision prohibiting any transfer, the Courts or Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders. 18. Further similar order of transfer transferring one C.Duraikannu, Chief Engineer (Civil) from the first respondent NLC to the second respondent Subsidiary Unit, which was challenged on similar grounds was upheld by this Court taking note of the promotion order given as in this case with a condition stating that the said person is also liable to be transferred to any Unit or Subsidiary. 19. 19. In the decision reported in (2003) 2 SCC 632 (P.U.Joshi v. Accountant General) the Honourable Supreme Court held that the employee has no right to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered into service for all purposes and the authority of the State is entitled to amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating to even an existing service. 20. Insofar as the allegation of mala fide in not granting time for relieving the petitioner and the petitioner having filed writ petition as General Secretary of the Association against the first respondent management, the said allegations are vague and without any substance. The writ petition filed by the petitioner as General Secretary of the Association is already admitted and pending. Petitioner's presence is not required at Neyveli to conduct the case. Not granting relieving time is also justified as the petitioner is not the only person transferred by the order dated 18.5.2012, but 29 other persons were also transferred to the second respondent Unit through the very same transfer order. Thus, there is no substance in the allegations of mala fide. 21. The proof of mala fide required in a case to sustain the said contention was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2006) 9 SCC 458 (Pushottam Kumar Jha v. State of Jharkhand). In the absence of any particulars specifying the grounds of mala fide and proof of mala fide alleged on the first respondent, the alleged ground raised to challenge the order of transfer on mala fide reasons is unsustainable. 22.(a) The decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in 1960 (1) LLJ 266 (Kundan Sugar Mills v. Ziya Uddin & Others) is not applicable to the facts of this case as the workman involved in the said case was 'workman' as defined under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. (b) The decision reported in 1963 (1) LLJ 282 (National Radio Corporation v. Their Workmen) is factually distinguishable as the workman, at the time of joining was fully aware of the fact that the factory was having any other branch and there was no condition mentioned in the appointment order that he will be liable to be transferred anywhere in India. (c) The decision relied on i.e, (1988) 2 SCC 351 (General Officer Commanding-in-Chief v. Dr.Subhash Chandra Yadav) was a decision rendered on the basis of Cantonment Funds Servants Rules, 1937 and the Rules were found to be ultra vires to Cantonments Act, 1924. (d) The decision reported in 1989 Supp (1) SCC 679 (Jawaharlal Nehru University v. K.S.Jawatkar) was rendered on the basis that the contract of service was entered into by the employee of the University making it either expressly or by implication enabling such transfer. In view of the said fact, the Honourable Supreme Court held that transfer cannot be ordered without the consent of the employee. (e) The decision of the Kerala High Court reported in 1979 (1) LLJ 139 (P.Pushpakaran v. Coir Board) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application as victimisation was proved in that case and due to the said reason the order of transfer was set aside. 23. Here in this case, the petitioner has neither established mala fide nor victimisation to quash the order of transfer, even though vague pleadings are made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. 24. 'Transfer is an incident of service' is a well settled proposition of law repeatedly held in the following decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in i) AIR 1993 SC 2486 (State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh Dhatt); ii) (1993) 4 SCC 357 : AIR 1993 SC 2444 (Union of India v. S.L.Abbas) iii) (2001) 8 SCC 574 (National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd v. Shri Bhagwan) iv) (2004) 11 SCC 402 (State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal); v) AIR 2004 SC 4850 : JT 2004 (9) SC 185 (Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Damodar Prasad Pandey); vi) AIR 2004 SC 4121 (State of U.P. v. Siya Ram); vii) (2006) 9 SCC 583 (S.C.Saxena v. Union of India); viii) (2007) 8 SCC 150 (Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P.); ix) (2007) 8 SCC 212 (Chief Commercial Manager, South Central Railway v. G.Ratnam); x) (2008) 9 SCC 345 (Government of A.P. v. G. Venkata Ratnam) xi) (2009) 3 SCC 124 (Novartis India Ltd. v. State of W.B.); xii) (2009) 11 SCC 678 (Tushar D.Bhatt v. State of Gujarat); xiii) (2010) 13 SCC 306 (State of Haryana v. Kashmir Singh); xiv) (2011) 12 SCC 137 (Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Madras v. R.Perachi); and of this Court in a) W.A.No.282 of 2009, Judgment dated 18.3.2009; b) (2006) 2 MLJ 140 (T.Jagadeesan v. Director General, Central Industrial Security Force, New Delhi); c) (2006) 2 MLJ 474 (A. Chinnasamy v. District Collector, Salem); d) (2006) 4 MLJ 1197 (Management, Gedee Weller Pvt Ltd., Coimbatore v. P.Swaminathan); e) (2007) 3 MLJ 290 (P.Samraj v. Commissioner of Police); f) (2008) 4 MLJ 538 (Dr.M.Ponnuswamy v. University of Madras); g) (2009) 2 MLJ 814 (Jayapaul Mohan v. Engineer-in-Chief and Chief Engineer (General) Water Resources Organisation, PWD, Chennai), confirmed in W.A.No.489/2009 dt.23.7.2009; and h) (2011) WLR 676 (H.Rahothuman & Others v. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Villupuram) Ltd. & Another). 25. Applying the principles laid down in the above decisions to the facts of this case, I hold, there is no illegality in the impugned order of transfer dated 18.5.2012. Consequently the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.