JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This is landlord’s writ petition who is aggrieved by judgment and order dated 30.10.2000 passed by District Judge, Jhansi in Rent Control Appeal No. 10 of 1997. The Appellate Court while allowing appeal has set aside judgment and order dated 10.2.1999 of Prescribed Authority and has remanded matter to consider landlord’s release application afresh in the light of observations made in appellate judgment. 2. The dispute relates to shop No. 27 situated at Subhashganj, Jhansi. The shop is on the ground floor of building and owned by petitioner. The respondent No. 3, Lalit Kumar Jain, is tenant of aforesaid shop on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. 3. The petitioner filed an application under Section 21(1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “Act 1972”) registered as Case No. 13 of 1997 before Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Jhansi stating that respondent-tenant is not doing any business while on the other hand petitioner-landlord is unemployed and wants aforesaid shop to be released so that he may start his own business therein. 4. The respondent No. 3 contested application alleging that petitioner-landlord is running a huge business of transport and has also other business i.e. STD shop etc. He is also running a confectionery factory. He used to make biscuits etc and therefore, his contention that he is unemployed is false and incorrect. There is no genuine need of shop for alleged self-employment of landlord and therefore, application deserves to be rejected. 5. The Prescribed Authority allowed application vide judgment and order dated 10.2.1999 and released shop in question in favour of landlord directing respondent No. 3-tenant to vacate the same. It also held that tenant shall be entitled for payment of rent of three years i.e. Rs. 2400/-. 6. The respondent filed Rent Control Appeal No. 10 of 1999. During pendency of appeal, he filed application requesting Appellate Court to admit certain additional evidence which was rejected by District Judge, Jhansi by order dated 29.1.2000 whereupon he came to this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9805 of 2005 which was allowed and Appellate Court was directed to admit documents filed by respondent No. 3 as additional evidence. During pendency of appeal, he filed application requesting Appellate Court to admit certain additional evidence which was rejected by District Judge, Jhansi by order dated 29.1.2000 whereupon he came to this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9805 of 2005 which was allowed and Appellate Court was directed to admit documents filed by respondent No. 3 as additional evidence. The relevant extract of the judgment dated 28.8.2000 is as under: “The petitioner filed an affidavit stating that the notice was not given as provided under the first proviso of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. He filed an affidavit in support of his contention. This plea was not taken before the Prescribed Authority. The Appellate Authority rightly on examining all aspects did not accept the same as additional evidence. The petitioner also filed certain other documents to prove the case of the landlord-respondent namely photographs and assessment list of shop running in the name of Kishan Lal. The Court has rejected these documents. The question as to whether these documents are relevant is still to be considered when the appeal is decided on merits. The landlord-respondent may file evidence of affidavit in rebuttal. In view of the above, the writ petition is partly allowed and the impugned order dated 29.1.2000 is quashed only in respect of certain documents to be admitted in evidence as observed above.” 7. Thereafter, again respondent No. 3 appears to have moved an application requesting Appellate Court to entertain certain documents and to lead evidence which was also rejected by District Judge, Jhansi by order dated 28.4.2000. The respondent No. 3 again came to this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20530 of 2000. This writ petition was disposed of vide judgment dated 2.5.2000 with the following directions : “Shri Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the affidavit has already been filed alongwith an application moved on 3.12.1999 and therefore, there was no occasion to give fresh affidavit. On the other hand, Shri Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 opposed the prayer and submitted that the hearing of the appeal is fixed on 4.5.2000 and the petitioner with a view to delay the disposal of the appeal had filed frivolous application which has rightly been rejected. On the other hand, Shri Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 opposed the prayer and submitted that the hearing of the appeal is fixed on 4.5.2000 and the petitioner with a view to delay the disposal of the appeal had filed frivolous application which has rightly been rejected. Be that as it may, this writ petition is being dispose of at this stage with the observation that if the affidavit in support of the documents said to have been filed, is already on record the learned District Judge will consider its admissibility as evidence. With the aforesaid observation, the writ petition stands finally disposed of.” (emphasis added) 8. The appellate Court now has remanded the case by setting aside Prescribed Authority’s order observing that question of maintainability under Section 21 (1) (a) of Act, 1972 should also be considered by Prescribed Authority after considering question of notice whether given by landlord to tenant as contemplated under Proviso 1st to Section 21 (1) (a) of Act 1972 and thereafter, decide the matter afresh. 9. From the judgment it appears that landlord Deep Kumar, purchased shop in question vide sale-deed dated 28.12.1988. The respondent No. 3 was already a tenant in shop in question since the time of erstwhile owner and therefore, continued as such even after the sale and transfer of shop in question to the petitioner Deep Kumar. 10. The landlord claimed to have sent a notice dated 21.2.1989 to respondent No. 3, a copy whereof is on record as Annexure 11 to writ petition. It says that shop has been purchased by Deep Kumar, petitioner from its erstwhile owner Badri Prasad, Son of Dayal, for personal use and therefore, after expiry of six months, the shop should be vacated by respondent No. 3. The aforesaid notice was received by respondent No. 3 who also tendered reply through his counsel Shri R.K. Agarwal, Advocate. 11. The tenant thereafter took a plea that six months notice after expiry of three years period as contemplated in Proviso to Section 21 was not given by subsequent purchaser and therefore, application for release of accommodation under Section 21 (1) (a) of the said Act was not maintainable. 12. From the record, it emerges that question of want of notice came to be agitated before appellate Court in view of subsequent admission of documents/evidence during pendency of the appeal. 13. 12. From the record, it emerges that question of want of notice came to be agitated before appellate Court in view of subsequent admission of documents/evidence during pendency of the appeal. 13. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that question of notice was never raised by tenant before Trial Court initially and hence, he is estopped from raising this dispute which involves investigation into facts. However, I find no substance in the argument. It is not in dispute that petitioner landlord is a subsequent purchaser of tenanted accommodation in question and at the time of purchase, respondent-tenant was already in possession of disputed shop. Proviso to Section 21(1) (a) of Act 1972 reads as under : “Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years:” 14. It is evident that embargo created by proviso is applicable on Court. It restrains the Court itself from entertaining an application founded on the ground under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21, if filed by a landlord who has acquired this status after purchasing the tenanted accommodation subsequently, while tenant was already in accommodation of the building. It says unless a period of three years from the date of purchase has elapsed and that landlord had given a notice in that behalf to tenant not less than six months before such application no such application shall be entertained. It however, further provides that six months notice before filing of application may be given by subsequent purchaser of building even before expiration of period of three years. If there is any want of notice under Section 21 (1) (a) of proviso Ist of Act 1972, the Court itself is not competent to entertain an application founded on the ground under Section 21(1)(a) hence, whether this objection has been raised by one or the other party or not has no such relevance. If there is any want of notice under Section 21 (1) (a) of proviso Ist of Act 1972, the Court itself is not competent to entertain an application founded on the ground under Section 21(1)(a) hence, whether this objection has been raised by one or the other party or not has no such relevance. It is a jurisdictional issue, and can be seen at any stage unless it is a case of waiver of notice on the part of tenant. 15. At the first instance, necessary facts to show compliance of Section 21 (1) (a) Proviso must be set out by landlord himself in his application if he is a subsequent purchaser and on those facts only the Court may entertain an application, if finds it in order but if those facts are disputed at any stage, Court will be under an obligation to find out correctness of claim set up by landlord about compliance of Section 21 (1) (a) Proviso and only when it is satisfied that landlord has complied, it can proceed further and not otherwise. In the present case, these relevant facts were not at all stated by petitioner in his application filed under Section 21 (1) (a)of Act 1972. It is evident from his application, a copy whereof is on record as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. 16. It is also true that in written statement filed by tenant, a copy whereof is Annexure 3 to writ petition, there is no such averment that the requirement of proviso to Section 21 (1) (a) of Act 1972 has not been satisfied. Be that as it may, this objection sought to be raised by tenant vide his application dated 17.12.1998 by seeking amendment in written statement but was rejected by Trial Court on 4.1.1999. Thereafter, the Trial Court in close proximity thereto, decided landlord’s application filed on 10.2.1999. Be that as it may, this objection sought to be raised by tenant vide his application dated 17.12.1998 by seeking amendment in written statement but was rejected by Trial Court on 4.1.1999. Thereafter, the Trial Court in close proximity thereto, decided landlord’s application filed on 10.2.1999. It is true that tenant’s amendment application was rejected by Trial Court but once this fact was brought to the notice that landlord was a subsequent purchaser, it was incumbent upon Trial Court to find out from landlord as to why these necessary facts were not stated by him in his application filed under Section 21(1)(a) of Act 1972 to demonstrate that he has complied with the requirements of Proviso enabling the Court to entertain his application for the reason that this embargo is on the Court and not upon defendant. Unfortunately the Trial Court missed to consider this aspect and simply proceeded to decide petitioner-landlord’s application filed under Section 21(1) (a) by virtual exclusion and omission of Proviso to Section 21 (1)(a) of Act 1972. 17. Thereon the tenant filed appeal in which he raised this ground that as required vide Proviso to Section 21 (a)(a), six months notice has not been given to him. On this aspect, he also sought permission of Appellate Court to admit certain documents and also sought amendment in written statement as is evident from his application dated 4.2.2000 (Annexure 7 to writ petition). This application registered as Paper No. 31-C was rejected by District Judge, Jhansi on ground that this plea was not taken by tenant earlier and since his application for amendment was already rejected by Trial Court also, therefore, the same cannot be permitted at the appellate stage. Against Appellate Court’s order dated 21.1.2000 rejecting tenant’s application No. 31-C, he (the tenant) preferred writ petition which was partly allowed vide judgment dated 28.2.2000. This Court however, took the view that since this plea was not raised before Prescribed Authority, the Appellate Court has rightly declined to accept additional evidence in respect to the plea of notice under Proviso to Section 21 (1) (a). In respect to other documents, this Court observed that relevancy of those documents would be examined by Appellate Court. The tenant was permitted to adduce those documents before Appellate Court and the same were directed to be admitted as evidence at the appellate stage. 18. In respect to other documents, this Court observed that relevancy of those documents would be examined by Appellate Court. The tenant was permitted to adduce those documents before Appellate Court and the same were directed to be admitted as evidence at the appellate stage. 18. Be that as it may, this Court has no manner of doubt that whenever issue regarding non-compliance of Provision to Section 21 (1) (a) is raised, landlord has to satisfy the Court about its compliance otherwise his application under Section 21(1) (a) itself would be liable to be dismissed as not entertainable. The provision is mandatory and takes away the jurisdiction of the Court in entertaining landlord’s application if its requirement is not satisfied. 19. In the present case, at the time when respondent-tenant filed amendment application before Trial Court, while contesting the same, petitioner-landlord had filed copy of notice dated 21.2.1989 which is said to have been given to tenant in purported compliance of Section 21 (1) (a) 1st proviso. The notice therefore, was already a part of record before the Appellate Court. It is said that another notice dated 7.10.1996 was served by petitioner-landlord upon tenant determining his tenancy and gives 30 days for vacation of shop in dispute. There is also on record a reply said to have been given by respondent No. 3 on 21.3.1989 to the notice dated 21.2.1989. Another reply is dated 11.10.1996 to the notice dated 7.10.1996. Copies of notices therefore, were on record. The Appellate Court could have looked into the aforesaid notices to find out whether, ex-facie, the same satisfy requirement of Proviso to Section 21 (1) (a) or not. If there is a dispute regarding service upon tenant and matter requires evidence from parties, it could have found it necessary to remand the matter but not otherwise. A power of remand should not be resorted to shirk away own responsibility of adjudication when a Court is exercising a concurrent jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of appellate Court as a Court of fact is same as that of Trial Court. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Court also could have admitted additional evidence from the parties concerned at the appellate stage itself. This by itself cannot be a ground to remand the matter. 20. An order of remand ought not have been passed in routine course. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Court also could have admitted additional evidence from the parties concerned at the appellate stage itself. This by itself cannot be a ground to remand the matter. 20. An order of remand ought not have been passed in routine course. The appellate Court must consider the matter with more seriousness if finds that order of Court below cannot be sustained at all, then, after demonstrating and discussing the same, it ought to have passed an order by itself. When the entire material on record is available the appellate Court ought not have remanded the matter but should have decided at its own level. An order of remand is normally passed when something not evident from record has to be seen. 21. This Court in M/s Nehru Steel Rolling Mills, Muzaffarnagar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, 1993 UPTC 407 (Hon’ble M. Katju, J. as His Lordship then was) while considering the correctness of an order passed by Sales Tax Tribunal remanding the matter to Deputy Commissioner observed as under : “In my opinion a remand order should not be readily made, and it should only be made when for very strong reasons the authority cannot itself dispose of the matter on merits. It seems that these remand orders were made by the authorities merely to get rid of the case so that the authority could avoid going into the matter deeply and deciding the issue once and for all. This kind of attitude is to be deprecated.” 22. Again in M/s Abid Hasan Watch Company, Varanasi v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, 1995 UPTC 1035, this Court observed in paras 8, 9 and 10 as under : “(8) The procedural law regarding remand may be stated. It is this that Appeal Court may remand a case if it has been decided on a preliminary point and said judgment of lower Court is set aside in appeal by the Appeal Court. It may again send the case to lower Court with directions in case it is necessary in the interest of justice. Another contingency is where the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered necessary, the Appellate Court can remand the case to decide specific issue or issues. Another contingency is where the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered necessary, the Appellate Court can remand the case to decide specific issue or issues. The Appellate Court may also frame issue or issues for determination after remand. In such a case additional evidence may also be directed to be taken. Otherwise the evidence already on record will again be read. (9) If, however, the evidence on record is sufficient to enable to Appellate Court to pronounce judgment, the Appellate Court may after resettling the issues, if necessary, finally determine the suit. (10) I would now deal with a few situations where remand or a prayer for it should be frowned upon. It is in exceptional cases that remand may be ordered, like when there has been no real trial. Mere insufficiency of evidence is no ground for allowing a party to adduce further evidence on remand. If there is insufficiency of evidence for any party to prove his case, he will suffer. Remand with a view to enable a party to fill up lacuna in evidence is not permissible. In protracted litigation the remand should not be resorted to on 4 the ground that final curtain should be drawn.” 23. The question has also been considered by Apex Court in a catena of cases and it will be useful to refer some recent judgments. In Ashwin kumar K. Patel v. Upendra J. Patel and others, AIR 1999 SC 1125 , the Apex Court held that even the High Court should not remand a case under Order 41 Rule 23 C.P.C. to lower Court merely if some reasoning of the lower Court is wrong, since it leads to unnecessary delay and cause prejudice to the parties. If the material is available, the High Court should decide the matter itself since it can consider all the aspects. The relevant observations as contained in para 7 are reproduced as under : 7. “In our view, the High Court should not ordinarily remand a case under Order 41, Rule 23, C.P.C. to the lower Court merely because it considered that the reasoning of the lower Court in some respects was wrong. Such remand orders lead to unnecessary delays and cause prejudice to the parties to the case. “In our view, the High Court should not ordinarily remand a case under Order 41, Rule 23, C.P.C. to the lower Court merely because it considered that the reasoning of the lower Court in some respects was wrong. Such remand orders lead to unnecessary delays and cause prejudice to the parties to the case. When the material was available before the High Court, it should have itself decided the appeal one way or other. It could have considered the various aspects of the case mentioned in the order of the trial Court and considered whether the order of the trial Court ought to be confirmed or reversed or modified.” 24. Recently, in Pushpa Devi and another v. Binod Kumar Gupta and another, AIR 2004 SC 1239 , it was held, if the entire material is available and the parties have raised all issues before the Appellate Court, it should not remand the matter but decide on its own. 25. In M/s S.P. Builders and others v. Chairman, Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal Allahabad and others, 2006(8) ADJ 586 , this Court while considering when an order of remand can be passed, has said: “. . . . . the Appellate Tribunal is not a body of limited jurisdiction. It exercise power coextensive with the Tribunal itself. In these circumstances, if there was no want of any relevant material, if the Tribunal has not discussed some issues properly, it was open to the Appellate Tribunal to consider itself all such issues and to decide the matter but, that, by itself, cannot be a reason to remand the matter to the Tribunal.” 26. On the question of remand and the manner it should be exercised, the view I have taken here has already been expressed in Ram Swaroop Singh v. State of U.P. Through Collector, Bijnor and another, 2011(9) ADJ 500 . The appellate Court’s judgment unfortunately has noticed the implication of requirement of compliance of Proviso to Section 21 (1) (a) where the building in dispute has came to be acquired by landlord subsequently, when the tenant was already in its occupation but then instead of proceeding itself to look into the matter when the relevant documents were already on record, it has simply chosen to remand the matter. Had the appellate Court would have gone through the very notice said to have been given by landlord to the respondent No. 1 from 1.2.1998 to find out whether requirement of Proviso to Section 21 (1) (a), the things would have been cleared. The Appellate Court in my view, has illegally passed the impugned order by remanding the case to Trial Court so as to unnecessarily prolong the proceedings though the issue which it had required the Trial Court to look into, could have been considered and adjudicated by Appellate Court itself since necessary documents are already on record. 27. It is interesting to note that regarding the notice and reply by respondent No. 3, the petitioner has made averments in para 13 of the writ petition which have not been denied by respondent No. 3 in para 8 of his counter-affidavit and once it is evident that notice dated 21.2.1989 was replied by tenant on 21.3.1989, the question of any dispute about service of this notice cannot arise at all and thus there would have been no justification in the entire facts and circumstances to allow any further delay in the matter by remanding it to Trial Court. 28. In the circumstances, I set aside appellate Court’s judgment dated 30.5.2000. Since the question of compliance of Proviso to Section 21 (1) (a), the matter has not been adjudicated by the Courts below at all therefore, instead of looking into this aspect at this level, treated as Court of first instance or the Court of fact, I find it appropriate that it should first be examined by a Court of fact, i.e. Appellate Court. This process would also save any unnecessary delay in the matter. 29. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned Appellate Court’s judgment and order dated 30.5.2000 is, hereby, set aside. The Appellate Court is directed to consider Rent Control Appeal No. 10 of 1999 of respondent No. 3 in the light of observations and directions made above, and decide the same expeditiously but not later than six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order, subject to other business of the Court. 30. The petitioner shall be entitled to costs which I quantify to Rs. 10,000/-. ——————