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2012 DIGILAW 254 (HP)

Vinod alias Raja v. Joginder Kaur

2012-05-07

KURIAN JOSEPH, SURINDER SINGH, V.K.AHUJA

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JUDGMENT Justice Kurian Joseph, C.J. Whether in view of the notification dated 10.10.2006, issued by the State Government under Section 24 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, every order passed by the Rent Controller is appealable, if not, what orders passed by the Rent Controller are appealable is the question referred to the Larger Bench. 2.Section 24 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, (hereinafter called the ‘Act’) provides for “Vesting of Appellate Authority on officers by the State Government”. The provision reads as follows: “Sec. 24 (1)(a) The State Government may, by a general or special order, by notification, confer on such officers and authorities, as it thinks fit, the powers of Appellate Authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.(b)Save as otherwise provided in this Act, any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller, except the orders for the recovery of possession made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Sec. 16, may, within fifteen days from the date of such order or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing, prefer an appeal in writing to the Appellate Authority having jurisdiction. (in computing the period of fifteen days, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded).(2)On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal.(3)The Appellate authority shall decide the appeal after sending for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Controller.(4)The decision of the Appellate Authority and subject only to such decision, an order, of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be recalled in question in any court of law except as provided in sub-section (5) of this section.(5)The High court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation there to as it may deem fit.” 3.Though the provision is intended as the caption indicates only tovest power on the appellate authority, it is the only provision where: i) substantive right of appeal to the aggrieved person and the procedure thereof is dealt with; ii)the only provision providing for revisional jurisdiction on the High Court and iii) the provision providing for vesting of powers on the appellate authority. 4. Section 24 (1) (b) provides that except as excluded in the other provisions of the Act, any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controller is entitled to file an appeal before the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In other words, the Section provides for a substantive right of appeal against the order passed by the Rent Controller unless otherwise excluded under any provisions of the Act and the appeal is to be preferred before the respective appellate authority conferred with the jurisdiction. 5.Section 24(1) (a) has empowered the State Government to confer the powers of the appellate authority on such officers or authorities in respect of the notified areas or in respect of the classes of cases as may be specified by the government in a notification issued by it in that regard. 5.Section 24(1) (a) has empowered the State Government to confer the powers of the appellate authority on such officers or authorities in respect of the notified areas or in respect of the classes of cases as may be specified by the government in a notification issued by it in that regard. Section 24(1)(a) read with Section 24(1)(b) if dissected would show the following parts: i)Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controller, if not otherwise specifically excluded, is entitled to file an appeal before the appellate authority within 15 days of the order.ii)The territorial jurisdiction of the appellate authority is to be specified by the State Government by way of notification.iii)The State Government is also free to specify the classes of cases to be dealt with by the appellate authority.iv)The State Government is free to confer the power of appellate authority on any officer or authority, as it thinks fit. 6.The disputed question is whether the State Government, in exercise of its power under Section 24(1) (a) for issuing the notification vesting the powers of the appellate authority is free to restrict the right of appeal to specified classes of cases. We may extract the notification dated 10.10.2006, issued by the State Government under Section 24(1) of the Act, which reads thus: Rajpatra, Himachal Pradesh (Extra-ordinary), dated 7th June, 1988 and in exercise of powers vested in him under sub section (1) of Section 24 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (Act No. 25 of 1987) the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to confer the powers of appellate authorities on all the District and Sessions Judges/Additional District and Sessions Judges in respect of the urban areas in their respective existing jurisdictions to hear appeals against the orders made by the Rent Controllers under sections 4,5,11,12,13,14 [Except 14(3) (a) (iii)] and 21 of the said Act.” 7.It has to be specifically noted that the notification is issued under Section 24(1) of the Act which contains two sub-clauses (a) and (b); (b) providing for substantive right of appeal and (a) providing for the appellate authority and their jurisdiction either in terms of the territory or in terms of specified classes of cases to be handled by the specified appellate authority. 8.Thus, the moot question would be whether the substantive right of appeal available to any person aggrieved by an order passed under the Act can be restricted by the government to be exercised only in a limited classes of cases? 9.The Act contains 35 Sections. The notification provides for exercise of appellate powers by the specified appellate authority, namely the District and Sessions Judges and Additional District and Sessions Judges in their respective territorial jurisdiction to exercise the powers of appellate authority only against the orders passed by the Rent Controllers under Section 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14 ( partially) and 21 of the Act. In other words, the appeal against the orders passed under the above mentioned seven provisions of the Act would lie before the respective District and Sessions Judges/ Additional District and Sessions Judges, having the territorial jurisdiction otherwise. Again, the question is what about the appeals in respect of the orders passed under the other provisions, in the instant case, against an order passed under Order 9 Rule 13, dismissing the application for setting aside the ex parte order for ejectment. Sh. Kapil Dev Sood, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the substantive right of appeal available to a person, aggrieved by an order passed under the Act, cannot be restricted by the delegate under the Act, namely the government, on whom the powers conferred is only to issue a notification specifying the appellate authority, specifying their territorial jurisdiction and specifying the classes of cases in which the appeals lie before them. Sh. G.C.Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent and Sh. Ankush Dass Sood, learned Additional Advocate General, contend that in the scheme of the Act and having regard to the legislative intent in setting up a Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the cases, the State Government is entitled to restrict the right of appeal to limited situations. 10. The classes of cases specified in the notification pertain to determination of fair rent (Section 4), revision of fair rent in certain cases (Section 5), cutting off or withholding essential supply or service (Section 11), conversion of residential building into non-residential (Section 12), duty of the land lord to keep the building in a good repair (Section 13), eviction of tenants (Section 14) and deposit of rent by the tenant (Section 21). The main excluded provisions pertain to increase in fair rent (Section 6), restriction on the landlord not to claim anything in excess of the fair rent (Section 7), restriction on the landlord not to charge any fine or premium for grant, renewal or continuance of tenancy (Section 8), recovery of excess rent (Section 9), increase of rent on account of certain contingencies (Section 10), recovery of possession in case tenancies for limited periods (Section 17), lease of vacant building (Section 19), time limit for making deposit etc. (Section 22), forfeiture of rent in deposit (Section 23), execution (Section 26 for which Order 21 CPC as such is made applicable), transfer of proceedings (Section 28), penalty (Section 30) and exercise of powers of Magistrate by the Controller for recovery of fine (Section 31). There can be numerous other orders as well since the forum has the trappings of a civil Court. 11. The three provisions where the right of appeal is specifically excluded in the Act are : 1) Under Section 14(3) (a) (iii), 2) Section 15(1) and 3) Section 15(2).The procedure under both the Sections is prescribed under Section 16. Section 14(3) (a) (iii) deals with the situation of a landlord who is a member of the Armed Forces and requiring the tenanted premises for the occupation of his family in the circumstances specified therein and Section 15(1) provides for right to recover immediate possession of residential premises on the ground that he has been directed to vacate the residential premises allotted by the Central Government, State Government or any Local Authority on the ground that he himself, his spouse or dependant child owns a house in the urban area and Section 15(2) provides for the landlord requiring his premises one year prior or after his retirement. 12.Section 33 provides for power to make rules empowering the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying out all or any of the provisions of the Act. 13.The substantive right of appeal available to any person aggrieved by an order passed under the Act is excluded by the Act only to the three classes of cases referred to above under Section 14(3) (a) (iii) and Section 15(1) and 15(2). In all other cases, the Act provides that an aggrieved person is entitled to file an appeal. 13.The substantive right of appeal available to any person aggrieved by an order passed under the Act is excluded by the Act only to the three classes of cases referred to above under Section 14(3) (a) (iii) and Section 15(1) and 15(2). In all other cases, the Act provides that an aggrieved person is entitled to file an appeal. The power available to the government, the delegate under the Act, under Section 24(1) is to notify the officer or authority who should exercise the appellate power in which area or in which type of cases and the rule making power available to the government under Section 33 of the Act is only to frame rules to give effect to the provisions of the Act. In other words, the government is free to define the territorial jurisdiction of any appellate authority and the government is also free to specify the classes of appeals to be handled by the specified appellate authority. To clarify further, it is open to the government to specify in the notification that certain classes of appeals would lie before the certain specified authority and certain other classes of appeals would lie before certain other specified appellate officer or authority. The delegate under the Act has no power to restrict the substantive right of appeal available to a person aggrieved by an order under the Act only to certain specified classes of cases. The legislature has not given such a mandate to the government. The exercise of a substantive right of appeal available to a person cannot be restricted by the government whose power is only to specify the appellate authority and to specify the different classes of appeals to be handled by different appellate authorities. 14.The legislative intent is un-ambiguously clear in excluding the right of appeal otherwise available to an aggrieved person, while excluding the three clauses under Section 14(3) (a) (iii), Section 15(1) and Section 15(2). The legislature itself having thus excluded the areas of appeal under the Act itself, there is no further question of exclusion of the right by the delegate in the Act, namely the government whose power is not to exclude any further category from the purview of appeals; it is only to specify the appellate authority or specify the classes of cases to be handled by the specified appellate authorities. That is the plain legislative intent of Section 24. That is the plain legislative intent of Section 24. 15.In this context, it is to be specifically noted that the notification is issued by the government not under Section 24(1)(a) alone but under Section 24(1) of the Act, which provides also for substantive right of appeal, unless otherwise excluded under the provisions of the Act. That exclusion, is as clearly stated under Section 16, [the provision on exclusion is specified under Section 24 (1)(b)] which deals with the three specified categories under Section 14(3) (a) (iii), 15(1) and 15(2). 16.Having dissected the provision and having noted the legislative intent and mandate, we shall have to necessarily also refer to the background of the reference. The reference order would indicate that there is a conflict in the views regarding the maintainability of the appeal under two cases. One in Sat Pal vrs. Smt. Sunaina Devi, reported in Latest HLJ 2006 (HP) 1238 read with the opinion rendered by the 3rd Judge in the same case in the order reported in 2007 (1) Shim. L C. 163 and the judgment dated 19.10.2010 in C.R. 66 of 2007. 17.The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, is intended to provide for the control of rent and evictions within the limits of urban areas in the State of Himachal Pradesh and it is deemed to have come into force on the 17th day of November, 1971, except for certain provisions. The predecessor Act was the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971. Prior to Sat Pal’s case, the appeals under the Rent Control Act were dealt with in terms of the notification issued under the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. After the coming into force of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, infact notification dated 26.5.1988 had been issued under Section 24 of the Act. Prior to Sat Pal’s case, the appeals under the Rent Control Act were dealt with in terms of the notification issued under the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. After the coming into force of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, infact notification dated 26.5.1988 had been issued under Section 24 of the Act. That notification reads as follows: “No-LSG-A(3)-1/71-II- In supersession of all the previous notifications issued by this Court in this behalf and in exercise of the powers vested in him under section 24 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (Act No. 25 of 1987) the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, with the prior approval of the Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh is pleased to confer on all the District and Sessions Judges/Additional District and Sessions Judges the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of aforesaid Act, within their respective jurisdictions, with immediate effect.By order,Sd/-Secretary.” 18.The said notification, as extracted above, had not specified any classes of cases to be handled by the specified appellate authorities. V.K. Gupta, C.J. in Sat Pal’s case, reported in Latest HLJ 2006 (HP) 1238, took the view that “ . in the discharge of its statutory obligations, it is indeed mandatory for the State Government to accord its due consideration to the issue whether in public interest it is advisable and desirable or it is not advisable and desirable to specify the cases or classes of cases in which alone appeals can be filed and if yes, which are those cases or classes of cases in which alone the appeals can be filed “. Surjit Singh, J. disagreed with the view of V.K. Gupta, C.J and took the view that the State Government had no power to restrict the right of appeal to specified classes of cases and held that all orders which had attained finality were appealable. Deepak Gupta, J. in the order reported in 2007 (1) Shim. LC 163, took the view that the orders passed under the Act which virtually decide the fate of the parties are appealable and only in such situations, it can be said that the person is aggrieved by an order under the Act. To quote paragraphs 18 and 19: “18. Deepak Gupta, J. in the order reported in 2007 (1) Shim. LC 163, took the view that the orders passed under the Act which virtually decide the fate of the parties are appealable and only in such situations, it can be said that the person is aggrieved by an order under the Act. To quote paragraphs 18 and 19: “18. I am of the view that the interpretation given to the word ‘judgment’ by the apex Court can also be applied to the word ‘Order’ in Clause 24(1)(b) of the Act. It is obvious that when the legislature gave the right to appeal, it was of the view that only a person aggrieved by an order can file an appeal. The grievance must be based on certain legitimate grounds and as held by the apex Court orders which merely cause some inconvenience or prejudice to the parties but do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties can never be held to be appealable orders. Similarly, routine orders passed during the progress of the case which do not affect rights of the parties cannot be appealed against. 19.After considering the entire law I am of the view that the word ‘Order’ in Section 24(1) (b) not only includes final orders passed under the Rent Control Act, but shall also include other orders including interlocutory orders which finally decide a question in issue or issue in controversy relatable to the main case; similarly, interim orders which finally decide issue(s) which have material bearing and may directly effect the final decision of the case can also be appealed against and lastly, orders which though only decide a collateral issue, but which will affect the vital rights and obligations of the parties can be appealed against. In case the various judgments of the apex Court are gone through carefully, it would be clear as to which orders are appealable and which are not. It is neither possible nor is it prudent to set out all the appealable orders in detail. It shall be for the appellate authority in the facts and circumstances of each, case to decide, whether the order appealed before it falls within the ambit and scope of appealable orders, in the light of the law discussed above. It is neither possible nor is it prudent to set out all the appealable orders in detail. It shall be for the appellate authority in the facts and circumstances of each, case to decide, whether the order appealed before it falls within the ambit and scope of appealable orders, in the light of the law discussed above. 20.I, therefore, disagree with the opinion of Surjit Singh, J. and agree with the opinion of My Lord the Chief Justice that all orders, including interlocutory orders, passed by the Rent Controller can be challenged in an appeal before the appellate authority, subject to the caveat that the order should either finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case; or it should be an order which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case or which finally decides a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case, but which vitally affects the rights and obligations of the parties and shall have material hearing on the final decision of the case.” 19. Sat Pal’s case was disposed of by judgment dated 23.8.2006 (C.R.84 of 2006). That decision is not reported and therefore, we shall extract the decision as such: “V.K. Gupta, C.J. (Oral) On 3rd August, 2006 the matter was referred to a learned 3rd Judge of this Court because of the dissenting opinions of the Members of this Bench rendered on that date. The opinion of the 3rd Judge has now been rendered vide his judgment dated 8th August, 2006 by which he has concurred with the opinion of the Chief Justice. Because of the majority opinion now the following order of the Court is passed:- ORDER OF THE COURT: 1.The interpretation given upon sub clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (1) of Section 24 shall be in accordance with the majority opinion.2.Based on the aforesaid majority opinion, the Notification dated 26th May, 1998, (sic. 26th May, 1988) in the light of the concluding para of the opinion of the Chief Justice rendered on 3rd August, 2006 and for the reasons stated therein is hereby quashed only to the extent of it not specifying the classes of cases in which the appeals are to be heard by the Appellate Authorities specified in the said Notification. 26th May, 1988) in the light of the concluding para of the opinion of the Chief Justice rendered on 3rd August, 2006 and for the reasons stated therein is hereby quashed only to the extent of it not specifying the classes of cases in which the appeals are to be heard by the Appellate Authorities specified in the said Notification. The Notification in so far as it constitutes, prescribes and specifies the Appellate Authorities, however, shall continue to remain operational until it is substituted by a new Notification on the subject. The State Government is consequently hereby directed to issue a fresh Notification, in the light of and based upon the observations contained in the two majority opinions, after consultation with the High Court of Himachal Pradesh on its administrative side.Because the matter is of absolutely urgent nature concerning hundreds of cases pending in the State, we direct that the fresh Notification shall be issued by the State Government within two weeks from today. The matter is disposed of.Dasti copy on usual terms.”20.It is interesting to note that the majority opinion is not as what is concluded by V.K. Gupta, CJ, in the decision as extracted above. Deepak Gupta, J. has not taken the view that appeal would lie only in notified classes of cases; the view is infact otherwise; only the appealable orders have been classified. The majority opinion of Deepak Gupta, J. and Surjit Singh, J. is that all orders passed under the Act which affect the rights of the parties are appealable under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act. But, unfortunately, it has been concluded otherwise. Rajiv Sharma, J. in the decision in Brijesh Kumar Sood and another vrs. Brig. K.K. Sood (Retd.) and another, in Civil Revision No. 66 of 2007, dated 19.10.2010, at paragraph 25 has hence rightly held as follows: “25. What emerges from the observations made hereinabove is that appeal is maintainable against the orders specifically notified by the notification dated 10.10.2006 as well as the orders explained by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta in Sat Pal versus Sunaina Devi ’s case (supra). By doing so, there will not be any conflict, absurdity or anomaly in section 24(1) clauses (a) and (b) of the Act. However, in the instant case, order is not appealable since it is not one of the orders, as explained by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta in Sat Pal versus Sunaina Devi ’s case (supra). By doing so, there will not be any conflict, absurdity or anomaly in section 24(1) clauses (a) and (b) of the Act. However, in the instant case, order is not appealable since it is not one of the orders, as explained by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta in Sat Pal versus Sunaina Devi ’s case (supra). However, it is made clear that the petitioner, in the case in hand, has the right to file revision against the impugned order. It is also made clear by way of abundant precaution that in case petitioner prefers a revision against the impugned order, the period spent in pursuing the remedy before the Appellate Authority and before this Court shall stand excluded.” 21.Again interestingly, the notification issued on 10.10.2006 has not in any way restricted the right of appeal available to a person aggrieved by an order passed under the Act. The notification has only specified the appellate authority who would be dealing with the appeals arising from the orders passed from the provisions specified in the notification. It does not say that no appeal would lie in other situations. 22.Inviting reference to the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/S Daya Chand Hardyal vrs. Bir Chand reported in 1983 (2) RLR ( Pb. & Hry.) 111, Sh. G.C.Gupta, learned senior counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the interpretation of an apparently similar provision under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The question posed in the said decision was “ Whether every order of the Rent Controller appointed under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, against which a party may be aggrieved, would now become appealable under Section 15(2) of the said Act by virtue of notification S.O/71/HA-1 1/73/S. 15/78, dated 8th May, 1978 ?”Section 15(1) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, as it then stood, reads as follows: “ 15.1. The State Government may, by a general or special order, by notification confer on such officers and authorities as it may think fit, the powers of appellate authorities for the purpose of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order”. The State Government may, by a general or special order, by notification confer on such officers and authorities as it may think fit, the powers of appellate authorities for the purpose of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order”. 23.The notification dated 8th May, 1978, referred to in the decision reads as follows: “No. S.O./71/H.A.11/73 S 15/78— In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of Section 15 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, and in supersession of all previous notifications issued in this behalf, the Governor of Haryana hereby confers on all the District Judges in the areas of their respective jurisdiction, the powers of Appellate Authorities.” 24.In the predecessor notification dated 7.9.1973, the power of the appellate authority was conferred on all the Deputy Commissioners. Prior to the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 was ruling the field. That Act also under Section 15 provided for issuance of notification and in exercise of that power a notification had been issued on 14.4.1947, which reads as follows: “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub clause (a) of clause (1) of Section 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, the Governor of Punjab is pleased to confer on all the District and Sessions Judges in the Punjab in respect of the urban Areas in their respective existing jurisdiction, the powers of Appellate Authorities for the purpose of the said Act, with regard to orders made by Rent Controller under Sections 4, 10, 12 and 13 of the Act.” 25.Their Lordships of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the Full “ S.15(2). Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within thirty days from the date of such order or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction Bench decision, referred to above, were of the view that the right of appeal was available only to those classes of cases notified by the government, despite a substantive right of appeal available under Section 15(2) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, to the extent relevant, reads as follows: “It was held at para - 7 that “the State Government has been vested with the power to confer the appellate jurisdiction on such officers and authorities and in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. Therefore, both the classes of cases in which the appeal is to be provided and the forum in which it would be filed are determined under Section 15(1) or 15(1)(a) of the of the respective statutes.” With respect, we are unable to be persuaded by the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, for reasons more than one. At the outset, it has to be noted that the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 under Section 15 and the provision under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 under Section 24 are not pani matenia. The distinguishing feature is that under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, the orders which are not otherwise appealable are specifically stated in the Section itself. That is not the situation with regard to the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. Even otherwise also, we find it difficult to agree with the view of their Lordships since the crucial question which goes to the root of the issue has not been addressed in the judgment, as to whether the substantive right of appeal otherwise provided by the legislature under the plenary statute can be permitted to be restricted by a notification by the delegate in the statute namely, the government. No doubt, there is an apparently appealing discussion in the judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at paragraph 14, which reads as follows: “14. No doubt, there is an apparently appealing discussion in the judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at paragraph 14, which reads as follows: “14. Even otherwise on larger considerations I find myself unable to subscribe to the view that either the Legislature or the State Government by issuance of the aforesaid notifications had intended to effect a radical change of making any and every order of Rent Controller as appealable. The sole purpose and object of the rent laws in creating the special forum was to expedite the process and to take the matter away from the rather tedious speed in the ordinary civil courts. This was aptly highlighted by the Division Bench in Raghu Nath Jalota v. Ramesh Duggal and another, AIR 1980 Pb & Hy. 188, in the following terms:- “The underlying purpose was to rid the authorities under the Act from the shackles of technical procedure and to provide a summary and expeditious mode of disposal, is further evident from the fact that originally only one appeal was provided by the statute to the Appellate Authority and all further appeals or revisions were barred by Section 15(4) of the Act. It was not till 1956 that by the Punjab Act XXIX sub-section (5) was added to Section 15 of the Act vesting the High Court with special revisional jurisdiction thereunder.” If any and every order of the Controller is to be made appealable and that in turn may become either revisable under Section 15(6) or supervisable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India then by a process of interpretation we would not be subserving the cause of expeditious disposal of the rent matters but only creating further road blocks therein. I have already pin pointed in considering Section 15 that if the intention of the Legislature was that any and every order of the Controller is appealable, then Sections 15(1) and (2) would not be cast and framed as they are. In any case, if the Legislature intended to make a significant change of this kind the proper and indeed the only method was the amendment of Section 15 designedly to that effect. It could then follow the existing example of Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan States where the statute in terms provided for every order or decree to be appealable. In any case, if the Legislature intended to make a significant change of this kind the proper and indeed the only method was the amendment of Section 15 designedly to that effect. It could then follow the existing example of Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan States where the statute in terms provided for every order or decree to be appealable. One cannot easily assume that so meaningful a change was sought to be introduced by a mere side wind by issuing a notification and then by implication withdrawing the same.” 26.At the outset, we have to note that it is not each and every order that is made appealable under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, but only those orders which otherwise decide the fate of the parties, in the proceedings which are not otherwise excluded under the Act. All other interlocutory orders are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, which may go into the legality and propriety of such orders. It is also relevant in this context to note that even the rule making power of the government under Section 33 of the Act is restricted to “ make rules for the purposes of carrying out all or any of the provisions of this Act”. In other words, it is not an omnibus provision to carry out the objects of the Act, that plenary power is reserved to the legislature and not to the delegate. Hence, the reference is answered as follows: “ Under Section 24 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, all orders passed by the Rent Controller which finally decide the fate of the parties are appealable. The substantive right of appeal available under Section 24 of the Act to an aggrieved person cannot be otherwise restricted by the government by notification issued under Section 24(1) of the Act.” 27.Though the reference has thus been answered, we do not want a question to be left in the dark as to who will be the appellate authority in the case of those appealable orders which are not notified by the Government. On the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium, we have to deal with that question as well in order to avoid further reference in that regard. On the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium, we have to deal with that question as well in order to avoid further reference in that regard. In this context, we may also keep in mind the factual matrix in this case that the petitioner is aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controller under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC dismissing the application for setting aside the ex parte order. It may be noted that the said order is otherwise appealable order under Order 43 Rule (d), but who is the appellate authority is the question, in the absence of the notification by the Government. In the 1987 notification, which has been quashed by the Division Bench in Sat Pal’s case, there was no such restriction as to the classes of cases which the appellate authorities were to deal with. But, unfortunately, the majority view was incorrectly understood by the Bench and the said notification was quashed with a further direction to issue a fresh notification specifying the appellate authority and specifying the classes of cases to be handled by the appellate authorities and thus the notification dated 10.10.2006 where the appellate authorities were entitled to deal with only a few classes of appeals. 28. In this context, we may refer to two Privy Council decisions. In Secretary of State for India versus Cheiinkani Rama Rao and others, reported in AIR 1916 Privy Council 21. To quote the relevant discussion: “By the Statute already named, it is provided (section 3) that the Governor in Council may constitute any land at the disposal of the Government a reserved forest; that he shall publish a notification (section 4) containing this declaration, specifying “as nearly as possible the situation and limits of such land,” and appointing a Forest Settlement Officer “to enquire into and determine the existence, nature, and extent of any rights claimed by or alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over” such land. Provision is made (section 6) for requiring, within a period of three months from the proclamation, every person claiming right “either to present to such officer within such period a written notice specifying, or to appear before him within such period and state the nature of such right, and in either case to produce all documents in support thereof.” Thereafter the Forest Settlement Officer is to enquire and to record evidence (section 8). And (section 10) the Forest Settlement Officer “shall pass an order specifying the particulars of such claim and admitting or rejecting the same wholly or in part.” If the claim be admitted, there are stipulated proceedings for the surrender, exclusion or acquisition of the right. But section 10 (ii) “if such claim be rejected wholly or in part, the claimant may, within thirty days of the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the District Court in respect of such rejection only.”What happened in the present case was that the claim was rejected. An appeal by the respondents was thereupon made to the District Court, and a decision was pronounced. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the Statute just quoted. In their Lordships’ opinion this objection is not well-founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply. This is in full accord with the decision of the Full Bench, Kamaraju v. Secretary of State (1) a decision which was given in 1988 and has been acted on in Madras ever since.” 29. Yet another relevant discussion is available in R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar and anr. Versus R. Chandrasekhara Thevar, reported in AIR (35) 1948 Privy Council 12, wherein it has been held as follows: “7.Before considering the propriety and validity of the orders made by the High Court in the two appeals presented to them it is necessary, in the first place, to determine whether the decision of the Full Bench was right. Versus R. Chandrasekhara Thevar, reported in AIR (35) 1948 Privy Council 12, wherein it has been held as follows: “7.Before considering the propriety and validity of the orders made by the High Court in the two appeals presented to them it is necessary, in the first place, to determine whether the decision of the Full Bench was right. The facts in the case before the Full Bench can be distinguished on the ground that in that case there were no proceedings in execution of the decree such as exist in the present case, but the Court expressed the view that the existence of execution proceedings would not make any difference. The view taken by the Full Bench was that S. 19 of the Act conferred a particular right upon a judgment-debtor and that, as the Act conferred no right of appeal from an order of the Court made under the section, no appeal was competent. The Court relied to some extent on the decision of this Board in 40 Cal. 21. That case, however, has been explained in later decisions of the Board as depending on the fact that the proceedings were from beginning to end ostensibly and actually arbitration proceedings. Their Lordships are not in agreement with the view o the Full Bench of the High Court of Madras. The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal. (“ All emphasis supplied”) 30. Wherever a right is provided by a statute, a remedy though not expressly provided for, may necessarily be implied. Whenever there is a right, there should also be an action for its enforcement and the legal procedure should be sufficiently elastic and comprehensive to afford the requisite means for the protection of the rights which the law has recognized, as held by the apex Court in Constitution Bench decision in Makhan Singh Tarsikka versus The State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1964 SC 381. 31.Guided thus by the salutary and first principles in the matter as above, we hold that any person aggrieved by an order which finally decides his fate in the case for which appellate authority is not otherwise provided in the notification issued by the government under Section 24(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, an appeal is maintainable as per the scheme of the Civil Procedure Code, until otherwise specified by the government by way of an appropriate notification.The Registry will send back the records to the learned Single Judge for appropriate further orders in the case.