Arvind Kumar Tripathi (II), J.— 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. This is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act preferred against the impugned award dated 11.5.2004 passed by Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Faizabad in Claim Petition No. 100 of 2001. 2. In brief, on 26.7.1991, at 2.00 p.m., when deceased Kumari Seema, aged about 10 years, was moving keeping left side of the Faizabad-Allahabad Road, a Jeep bearing No. URP 4658, which was driven by Mohd. Kalim rashly and negligently, dashed with the deceased Kumari Seems, causing her death on the spot. The Tribunal framed relevant issues with regard to injuries, policy, accident in question, limitation, driving licence etc. After providing due opportunity to both sides, the tribunal had recorded a finding that accident in question occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the Jeep in question and had held that the claim petition was not barred by limitation and awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/-. 3. Shri Anil Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant has raised two fold arguments:- (1) Appeal is barred by limitation on account of fact that relevant portion from Section 166 Motor Vehicle Act was deleted by the legislature w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The submission is that since, accident occurred prior to amendment, the petition shall be barred by limitation. (2)Second argument advanced by appellant's counsel is that though admittedly vehicle was insured and insurance policy was issued on 26.7.1991 whereby it has been stipulated that the vehicle shall deem to be insured from the said date at 2.00 p.m. onward. The submission is that since, accident occurred at 2.00 p.m. and vehicle shall deem to be insured later appellant is not liable to pay compensation. 4. Shri Anil Srivastava learned counsel for the appellant while elaborating the argument further submits that formalities with regard to issuance of insurance papers may not be done in less than an hour. Accordingly, appellant is not liable to pay compensation. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent had relied upon a judgement reported in AIR 1996 SC 2155 , Dhannalal Vs. D.P.Vijayvargiya and others and submits that once stipulated provision is deleted by amendment w.e.f. 14.11.1994 then under the fiction of law the provision shall not deem to be not exist in statute and claim petition may be filed even after expiry of period. D.P.Vijayvargiya and others and submits that once stipulated provision is deleted by amendment w.e.f. 14.11.1994 then under the fiction of law the provision shall not deem to be not exist in statute and claim petition may be filed even after expiry of period. Further submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that since, vehicle was insured on the date of accident manual formalities shall not come in the way of appellant and shall be bound to be condition stipulated in the agreement between the parties. 6. We have considered the arguments at length and perused the record. In the case of Dhannalal (supra) their Lordship of Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered the question with regard to limitation keeping in view the amendment done in Section 166 Motor Vehicle Act whereby certain provision has been deleted w.e.f. 14.11.1994. Relevant portion from the judgement of Dhannalal is reproduced as under:- "Where a claim petition was filed while sub-s.(3) of S. 166 was operative; an objection was raised that the petitioner was barred by limitation under the Proviso to sub-s.(3) and the proceedings involving the question whether the delay could be condoned was pending before the High Court on 14.11.1994, i.e. the date on which sub-s. (3) of S. 166 stood repealed, the benefit of the repeal would be available to the claimant and the petition could not be dismissed on ground that at the time of its filing it was barred by limitation under sub-s. (3)." 7. Keeping in view the aforesaid ratio of Dhannalal (supra) it is evident that once the provision has been deleted by amendment it shall deem to be not in existence of the statutory provision of limitation and the unamended provision shall not come in the way of claimant to file an objection or claim compensation. Accordingly, first limb of argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner seems to be not sustainable and rejected . 8. Second limb of the argument of the appellant's counsel that since, vehicle was insured on 26.7.1991 w.e.f. 2.00 pm and it must have been taken more than an hour to complete the formalities, hence the appellant is not liable to pay compensation seems to be also misconceived argument. 9. 8. Second limb of the argument of the appellant's counsel that since, vehicle was insured on 26.7.1991 w.e.f. 2.00 pm and it must have been taken more than an hour to complete the formalities, hence the appellant is not liable to pay compensation seems to be also misconceived argument. 9. Once the agreement is signed by the parties and conditions are accepted then in view of provision contained in Section 7 and 8 of the Contract Act, it shall be obligatory on the part of parties to accept the condition of contract to perform necessary obligations in terms of contract. Section 10 of the Contract Act further provides that in case a contract is made with the consent of parties then it shall be lawful and obligatory for the parties to abide by it. In the present case, it is not a case where contract was not signed or there is commission of fraud or it suffers from some illegality. Admittedly, contract with regard to insurance policy was signed between the parties. Voluntarily, in such conditions, it shall be obligatory on the part of appellant insurance company to discharge its obligation in terms of contract and conditions stipulated therein. There is no way on the part of appellant to defy the conditions contained in the insurance policy or the agreement entered into between the parties. Whether vehicle was produced for inspection at 2.00 p.m. or not shall not come in the way or create defence for the appellant to deny the payment of compensation in terms of contractual obligation unless the question with regard to illegality of contract signed between the parties is raised and issues are framed and courts recorded a finding thereon. Otherwise also the appellant is not lead any evidence before the tribunal to establish the factual material with regard to production of vehicle or alike things. 10. Appeal being devoid of merit dismissed. Let entire compensation be deposited alongwith interest before tribunal within two months and tribunal shall release the same expeditiously, say within a period of two months from the date of deposit of amount by the appellant. The amount deposited in this court shall be remitted to the tribunal forthwith by registry say within a period of one month. However, appellant counsel has invited attention of the court with regard to interest provided by the tribunal which is 12 per cent. The amount deposited in this court shall be remitted to the tribunal forthwith by registry say within a period of one month. However, appellant counsel has invited attention of the court with regard to interest provided by the tribunal which is 12 per cent. The 12 per cent interest seems to be excessive. Keeping in view the factual matrix and current trend, appellant shall liable to pay interest @ 9 per cent and award stand modified accordingly. 11. Subject to aforesaid observation and finding recorded, the appeal is allowed in part. Impugned award stands modified. The payment of interest is reduced to 9 per cent from the date of filing of application and date of actual payment of compensation in terms of modified award. Appeal decided accordingly. No order as to costs. _____________