Sudhir Agarwal, J.;— 1. Heard Sri Pankaj Agarwal, holding brief of Mr A.K. Gupta, for the petitioner and Sri M.K. Gupta for the respondent. 2. The respondent-landlord filed a suit for eviction of the petitioner from the accommodation in question on various grounds, including default in payment of rent and material alteration, i.e. the grounds falling under section 20(2)(a), 20(2)(b) and 20(2)(c) of UP Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short, the Act of 1972). 3. The trial court dismissed the suit on the finding that there is no evidence to prove default on the part of the tenant in payment of rent. The revisional court, however, set aside trial court's judgement dated 16.11.2000, holding that there is default by short payment of rent and other expenses for the period of May, 1992, and that there is material alternation diminishing the value of property in question. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the entire outstanding dues were deposited on 27.5.1992 and the rent for the month of May, 192, was not due on that date (27.5.1992) as it fell due only after the end of the month. Therefore, the question of payment of rent upto 27.5.1992 would have arisen. The revisional court has clearly misdirected itself by holding that the rent whatever it was due on 27.5.1992, should have been deposited in view of section 20(4) of the Act, though not payable. Sri A.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the aforesaid presumption on the part of the revisional court is patently illegal. He has further submitted that so far as the material alteration is concerned, the observations of the revisional court are based on conjectures and surmises and there is no evidence whatsoever to support them, hence the impugned order of the revisional court is totally erroneous. 5- Sri Pankaj Agarwal, Advocate, holding brief of Mr M.K. Gupta, Advocate, appearingfor respondent, stated at the outset that so far as argument regarding deposit of the rent for 27 days of May, 1992, is concerned, he cannot dispute that revisional court has erred in law and to that extent revisional order is unsustainable. 5- Sri Pankaj Agarwal, Advocate, holding brief of Mr M.K. Gupta, Advocate, appearingfor respondent, stated at the outset that so far as argument regarding deposit of the rent for 27 days of May, 1992, is concerned, he cannot dispute that revisional court has erred in law and to that extent revisional order is unsustainable. However, so far as findings on material alteration part are concerned, in paragraphs 13 and 14 of its order, the revisional court has discussed material alterations effected by the petitioner; therefore, the eviction of tenant on that ground is sustainable. 6- Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the impugned revisional court's order are quoted hereunder: @ Hindi @ "13. In relation to Issue No. 4, the Revisionist argued that the Respondent has changed its mode of use. The Lower Court has not admitted the fact of change in its use merely on the ground that there were contradictions in the chief and cross-examinations of Advocate Commissioner and he had not apprised of the fact how many 'hand-presses' and what kind of 'machine' were installed in the premises in question. In addition to it, this Issue Number was decided against the Revisionist because Advocate Commissioner was not noticed and his evidence was not relied upon. On behalf of the Respondent, it was said that no hand-press, machine have been installed in the premises in question. This building was taken by her husband during tenancy period in his life-time, the conditions on which basis it was taken is still in force. No change in its use has been made on her behalf. On the other hand she said that trading works were carried out from the very premises from her husband's life-time. Revisionist never raised objections over it. Whereas, the Revisionist has proved by evidence that the premises-in-question was given for residential purposes, now the Respondent has installed hand-press and machine in it. This fact has been corroborated with the depositions of PW-1 Devendra Kumar Gupta, PW-2 Subhash Chandra Gupta and PW-3 Advocate Commissioner Jitendra Pal Singh. In addition to this, a premises cannot be used in a dual modes means it is used as residence and that for commercial purposes. In my opinion when respondent found that the use of premises has been changed, they chose the ground that trading work was being run in the said premises from much earlier. In addition to this, a premises cannot be used in a dual modes means it is used as residence and that for commercial purposes. In my opinion when respondent found that the use of premises has been changed, they chose the ground that trading work was being run in the said premises from much earlier. Admitting of trading work proves that hand-press and machine etc. are installed in the premises-in-question. As a matter of fact, the use of this must have been causing damage to the property. That is why the roof-top of the said house has been demolished and business is being run by laying a tin-shade. Hence, observation made on the basis of this conclusion with regard to Issue No. 3 and 6 by the Lower Court is also presumed to have been delivered on account of wrong appreciation of evidence. Hence, it is evident from the appreciation of aforesaid facts that the respondent has changed the use of building-in-question and as a result of change in its use, some alteration took place, as apparent by the report of Advocate Commissioner which resulted in the demolition of premises' roof-top and depreciation in the cost and utility of disputed building. Hence, observation made by the Lower Court in this regard is found erroneous." (English translation by Court) 8. The aforesaid discussion and findings show that Revisional Court has formed an opinion on sheer conjuncture and surmises as also presumptions with respect to damage to the property. It has presumed that on account of commercial user, the property must have suffered some damages. Further in respect of commercial user the finding is based on sheer conjecture and surmises instead of any credible evidence. He has proceeded on the assumption that a particular premises cannot be used for two different purposes, i.e. residential as well as commercial. This presumption is totally unfounded and baseless. 9. When confronted Sri Pankaj Agarwal also could not dispute that basic inference drawn by revisional court with respect to material/structural alteration and its consequences, namely, diminishing the value etc. are wholly presumptuous and conjectural, based on no evidence. This presumption is totally unfounded and baseless. 9. When confronted Sri Pankaj Agarwal also could not dispute that basic inference drawn by revisional court with respect to material/structural alteration and its consequences, namely, diminishing the value etc. are wholly presumptuous and conjectural, based on no evidence. It is well established that question, whether any alteration, structural or otherwise, has been made by the tenant, is a question of fact and in this regard findings of Trial Court ordinarily are not to be interfered by Revisional Court unless the findings of Trial Court are found contrary to material on record, or there is material illegality in not considering some relevant evidence or considering nonest evidence etc. Similarly whether a particular alteration or construction etc. would result in diminishing the value or disfigure of property is a mixed question of law and fact and in forming such opinion, Revisional Court may interfere but in the present case with respect to alteration/construction etc., Revisional Court has recorded its own presumptive finding and has drawn inference which is patently erroneous and based on no evidence at all. 10. The Revisional Court's order therefore cannot sustain. 11. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned revisional court's order dated 16.11.2000 is set aside. The judgement and order of the trial court 14.8.1995 is restored and confirmed. No costs. _____________