Sudhir Agarwal, J.;— 1. Heard Mr Pankaj Agarwal, Advocate, holding brief on behalf of Mr. M.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Vibhu Rai, Advocate, holding brief of Mr. Anoop Trivedi for the respondents. 2. Mr Pankaj Agarwal contended that there was no default in payment of rent and, therefore, no violation of the provisions contained in Section 20(2)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act of 1972 (in short, the Act), for the reason that rent was tendered to respondent-landlord by money order, but he refused to receive the same. As such, the question whether the petitioner ought to have been given any benefit under section 20(4) of Act does not arise because the very ground for eviction of petitioner from the accommodation in question was not available to the landlord. He further contended that the amount of notice charges sought by the respondent-landlord were highly excessive and the same was held so by the trial court; but, without considering that finding, the revisional court has held that since notice expenses, as demanded by landlord from the tenant was not paid, therefore, benefit of section 20(4) cannot be given even though the entire amount, according to the tenant, was deposited before the first date of hearing before the trial court. 3. Learned counsel for respondent could not contract the first argument advanced by Sri Pankaj Agarwal. However, as regards the second aspect of the argument, he submitted that since it was apparent that the petitioner had not deposited notice charges before the first date of hearing, he was not entitled to seek any protection under section 20(4) of the Act. 4. Undoubtedly, a landlord is entitled to file a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after determining tenancy, if one or more of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 20 exists. One of such grounds is that tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to landlord within one month from date of service of notice of demand upon him. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the tenant tendered rent by money order but was not accepted by landlord. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the tenant tendered rent by money order but was not accepted by landlord. The first receipt of money order on record is dated 18.8.1992 and the second is dated 16.7.1999, whereby rent from 1.9.1992 to 31st August, 1999, was remitted by tenant to the landlord. The landlord refusing to receive money order, however, filed suit for eviction of tenant on 30th July, 1999, after determining tenancy of tenant vide notice dated 22.6.1999, which was served upon tenant on 25.6.1999. Thus here is a case where tenant tendered rent to landlord within one month of receipt of notice. A copy of money order receipt dated 16.7.1999 on record is annexure - 4, at page 42 of writ petition, which was numbered as Paper No. 38-C before the court below. Money order message, annexure - 3, at page 40, to the writ petition, shows that rent was tendered for the period 1.9.1992 to 31.7.1999, pursuant to notice dated 22.6.1999. It is, thus, evident that the tenant tendered entire rent demanded by landlord vide his notice dated 22.6.1999, but the said money order dated 16.7.1999 was declined to accept by the landlord. The ground, therefore, for eviction under section 20 (2) (a) of the Act could not have materialised giving right to file a suit to landlord for eviction under the aforesaid provision. It is not in dispute that after refusal by landlord from receiving aforesaid money order, the tenant deposited rent in court under section 30(1) in Misc. Case No. 49 of 1999, vide her application dated 17.8.1999. Since there was no default, the ground set out in section 20(2)(a) of the Act, did not come into picture, the question of attracting section 20(4) also did not arise and, therefore, the suit itself being not maintainable, decree of eviction could not have been passed against the tenant. 5. Be that as it may, even if it is assumed that there was any default of payment of rent, the same stood removed when the tenant deposited entire dues including legal expenses on the first date of hearing. The appellate court has, however, found that Rs. 250/- towards notice expenses were not paid, and, therefore, there was a default. It is said that the tenant deposited Rs. 1425/- though it was supposed to pay Rs. 1604/- including notice expenses of Rs. 250/-. The appellate court has, however, found that Rs. 250/- towards notice expenses were not paid, and, therefore, there was a default. It is said that the tenant deposited Rs. 1425/- though it was supposed to pay Rs. 1604/- including notice expenses of Rs. 250/-. The first date of hearing, according to the parties, was 16.9.1999. The tenant, therefore, was liable to pay rent payable in September, 1999, i.e. upto 31.8.1999. Rate of rent was Rs. 10/- per month. Therefore, for 84 months, total amount of rent comes to rs. 840/-. This amount was already deposited under section 30 (1) of the Act and was liable to be credited to petitioner-tenant. On 2.9.1999 the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 1425/-. This is evident from Annexure - 8 to the writ petition and, in fact, not disputed by respondent-landlord. The rent having already been deposited under section 30(1), further amount which the tenant ought to have deposited in order to claim benefit under section 20(4) including interest of Rs. 261.45, court fees Rs. 57.75, counsel's fee, clerk's fee and notice expenses, which all comes to much less than Rs. 1425/-, including notice expenses. When the counsel for respondent-landlord was put to reply the aforesaid facts available on record and to demonstrate as to how it can be said that tenant had failed to comply with the requirement of section 20(4) of the Act before first date of hearing, he could not show anything otherwise. In fact, in paragraph 13 of plaint itself, the landlord had claimed total expenses including rent upto 31.7.1999 as Rs. 1230/-. Since the amount deposited by tenant was much more than that which included rent upto 31.8.1999, which was payable in September, 1999, therefore, even otherwise findings recorded by revisional court in respect of non-compliance of section 20(4) are perverse and cannot sustain. 6. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition is allowed. The revisional court's order dated 24.9.2003 is set aside and trial court's judgement dated 20.9.2002 is restored and affirmed. 7. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________