R.K. GUPTA.— The learned Counsel for the Appellants is heard on the question of admission of the Appeal. This is an Appeal preferred by the Appellants challenging the judgment passed by the DRT on 21st October, 2011 in Securitisation Application No. 79/2010, which was dismissed by the DRT. Before the DRT the Appellants challenged the actions so taken by the Respondent-Bank to auction the property by taking recourse to section 13 (4) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 (hereinafter shall be called as 'Act'). 2. The facts leading to the present case are that the Appellants had taken the loan facility from the Respondent-Bank. Since there was default in repayment of the same as per the agreement, therefore, the account was declared as NPA. A notice under section 13 (2) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 was issued on 6th November, 2009 and the same was received by the Respondent No. 3. Thereafter, the possession notice was issued on 11th January, 2010 and the same was published in the newspaper. Thereafter, the possession was taken and the proceeding to auction the property was initiated. The auction was scheduled for 7th February, 2010 as per the notice published in the newspaper, which was subsequently rescheduled on 10th March, 2010. The property was auctioned and the sale certificate was issued on 7th April, 2010. 3. The Appellants filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur on 13th April, 2010, which was registered as W.P. No. 4899/2010. The said writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court by its order dated 21st April, 2010. The said petition as dismissed on the ground that there was an alternative remedy available to the Appellants to file application under section 17 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 and the Petitioner was set at liberty to avail the said remedy and the petition was dismissed in limine. Thereafter, the Appellants filed a writ Appeal against the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge before the Hon'ble Division Bench of the said High Court, which was registered as Writ Appeal No. 370/2010. The said writ Appeal was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated 20th May, 2010. 4. Thereafter, the Appellants filed a writ Appeal against the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge before the Hon'ble Division Bench of the said High Court, which was registered as Writ Appeal No. 370/2010. The said writ Appeal was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated 20th May, 2010. 4. Thereafter, the Appellants preferred the Securitisation Application under section 17 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 on 3rd June, 2010 before the DRT. In the same, the question with regard to the improper auction of the property and non-issuance of any notice under section 13 (2) were agitated. It was also agitated that the notice of possession was not served on them. It was also submitted inter-alia that the reserve price of the property was not properly fixed. 5. The Tribunal below held that the Securitisation Application preferred by the Appellants was itself barred by time and it has no power to condone the delay. The Tribunal further held that there was no illegality in auctioning the property. The Tribunal further held that the Appellants are guilty of not approaching the forum with clean hands by alleging that no notice under section 13 (2) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 was received and also with regard to the fact in relation to the possession notice, the Tribunal arrived at a finding that the notice was received and was also published in the newspaper. The Tribunal further held that for the purpose of fixation of the reserve price, it was not necessary to consult the borrower. Since notice was published properly in the newspaper, therefore, the action so taken is valid. 6. Section 17 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 provides for filing of Securitisation Application within 45 days from the date, the measures are to be taken. In the present case, the Securitisation Application was preferred on 3rd June, 2010. 7. Since notice was published properly in the newspaper, therefore, the action so taken is valid. 6. Section 17 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 provides for filing of Securitisation Application within 45 days from the date, the measures are to be taken. In the present case, the Securitisation Application was preferred on 3rd June, 2010. 7. The learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that in the present case, the Appellants are entitled to invoke the benefit of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes that the time so consumed by initiating the proceedings before the forum having no jurist -- is to be excluded, therefore, under these circumstances, the time so consumed by filing writ petition and writ Appeal, has to be excluded and for this reason, the application is within time. In this regard, this is to be seen, whether the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and particularly section 5 or section 14 of the said Act would have any application to the present case? 8. The Apex Court in the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow v. Parson Tools and Planh, Kanpur, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1039 on consideration of the question; whether the principles of section 5 and section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act are attracted to the proceedings under the Sales tax Act; has answered the said question and the Apex Court ultimately came to a conclusion that if the Legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation, by analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. The Apex Court further held that these provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be imported into the U.P. Sales Tax Act even by analogy and for the purpose of convenience, the relevant paras Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: "8. The Apex Court further held that these provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be imported into the U.P. Sales Tax Act even by analogy and for the purpose of convenience, the relevant paras Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: "8. The material part of section 10 runs thus: "(3)(1) The Revising Authority........may, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order made by any appellate or assessing authority under this Act. Either on its own motion or on the application of the Commissioner of Sales-tax or the person aggrieved, the record of such order and pass such order as it may think fit. XXX (3-A) (3-B) The application under sub-section (3) shall be made within one year from the date of service of the order complained of, but the Revising Authority may on proof of sufficient cause entertain an application within a further period of six months." Three features of the scheme of the above provisions are noteworthy. The first is that no limitation has been prescribed for the suo motu exercise of its jurisdiction by the Revising Authority. The second is that limitation for filing an application revision by the aggrieved party is unusually long the third is that the Revising Authority has no discretion to extend this period beyond a further period of six months, even on sufficient cause shown. As tightly pointed out in the minority, judgment of the High Court, pendency of proceeding of the nature contour, plated by section 14 (2) of the limitation Act, may amount to a suffice cause for condoning the delay extending the limitation for filing revision application, but section 10 (3-B) of the Sale-tax Act, gives no jurisdiction to the Revising Authority to extend the limitation, even in such a case, for a further period of more than six months. 9. The three stark features of the scheme and language of the above provision, unmistakably show that the Legislature has deliberately excluded the application of the principles underlying sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, except to the extent and in the truncated form embodied in sub-section (3-B) of section 10 of the Sales-tax Act. 9. The three stark features of the scheme and language of the above provision, unmistakably show that the Legislature has deliberately excluded the application of the principles underlying sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, except to the extent and in the truncated form embodied in sub-section (3-B) of section 10 of the Sales-tax Act. Delay in disposal of revenue matters adversely affects the steady in flow of revenues and the financial stability of the State, section 10 is therefore designed to ensure speedy and final determination of fiscal matters, within a reasonably certain time-schedule. 10. It cannot be said that by excluding the unrestricted application of the principles of sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, the Legislat-ire has made the provisions of section 10 unduly oppressive. In most cases, the discretion to extend limitation, on sufficient cause being shown for a further period of six months only given by sub-section (3-B) would be enough to afford relief. Cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party despite sufficient cause is unable to make an application for revision within its maximum period of 18 months. Such harsh cases would be rare. Even in such exceptional cases of extreme hardship, the Revising Authority may, on its own motion, entertain revision and grant relief. 11. Be that as it may, from the scheme and language of section 10, the intention of the Legislature to exclude the unrestricted application of the principles of sections 5 and 10 of the Limitation Act is manifestly clear. There provisions of the Limitation Act which the Legislature did not, after due application of mind, incorporate in the Sales-tax Act, cannot be imported into it by analogy. An enactment being the will of the Legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it." "The will of the Legislature is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience," "Judicial power is never exercised." And Marshall C.J. of United States, "for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judges; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or in other words, to the will of the law." 12. If the Legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omis-sus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and uam-biguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation by analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. "To do so" (at p. 65 in Prem Nath L. Ganesh v. Prem Nath L. Ram Nath. A.I.R. 1963 Pun. 62 Per Tek Chand J.) "would be entrenching upon the preserves of Legislature". The primary function of a Court of law being jus decere and not jus dare. 17. Thus the principle that emerges is that if the Legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown may be extended, in the maximum only up to a specified time-limit and no further, then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation. An application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act. 18. We have said enough and we may say it again that where the Legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the law-giver, more so if the statute is a txing statute, we will close the discussion by recalling what Lord Hailsham (at p. 11 in Pearlberg v. Verty). (1972) 2 All. E.R. 6 has said recently in regard to importation of the principles of natural justice into a statute which is a clear and complete code, by itself; "It is true of course that the Courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly fair. (1972) 2 All. E.R. 6 has said recently in regard to importation of the principles of natural justice into a statute which is a clear and complete code, by itself; "It is true of course that the Courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly fair. But they have no power to amend or supplement the language of a statute merely because in one view of the matter a subject feels himself entitled to a larger decree of say in the making of a decision than a statute accords him. Still less is it the functioning. Of the Courts to form first a judgment on the fairness of an act of Parliament and then to amend or supplement it with new provisions so as to make it Conform to that judgment." For all the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the object, the scheme and language of section 10 of the Sales-tax Act do not permit the invocation of section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act either, in terms, or in principle, for excluding the time spent in prosecuting proceedings for setting aside the dismissal of Appeals in default, from computation of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision under the Sales-tax Act. Accordingly, we answer the question referred, in the negative." 9. To the aforesaid, this is to be seen that on the basis of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 2393/2011 (Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State Bank of India), decided on 5th September, 2011, this Tribunal while holding the additional charge of DRAT, Delhi has taken view in Misc. Appeal No. 290/2011 in T.S.A. No. 1/2010 Dena Bank v. Vinedale Distilleries Limited, decided on 4th October, 2011 that there is no power vested with this Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the Appeal and it is further hel4 that the said judgment is also applicable with regard to the Securitisation Application preferred under section 17 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002. The relevant Para No. 19 to 25 of this judgment are quoted herein below: "19.By virtue of Sec. 36 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 the Indian Limitation Act has been taken care of, then the question would arise in the case that by virtue of section 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act; whether the provisions contained from section 4 to section 24 are excluded? 20. Section 18 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 also provides for filing an Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against the orders passed by the DRT in exercising of their power under section 17 of the Act, 2002 and in section 18 also though the period of limitation is provided of 30 days for filing the Appeal and the said section does not provide any power with the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay. The same view was taken by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad in Appeal Sr. No. 97/2010 Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills Put. Ltd. v. State Bank of India, decided on 21st January, 2011 that there is no power to condone the delay. There is express exclusion of sections 4 to 24 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Against the same a writ petition was preferred by the borrower before the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh Principal Seat Jabalpur which was registered as Writ Petition No. 2393/11 (Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State Bank of India). The Hon'ble High Court in its Judgment dated 5th September, 2011 decided the said question by upholding the Judgment passed by the DRAT, Allahabad. In the said Judgment the question with regard to express exclusion of provisions of Indian Limitation Act has been considered and the Hon'ble High Court held that "expressly excluded also includes exclusion" by necessary implication and the said view taken on the basis of the Judgment passed by the Apex Court in Hukumdev Narayan Yadav v. Lalit Na-rayan Mishra, A.I.R. 1974 S.C 480. and in the said Judgment the Hon'ble High Court has taken into account the provisions of section 18 as well as section 36 of the SRFAESI Act 2002 and also considered the language applied section 18 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 and thereafter the view is taken that there is no power to condone the delay and section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is excluded. The provisions as contained under section 17 and 18 of the Act, 2002 are para materia to the extent that both the sections do not empower the Tribunal to condone the delay, in case the proceedings are initiated beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under the Act. The Judgment passed the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur fully applies to the case. 21. On behalf of the Respondent-borrower Mr. Hemant Choudhary, learned Counsel vehemently submitted that even the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in its Judgment (supra) in para No. 17 has also held that the power to condone the delay applies in the proceedings, under section 17 of the "Act" lodged by the borrower beyond the period of limitation and on this basis it is submitted that the Judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh Jabalpur fully covers the field. The submission so made by the Counsel for the Respondent Mr. Choudhary is considered. The ratio of full Division Bench Judgment is to be taken into account, then the conclusion which is drawn by the Hon'ble High Court is that by virtue of section 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, the provisions of the Limitation Act have expressly been excluced. If the same ratio is applied with regard to the power to condone the delay in Appeals lodged under Sec. 17 of Act 2002, then the same ratio shall certainly be applicable which is applied to hold that there is no power to condone the delay in Appeal preferred under section 18 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002. Under these circumstances the submission made by Mr. Choudhary cannot be accepted. 22. The Hon'ble High Court has already considered two Judgment of the High Court i.e., I/CO Bank v. Kanji Manji Kothari, 2008 (4) Mh. Under these circumstances the submission made by Mr. Choudhary cannot be accepted. 22. The Hon'ble High Court has already considered two Judgment of the High Court i.e., I/CO Bank v. Kanji Manji Kothari, 2008 (4) Mh. L.J. 424 and Punnu Swami v. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, 2009(3)B.J.401 wherein the Bombay High Court as well as the Madras High Court have taken a view that section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under section 17 of the SRFAESI Act 2002, but the aforesaid two Judgments were not approved by the Division Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in its Judgment (supra), therefore, I do not consider the said Judgment as I have already placed my reliance on the Judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh (supra). 23. The Judgment passed by a Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Union Bank of India v. Chairperson Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and 3 others, A.I.R. 2010 Guj. 63 wherein again the view is taken that the section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the proceedings initiated under section 17 of the SRFAESI Act 2002. The para No. 37 states as under : "37.Section 17 (1) of the SRFAESI Act, prescribes a period of limitation of just 45 days for filing an application, challenging any of the measures taken by the secured creditor under section 13 (4) of the Act. The remedy under section 17 (1) is virtually a remedy in respect of a right of redemption. Therefore, to hold that section 5 of the Limitation Act, will not apply to an application under section 17 (1) would virtually defeat the valuable right of redemption available to a mortgagor. This right of redemption normally gets extinguished after the sale of the property. Therefore, the apprehension expressed by the learned Counsel for the Bank that the parties may come up with applications after a huge delay and defeat the object the Act for speedy recovery of dues, may not be well founded for the simple reason that after losing possession of the property under section 13 (4), a debtor cannot afford to wait for long. If he waits for long, the property may get sold and his rights may get extinguished. If he waits for long, the property may get sold and his rights may get extinguished. Hence the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act, to proceedings under section 17 (1) of the SRFAESI Act, would neither defeat the rights of the secured creditor nor cause irreparable hardship to the secured creditor". 24. This is to be seen that this was the additional reasoning given by the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, as the other reasoning given to hold that sections 4 to 24 of the Indian Limitation Act is applicable, have already been not accepted by the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh. So far the Para No. 37 of the Judgment passed by the Gujarat High Court is concerned, this is fully based upon the sympathy. The question of sympathetic consideration while interpreting the law is not applicable but the question is with regard to the express exclusion of Indian Limitation Act to the SRFAESI Act 2002 by interpreting section 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act. The Judgment passed by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh directly holds the fields. Under these circumstances the law laid down by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court while deciding the case in relation to applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under section 18 of the Act also applies to the proceedings initiated under section 17 to hold that there is no power to condone the delay. 25. The next question arises for consideration of commencement of the period of limitation under section 17 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002. Section 17 has already been reproduced in earlier paragraph and the opening sentence of this section i.e. subsection (1) itself indicates that any person (including borrower), aggrieved by "any of the measures' referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 can lodge an Appeal to the DRT under section 17 of the Act, as in the earlier paragraph four different measures as provided under section 13 (4) of the Act 2002 have already been discussed. The period of limitation is 45. The period of limitation is 45. Thus for the purposes of commencement of the period of the limitation the word used in subsection (1) of section 17 "aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13" are of great help for reaching to a conclusion with regard to the commencement of the period of limitation. Thus once the Legislature in subsection (1) of section 17 has used the word "any of the measures, then for each four measures as provided in sub-section (4) would be the commencement of the period of limitation and thus it cannot be said that once the borrower if has failed to take action with regard to the first two measures or three measures, then he cannot challenge the last measure taken but for each four measures as provided in sub-section (4) of section 13 the period of limitation "would commence from the date of such measure is taken by the secured creditor and the period of commencement would be 45 days from such initiation of the action. Thus I am inclined to hold that there is no power to condone the delay vested with the DRT in the applications which are barred by limitation." 10. On the basis of the aforesaid this has to be held that the provisions of section 5 or 14 of the Indian Limitation Act have no application in the present case. 11. The Appellants have also not relied upon the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of condonation of delay, but have taken resort to section 14 of the Limitation Act. According to the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur (supra), this has to be held that the said two sections i.e; section 5 as well as section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act cannot be imported to the special law i.e., SRFAESI Act, 2002 and it has to be held that the time so consumed by the litigant by initiating the proceedings before a wrong forum cannot be condoned. 12. The learned Counsel for the Appellants relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Shakti Tubes Ltd. v. State of Bihar. 12. The learned Counsel for the Appellants relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Shakti Tubes Ltd. v. State of Bihar. A.I.R. 2009 S.C. 1200 The facts in Shakti Tubes Ltd. (supra) if are to be seen carefully where though the Petitioners were claiming the benefit of section 14 of Indian Limitation Act with regard to exclusion of time which has taken place in prosecuting the remedy before the Hon'ble High Court, but ultimately the same was not allowed. According to the judgment, it is clear that the petition was preferred by the Appellants before the Hon'ble High Court but the Hon'ble High Court admitted partly the said petition and a part of the relief was rejected and therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court was of the view that once the petition was partly admitted and with regard to the part of the relief the petition was dismissed, therefore, the time so consumed in prosecuting the writ petition has to be excluded. The Apex Court in para No. 21 of the said judgment has concluded that the remedy was resorted to by the Plaintiff and a part of the writ petition was admitted. The writ petition was not entertained in respect of the another relief related to the escalated price by the High Court and for this reason, since the petition was admitted for hearing, therefore, the time so consumed in disposing off the said petition and the petition ultimately was dismissed and the same was found to be bona fide and in good faith. The Apex Court found that the Appellant was pursuing the said remedy bonafidely and in good faith. The para No. 21 of this judgment is relevant in this regard, which is reproduced as under : "21.Sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: "14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction. The Apex Court found that the Appellant was pursuing the said remedy bonafidely and in good faith. The para No. 21 of this judgment is relevant in this regard, which is reproduced as under : "21.Sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: "14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction. (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of Appeal or revision, against the Defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it....." The said provision should be construed liberally. It is not in dispute that the writ remedy was resorted to by the Plaintiff. A part of the writ petition was admitted. The writ petition was not entertained in respect of the escalated price by the High Court for the reasons stated by the High Court in its order dated 14th September, 1995. It has not been held that the writ petition was not maintainable. It was not dismissed at the threshold. In view of the fact that a part of the writ petition was admitted for hearing, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the same was maintainable. Appellant was, therefore, pursuing the said remedy bona fide and in good faith." 13. But the facts in the present case are entirely different. In the present case, the petition was not at all admitted and was dismissed threshold in limine. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in writ Appeal also upheld the order. Appellant was, therefore, pursuing the said remedy bona fide and in good faith." 13. But the facts in the present case are entirely different. In the present case, the petition was not at all admitted and was dismissed threshold in limine. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in writ Appeal also upheld the order. Under these circumstances, the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be availed of by the Appellants and particularly, in the light of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the Commissions of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur (supra), wherein it is held r' tat the provision of Sec. 5 and section of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked to a special statute and it has already been held earlier that section 17 does not empower the DRT to condone the delay and for this reason, I have no hesitation to hold that the Securitisation Application preferred by the Appellants was rightly held to be barred by time. 14. With regard to the other objection raised by the Appellants pertaining to the improper auction of the property, non-serving of any notice under section 13 (2) and (4) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 and improper fixation of reserve price of the property, the Tribunal has recorded the findings in detail in its judgment dated 21st October, 2011 which is impugned in the present case. 15. The Tribunal has recorded the finding on improper auction and non-serving of any notice under section 13 (2) and (4) that the notice of demand was duly served on all the three Appellants (borrower, mortgagor/guarantor) and the possession notice under section 13 (4) was served on Appellant No. 3, the mortgagor and the same was also affixed on the secured assets as well as the same published in the newspaper. It is further held that as per the section 13 (4) (a) read with Rule 8 (1) and (2), when the possession over the secured asset has been taken by the secured creditor, then notice is to be served to the mortgagor/borrower whose property was mortgaged and not to all the borrowers. It is further held that as per the section 13 (4) (a) read with Rule 8 (1) and (2), when the possession over the secured asset has been taken by the secured creditor, then notice is to be served to the mortgagor/borrower whose property was mortgaged and not to all the borrowers. The Tribunal further held that though Appellant No. 3 had received section 13 (2) and (4) notice and section 13 (2) notice was served on all who had sworn on affidavit that he had not receive any notice under section 13 (2) and (4) which reveals that they have come with unclean hands and are not entitled for any relief. It is further held that the possession notice published on 17th January, 2010 and the auction notices published on 7th February, 2010 are published in newspaper having less circulation, is not proved by the Appellants and in this regard, no document is produced by them. 16. The Tribunal further held that the sale certificate was issued on 7th February, 2010 is favour of Respondent No. 3 auction purchaser, who purchased the property for a sum of Rs. 10.00 lacs against the reserve price of Rs. 7.20 lacs fixed as per the valuation report dated 22nd January, 2010 in consultation with the secured creditor. On the objection raised by the Appellants that they were not consulted in fixing the reserve price as required under Rule 8 (5), the Tribunal has recorded the finding that the Appellants misled the Tribunal even on legal provision under Rule 8 (5), which states "Before effecting sale of the immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 9 the authorized officer shall obtain valuation of the property from or approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or part of such immovable assets by any of the following methods : " Nowhere in Rule 8 (5) consultation with borrower/mortgagor is mandated or desired, but consultation with secured creditor is alone required. On the contention of the Appellants that the valuation report reveals the value to be Rs. On the contention of the Appellants that the valuation report reveals the value to be Rs. 15.60 lacs when the credit facility was availed is explained in the reply lodged by the Bank, the Tribunal has held mat the same has not been denied by the Appellants who had availed the opportunity to lodge the rejoinder. It is further held that when the possession notice was published in the newspaper, the Appellant could have cleared the dues as provided in section 13 (8) of the Act, 2002 or could have participated in the bid either by themselves or producing bidders for the price expected by them. In this regard, the Tribunal relied upon a judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka as reported in 2002 (2) I.S.J. Banking 258, wherein it is held that mere inadequacy of price by itself cannot be a ground to set aside the sale. Moreso, the Appellants would have presented any person before the D.R.T. who was willing to purchase the property for a higher price than offered by the highest bidder, but they have not chosen to do so. 17. In view of the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any reason to interfere in the order passed by the Tribunal and accordingly, the Appeal is without any merit and hence, the same is dismissed. 18. A copy of the judgment be supplied to the parties as well as to the DRT concerned as per law. Appeal Dismissed. _____________