Anil Kumar, J.;— Heard Shri Alok Kumar Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned State Counsel as well as Shri Ravi Shanker Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party nos.3 to 6 and perused the record. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the impugned order dated 31.8.2012 passed by opposite party no.1 by which the delay in filing the revision has been condoned. Shri Alok Kumar Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the impugned order submits that there is much delay in filing the revision, as such, there is no justification or reason whatsoever on the part of the opposite party no.1 to condone the delay in filing the same. Hence, the impugned order is illegal and arbitrary in nature. In addition to the abovesaid submission, Shri Alok Kumar Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that the contesting respondents have no locus in the matter in question and if there is any grievance in the matter it is of the Gaon Sabha, so the action on the part of the opposite party no.1 to entertain the revision is an illegal exercise, as such the impugned order is void ab initio without jurisdiction, liable to be set aside. Learned Standing Counsel as well as Shri Ravi Shanker Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents while supporting the impugned order as contained in Annexure No.1 to the writ petition submit that as per the settled proposition of law, the matter may be decided and heard on merit before the opposite party no.1. When the same is to be adjudicated and decided on merit then the contesting respondents have no locus in the matter in question and their version are liable to be rejected. They further submit that it will be open to the petitioner to raise the grievance before the opposite party no.1, when the said matter is to be considered and decided on merit. Hence, there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order, under challenge in the present writ petition by which the delay has been condoned by opposite party no.1 in filing the revision and should not be dismissed on the ground of limitation. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Hence, there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order, under challenge in the present writ petition by which the delay has been condoned by opposite party no.1 in filing the revision and should not be dismissed on the ground of limitation. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. As per the admitted facts stated hereinabove, by impugned order dated 31.8.2012, opposite party no.1 has only condoned the delay, thus, in the matter of condonation of delay the Apex Court has constantly held that the pragmatic view should be taken. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition V. Mst. Kati Ji and others, reported in 1987 (13) ALR 306 (SC) held as follows: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1.Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties. 3. "Every" day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The dectrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side can not claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. The dectrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side can not claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by restoring to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grapped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." In N. Balakrishnan V. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 133 the Apex Court explained the scope of limitation and condonation of delay, observing as under: "The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy." In Smt. Prabha V. Ram Prakash Kalra reported in 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 338 the Supreme Court took the view that the Court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil V. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others reported in 2001 (44) ALR 577 (SC) the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under: "In exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach...." In New India Insurance Co. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach...." In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Smt. Shanti Misra reported in AIR 1976 SC 237 , Hon'ble Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The express "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Shakuntala Devi Jain V. Kuntal Kumari reported in AIR 1969 SC 575 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay can not be refused to be condoned. In O.P. Kathpalia V. Lakhmir Singh reported in AIR 1984 SC 1744 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Thus, I do not find any illegality, infirmity in the impugned orders under challenge in the present writ petition by which the delay has been condoned in filing the revision. Further, so far as argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that the opposite party no.1 has erred in entertaining the revision on behalf of the contesting respondents and while doing so neither any illegality nor infirmity has been done by the respondent no.1 because the revision is to be heard and decided on merit and the petitioners will get ample opportunity to prove their case before the opposite party no.1; that the contesting respondents have got no locus in the present case whereas if there is any grievance, the same is of the Gaon Sabha. Thus, at this stage, no legal injury has been caused to the petitioner by means of the impugned order dated 26.9.2012 to interfere in the matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed. No order as to costs. _____________