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2012 DIGILAW 2578 (MAD)

P. N. Peruvazhuthi v. Railway Board, Rep by its Principal Secretary-Cum-Chairman

2012-06-21

ELIPE DHARMA RAO, M.VENUGOPAL

body2012
Judgment :- ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J. 1. The petitioner, a practising Advocate, is challenging the selection of candidates to the posts of Vice Chairman and Member (Judicial) in the Railway Claims Tribunal. 2. The Ministry of Railways has issued a notification on 27.6.2005, inviting applications, in the prescribed format, to fill up the posts of Vice Chairman and Members (Judicial) against the existing and prospective vacancies at various Benches of Railway Claims Tribunal. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner has submitted his application dated 12.7.2005. Since he did not receive any communication for the oral interview, he sought for information from the authorities concerned under the Right to Information Act and having come to know that his candidature was not considered on the ground that his income was below Rs.2 lakh, which, according to the petitioner, was not a condition in the notification, he filed an Original Application before the 6th respondent/Tribunal, praying to call for the records pursuant to the advertisement, vide notification No.1714/2005 and to direct the respondents to compare his application with that of other selected candidates (among advocates) and to declare the selection and appointment made by the respondents as illegal and set aside the same and to appoint the applicant for the post applied for by him. The said Application, having been numbered as Dy.No3408 of 2007, has been dismissed by the Tribunal at the time of admission itself with the following observations: "2. A notification was issued calling for applications to fill the posts of Vice Chairman in the Railway Claims Tribunal. In pursuance of this, the applicant is one of the contenders. It is an undisputed fact that the selection has to be made by a Committee constituted and headed by the Supreme Court Judge. It is only on fulfilling certain conditions and criteria, the question of considering the eligibility of the candidate arises. In the wisdom of the Selection Committee, it appears that the applicant was not found suitable and therefore he was not considered. Appointing a person or rejection by the Committee cannot be questioned before this Tribunal and also not within the competency of the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. Therefore, the relief prayed is misconceived which cannot be entertained by this Tribunal. Accordingly, Dy.No.3408/2007 is dismissed when the matter came up for admission." 3. Thereafter, the petitioner has come forward to file this writ petition with the prayer mentioned supra. Therefore, the relief prayed is misconceived which cannot be entertained by this Tribunal. Accordingly, Dy.No.3408/2007 is dismissed when the matter came up for admission." 3. Thereafter, the petitioner has come forward to file this writ petition with the prayer mentioned supra. It is to be pointed out that though in the grounds of writ petition, the petitioner attacked the order of the Tribunal on various counts, he has not sought for any prayer of Writ of Certiorari to quash the same but only a prayer of Declaration, declaring the selection of candidates from amongst Advocates, pursuant to notification bearing No.1714/2005 issued by way of Newspaper Advertisement by the respondents, as null and void and to declare that the petitioner is most eligible amongst Advocate candidates called for interview, with full regard to his academic qualifications, merit and experience. Though, on this ground of variation in prayer, the matter could have been dismissed, considering the fact that the petitioner is challenging the appointments made to a higher judicial body and since this Court firmly believes that mere technicalities should not stand in the way of rendering justice, we proceeded to hear the matter. 4. During the pendency of this writ petition, as it came to be known that pursuant to the selection process appointments were made and the selected candidates were also functioning as Members (Judicial) of the Railway Claims Tribunal, this Court, by the order dated 24.4.2008, suo motu ordered to implead the selected candidates. Accordingly, respondents 7 to 9 were brought on record, but nobody appeared on their behalf to contest the case. 5. A common counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents 1 to 5, stating that the notification and subsequent selection has been done as per the provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 and the Rules notified thereunder; that the notification clearly mentions the eligibility criteria for the appointment of Member (Judicial) and Vice Chairman (Judicial) in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act and as far as the petitioner is concerned, he must have been qualified to be a Judge of the High Court, which is the only criteria laid down in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 for an Advocate to be considered for appointment. It is their further case that the selection to the post of Vice Chairman (Judicial) and Member (Judicial) is done by a Selection Committee headed by a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court, which is nominated by the Chief Justice of India with Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal; Law Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice; Member Traffic, Railway Board and Ex-officio Secretary to the Government of India as Members and the Selection Committee, constituted in pursuance of the vacancy notice No.1714/2005, was headed by The Honourable Mr. Justice Ashok Bhan, Judge of the Supreme Court of India and the Selection Committee held its preliminary meeting on 5.10.2005 and laid down guidelines for calling persons for interview for the posts of Vice Chairman and Member (Judicial) keeping in view the provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 and Rules notified thereunder and other extant instructions; that the Committee decided, inter alia, that Advocates with ten years practice with an income of at least Rs.2 lakhs per annum supported by Income Tax Assessment order or acknowledgement of Income-tax Return filed, may be called for interview and only such of the Advocates who were fulfilling the criteria laid down by the Committee were called for interview and as the income of the petitioner was less than Rs.2 lakhs, he was not called for interview nor was any intimation sent. It is the case of the official respondents that it is the prerogative of the Selection Committee to lay down the guidelines for selection. 6. It is also submitted on behalf of the official respondents that the Ministry of Law and Justice, vide their letter dated 5.6.2006, advised that in addition to the qualification prescribed under Article 217 of the Constitution of India, an Advocate is considered for appointment as a Judge of the High Court, if his gross professional income is Rs.3 lakhs or more during the last three years and has attained a minimum age of 45 years and the Committee, thus, had relaxed the income criteria and fixed it as Rs.2 lakhs, but, even then, the petitioner did not fulfil the relaxed criteria and hence he was not called for interview and the entire position has, however, been clarified by the Ministry of Railways in their reply to the petitioner, sent against his application filed under the Right to Information Act, 2005. On such and other grounds, the official respondents would pray to dismiss the writ petition. 7. Mr. K. Kumar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would argue that the official respondents should have kept in mind the fact that the conditions and qualifications laid down in the advertisement should not be changed in the midway and since in the case on hand, a condition which was not mentioned in the Advertisement, has been followed by the official respondents, in selecting the candidates to a high brass cadre, the same has to be nullified. 8. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner would rely on the following judgments: 1. REKHA CHATURVEDI vs. UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS [1993 Supp (3) SCC 168]; 2. ASHOK KUMAR SHARMA AND OTHERS vs. CHANDER SHEKHAR AND ANOTHER [ (1997) 4 SCC 18 ]; 3. HEMANI MALHOTRA vs. HIGH COURT OF DELHI [(2008) 7 SCC 11] and 4. MOHD.SOHRAB KHAN vs. ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS [ (2009) 4 SCC 555 ] 9.In the first judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court, while dealing with the selection of University teachers in University of Rajasthan, and considering the fact that almost eight years have elapsed after the appointment of the selected candidates and there is no record to show as to how the Selection Committee had proceeded to weigh the respective merits of the candidates and to relax the minimum qualifications in favour of some in exercise of the discretionary powers vested in it under the University Ordinance, has declined to set aside the selections despite the aforesaid illegality, but as framed the following guidelines for future selections process: "A. The University must note that the qualifications it advertises for the posts should not be at variance with those prescribed by its Ordinance/Statutes. B. The candidates selected must be qualified as on the last date for making applications for the posts in question or on the date to be specifically mentioned in the advertisement/notification for the purpose. The qualifications acquired by the candidates after the said date should not be taken into consideration, as that would be arbitrary and result in discrimination. B. The candidates selected must be qualified as on the last date for making applications for the posts in question or on the date to be specifically mentioned in the advertisement/notification for the purpose. The qualifications acquired by the candidates after the said date should not be taken into consideration, as that would be arbitrary and result in discrimination. It must be remembered that when the advertisement/notification represents that the candidates must have the qualifications in question, with reference to the last date for making the applications or with reference to the specific date mentioned for the purpose, those who do not have such qualifications do not apply for the posts even though they are likely to acquire such qualifications and do acquire them after the said date. In the circumstances, many who would otherwise be entitled to be considered and may even be better than those who apply, can have a legitimate grievance since they are left out of consideration. C. When the University or its Selection Committee relaxes the minimum required qualifications, unless it is specifically stated in the advertisement/notification both that the qualifications will be relaxed and also the conditions on which they will be relaxed, the relaxation will be illegal. D. The University/Selection Committee must mention in its proceedings of selection the reasons for making relaxations, if any, in respect of each of the candidates in whose favour relaxation is made. E. The minutes of the meetings of the Selection Committee should be preserved for a sufficiently long time, and if the selection process is challenged until the challenge is finally disposed of. An adverse inference is liable to be drawn if the minutes are destroyed or a plea is taken that they are not available." 10. In the second judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'an advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it.' 11. In the third judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'changing rules of the game during selection process or when it is over is not permissible.' 12. It cannot act contrary to it.' 11. In the third judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'changing rules of the game during selection process or when it is over is not permissible.' 12. In the fourth judgment cited above, the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'the Selection Committee cannot change selection criteria midway since some candidates might not have applied by considering themselves ineligible according to advertised qualifications.' 13. Relying on the above judgments, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner would argue that since the condition of income is not incorporated in the advertisement, the Selection Committee is not correct in insisting on the income and it amounts to changing the rules of game in the midway. On such arguments, the learned senior counsel would pray to allow the writ petition. 14. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 5 would argue that the Selection Board is headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court and since the Selection Board can decide its own procedure, no illegality or irregularity can be said to have been committed in the entire selection process. The learned counsel would further argue that the selection having been completed long back, the selected candidates are functioning as Members (Judicial) for the last 5-6 years. The learned counsel for the official respondents would rely on the following judgments: 1. MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION vs. NAVNIT KUMAR POTDAR AND ANOTHER [ (1994) 6 SCC 293 ] and 2. B.RAMAKICHENIN ALIAS BALAGANDHI vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ (2008) 1 SCC 362 ]. 15. In the first judgment cited above, challenge was made to the selection of Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts, constituted under the provisions of M.P.Industrial Relations Act, 1960 on the ground that though applications are invited from the advocates with five years of standing, the same was increased to 7 1/2 years by the selection board. In these circumstances, the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: "Where the selection is to be made purely on the basis of interview, if the applications for such posts are enormous in number with reference to the number of posts available to be filled up, then the Commission or the Selection Board has no option but to shortlist such applicants on some rational and reasonable basis. Where selections are to be made only on the basis of interview, then such interviews/viva voce tests must be carried out in a thorough and scientific manner in order to arrive at a fair and satisfactory evaluation of the personality of the candidate. The sole purpose of holding interview is to search and select the best among the applicants. It would be impossible to carry out a satisfactory viva voce test if large number of candidates are interviewed each day till all the applicants who had been found to be eligible on basis of the criteria and qualifications prescribed are interviewed. If large number of applicants are called for interview in respect of four posts, the interview is then bound to be casual and superficial because of the time constraint. The members of the Commission shall not be in a position to assess properly the candidates who appear before them for interview. It is necessary to fix the limit of the applicants who should be called for interview where there is no written test, on some rational and objective basis so that personality and merit of the persons who are called for interview are properly assessed and evaluated. This decision regarding short-listing the number of candidates who have applied for the post must be based not on any extraneous consideration, but only to aid and help the process of selection of the best candidates among the applicants for the post in question. This process of short-listing shall not amount to altering or substituting the eligibility criteria given in statutory rules or prospectus. In substance and reality, this process of short-listing is part of the process of selection. Once the applications are received and the Selection Board or the Commission applies its mind to evolve any rational and reasonable basis, on which the list of applicants should be short-listed, the process of selection commences. The Selection Board or the Commission has to decide as to what procedure is to be followed for selecting the best candidates from amongst the applicants. In most of the services, screening tests or written tests have been introduced to limit the number of the candidates who have to be called for interview. Such screening tests or written tests have been provided in the concerned statutes or prospectus which govern the selection of the candidates. In most of the services, screening tests or written tests have been introduced to limit the number of the candidates who have to be called for interview. Such screening tests or written tests have been provided in the concerned statutes or prospectus which govern the selection of the candidates. But where the selection is to be made only on basis of interview, the Commission or the Selection Board can adopt any rational procedure to fix the number of candidates who should be called for interview." 16. In the second judgment, relying on the first judgment above, the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: "Method of short listing can be validly adopted by the selection body. Even if there is no rule providing for short listing nor any mention of it in the advertisement calling for applications for the post, the selection body can resort to a short listing procedure if there are a large number of eligible candidates who apply and it is not possible for the authority to interview all of them. For example, if for one or two posts there are more than 1000 applications received from eligible candidates, it may not be possible to interview all of them. In this situation, the procedure of short listing can be resorted to by the selection body, even though there is no mention of short listing in the rules or in the advertisement." 17. Relying on the above judgments, the learned counsel appearing for the official respondents would submit that since the selection is purely based on interview, there is nothing wrong in the Selection Board short listing the candidates. On such arguments, he would pray to dismiss the writ petition. 18. The issue in this matter is the appointment of Vice Chairman and Member (Judicial) of the Railway Claims Tribunal. Section 5 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act prescribes the qualification for the said posts. For ready reference, the same is extracted hereunder: "5. Qualifications for appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other Member.- (1) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Chairman unless he- (a) Is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court ; or (b) Has, for at least two years, held the office of a Vice-Chairman. For ready reference, the same is extracted hereunder: "5. Qualifications for appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other Member.- (1) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Chairman unless he- (a) Is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court ; or (b) Has, for at least two years, held the office of a Vice-Chairman. (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Vice-Chairman unless he- (a) Is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a Judge of a High Court; or (b) Has been a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that Service or any higher post for at lest five years; or (c) Has, for at least five years, held a civil judicial post carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India ; or (d) Has, for at least five years, held post under a railway administration carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India and has adequate knowledge of rules and procedure of, and experience in, claims and commercial matters relating to railways ; or (e) Has, for a period of not less than three years, held office as a Judicial Member or a Technical Member, (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judicial Member unless he- (a) Is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a Judge of High Court ; or (b) Has been a Member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that Service for at least three years ; or (c) Has, for at least three years, held a civil judicial post carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India. (4) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Technical Member unless he has, for at least three years, held a post under a railway administration carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India and has adequate knowledge of rules and procedure of, and experience in, claims and commercial matters relating to railways. (5) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (6), the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and every other Member shall be appointed by the President. (6) No appointment of a person as the Chairman shall be made except after consultation with the Chief Justice of India." 19. The above said qualifications, prescribed in the above Section, were mentioned in the notification itself. A candidate, besides other conditions, is required to be qualified to be a Judge of a High Court. Therefore, there cannot be any ambiguity that the candidate seeking appointment as the Chairman/Vice-Chairman/Member (Judicial) of the Railway Claims Tribunal must satisfy the qualification to be a Judge of a High Court. To maintain high values in the appointment, the income of the applying candidates is also being considered, which has also been made known to the individuals applying for the appointment in the notification, in the following words: "Candidates should annex an attested copy of the completed order of assessment for the Assessment Year 2004-05 i.e. for the Financial Year 2003-04 so as to indicate their total income for the purpose of income tax. In case the said assessment is not yet complete, the last completed order of assessment together with an attested copy of the return for the Assessment Year 2004-05 i.e. for the Financial Year 2003-04 which may have been filed, should be annexed." 20. In fact, the petitioner has also submitted his income-tax returns along with the application. But, it is his contention that the condition now being pressed into service by the official respondents that the candidate should have a minimum of Rs.2 lakh income during the relevant period is an additional condition, since such a condition was not there in the notification. 21. The Ministry of Law and Justice by the letter dated 5.6.2006 advised that in addition to the qualification prescribed under Article 217 of the Constitution of India, an Advocate is considered for appointment as a Judge of the High Court, if his gross professional income is Rs.3 lakh or more during the last 3 years and has attained a minimum age of 45 years. When the very condition for being appointed to the post of Chairman/Vice Chairman/Member (Judicial) is that he must be qualified to be a Judge of a High Court, the petitioner is expected to have knowledge of such conditions. When the very condition for being appointed to the post of Chairman/Vice Chairman/Member (Judicial) is that he must be qualified to be a Judge of a High Court, the petitioner is expected to have knowledge of such conditions. Even though the Ministry of Law and Justice has advised that the gross professional income of a candidate be Rs.3 lakhs or more during the last three years, the Selection Committee, headed by a Honourable Judge of the Supreme Court has relaxed the same and fixed it as Rs.2 lakhs. However, the petitioner did not fall within this relaxed category also. This fixation of the minimum professional income is aimed at short-listing the candidates, since large number of candidates have applied for and the way of selection is only viva voce. This shortlisting cannot be held to be illegal, being a well recognised method of separating grain from chaff and upheld by the Honourable Apex Court in MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION vs. NAVNIT KUMAR POTDAR AND ANOTHER [ (1994) 6 SCC 293 ] and B. RAMAKICHENIN ALIAS BALAGANDHI vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ (2008) 1 SCC 362 ]. 22. As the condition that the candidate must be qualified to be a Judge of a High Court is imbibed in the Notification, in terms of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, it goes without saying that the said condition must be read along with the other conditions imposed to maintain the dignity of the high offices. The method of short-listing the applicants for viva voce, adopted by the Selection Board, cannot be said as changing the game rules in the midway as it is an embodied condition in the Notification itself, which should be read in a broader sense, i.e. to be read along with the conditions for appointment of a High Court Judge. In this view of the matter, since no condition has either been changed or inducted into in the midway, the judgments cited on the part of the petitioner will have no application to the facts of the case. Further more, no malafides or bias could be attributed to the Selection Board, headed by a Honourable Sitting Judge of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the case of the petitioner has no legs to stand before us. 23. Further more, no malafides or bias could be attributed to the Selection Board, headed by a Honourable Sitting Judge of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the case of the petitioner has no legs to stand before us. 23. With regard to the order passed by the Tribunal, regarding its jurisdiction, though no arguments have been advanced before us, we deem it necessary to answer this legal question. 24. In L.CHANDRA KUMAR vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ AIR 1997 SC 1125 ], a Seven Judge Constitutional Bench of the Honourable Apex Court has discussed the entire issue in threadbare and held as follows: “The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statute following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent status, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunal will, however, continue to see as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.” 25. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.” 25. Both the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Railway Claims Tribunal are the 'Tribunals' under Article 323A of the Constitution and as per the latest pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in S.D.JOSHI AND OTHERS vs. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY AND OTHERS [ (2011) 1 SCC 252 ], Tribunals and Courts are different as it is the settled law that Tribunals will function within the sphere of 'Principles of Natural Justice' unlike the Courts. Therefore, it will be out of the judicial competence of the Central Administrative Tribunal, to decide the selection of a Member (Judicial) of the Railway Claims Tribunal being standing on the same footing as that of the Central Administrative Tribunal. The selection of a Member (Judicial) of the Railway Claims Tribunal is governed by the provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. Therefore, in our considered view, a Tribunal (like the Central Administrative Tribunal) cannot go into the aspect as to whether the appointment of a person to the Bench of another Tribunal, as it it is out of the judicial competence of the Central Administrative Tribunal. It is for this legally sustainable reason that the Central Administrative Tribunal has rejected to entertain the plea of the petitioner on question of maintainability. We have no hesitation to uphold this decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Thus, viewing from any angle, we find no merits in this case. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs.