Sudhir Agarwal, J.;— 1. Smt. Sudha Agrawal wife of Sri Satya Narain Prasad is the landlord of house No. D-14/64 situated at Mohalla Terhi Neem, Varanasi wherein respondent no. 3 is the tenant. 2. The petitioner landlord filed suit for eviction being SCC Suit No. 48 of 1991 in the Court of Small Cause, Varanasi which has been dismissed by Trial Court vide judgment dated 12.02.1999 and petitioner having also failed before Revisional Court, since the revision filed by her has been dismissed vide judgement dated 27.08.2001, has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing of both the aforesaid judgments passed by courts below, i.e., respondents no. 1 and 2. 3. The rented accommodation consists of one room at the ground floor of building. The landlord claimed that monthly rent was Rs. 150/- besides house tax and water tax which was not paid by tenant after February, 1989. A demand was raised by registered notice dated 08.07.1991 and the tenancy of tenant was determined, whereafter vide plaint dated 17.08.1991, SCC Suit No. 48 of 1991 was filed. 4. The tenant contested the suit stating that building in question was earlier owned by somebody else and it was purchased by present landlord subsequently. The tenant was already occupying a small room-cum-shop at the ground floor of building which was let out by erstwhile owner in December, 1975 on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- which included house tax and water tax. The tenant besides residing in the said room was looking after his petty business of embroidery. In 1980 one more room was let out by erstwhile owner on a total monthly rent of Rs. 70/- but in 1984 the additional room made available to tenant in 1980 was vacated on the requirement shown by erstwhile landlord whereafter the rent stood reduced to Rs. 50/- which included house tax and water tax. At no point of time monthly rent of accommodation in question was Rs. 150/- as claimed by landlord. The entire rent was paid by tenant up to May 1990 to erstwhile owner/landlord of building but he has lost receipts for the period of January, 1989 to May, 1990. 50/- which included house tax and water tax. At no point of time monthly rent of accommodation in question was Rs. 150/- as claimed by landlord. The entire rent was paid by tenant up to May 1990 to erstwhile owner/landlord of building but he has lost receipts for the period of January, 1989 to May, 1990. After purchase of house in question by petitioner, the rent from the month of June, 1990 and onwards sought to be paid to petitioner but on refusal, the entire rent was deposited under Section 30(1) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972") in Case No. 61 of 1991 in the court of City Munsif, Varanasi and the entire rent up to March 1992 has been paid in the court. The default, if any, in payment of rent was denied and it was pleaded that there was no ground justifying eviction of respondent-tenant from accommodation in question. 5. In the replication filed by petitioner-landlord, besides reiterating what she has stated in the plaint, it is further said that the building was purchased by her in December, 1988 and, therefore, the question of payment of rent up to May, 1990 to erstwhile owner would not arise at all. It is also said that amount deposited under Section 30(1) is wholly illegal and it would not attract any benefit to help the tenant by applying Section 20(4) of Act, 1972. It is said that there is no compliance of Section 20(4) of Act, 1972 and the courts below have erred by not decreeing the suit for eviction of respondent-tenant. 6. The courts below have recorded a finding of fact that monthly rent of accommodation in question was Rs. 50/- per month only which included house tax and water tax also. The issue no. 1 framed by Trial Court on this aspect has been decided in favour of respondent-tenant. It involves a question of fact and, therefore, the findings of fact recorded by Trial Court, confirmed by Revisional Court, cannot be interfered in a writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless it is shown that finding is perverse or there is any manifest error that it is not based on any evidence whatsoever. This has not been so demonstrated to this Court. 7. This has not been so demonstrated to this Court. 7. Here the case set up by landlord is that the tenant had a rental liability of Rs. 150/- per month and has committed default in payment thereof since March 1989 and onwards. The onus to prove the aforesaid fact i.e. rate of rent lay upon landlord. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not dispute that the issue about rate of rent involves a question of fact. The landlord could produce no documentary evidence before the Trial Court to prove that monthly rent was Rs. 150/-, excluding house tax and water tax. It is contended that two witnesses produced by landlord stated that the shop in question was let out to tenant at monthly rent of Rs. 150/- and the Trial Court ought not to have disbelieved the said oral deposition. In the statement of PW 1, (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) he has categorically said that there is no written document to show that monthly rent was Rs. 150/-. He also admitted that he had no knowledge about monthly rent at which the accommodation in question was let out by erstwhile owner Sri Hazari Bhanu Pratap Shukla to the respondent-tenant and what were the conditions with regard to rent etc. decided between them. The landlord did not produce the erstwhile owner to show as to what was the monthly rent payable to him. The second witness also has been found uncreditworthy for not disclosing source of his information. 8. It is thus evident that petitioner-landlord miserably failed to prove the case set up by her. The aforesaid question of fact, thus, having been decided by both the courts below against landlord, it warrants no interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. The question, whether a particular witness ought to have been believed or not is not to be examined in writ jurisdiction when the courts below have found witness's oral statements uncorroborated by any other evidence and further wholly unreliable and unbelievable for other reasons stated in the judgment. The reasons assigned therefor are also not shown to be patently erroneous or imaginary. The finding recorded by Trial Court, therefore, that the monthly rent was only Rs. 50/- and in absence of any written contract between parties the tenant is liable to pay water tax separately, warrants no interference. 10. In respect to issue no. The reasons assigned therefor are also not shown to be patently erroneous or imaginary. The finding recorded by Trial Court, therefore, that the monthly rent was only Rs. 50/- and in absence of any written contract between parties the tenant is liable to pay water tax separately, warrants no interference. 10. In respect to issue no. 2, whether there is any default in payment of rent, the Trial Court has found that the accommodation was purchased by petitioner-landlord in December, 1988 and, therefore, it cannot be believed that subsequent rent thereafter could have been paid by the tenant to erstwhile owner. It thus has held that there was a default on the part of tenant in payment of rent from March, 1989 and onwards as claimed by landlord giving right of determination of tenancy to him (landlord). 11. It thereafter has considered another question, whether there is any change of user of accommodation in question and has decided the issue in favour of tenant observing, when the accommodation was let out to tenant there is nothing to show that it was only for residential purposes and not to carry on the petty business of embroidery. 12. However, while deciding issue No. 4 the Trial Court has held that there is a substantial compliance of Section 20 sub-section (4), therefore, the decree of eviction cannot be granted. It has held that from June 1990 the rent was paid by tenant under Section 30(1) and rest of amount alongwith interest etc. was deposited on the first date of hearing. The tenant deposited Rs. 2670/- vide tender dated 06.03.1992 while the first date of hearing was 13.04.1992, inasmuch as the summons were issued to tenant by publication by order dated 21.01.1992, whereupon the tenant appeared on 23.03.1992 and he was served with copy of application/plaint and given 15 days time to file his written statement and next date fixed was 13.04.1992. Before that date, on 06.03.1992 the tenant deposited Rs. 2670/- which the Trial Court found substantial compliance requirement of total amount for attracting Section 20(4). The Trial Court found that Rs. 1100/- was deposited by tenant between 26.02.1991 to 29.01.1992 under Section 30(1) and the said amount deserved due credit for attracting Section 20(4) of the Act. 13. Before that date, on 06.03.1992 the tenant deposited Rs. 2670/- which the Trial Court found substantial compliance requirement of total amount for attracting Section 20(4). The Trial Court found that Rs. 1100/- was deposited by tenant between 26.02.1991 to 29.01.1992 under Section 30(1) and the said amount deserved due credit for attracting Section 20(4) of the Act. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that notice determining tenancy was served upon tenant on 08.07.1991 and the amount deposited by tenant under Section 30(1) thereafter, i.e., on 09.08.1991, 12.12.1991 and 29.01.1992 cannot be given due credit for the purpose of attracting Section 20(4). He has relied on various authorities of this Court that after notice the amount deposited under Section 30(1) cannot be said to be a valid deposit to attract Section 20(4) and referred to decisions of this Court in Gokaran Singh Vs. Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi and others, 2000(1) ARC 653 ; Daya Ram Shiv Hare Vs. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Jalaun at Orai and others, 2000(1) ARC 79 ; Shri Behari Ashram Vs. Vth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad and others, 2000(1) ARC 307; Chameli Devi Vs. VIth Additional District Judge, Pilibhit and another, 2003(2) ARC 788; Naresh Chandra Gupta Vs. Rajendra Mohan Mishra, 2007(1) ARC 615; Shekhar Bahuguna Vs. Suresh Chandra Kapoor, 2010(3) ARC 375; and, Mahendra Kumar Vs. Smt. Santo and others, 2012(2) ARC 65 . 14. In this regard this Court finds that both the courts below have found that the total amount deposited by tenant under Section 30(1) as also before first date of hearing comes to more than the amount which he was liable to deposit being due up to the first date of hearing for claiming benefit under Section 20(4) of Act, 1972. 15. However, at the best, if the amount deposited by tenant after receipt of notice dated 08.07.1991 is to be excluded, it would make a shortage of amount about Rs. 466/-. It pre-supposes that from the very first date of notice, i.e., 08.07.1991 the entire subsequent deposits made by tenant should be excluded. This presumption is thoroughly misconceived inasmuch as the deposit made after receipt of notice by tenant at the best may be required to be excluded and till the notice is served it cannot be said that deposit made by tenant are illegal and unauthorized. This presumption is thoroughly misconceived inasmuch as the deposit made after receipt of notice by tenant at the best may be required to be excluded and till the notice is served it cannot be said that deposit made by tenant are illegal and unauthorized. In the plaint the date of service of notice has not been mentioned. The respondent-tenant has admitted service of notice but the exact date of its receipt is not given even in the written statement. 16. Taking all legal niceties the petitioner counsel at the best can claim that there is some shortfall in the amount paid by tenant disentitling him the benefit under Section 20(4). In this regard the matter needs be examined from one more angle. The respondent-tenant is a petty skilled worker earning his livelihood from embroidery etc. living in the same room, doing his activities for earning livelihood besides shelter in the same small space. He belongs to the category of a poor person and cannot afford to arrange his lifestyle but everything is governed by his basic necessities. He does not dictate to arrange his affairs but is guided by basic necessities and adjust himself accordingly. The accommodation, therefore, serves twin purposes, namely, a place to rest as also a place to provide some resource of survival to a poor person like the respondent-tenant. 17. I would like to remind the observations of Apex Court in Sant Ram Vs. Rajinder Lal and others, 1979 ARC 28 wherein considering a similar matter involving a poor tenant, i.e., a cobbler, the Court said that actual life situations and upon conditions of India, especially where poor tradesmen like cobblers, candle-stick makers, cycle repairers and tenduri bakers, takes out small spaces on rent, do not warrant an irresistible inference that they are doing any commercial activities therein. It is common knowledge that in the small towns and even in the big cities, little men plying little crafts and possessing little resources taken on lease, little work places to trade and to live, the two being interlaced for the lower, larger bracket of Indian humanity. One struggle to make a small income and work late into the night from early in the morning and during intervals, rest his bones in the same place, drawing down the shutters of accommodation for a while. The primary and secondary purpose get intermingled. One struggle to make a small income and work late into the night from early in the morning and during intervals, rest his bones in the same place, drawing down the shutters of accommodation for a while. The primary and secondary purpose get intermingled. The necessary incident is to sleep in the same place since such person can automatically afford anything but a pavement for the creature's needs of cooking food, washing yourself, sleeping for a time and the like. The life style of the people shapes the profile of law and not vice versa. Law, not being an abstraction but a pragmatic exercise, the legal inference to be drawn in such circumstances is conditioned by prevailing circumstances. 18. A sense of proportion in social assessment is of the judicial essence. The poor tenant in the case in hand has tried to pay out his rent in the best possible manner he could have. There does not appear to be any reason as to how he would have benefited himself by not paying a small further sum but would have prefer to incur a decree of eviction. Even if there is some paltry about shortfalls, in exercise of my jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution I find no justification to interfere in this case by disturbing the otherwise valid and justified concurrent findings of facts recorded by courts below. 19. In my view, it is not a fit case warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition, therefore, lacks merit. Dismissed. 20. No costs. _____________