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2012 DIGILAW 2587 (DEL)

Mahesh Chand v. Delhi Development Authority

2012-09-03

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, SIDDHARTH MRIDUL

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JUDGMENT : Siddharth Mridul, J. 1. The instant writ petition assails the order dated 11.01.2008 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’) in T.A. No.32/2007 whereby the order imposing penalty of removal on the petitioner was upheld. 2. The facts as are germane to the adjudication of the present writ petition are as enunciated in the succeeding paragraphs:- (i) The petitioner commenced service in the year 1977 as a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) on daily wage basis and was subsequently regularized on 01.01.1982. (ii) That sometime in December-January, 1989-90, while the petitioner was officiating as a Cashier, some lapses were detected during vigilance checking and on the basis of these lapses the petitioner was suspended from service on 10.01.1990. (iii) In due course a memorandum of charges dated 10.11.1993 was issued to the petitioner, inter alia, alleging embezzlement to the tune of Rs.1,73,375.39. The petitioner had submitted an explanation on 08.12.1993 after which a departmental enquiry was held by an independent officer. (iv) On the basis of the enquiry report, notice was issued to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority during August 1994, giving an opportunity to the petitioner of making representation against the proposed penalty. (v) By an order dated 08.03.1995, the penalty of removal from services of Delhi Development Authority (DDA), the respondent herein, was imposed upon the petitioner. (vi) An appeal had been preferred by the petitioner which was disposed of by the Finance Member, DDA, vide order dated 18.10.1995. (vii) Aggrieved by the said order dated 18.10.1995 the petitioner preferred a writ petition therefrom being CWP No.1156/1996, which was later on transferred to the Tribunal in 2007. 3. The petitioner herein has challenged his removal asserting that the authority imposing the penalty of removal as well as the appellate authority that dismissed his appeal was improperly constituted and was thereby incompetent to order such removal. No other issue was raised before us. 4. With reference to the Regulations, counsel for the petitioner submits that the Schedule prescribes the authorities empowered to impose penalties in DDA. Counsel urges that in respect of Class-II posts, the Vice Chairman is the authority for making appointments. This is the case with Class-III and Class-IV posts as well. Further it is urged that the appellate authority in respect of Class-III and Class-IV posts is the Chairman. The petitioner is a Class-III employee. 5. Counsel urges that in respect of Class-II posts, the Vice Chairman is the authority for making appointments. This is the case with Class-III and Class-IV posts as well. Further it is urged that the appellate authority in respect of Class-III and Class-IV posts is the Chairman. The petitioner is a Class-III employee. 5. It was consequently submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the charge sheet as well as the penalty advice as also the appellate order, had been issued by persons who are far lower in the rungs of hierarchy. The suspension order had been issued by the Member Finance and the charge sheet had been issued by the same person. The penalty advice had come to be issued by the Commissioner (Personnel). The appellate order was issued by the Finance Member. According to the counsel for the petitioner all of the above authorities are lower in the rank than the notified authority, and therefore, the proceedings were in total violation of the governing Regulations and without jurisdiction. 6. Per contra, on behalf of DDA it is submitted that the Schedule attached to Regulation 15 of the DDA (Salaries, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1961 with respect to Class-III employees, was amended vide notification dated 01.03.1994 and thereafter the Commissioner(P), DDA, was the appointing authority as well as the Disciplinary Authority empowered to impose punishment on such employees. 7. Dealing with the issue of penalty of removal the counsel urged that the petitioner was removed from service vide order dated 08.03.1995 and the authority imposing this penalty was the Commissioner(P), DDA. As noticed above the law applicable at the relevant time was the amended Schedule to Regulation 15 of the DDA (Salaries, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1961. 8. A perusal of the said Schedule clearly indicates that the appointing authority for the Group “C” employees was the Commissioner(P), DDA. Also the authority empowered to impose penalty on such employees could be either the Commissioner(P) or any other Commissioner or the Chief Engineer or the CAO. Here it is also noticed that the petitioner was appointed by Deputy Commissioner(Slums), DDA. 9. Therefore, it would be incorrect to hold that the authority imposing penalty of removal on the petitioner was not duly constituted or was incompetent in any manner. 10. Here it is also noticed that the petitioner was appointed by Deputy Commissioner(Slums), DDA. 9. Therefore, it would be incorrect to hold that the authority imposing penalty of removal on the petitioner was not duly constituted or was incompetent in any manner. 10. Coming to the issue of appellate authority, the evidence on record indicates that the petitioner’s appeal was decided on 18.10.1995 and the appellate order was issued by the Finance Member, DDA. The amended Schedule as referred to hereinabove prescribes that the appellate authority is any full time member of the DDA. 11. It is trite to state that the amended Regulations were the relevant law at that time and consequently it is observed that the order of the appellate authority also does not suffer from any disability since the Finance Member was lawfully empowered to pass the same. 12. In the circumstances the present petition is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.