Judgment : The petitioner, a partnership Firm, has filed this writ petition, seeking directions by way of Mandamus, declaring the action of respondents in not handing over vacant possession of the premises bearing plot No.6, Ward No.23 in Sy.No.1576/645, opposite Municipal Vegetable Market on GNT road, Nellore to the petitioner, as illegal and arbitrary and without any authority of law, and for a consequential direction to the respondents to hand over the vacant site of the aforesaid premises to the petitioner. 2. Necessary facts in brief, for disposal of this writ petition, are as under : One Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum was the owner and possessor of 125 Ankanams of land (as mentioned in the sale deeds, which are filed along with the writ petition) covered by plot No.6, Ward No.23 in Sy.No.1576/645 on GNT road, Nellore. The said piece of land was initially leased to ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. for the years from 1956 to 1966 to run a retail petroleum outlet. The lease was renewed from 01.11.1966 to 31.10.1974 on a monthly rent of Rs.250/- vide lease deed, dated 12.07.1968. As per the option provided under the said lease deed, the lease was further extended from 01.11.1974 to 31.10.1982 on a monthly rent of Rs.300/-. The 1st respondent-Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited is a Statutory Corporation formed under the ESSO (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974 by the Central Government. The original lease was obtained by M/s.ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. Company and the petroleum outlet was commissioned through their dealer i.e. M/s.Southern Trade Corporation, Madras and the retail outlet was operated under the name and style of ‘M/s.Southern Trade Corporation, Nellore’. Out of the said 125 Ankanams of land, an extent of 12 Ankanams is stated to have been acquired for public purpose. The original owner Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum died, leaving behind her daughter by name Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha and other sons. Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha has acquired rights over the entire property by virtue of registered gift deeds executed by her brothers. The petitioner herein acquired title to the property by virtue of its purchase from the daughter of the original owner, by way of registered sale deeds, dated 29th December 2001. Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha has acquired rights over the entire property by virtue of registered gift deeds executed by her brothers. The petitioner herein acquired title to the property by virtue of its purchase from the daughter of the original owner, by way of registered sale deeds, dated 29th December 2001. The lease deed executed by the predecessor in title to the petitioner, has come to an end by 31st of October 1982, but the Corporation has exercised the Statutory option available to it under the ESSO (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974, vide their letter, dated 25th of October 1982, claiming the lease for a further period of eight years on a monthly rent of Rs.300/-. 3. After purchase of the aforesaid piece of land by way of two registered sale deeds, dated 29th December 2001, a notice, dated 11.11.2004, was sent by the petitioner, to respondents 1 to 3 herein, calling upon them to deliver vacant possession of property in view of the termination of tenancy and also claiming damages at the rate of Rs.50,000/-per month. In response to the same, a notice, dated 01.01.2005, was sent to the counsel for petitioner, stating that payment of rents was withheld only because of non-submission of the information required by them, as such, there is no willful default or negligence in paying the rents. In the said reply notice, it is admitted that after the death of Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum, registered gift settlement deeds were executed by her sons in favour of the vendor of the petitioner i.e. Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha. The respondents have resisted for vacating the premises in question, alleging that the action of the petitioner’s vendor in not extending the first option to them for purchase of the site in question, is unjust, though there is a clause to that effect, in the lease agreement. 4. As the respondents were in possession of No Objection Certificate as contemplated under Section 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002, framed under the Petroleum Act of 1934, the petitioner has approached the District Revenue Officer-cum-Additional District Magistrate, Nellore, seeking cancellation of the said No Objection Certificate issued in favour of respondent No.4. 4. As the respondents were in possession of No Objection Certificate as contemplated under Section 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002, framed under the Petroleum Act of 1934, the petitioner has approached the District Revenue Officer-cum-Additional District Magistrate, Nellore, seeking cancellation of the said No Objection Certificate issued in favour of respondent No.4. The aforesaid cancellation is sought on the ground that once the lease is terminated, the possession of tenant is unlawful, as such, the respondents have no right to store the petroleum products in the site in question, as such, the No Objection Certificate issued to them is liable to be cancelled. On such representation, the District Revenue Officer-cum-Additional District Magistrate, Nellore, vide proceedings in Rc.No.C2(M)565/2006, dated 28.05.2007, has cancelled the No Objection Certificate, in exercise of power under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 150 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002. In the aforesaid order, a finding is recorded that the licencee is seized to have any right to use the site for storing petroleum products, as such, in view of the termination of lease, the No Objection Certificate issued vide Collector’s Proceedings D.Dis.No.2008/55, dated 22.11.1955 and D.Dis.No.200/56, dated 29.02.1956, is cancelled. 5. In view of the aforesaid order, which has become final, alleging that the respondents have no right to continue in possession and claiming title to the aforesaid property from the successors in interest of the original owner Mrs.Nasimuniisa Begum, the petitioner got issued notice, dated 27th January 2008, calling upon the respondents to deliver vacant possession of the aforesaid property. Inspite of the same, when possession was not delivered, this writ petition is filed in the year 2008. 6. In this writ petition, it is the case of the petitioner that in view of the order passed by the District Revenue Officer cancelling the No Objection Certificate granted under Section 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002, the respondents cannot store any petroleum products in the site in question, and as such, there is no reason for not delivering the possession of aforesaid site to the petitioner. 7. Counter affidavit is filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3. 7. Counter affidavit is filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3. In the counter affidavit, while denying the various allegations made by the petitioner, it is stated that the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation has been operating the subject retail outlet at CIS No.464 in Sy.No.1576/645, Plot No.6, Ward No.23, opposite to the Municipal Vegetable Market, GNT road, Nellore, for the last several Decades. Under the dealership agreement, dated 21.12.1970, executed by the predecessor of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited i.e. M/s.ESSO Standard Inc., this retail outlet was commissioned with M/s.Southern Trade Corporation, Madras. In the counter, it is stated that the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation is a Government of India Company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. It is engaged in the business of selling motor spirit, high speed diesel and liquified petroleum gas, by setting up retail outlets. In the counter, it is stated that the piece of land covered by Plot No.6, CIS No.464, Sy.No.1576/645 in Ward No.23, was acquired on lease from the original owner Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum Saheba, vide lease deed, dated 16th August 1958. Such initial lease was from 1956 to 1966 on a monthly rent of Rs.100/- and it was extended from 01.11.1966 to 31.10.1974 on a monthly rent of Rs.250/- and it was further extended from 01.11.1974 to 31.10.1982 on a monthly rent of Rs.300/-. Subsequently, the Corporation has exercised the Statutory option available to it under the ESSO (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974. In the counter, it is stated that a letter, dated 31st of August 1986, was addressed by the legal heirs of Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum, informing the Corporation that she had expired on 13th June 1986, as such, the Corporation stopped the payment of rents with effect from 01.09.1986 and requested the legal heirs to submit necessary documents in proof of their legal heirship, so that it can resume payment of rents, however, there is no reply from them. It is admitted that since the sons of Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum have gifted the subject property to their only sister by name Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha by registered gift settlement deed, dated 10.07.1989, bearing document No.3759, Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha became absolute owner of the subject property. It is admitted that since the sons of Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum have gifted the subject property to their only sister by name Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha by registered gift settlement deed, dated 10.07.1989, bearing document No.3759, Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha became absolute owner of the subject property. In the counter, it is further stated that as per clause 3(e) of the lease deed, dated 16.08.1958, the land lady was supposed to offer the “first right of refusal” to the Corporation before assigning or selling the subject site to any outsider. However, in violation of the above provision, the land lady sold the site to an outsider, notwithstanding the same, the Corporation has repeatedly requested the new landlord i.e. the petitioner herein, either to offer the site on lease basis or on outright sale to the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, but, the petitioner did not agree for the same. While referring to the orders passed by the District Revenue Officer, it is stated that in total disregard to the administrative principles, the said authority has adjudicated the legal rights of the parties and passed orders cancelling the No Objection Certificate issued to them. In the counter, the claim of the petitioner is resisted mainly on the ground that the petitioner cannot seek delivery of subject site in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and that the 1st respondent-Corporation can only be dispossessed by following due process of law. Further, it is stated that the claim of the petitioner for damages at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month is highly exorbitant and is wholly baseless. 8. On behalf of the 4th respondent-Corporation, a Memo dated 30th October 2011 is filed, adopting the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3. 9. A reply affidavit is filed on behalf of the petitioner, stating that inspite of furnishing the gift settlement deed executed by her brothers in favour of the vendor of the petitioner, the respondents did not pay rents to the petitioner’s vendor since 1986. It is stated that the 1st respondent, having exercised the Statutory option available to it under the ESSO (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974, cannot seek for any further renewal or extension of lease. It is stated that there is no need to extend the ‘first right of refusal’ to the respondents. It is stated that the 1st respondent, having exercised the Statutory option available to it under the ESSO (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974, cannot seek for any further renewal or extension of lease. It is stated that there is no need to extend the ‘first right of refusal’ to the respondents. In the reply affidavit, petitioner has reiterated its stand that inspite of orders cancelling the No Objection Certificate by the competent authority under the Petroleum Rules, 2002, and in view of the expiry of lease, which was extended pursuant to the Statutory option exercised by the 1st respondent, there is no authority or legal right for the respondents to continue in possession. In the reply, it is stated that in view of the expiry of lease period and termination of lease, the 1st respondent, being a Statutory body, cannot act like a private litigant and refuse to deliver the property to the petitioner, more so, when it has no right to site, so as to store the petroleum products in view of the orders passed by the competent authority. 10. Heard Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner, Sri Thoom Srinivas, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and Sri S.A.Razat, learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent-Corporation. 11. In this writ petition, it is contended by Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner that originally, the site in question was leased out by the original owner Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum for a period of 10 years from 1956 to 1966, and thereafter, it was extended from 1966 to 1974, pursuant to the lease deed executed on 12.07.1968. Further, the Statutory option was exercised by the 1st respondent-Corporation and leasle was extended from 01.11.1974 to 31.10.1982 on a monthly rent of Rs.300/-, and thereafter, though there was no lease deed, respondents have claimed lease pursuant to the option exercised under the provisions of ESSO (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974, pursuant to their letter, dated 25.10.1982. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel that even according to the respondents, there is no lease for the period beyond 24th October 1990, and possession of respondents over the property in question is unlawful and illegal. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel that even according to the respondents, there is no lease for the period beyond 24th October 1990, and possession of respondents over the property in question is unlawful and illegal. It is submitted that in view of the death of original owner, said property was succeeded by her daughter in view of the gift settlement deeds executed by her brothers and the said piece of land was sold to the petitioner as early as on 29.12.2001 for valuable consideration by way of registered sale deeds. As much as there is no valid lease with effect from 24.10.1990, there is no reason for the respondents for not vacating the premises by handing over possession to the petitioner. It is submitted that the respondents have illegally continued in possession even without paying rents either to the vendor of the petitioner or to the petitioner. It is further submitted that for storing the petroleum products, even the No Objection Certificate obtained by the respondents as contemplated under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules of 2002 framed under the Petroleum Act, 1934, is also cancelled on the application filed by the petitioner, and in that view of the matter, there appears no reason at all for not vacating the premises and handing over possession to the petitioner, who is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration. It is submitted by the learned counsel that though the possession claimed by the respondents is pursuant to initial contract of lease, in view of the undisputed facts, the petitioner can seek the relief even in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Senior Counsel, in support of his arguments, has placed reliance on the judgments of Supreme Court in the case of C.Albert Morris Vs. K.Chandrasekaran and others (2006) 1 SCC 228 , in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd & another Vs. Dolly Das (1999) 4 SCC 450 , in ABL International Ltd & another Vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd & others (2004) 3 SCC 553 and in Noble Resources Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa & another (2006) 10 SCC 236 ,and also on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.22721 of 1998 and batch, dated 25.07.2001. 12. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd & others (2004) 3 SCC 553 and in Noble Resources Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa & another (2006) 10 SCC 236 ,and also on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.22721 of 1998 and batch, dated 25.07.2001. 12. On the other hand, it is argued by the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent-Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., and also the learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent-M/s.Southern Trade Corporation, that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not at all maintainable, having regard to the nature of relief sought for. It is submitted that the respondents came into possession pursuant to the contractual obligations by entering into lease with the predecessor in title to the petitioner, and in that view of the matter, to seek delivery of possession, petitioner has to approach the common law court, but he cannot seek any relief in this writ petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that in view of several factual disputes, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief in this writ petition. 13. At the outset, in this case, it is to be noticed that the petitioner’s claim of succeeding to the title from Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum, who is the initial lessor of respondents, is not in dispute. The respondents came into possession pursuant to a lease granted by the predecessor in title to the petitioner Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum, initially for a period of ten years i.e. from 1956 to 1966, to run a retail petroleum outlet. Even as per the averments made in the counter affidavit, lease was renewed from 01.11.1966 to 31.10.1974 on a monthly rent of Rs.250/-, pursuant to the lease deed, dated 12.07.1968. It is further stated that as per the option clause in the lease deed, the lease period was further extended from 01.11.1974 to 31.10.1982 on a monthly rent of Rs.300/-. The Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. is a Statutory Corporation formed under the provisions of the ESSO (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974 and it is a Government Company. After the said enactment, in view of the Statutory option exercised by the respondents, they claim extension of lease pursuant to the letter, dated 25th October 1982, for a further period of eight years. After the said enactment, in view of the Statutory option exercised by the respondents, they claim extension of lease pursuant to the letter, dated 25th October 1982, for a further period of eight years. In that view of the matter, even by extending the benefit of Statutory option also, the lease period for the land in question is expired by 24th of October 1990. 14. The petitioner herein claims title from the daughter of the original lessor by name Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha. As the original owner died leaving the vendor of the petitioner and other sons, the sons of original owner have executed registered gift deeds in favour of the only daughter of Mrs.Nasimunnisa Begum i.e. Mrs.Shaheen Altaf Pasha, and the petitioner has acquired title to the aforesaid land by registered sale deeds executed by the said daughter of the original owner. 15. Undisputedly, there is no lease in force, in favour of respondents either from the predecessor in title to the petitioner or from the petitioner after his purchase, for any period beyond 24th of October 1990. It is also to be noticed that unless there is Statutory No Objection Certificate from competent authority, no licence can be granted to use any site for the purpose of storing petroleum products. In this case, pursuant to the original lease obtained by the respondents to run the retail outlet for petroleum products, licence was obtained by the respondents to run retail outlet for petroleum products, pursuant to the No Objection Certificate granted by the authority under the provisions of the Petroleum Rules, 2002, framed under the Petroleum Act of 1934. When the petitioner has filed an application for cancellation of such No Objection Certificate, the District Revenue Officer-cum-Additional District Magistrate, Nellore, vide proceedings in Rc.No.C2(M)565/2006, dated 28.05.2007, has recorded a finding that in view of expiry of lease, the 1st respondent-licencee ceases the right to use the site for storing petroleum products, and accordingly, ordered for cancellation of NOC granted, in exercise of power under Rule 150 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, they have disputed the findings recorded in the said order, but the fact remains that the order passed by the competent authority cancelling the NOC obtained by the respondents, has become final and is not subject matter of challenge before any other forum/any Court of law. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, they have disputed the findings recorded in the said order, but the fact remains that the order passed by the competent authority cancelling the NOC obtained by the respondents, has become final and is not subject matter of challenge before any other forum/any Court of law. In that view of the matter, it is to be taken that there is no ‘No Objection Certificate’ as contained under the Petroleum Rules, 2002, in favour of respondents nor there is existing licence in their favour to run the petroleum outlet. It is the specific case of the petitioner that in the very nearby place to the site in question, the 1st respondent-Corporation is already running another petroleum outlet, and the same is also not disputed in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents. 16. As evident from the counter, mainly it is the defence of respondents that the original owner has sold the property to the petitioner in violation of the terms of lease. The said averment is with regard to Clause 3(e) of the lease agreement, which reads as under : “….that the landlord will not sell or agree to sell his/her title and interest in the premises hereby demised until the expiration of 30 days after he/she have given to the tenant notice of his/her intention to sell which notice will state the price at which landlord shall intend to sell.” Even a perusal of the said clause in the agreement shows that there is absolutely no prohibition for sale of property to third parties. In any event, even having come to know about the purchase of the aforesaid property by the petitioner pursuant to the registered sale deeds, at no point of time, respondents have taken any steps either to enforce such a condition in the agreement or to question the validity of sale in favour of the petitioner. In that view of the matter, it is too late in the day for the respondents to defend possession even after the expiry of lease on such a term in the original lease deed as referred above. In that view of the matter, it is too late in the day for the respondents to defend possession even after the expiry of lease on such a term in the original lease deed as referred above. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the respondents cannot continue to be in possession inspite of transfer of title in favour of the petitioner, on the ground that such a covenant is there in the original lease deed executed by the predecessor in title to the petitioner. 17. Though another objection is raised by the respondents for grant of relief in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in view of the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner, this Court is of the view that the bar under Article 226 is not an absolute bar for grant of relief even in matters relating to contracts. In the judgments referred above, in categorical terms, it is held that when there are no factual disputes, even this Court can entertain the petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for grant of relief. I refer to certain judgments relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner, which support his case. In the case of C.Albert Morris (1 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the Petroleum Rules of 1976, which also contained similar provisions to that of the rules contained in Petroleum Rules, 2002, has held in para 20 of the judgment, as under : “In our opinion, any right which the dealer has over his site was the right which he had acquired in terms of the lease. When that lease expired and when the landlord declined to renew the same and also called upon the erstwhile tenant to surrender possession, the erstwhile lessee could no longer assert that he had any right to the site. His continued occupation of something which he had no right to occupy cannot be regarded as source of a right to the land of which he himself was not in lawful possession. As observed by this Court in the case of M.C. Chockalingam and Ors. v. V. Manickavasagam and Ors.( AIR 1974 SC 104 ), litigious possession cannot be regarded as lawful possession. As observed by this Court in the case of M.C. Chockalingam and Ors. v. V. Manickavasagam and Ors.( AIR 1974 SC 104 ), litigious possession cannot be regarded as lawful possession. As rightly pointed out by the Division Bench of the High Court the right referred to in this Rule has necessarily to be regarded as right which is in accordance with law and the right to the site must be one which is capable of being regarded as lawful. We have already referred to Bhawanji Lakhamshi and Ors. v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani and Ors.( AIR 1972 SC 819 ) wherein this Court held that the act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind”. 18. Further, a learned Single Judge of this Court, in W.P.No.22721 of 1998 and batch, dated 25.07.2001, while relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & another Vs. Dolly Das (2 supra), in identical circumstances, rejected the plea of non-maintainability of writ petition, and allowed the writ petitions, directing the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. to vacate the premises. 19. In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (2 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the question with regard to maintainability of writ petition in identical situation, and has held in para 9 of the judgment, as under : “We may now advert to the contention that the writ remedy is not appropriate in this case. Where interpretation of a contract arises in relation to immovable property and in working such contract or relief thereof or any other fall out thereto may have the effect of giving rise to an action in tort or for damages, the appropriate remedy would be a civil suit. But if the facts pleaded before the court are of such nature which do not involve any complicated questions of fact needing elaborate investigation of the same, the High Court could also exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such matters. There can be no hard and fast rule in such matters. When the High Court has chosen to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution we cannot say that the discretion exercised in entertaining the petition is wrong". 20. There can be no hard and fast rule in such matters. When the High Court has chosen to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution we cannot say that the discretion exercised in entertaining the petition is wrong". 20. In the case of ABL International Ltd. (3 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in appropriate cases, the Court can entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar for entertaining the writ petition even if the same arises out of contractual obligations/or involve some disputed questions of fact. In paragraphs 16 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment, it is held : “16. A perusal of this judgment though shows that a writ petition involving serious disputed questions of facts which requires consideration of evidence which is not on record, will not normally be entertained by a court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This decision again, in our opinion, does not lay down an absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed questions of tact the parties should be relegated to a civil suit. In this view of ours, we are supported by a judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Ors. v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and Ors.( AIR 1970 SC 802 ) where dealing with such a situation of disputed questions of fact in a writ petition this Court held : "The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit in reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined: In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. Exercise of the jurisdiction is it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons. From the averments made in the petition filed by the appellants it is clear that in proof of a large number of allegations the appellants relied upon documentary evidence and the only matter in respect of which conflict of facts may possibly arise related to the due publication of the notification under Section 4 by the Collector, In the present case, in our judgment, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the ground that it will not determine disputed question of fact. The High Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of fact, even if they are in dispute and the present, in our judgment, is a case in which in the interests of both the parties the High Court should have entertained the petition and called for an affidavit in reply from the respondents, and should have proceeded to try the petition instead of relegating the appellants to a separate suit." 19. Therefore, it is clear from the above enunciation of law that merely because one of the parties to the litigation raises a dispute in regard to the facts of the case, the court entertaining such petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties to a suit. In the above case of Smt. Gunwant Kaur (supra), this Court even went to the extent of holding that in a writ petition, if facts required, even oral evidence can be taken. In the above case of Smt. Gunwant Kaur (supra), this Court even went to the extent of holding that in a writ petition, if facts required, even oral evidence can be taken. This clearly shows that in an appropriate case, the writ court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition even if the same arises out of a contractual obligation and or involves some disputed questions of fact”. 21. Applying the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above said judgments, to the facts of the case on hand, this Court is of the view that there is no basis to defend the possession of respondents over the site in question. Admittedly, there is no lease in favour of respondents after availing the Statutory option of lease for a period of eight years, which has come to an end on 24th of October 1990, and thereafter, admittedly, there is no lease executed either by the legal heirs of the original owner or by the petitioner, who is the purchaser of the site. As much as the title of the petitioner pursuant to registered sale deeds, dated 29th December 2001, is not in dispute, this Court is of the view that there is no basis for defending the possession of respondents. The 1st respondent-Corporation, being a Government of India Company, should be a role model for the other litigants, but it cannot resort to unnecessary litigation by squatting on the site without paying rents, and that too, without using the same for the purpose, for which it was originally leased out. Such an action on the part of respondents is arbitrary and totally irrational. Though the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser of the site in question for valuable consideration, which was purchased for making constructions, he is unduly deprived of the benefit of purchase for several years. By applying the ratio laid down in the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner, and in view of cancellation of NOC by order, dated 28.05.2007, by the District Revenue Officer-cum-Additional District Magistrate, Nellore, vide proceedings in Rc.No.C2(M)565/2006 in view of expiry of lease, there is no reason to relegate the petitioner at this point of time for any civil suit. In view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred above, in the absence of absolute bar, this Court can grant relief to the petitioner, in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly, in the absence of any semblance of defence to retain possession by the respondents for any further period. For the aforesaid reasons, this writ petition deserves to be allowed. 22. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to deliver the vacant possession of plot No.6 in Ward No.23 in Sy.No.1576/645, opposite to Municipal Vegetable Market, GNT road, Nellore, which is covered by the sale deeds, dated 29th December 2001, to the petitioner, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order. No order as to costs.