JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. The following common substantial questions of law, on which these appeals were admitted, are involved in these appeals, hence they are being disposed of by a common judgment:- 1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in reversing the order of the CIT(A) and thereby wrongly concurring with the action of the A.O. in confirming the issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to a duly completed assessment u/s 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 wherein no notice u/s 143(2) having been issued within the statutory period of twelve months and the assessment having attained finality especially when the order was without any cogent reason to believe and without any new material on record and thus a change of opinion which is illegal and arbitrary there being no new material brought on record by the A.O. 2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in reversing the order of the CIT (A) on the basis of audit objection which is illegal and arbitrary and thereby wrongly concurring with the action of the A.O in confirming the issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to a duly completed assessment u/s 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 2. These appeals pertain to the returns filed by the appellant for the years 1997-98, 1998-99 and 2000-2001. Questions of law are same. Except for difference in dates facts being almost identical/ similar, for the purpose of adjudication of these appeals, facts pertaining to the year 1997-98 are being referred to. FACTS OF I.T.A. No.14 of 2007 3. Appellant is a partnership firm having an industrial undertaking, an oil mill unit in Damtal, within the State of Himachal Pradesh. It also has other businesses of petrol pumps, carriage contacts of Indian Oil Corporation, Kerosene oil and trading outlets in other parts of this State and also in the neighboring State i.e. Punjab at Pathankot. Appellant is assessed to income tax. Appellant is maintaining separate books of accounts in respect of industrial undertaking i.e. oil mill unit, Damtal and all other respective business carried out at different places within and outside the State of Himachal Pradesh. 4. Appellant is assessed to income tax. Appellant is maintaining separate books of accounts in respect of industrial undertaking i.e. oil mill unit, Damtal and all other respective business carried out at different places within and outside the State of Himachal Pradesh. 4. The appellant filed return of income tax for the year 1997-98 annexing the requisite financial statement, computation of income from various units/branches as part of the return of the income for the oil manufacturing unit. Common expenses incurred by the assessee were fully disclosed as part of profit and loss account (consolidated alongwith branches). Out of the profit derived from the oil mill unit, Damtal, (H.P.) assessee claimed deduction @ 25% u/s 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, the Act). After aggregating the profits of all its units, assessee deducted expenses of Rs. 24,25,489/- to arrive at its profit for the said unit. Return of income filed by the assessee on 27.10.1997 was accepted by the revenue as no notice u/s 143(2) of the Act was ever issued. However, subsequently Assessing Officer re-opened the assessment u/s 147 of the Act by issuing notice dated 5.9.2002 (Annexure A/9, Pg. 124) u/s 148 of the Act. On request reasons for reopening were supplied (Annexure A/8, Pg.122). Assessments were reopened on the ground that common expenses pertaining to the head office of the assessee firm had been deducted by the assessee after aggregating profits of all its unit to arrive at the net profit of the unit entitled to the subsidy under the provisions of Section 80IA of the Act. Thus net expenses amounting to Rs. 24,25,489/- pertaining to all the units of the firm including the unit eligible for deduction were claimed. According to the Assessing Officer, for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s 80-IA of the Act, proportionate expenses out of total expenses incurred by the assessee in the relevant year should have been deducted and deductions should have been claimed on the resultant figure of the profit. Pursuant to the notice, assessee filed fresh returns disclosing the very same income which stood disclosed in the original return. Vide order dated 5.3.2004 (Annexure A/3, pg. Pursuant to the notice, assessee filed fresh returns disclosing the very same income which stood disclosed in the original return. Vide order dated 5.3.2004 (Annexure A/3, pg. 63) the Assessing Officer, by reassessing the income apportioned the deductible common expenses in the ratio of turn over of different units and worked out deductible expenses relatable to the oil unit, holding that assessment of the relevant amount in the relevant year as claimed by the appellant was excess and had escaped assessment on account of claiming excessive deduction u/s 80-IA of the Act. Thus on the original figure of profit amounting to Rs. 31,60,940/- being the net income on which deduction of Rs. 10,43,208/- to the extent of 25% as claimed by the assessee, the Assessing Officer restricted the deductions to the extent of Rs. 7,87,820/-, thereby making the total net income of the assessee to be Rs. 34,16,328/-. 5. Order of assessment dated 5.3.2004 passed by the Assessing Officer was assailed by the assessee in Appeal No. IT/31/04-05/PLP before the CIT (Appeals), Palampur, which was allowed vide order dated 9.8.2004 (Annexure A/2, pg. 49). Aggrieved thereof, Revenue filed Appeal No. ITA Nos. 1227/Chandi/2004 before the ITAT, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh, whereby in terms of order dated 12.12.2006, the order passed by the CIT (A) was set aside and the order passed by the Assessing Officer upheld. Hence the present appeal No. 14 of 2007. 6. For better appreciation and sake of convenience, facts as narrated hereinabove, are reproduced with respect to each of the Assessment Year in a tabulated form: ITA No. 14 of 2007 Annexure Page Date No. Brief description of Assessment document Year A/9 124 5.9.2002 Notice u/s 148 1997-98 of the Act A/8 122 9.7.2002 Reasons for initiating 1997-98 proceedings u/s 147 of the Act A/3 63 5.3.2004 Re-assessment order 1997-98 passed by Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, u/s 143(3) of the Act. A/2 49 9.8.2004 Order passed by CIT 1997-98 (Appeals), Palampur, in Appeal No. IT/31/04-05/PLP A/1 36 12.12.2006 Order of Appellate 1997-98 & Tribunal, in ITA Nos. 1998-99 1227 & 1228/Chandigarh/2004 A/6 120 5.7.1999 Letter of Jt. A/2 49 9.8.2004 Order passed by CIT 1997-98 (Appeals), Palampur, in Appeal No. IT/31/04-05/PLP A/1 36 12.12.2006 Order of Appellate 1997-98 & Tribunal, in ITA Nos. 1998-99 1227 & 1228/Chandigarh/2004 A/6 120 5.7.1999 Letter of Jt. 1995-96 Commissioner of income tax addressed to appellant A/7 121 14.7.1999 Reply of the appellant 1995-96 to letter dated 5.7.1999 A/5 111 25.5.2006 Order of ITAT, 1996-97 Chandigarh in ITA No. 1072/Chandi/2004 A/10 125 29.6.2006 Order of ITAT, 2000-01 Chandigarh in ITA No. 205/Chandi/2005 ITA No. 15 of 2007 Annexure Page Date No. Brief description of Assessment document Year A/4 70 Year ended 31.3.98 Statement of Income 1998-99 A/5 123 21.8.1999 Intimation u/s 143(1)(a) 1998-99 of the Act A/10 137 27.6.2002 Notice u/s 148 1998-99 of the Act A/9 135 27.6.2002 Reasons for initiating 1998-99 proceedings u/s 147 of the Act A/3 64 5.3.2004 Assessment Order passed 1998-99 by Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Palampur, u/s 143(3) of the Act A/2 49 5.8.2004 Order of CIT (Appeals), 1998-99 in Appeal No. IT/32/04-05/PLP A/1 46 12.12.2006 ITAT, Chandigarh, in ITA 1997-98 & Nos. 1227 & 1228/ 1998-99 Chandi/ 2004 ITA No. 20 of 2007 Annexure Page Date No. Brief description of Assessment document Year A/5 125 - Intimation u/s 143(1)(a) of the Act 2000-2001 A/10 140 26.6.2002 Notice u/s 148 2000-2001 of the Act A/9 137 26.6.2002 Reasons for initiating 2000-2001 proceedings u/s 147 of the Act A/3 65 5.3.2004 Assessment order passed 2000-2001 by Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Palampur, u/s 143(3) of the Act A/2 48 29.12.2004 Order passed by 2000-2001 CIT(Appeals) in Appeal No. IT/33/04-05/PLP A/1 43 24.6.2006 Order passed by ITAT, 2000-2001 Chandigarh, in ITA No. 205/Chandi/2005 7. It is the contention of the appellant that with regard to the year 1995-96 similar notice dated 5.7.1999 (Annexure A/6, pg. 120 of Appeal No.14/2007), was issued by the Assessing Officer, informing that income from eligible undertaking had not been computed separately to facilitate the working out of the income eligible from the deductions u/s 80IA of the Act. Appellant immediately responded to the same in terms of letter dated 14.7.1999(Annexure A/7, pg. 121 of Appeal No.14/2007), clarifying that claim u/s 80IA sub-section (7) was rightly claimed and correctly allowed u/s 143(1)(a) of the Act only on the eligible business and income derived from the said eligible business. Appellant immediately responded to the same in terms of letter dated 14.7.1999(Annexure A/7, pg. 121 of Appeal No.14/2007), clarifying that claim u/s 80IA sub-section (7) was rightly claimed and correctly allowed u/s 143(1)(a) of the Act only on the eligible business and income derived from the said eligible business. As per the statement showing computation of income, separate profit and loss account in respect of oil mills units, Damtal (H.P.) only eligible income was separated to deduction under the Act. Alongwith letter appellant again submitted statement of accounts to the said effect. Even though outcome of these proceedings was neither brought to the notice of the authorities below nor was it placed before this Court at the time of filing of the appeal, but, however, during the course of hearing learned counsel for the appellant has placed on record order of assessment dated 18.12.1998 passed by the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range Office, Shimla, H.P. accepting the return of taxable income to be same as was initially disclosed by the assessee. 8. Further with respect to Assessment Year 1996-97 assessee had filed return of income on 28.10.1996. The same was processed u/s 143(1)(a) on 27.2.1997. The case with respect to said order was selected for scrutiny and assessment was made u/s 143(3) of the Act vide orders dated 18.12.1998. Significantly practice adopted by the assessee with respect to the years in question was also adopted in the previous years and accepted as such by the revenue. In fact this practice has been continuously followed since the year 1991/1992 onwards. However, subsequently, the said assessment was re-opened by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the assessee had claimed deduction u/s 80IA in excess to what was permissible under law. While maintaining separate books of accounts in respect of Oil Units, Damtal (H.P), the assessee had not taken into account the common administrative expenses in working out the profit of the different units situated within and outside the State of Himachal Pradesh. This re-opening of assessment was objected to by the assessee. The Assessing Office vide orders dated 16.2.2004 re-opened the assessment u/s 147 and income of the assessee was re-assessed from Rs. 7,66,330/- to Rs. 12,09,010/-. Aggrieved thereof, assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who held re-opening of the assessment as invalid and the same was accordingly quashed. The Assessing Office vide orders dated 16.2.2004 re-opened the assessment u/s 147 and income of the assessee was re-assessed from Rs. 7,66,330/- to Rs. 12,09,010/-. Aggrieved thereof, assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who held re-opening of the assessment as invalid and the same was accordingly quashed. Revenue unsuccessfully challenged the same by filing an appeal before the ITAT, Chandigarh Bench. Order passed by the CIT(A) was affirmed not only on the ground that action of the Assessment Officer was beyond the period of limitation i.e. 4 years, but also on merits on the ground that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment and re-opening of the assessment was bad in law. In this regard, appellant has placed on record order dated 25.5.2006 passed by Order of ITAT, Chandigarh in ITA No. 1072/Chandi/2004 (Annexure A-5, paged 111 of Appeal No. 14/2007). 9. Mr. Mukhi, learned counsel for the appellant has made submissions to the effect that appellant has made full disclosure of all relevant facts and there was no new material which had come to the notice of Assessing Officer warranting re-opening of the assessment, which stood finalized u/s 143(1)(a) of the Act; No notice u/s 143(2) of the Act, with respect to the orders in question was ever issued to the assessee, therefore, assessment u/s 143(1)(a) had acquired finality and could not be re-opened; audit objection is not information and thus issuance of notice is bad in law; Mere change of opinion on same set of facts is impermissible in law particularly when proceedings with regard to earlier years i.e. 1995-96 and 1996-97 acquired finality. Hence principle of resjudicata would apply. 10. In rebuttal, Mr. Vinay Kuthiala and Mrs. Vandana Kuthiala, learned counsel for the Revenue, have argued that appellate authority has remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication of the matter on merits; for the years in question there was no assessment carried out under the provisions of Section 143(3); the Assessing Officer was well within his rights to re-open the assessment and it would not amount to change of opinion. In matter of taxation principle of resjudicata does not apply. 11. Learned counsel for both the sides referred to and relied upon various decisions rendered by different High Courts and the Apex Court. In matter of taxation principle of resjudicata does not apply. 11. Learned counsel for both the sides referred to and relied upon various decisions rendered by different High Courts and the Apex Court. Having gone through all of them, we have done our own research and only the relevant decisions have been taken into account while deciding the appeals. 12. It is not in dispute that alongwith the return filed by the unit eligible for deduction, assessee had furnished sufficient information with regard to income, profit and loss and deductions claimed by the assessee with respect to all its businesses. Pertinently assessee has been carrying on with this practice for atleast last two years prior to the years in question, though assessee claims to have adopted this practice since the year 1991-1992. Undisputedly, reasons for issuing notice u/s 148 of the Act do not disclose any new fact or information which had come to the notice/knowledge of the Assessing Officer. The only reason assigned is that common expenses belonging to all the units of the assessing firm including the manufacturing unit had been claimed as deduction whereas only proportionate expenses out of the total expenses of Rs. 24,25,489/-should have been deducted and deduction should have been claimed on the resultant figure of the profits. Apportioning the net expenses in the ratio of turnover of different units was the only fair method. It is also not in dispute that there was no omission or failure on the part of assessee to fully and truthfully disclose facts claiming deduction for assessment. Therefore, all necessary facts were before the Assessing Officer at the time of finalization of the returns filed in accordance with the provisions of Section 143-IA of the Act. It is also not in dispute that no notice u/s 143(2) was ever issued to the Assessee. 13. Section 147 as applicable after 1.4.1989 reads as under:- 147. Therefore, all necessary facts were before the Assessing Officer at the time of finalization of the returns filed in accordance with the provisions of Section 143-IA of the Act. It is also not in dispute that no notice u/s 143(2) was ever issued to the Assessee. 13. Section 147 as applicable after 1.4.1989 reads as under:- 147. If the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section or recomputed the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in this section and in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year): Provided that where an assessment under subsection (3) of section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return u/s 139 or in response to a notice issued under subsection (1) of section 142 or section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. Explanation 1.- Production before the (sic) the Assessing Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the foregoing proviso. Explanation 2. Explanation 1.- Production before the (sic) the Assessing Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the foregoing proviso. Explanation 2. - For the purposes of this section, the following shall also be deemed to be cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, namely:- (a) where no return of income has been furnished by the assessee although his total income or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income tax; (b) where a return of income has been furnished by the assessee but no assessment has been made and it is noticed by the Assessing Officer that the assessee has understated the income or has claimed excessive loss, deduction, allowance or relief in the return; (c) where an assessment has been made, but- (i) income chargeable to tax has been under assessed; or (ii) such income has been assessed at too low a rate; or (iii) such income has been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act; or (iv) excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance under this Act has been computed. (Emphasis supplied) 14. In fact while dealing with the provisions of Sections 147 and 148 of the Act, i.e. prior to 1.4.1989, in M/s. Phool Chand Bajrang Lal and another Vs. Income Tax Officer and another, (1993) 4 SCC 77 , after reviewing judicial precedents on the subject, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the following proposition: From a combined review of the judgments of this Court, it follows that an income tax Officer acquires jurisdiction to reopen assessment under S. 147(a) read with S. 148 of the income tax Act, 1961 only if on the basis of specific, reliable and relevant information coming to his possession subsequently, he has reasons which he must record, to believe that by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a true and full disclosure of all material facts necessary for his assessment during the concluded assessment proceedings, any part of his income, profit or gains chargeable to income tax has escaped assessment. He may start reassessment proceedings either because some fresh facts come to light which were not previously disclosed or some information with regard to the facts previously disclosed comes into his possession which tends to expose the untruthfulness of those facts. In such situations, it is not a case of mere change of opinion or the drawing of a different inference from the same facts as were earlier available but acting on fresh information. Since, the belief is that of the income tax Officer, the sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief, is not for the Court to judge but it is open to an assessee to establish that there in fact existed no belief or that the belief was not at all a bona fide one or was based on vague, irrelevant and non-specific information. To that limited extent, the Court may look into the conclusion arrived at by the income tax Officer and examine whether there was any material available on the record from which the requisite belief could be formed by the income tax Officer and further whether that material had any rational connection or a live link for the formation of the requisite belief. It would be immaterial whether the income tax Officer at the time of making the original assessment could or, could not have found by further enquiry or investigation, whether the transaction was genuine or not, if on the basis of subsequent information, the income tax Officer arrives at a conclusion, after satisfying the twin conditions prescribed in S. 147(a) of the Act, that the assessee had not made a full and true disclosure of the material facts at the time of original assessment and therefore income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. One of the purposes of S. 147, appears to us to be, to ensure that a party cannot get away by willfully making a false or untrue statement at the time of original assessment and when that falsity comes to notice, to turn around and say "you accepted my lie, now your hands are tied and you can do nothing." It would be travesty of justice to allow the assessee that latitude.' In Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. Vs. Income Tax Officer and Others, (1999) 236 ITR 34 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court rejected the challenge to the notice of reassessment by observing that at the stage of notice, the court can only consider whether there is a prima facie case for reassessment and reopening of proceedings cannot be quashed by going into the sufficiency or correctness of the material relied upon by the assessing authority. The aforementioned judgments have been relied upon by this Court in Bal Ram Jakhar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Others, (2001) 250 ITR 393, and Bhajan Lal Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Another, (2001) 250 ITR 399, and the writ petitions filed for quashing the notices issued u/s 148 were dismissed as premature. If the reasons assigned by respondent No.1 for issuing the notice u/s 148 of the Act are considered in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it is not possible to hold that he did not have any material before him for entertaining a belief that the income of the petitioner had escaped assessment. (Emphasis supplied) 15. However, subsequently Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the amended provisions in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Private Limited, (2008) 14 SCC 208 = (2007) 257 ITR 500, wherein the Court was dealing with the case where return filed by the assessee was processed u/s 143(1) of the Act, accepting the loss declared by the respondent. Notice u/s 148 of the Act was issued on the ground that claim of bad debts as expenditure was not acceptable. Assessee filed a return declaring the loss to be the same vehicle as was declared in the original return. Objections filed by the assessee alongwith fresh return, for initiation of reassessment proceedings were dismissed, which were challenged by the assessee. The High Court upheld the assessee's contention that in view of return having been accepted u/s 143(1) of the Act, the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to re-open the case under the provisions of Section 148. It is in this background that the Apex Court while setting aside the judgment passed by the High Court upheld the order passed by the Assessing Officer. It held as under:- 19. It is in this background that the Apex Court while setting aside the judgment passed by the High Court upheld the order passed by the Assessing Officer. It held as under:- 19. Section 147 authorises and permits the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess income chargeable to tax if he has reason to believe that income for any assessment year has escaped assessment. The word reason in the phrase reason to believe would mean cause or justification. If the Assessing Officer has cause or justification to know or suppose that income had escaped assessment, it can be said to have reason to believe that an income had escaped assessment. The expression cannot be read to mean that the Assessing Officer should have finally ascertained the fact by legal evidence or conclusion. The function of the Assessing Officer is to administer the statute with solicitude for the public exchequer with an inbuilt idea of fairness to taxpayers. 21. The scope and effect of section 147 as substituted with effect from April 1, 1989, as also sections 148 to 152 are substantially different from the provisions as they stood prior to such substitution. Under the old provisions of section 147, separate clauses (a) and (b) laid down the circumstances under which income escaping assessment for the past assessment years could be assessed or reassessed. To confer jurisdiction u/s 147(a) two conditions were required to be satisfied firstly the Assessing Officer must have reason to believe that income profits or gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment, and secondly he must also have reason to believe that such escapement has occurred by reason of either (i) omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for his assessment of that year. Both these conditions were conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Assessing Officer could have jurisdiction to issue notice u/s 148 read with section 147(a) But under the substituted section 147 existence of only the first condition suffices. In other words if the Assessing Officer for whatever reason has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment it confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. It is however to be noted that both the conditions must be fulfilled if the case falls within the ambit of the proviso to section 147. In other words if the Assessing Officer for whatever reason has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment it confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. It is however to be noted that both the conditions must be fulfilled if the case falls within the ambit of the proviso to section 147. The case at hand is covered by the main provision and not the proviso. (Emphasis supplied) 16. This squarely answers the first contention raised by Mr. Mukhi. It would be open for the Revenue to issue notice u/s 147/148 even if notice u/s 143(2) was never issued or for that matter even if assessment u/s 143(3) had taken place. 17. But the question really is as to whether in the given facts Revenue can be allowed to do so. The answer to the same is in the decisions rendered by various Courts as noticed hereinbelow. 18. In Commissioner of Income Tax Central, Kanpur Vs. J.K. Charitable Trust Kamal Tower, Kanpur, (2009) 1 SCC 196 , the Apex Court held that if the fact situation changes in subsequent years, Revenue can prefer an appeal notwithstanding the fact that for previous years no appeal was preferred. Non-filing of appeal on the ground of revenue neutral by itself cannot a ground for dismissing the subsequent appeal on the principle of res judicata. 19. In (1972) 4 SCC 432 (SC) the Apex Court held that principle of res judicata does not apply in matters pertaining to tax for different assessment years. 20. But in M/s. Radhasoami Satsang Saomi Bagh, Agra Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1992) 1 SCC 659 , reiterating the view earlier taken in M.M. Ipoh and Others Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1968 SC 317 , the Court clarified that where fundamental aspect permeating through different assessment years has been found as a fact one way or other and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order, it would not be at all appropriate to allow the position to be changed in a subsequent year. 21. In the said decision Court was dealing with the issue as to whether income derived from a religious institution was entitled to statutory exemptions under the Income Tax Act. 21. In the said decision Court was dealing with the issue as to whether income derived from a religious institution was entitled to statutory exemptions under the Income Tax Act. Considering the long standing history of the Institution and the background in which its branches had been accorded such exemptions and were allowed to continue to avail such advantages constantly over a period of time, throughout various parts of the Country, the Court was of the view that income tax authorities could not be allowed to take a contradictory and conflicting view. 22. In M.M.IPOH (supra), the Apex Court held that "the doctrine of res judicata does not apply so as to make a decision on a question of fact or law in a proceeding for assessment in one year binding in another year. The assessment and the facts found are conclusive only in the year of assessment; the findings on questions of fact may be good and cogent evidence in subsequent years, when the same question falls to be determined in another year, but they are not binding and conclusive." 23. The aforesaid view was subsequently reiterated in Municipal Corporation of City of Municipal Corporation of City of Thane Vs. Vidyut Metallics Ltd. and Another, (2007) 8 SCC 688 . Significantly, in this case Apex Court reiterated its earlier decisions, reproduction of relevant extract of the said report would be absolutely relevant for adjudication of the instant case. It reads as under:- 19. In the leading case of Broken Hill Proprietory Co. v. Municipal Council, 1926 AC 94 : 1925 All ER 672 : 95 LJPC 33, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed (All ER p. 675 E-G).; The decision of the High Court related to a valuation and a liability to a tax in a previous year, and no doubt as regards that year the decision could not be disputed. The present case relates to a new situation, namely, the valuation for a different year and the liability for that year. It is not eadem question, and therefore, the principle of res judicata cannot apply. (emphasis supplied) 20. In Joint Family of Udayan Chinubhai, etc. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat, AIR 1967 SC 762 , this Court stated; 12. The present case relates to a new situation, namely, the valuation for a different year and the liability for that year. It is not eadem question, and therefore, the principle of res judicata cannot apply. (emphasis supplied) 20. In Joint Family of Udayan Chinubhai, etc. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat, AIR 1967 SC 762 , this Court stated; 12. ...It is true that an assessment year under the Income Tax Act is a self-contained assessment period and a decision in the assessment year does not ordinarily operate as res judicata in respect of the matter decided in any subsequent year, for the assessing officer is not a Court and he is not precluded from arriving at a conclusion inconsistent with his conclusion in another year. It is open to the Income Tax Officer, therefore, to depart from his decision in subsequent year, since the assessment is final and conclusive between the parties only in relation to the assessment for the particular year for which it is made. A decision reached in one year would be a cogent factor in the determination of a similar question in a following year, but ordinarily there is no bar against the investigation by the Income Tax Officer of the same facts on which a decision in respect of an earlier year was arrived at. (emphasis supplied) 24. We are in agreement with the following observations of Ranganath Misra, C.J. in M/s. Radhasoami Satsang Saomi Bagh, Agra Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1992) 1 SCC 659 . 16. We are aware of the fact that strictly speaking res judicata does not apply to income tax proceedings. Again, each assessment year being a unit, what is decided in one year may not apply in the following year but where a fundamental aspect permeating through the different assessment years has been found as a fact one way or the other and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order, it would not be at all appropriate to allow the position to be changed in a subsequent year. (emphasis supplied) 25. The Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and Another Vs. (emphasis supplied) 25. The Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2006) 3 SCC 1 , has held that: The decisions cited have uniformly held that res judicata does not apply in matters pertaining to tax for different assessment years because res judicata applies to debar Courts from entertaining issues on the same cause of action whereas the cause of action for each assessment year is distinct. The Courts will generally adopt an earlier pronouncement of the law or a conclusion of fact unless there is a new ground urged or a material change in the factual position. The reason why Courts have held parties to the opinion expressed in a decision in one assessment year to the same opinion in a subsequent year is not because of any principle of res judicata but because of the theory of precedent or the presidential value of the earlier pronouncement. Where facts and law in a subsequent assessment year are the same, no authority whether quasi judicial or judicial can generally be permitted to take a different view. This mandate is subject only to the usual gateways of distinguishing the earlier decision or where the earlier decision is per incuriam. (Emphasis supplied) 26. In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Neo Poly Pack (P.) Ltd., (2000) 245 ITR 492, High Court of Delhi had occasion to deal with a case where undisputedly there was a continuous past practice accepted by Revenue with regard to returns filed pertaining to the assessment years 1984-85 onwards till the assessment year 1989-90 pertaining to which Revenue was seeking to re-assess the income. This was not allowed. 27. In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. A.R.J. Security Printers, (2003) 264 ITR 276, High Court of Delhi had occasion to deal with a case pertaining to assessment years 1995-96 and 1997-98. The assessments were reopened notwithstanding the view that with regard to prior assessments pertaining to the period 1992-93 onwards, similar view was sought to be taken by the Assessing Officer for the years in question. Thus action of the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessments for the years in question was held to be bad in law. 28. In Arihant Builders, Developers and Investors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Thus action of the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessments for the years in question was held to be bad in law. 28. In Arihant Builders, Developers and Investors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and Others, (2005) 277 ITR 239 , the High Court of Madhya Pradesh had an occasion to deal with the case where the Assessing Officer had taken a view contrary to the one taken in the assessment proceedings pertaining to earlier years, which stood conclusively affirmed by the appellate Authority. Thus action of the Assessing Officer in not following the view taken by the Appellate Authority was found to be erroneous. 29. To the similar effect are the decisions rendered by various other High Courts in Dhansiram Agarwalla Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1996) 217 ITR 4, Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Gendalal Hazarilal and Co., (2003) 263 ITR 679 , and Jai Hotels Co. Ltd. vs. Assistant Director of Income Tax, (2009) 24 DTR Judgments 37 (Delhi) Bapalal and Co. Exports Vs. The Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (OSD), (2007) 289 ITR 37, Apollo Hospitals Enterprises Limited Vs. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, (2006) 3 MLJ 1106 , Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat-V, (1980) 123 ITR 669. 30. In Punjab Tractors Ltd. Vs. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2002) 254 ITR 242 , High Court of Punjab & Haryana had to deal with a case where prior to passing of the order u/s 143(3), notice u/s 147/148 was issued to the assessee. The Court held that finalization of proceedings u/s 143 was not sine qua non for issuance of notice u/s 147/148 of the Act. 31. Reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. (supra), by the Revenue is totally misconceived on facts. In the instant case, as has already been noticed herein earlier practice adopted by the assessee was accepted by the Revenue after issuance of notice u/s 143(2), in relation to proceedings pertaining to the year 1995-96 and also issuance of notice u/s 147 in relation to the proceedings pertaining to the year 1996-97, which action of the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment and re-assess the income was set aside. 32. As to whether mere change of opinion would constitute information or not has been answered by the Apex Court in A.L.A. Firm Vs. 32. As to whether mere change of opinion would constitute information or not has been answered by the Apex Court in A.L.A. Firm Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, (1991) 2 SCC 558 , the Court held that: However, Section 147(b) (as it stood in 1960-61) would permit initiation of reassessment proceedings in the light of 'information' obtained by ITO by an investigation into material already on record or by research into the law applicable thereto which has brought out an angle or aspect that had been missed earlier. But a 'bare or mere change of opinion' would not constitute the 'information'. Therefore, the ITO (very often a successor officer) cannot reopen the assessment merely because the opinion formed earlier by himself (or, more often, by a predecessor ITO) was, in his opinion, incorrect. 33. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi Vs. Kelvinator of India Limited, (2010) 2 SCC 723 , the Court has held that: One must treat the concept of 'change of opinion' as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, Assessing Officer has power to re-open, provided there is 'tangible material' to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to Section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words 'reason to believe' but also inserted the word 'opinion' in Section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the Companies against omission of the words 'reason to believe', Parliament re-introduced the said expression and deleted the word 'opinion' on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer. 34. In Berger Paints India Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, (2004) 12 SCC 42 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the case where question of law stood similarly decided by three different High Courts of the country. 34. In Berger Paints India Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, (2004) 12 SCC 42 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the case where question of law stood similarly decided by three different High Courts of the country. Noticing the conflicting views taken by various Tribunals, a special Bench of ITAT was constituted to resolve the issue which also affirmed the view taken by the High Courts and the judgments/findings were never assailed by the Revenue before the Supreme Court but were in fact accepted with regard to different assesses, the Supreme Court held that : If the Revenue has not challenged the correctness of the law laid down by the High Court and has accepted it in the case of one assessee, then it is not open to the Revenue to challenge its correctness in the case of other assesses, 'without just cause'. 35. As to whether the opinion of internal audit party of the Income Tax department on the point of law can be regarded as 'information' within the meaning of Section 147-B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (pre amended provisions) or not came up before the three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Indian and Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society, New Delhi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, (1979) 4 SCC 248 , wherein the Apex Court has held that: 13. In the present case, an internal audit party of the income tax Department expressed the view that the receipts from the occupation of the conference hall and rooms did not attract Section 10 of the Act and that the assessment should have been made u/s 9. While Sections 9 and 10 can be described as law, the opinion of the audit party in regard to their application is not law. It is not a declaration by a body authorised to declare the law. That part alone of the note of an audit party which mentions the law which escaped the notice of the income tax Officer constitutes 'information' within the meaning of Section 147(b); the part which embodies the opinion of the audit party in regard to the application or interpretation of the law cannot be taken into account by the income tax Officer. In every case, the income tax Officer must determine for himself what is the effect and consequence of the law mentioned in the audit note and whether in consequence of the law which has now come to his notice he can reasonably believe that income tax has escaped assessment. The basis of his belief must be the law of which he has now become aware. The opinion rendered by the audit party in regard to the law cannot, for the purpose of such belief, add to or colour the significance of such law. In short, the true evaluation of the law in its bearing on the assessment must be made directly and solely by the income tax Officer. 14. Now, in the case before us, the income tax Officer had, when he made the original assessment, considered the provisions of Sections 9 and 10. Any different view taken by him afterwards on application of those provisions would amount to a change of opinion on material already considered by him. The Revenue contends that it is open to him to do so, and on that basis to reopen the assessment u/s 147(b). Reliance is placed on (1976) 102 ITR 287 (SC) where a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court observed that a case where income had escaped assessment due to the "oversight, inadvertence or mistake" of the income tax Officer must fall within Section 34(1) (b) of the Indian income tax Act, 1922. It appears to us, with respect, that the proposition is stated too widely and travels farther than the statute warrants insofar as it can be said to lay down that if, on reappraising the material considered by him during the original assessment, the income tax Officer discovers that he has committed an error in consequence of which income has escaped assessment it is open to him to reopen the assessment. In our opinion, an error discovered on a reconsideration of the same material (and no more) does not give him that power. That was the view taken by this Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commr. of income tax [1959 Supp 1 SCR 10], Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. A. Raman and Company, AIR 1968 SC 49 , and Bankipur Club Ltd., Patna Vs. That was the view taken by this Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commr. of income tax [1959 Supp 1 SCR 10], Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. A. Raman and Company, AIR 1968 SC 49 , and Bankipur Club Ltd., Patna Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa, Patna, (1972) 4 SCC 386 , and we do not believe that the law has since taken a different course. Any observations in Kalyanji Mavji & Co. v. Commr. of income tax (supra) suggesting the contrary do not, we say with respect, lay down the correct law. 15. A further submission raised by the Revenue on Section 147(b) of the Act may be considered at this stage. It is urged that the expression 'information' in Section 147(b) refers to the realisation by the income tax Officer that he has committed an error when making the original assessment. It is said that, when upon receipt of the audit note the income tax Officer discovers or realizes that a mistake has been committed in the original assessment, the discovery of the mistake would be 'information' within the meaning of Section 147(b). The submission appears to us inconsistent with the terms of Section 147(b). Plainly, the statutory provisions envisages that the income tax Officer must first have information in his possession, and then in consequence of such information he must have reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. The realisation that income has escaped assessment is covered by the words 'reason to believe', and it follows from the 'information' received by the income tax Officer. The information is not the realisation, the information gives birth to the realisation. 36. Mr. Kuthiala has vehemently relied upon the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. P.V.S. Beedies Pvt. Ltd., (1998) 9 SCC 272 , wherein it has been held that: We are of the view that both the Tribunal and the High Court were in error in holding that the information given by the internal audit party could not be treated as information within the meaning of section 147(b) of the income tax Act. The audit party has merely pointed out a fact which has been overlooked by the income tax Officer in the assessment. The audit party has merely pointed out a fact which has been overlooked by the income tax Officer in the assessment. The fact that the recognition granted to this charitable trust had expired on September 22, 1972, was not noticed by the income tax Officer. This is not a case of information on a question of law. The dispute as to whether reopening is permissible after the audit party expresses an opinion on question of law is not being considered by a larger Bench of this court. There can be no dispute that the audit party is entitled to point out a factual error or omission in the assessment. Reopening of the case on the basis of a factual error pointed out by the audit party is permissible under law. In view of that we hold that reopening of the case u/s 147(b) in the facts of this case was on the basis of factual information given by the internal audit party and was valid in law. The judgment under appeal is set aside to this extent. 37. The decision rendered by the three Judge Bench in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society (supra) was not brought to the notice of the two Judge Bench which decided P.V.S. Beedies (supra). That apart, decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. The audit party had merely pointed out a fact which had been overlooked by the Assessing Officer. On facts, it was found that 'information' was not on the 'question of law'. The Court found that re-assessment was on the basis of factual error pointed out by the audit party, which was permissible under law. 38. In Cartini India Ltd. Vs. Addl. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2009) 4 MhLj 102 , the High Court of Judicature at Bombay while dealing with the case where the Assessing Officer, after accepting the explanation furnished by the assessee had passed orders which were sought to be reopened by issuing notice u/s 148 of the Act, held that in the absence of existence of "tangible material" on the basis of which Assessing Officer could form a reasonable belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment, it would be impermissible for the revenue to reopen the assessments. Facts of the instant case are similar to the one before the court in the said decision. 39. Facts of the instant case are similar to the one before the court in the said decision. 39. To this effect are also decisions of the other High Courts as reported in Asian Paints Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Another, (2009) 308 ITR 195, Chakiat Agencies (P) Ltd., (2009) 224 CTR (Mad) 286, Legato Systems India (P) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT, (2010) 43 SITC 372 (Del), Aventis Pharma Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and others, (2010) 233 CTR (Bom) 257, Satnam Overseas Ltd. and Another Vs. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, (2010) 188 TAXMAN 172, Carlton Overseas Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Income Tax Officer and Others, (2009) 318 ITR 295, and Commission of Income Tax vs. SFIL Stock Broking Ltd., (2010) 233 CTR (Del) 69. 40. In the instant case as has already been noticed earlier, statement of accounts of profit and loss and return submitted by the appellant were accepted by the Assessing Officer with regard to previous years after due scrutiny and application of mind, hence there was no error or question of fact involved. Question of law, whether appellant was entitled to deductions or not, already stood examined, considered and adjudicated by the Assessing officer in the previous years. 41. Significantly it is not the case of Revenue that the assessee had suppressed any income. It is also not their allegation that assessee had suppressed information or misled the authority. It cannot be disputed that all relevant facts stood fully disclosed by the assessee. Notice issued to the assessee does not even refer to the report of the audit party. Initially, basis on which assessments were sought to be re-opened were not communicated to the petitioner. There was no new material, cause or justification before the Revenue to have known or presumed that income had escaped assessment. In our considered view Assessing Officer had no reason to believe that income, profit or gains chargeable to income had escaped assessment. It is quite likely that two views on same set of facts are possible, but once having formed an opinion it would be impermissible for the Assessing Officer, after carrying out assessments on merits, with regard to previous years, to form a different opinion. 42. It is quite likely that two views on same set of facts are possible, but once having formed an opinion it would be impermissible for the Assessing Officer, after carrying out assessments on merits, with regard to previous years, to form a different opinion. 42. True, it is that neither principle of res judicata nor principle of estoppel would apply to the proceedings with regard to separate assessments of Assessment years but then principle of consistency and continuity has to be maintained at all times. For promoting the industry certain benefits were accorded, which in our considered view have to be liberally construed. 43. It cannot be said that Tribunal has simply remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for adjudication of the case on merits. Significantly order dated 25.5.2006 in ITA No. 1072/Chandi/2004, pertaining to the Assessment Year 1996-97, passed by the ITAT, Chandigarh, was brought to the notice of the Presiding officer ITAT, Chandigarh, who was dealing with the ITA No. 205/Chandi/2005, in which the orders in question were passed. Importantly the Bench was headed by the same Presiding Officer. Contention of the assessee that action on part of the Assessing Officer to re-open the assessments was bad in law, particularly, in view of order dated 25.5.2006 was repelled, in our view, wrongly, by holding that the said order was passed only on the question of limitation, as notice of re-assessment with regard to the said order was issued after expiry of four years. Thus contention raised by the Revenue that new pleas have been taken before this Court by the assessee of past adjudication of the proceedings on merits, is factually incorrect. 44. In our view, fact that the assessment had been made and excessive depreciation allowance was computed or not was a question which already stood adjudicated by the very same Officer. There was no cogent reason to believe or new material on record enabling or entitling the officers to change his opinion. 45. In view of the above discussion question No.1 as framed is partly answered in favour of the revenue and partly against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. As far as the issue of limitation is concerned the question is answered in favour of the revenue and it is held that the action taken by the Revenue was within limitation. As far as the issue of limitation is concerned the question is answered in favour of the revenue and it is held that the action taken by the Revenue was within limitation. However, in view of the above discussion, it has been found that there was no reason or new material on record to change the earlier opinion and therefore the second part of the question is answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. As far as second question is concerned the same is answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. 46. In view of the above discussion, the appeals are allowed and the impugned orders are set-aside. No costs.