ORDER 1. As the grievance raised in the aforesaid two petitions is identical and same, they are heard together and disposed of by this common order. 2. For facility of reference, facts are being taken from Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.7348/11. 3. Present petition (Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.7348/11) is preferred by the petitioners-accused under section 482 of CrPC having been aggrieved by an order dated 26th September, 2011. By the aforesaid order, the petitioner-accused No.1. O.T.G. Global Finance Ltd.Co. was acquitted of the charges under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act while setting aside the sentence for the alleged offence. However, the conviction recorded by the trial Magistrate and affirmed by the appellate Court against the petitioners No.2 and 3 for the offence alleged was maintained with sentence of imprisonment of one month suffered by them. While summing up, it was also directed in para 34 of the order impugned which is extracted below : “(34) Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and keeping in view the fact that the petitioners-accused No.2 and 3 have already suffered the sentence of imprisonment awarded to them under the impugned judgment, in the opinion of this Court, interest of justice would be sub-served if any further substantial punishment is not awarded and same is taken to be sufficient. While holding so, it is directed that now, the petitioners-accused No.2 and 3, namely, Janak Gandhi, Managing Director and S.S. Yadav, Director of Finance of O.T.G. Global Finance Ltd. shall equally be responsible to pay Rs.10,00,000/- (Rs. Ten lacs) instead of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rs. Eight lacs). The portion of fine amount imposed against them is deleted herewith. The said amount of compensation shall be deposited with the trial Court within a period of six months. The complainant-accused shall further have liberty to adopt the legal recourses if the law permits them before the civil Court to settle their disputes regarding the settlement of their liabilities after termination of joint venture companies/partnership of Cable Network at Gwalior. In that case the amount of compensation shall be adjusted in the amount which may be awarded by the civil Courts in future. In that case the amount of compensation shall be adjusted in the amount which may be awarded by the civil Courts in future. The fine amount, the cash or securities and bank guarantee under direction of this Court/appellate Court/trial Court, if deposited/filed before the trial Court/registry of this Court, be returned back to the petitioners-accused subject to enforceable law prevailing, or on the request of the parties, may be adjusted in the compensation amount as awarded by this Court.” 4. At the time of pronouncement of the verdict, learned counsel for the parties brought the fact to the notice of the Court that the compromise was arrived at and pursuant to the said compromise, now the complainant-respondent No.1 does not wish to pursue his complaint any more and seek quashment of the criminal proceedings vis-a-vis the acquittal of the petitioners-accused.The interlocutory applications being No.10466/11 and 10468/11 were moved for the said purpose which came to be dismissed by this Court for the reasons mentioned in paras 35 and 36 of the order itself. Paras 35 and 36 are reproduced below : “35. At the time of pronouncement of the order by this Court, learned counsel appearing for the parties submitted at bar that the matter has been settled between the parties out of the Court and in the light of the compromise so arrived at, now the complainant, respondent No.1 does not wish to pursue his complaint any more and, therefore, the petitioners be acquitted of the alleged offences. In support of submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of K.M. Ibrahim v. K.P. Mohammed [ (2010)1 SCC 798 ]. 36. An application for compounding of offence filed under section 320 of CrPC after pronouncement of the judgment in appeal/revision, petition does not lie as the Court has no more seisin over the case. Compounding of offence under section 320 of CrPC is permissible only when the case is pending before the Court. In this very case, after pronouncement of the judgment, it was stated that the compromise application has been moved. Compounding of offence under section 320 of CrPC is permissible only when the case is pending before the Court. In this very case, after pronouncement of the judgment, it was stated that the compromise application has been moved. In the case of State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala [ AIR 1979 SC 87 ], it was held by the apex Court that once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. The same situation does arise in this case. Consequently, the applications (I.A. Nos.10466/11 and 10468/11) are not tenable before this Court. Such application is permissible only when the case is pending before the Court and not at the stage when the case is fixed for pronouncement of the judgment by the Court. Consequently, both the applications stand rejected with a liberty to the petitioners to take appropriate recourse in accordance with law. 5. Being aggrieved by the rejection of the applications (I.A. Nos.10466/11 and 10468/11), the present petitions under section 482 of CrPC have been submitted. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that as per section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, offence under section 138 of the Act has been made compoundable and for that purpose no permission of the Court is necessary. It is submitted that if the offence is compoundable and the parties have entered into compromise, this Court ought to have decided the case in the light of the compromise arrived at between the parties and acquitted the accused-petitioners of the alleged offence. Accordingly, placing reliance on the decision in the case of K.M. Ibrahm v. K.P. Mohammad [ (2010)1 SCC 798 ], it is prayed that the petition may be allowed and the compromise arrived at between the parties may be accepted. Along with the petitions, applications (R.I.A. Nos.11057/11 and 11059/11) under section 320 of CrPC read with section 147 of the N.I. Act have been annexed for favour of consideration. 7. Along with the petitions, applications (R.I.A. Nos.11057/11 and 11059/11) under section 320 of CrPC read with section 147 of the N.I. Act have been annexed for favour of consideration. 7. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent No.2 raised an objection as to the maintainability of the petition under section 482 of CrPC in the matters where the High Court has decided the revision application of the accused on merits. 8. It is true that this Court had disposed of finally the revision application challenging the judgment by confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court, but it cannot be lost sight of the fact that this Court has a power to have intervened in exercise of the powers vested under section 482 CrPC only with a view to do substantial justice or to avoid miscarriage and the spirit of the compromise arrived at between the parties. This is perfectly justified and legal too. 9. The resistance placed by the learned Public Prosecutor is that in view of the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 320 CrPC and the observations made by the apex Court in the case of Tanveer Aquil v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1990 (Supp.) SCC 63, the parties should be relegated to the apex Court to initiate appropriate proceedings to get the actual effect of compromise arrived at between the parties. In the case of Tanveer Aquil (supra), the appellant was convicted under section 324 IPC and was ordered to suffer RI for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-. After the pronouncement of the judgment by the High Court the learned counsel appeared and pleaded for an opportunity of hearing and at that stage the High Court again heard the matter and added a postscript in the judgment confirming the conviction and sentence. The petitioner thereafter had moved the High Court for a compromise to compound the offence. It was submitted to the High Court that the accused has paid a sum of Rs.3,500/- to the complainant and the learned counsel for the complainant confirmed of having received the amount of Rs.3,500/ in token of the compromise arrived between the parties. In para 1 of the cited decision the apex Court has observed : “.... It was submitted to the High Court that the accused has paid a sum of Rs.3,500/- to the complainant and the learned counsel for the complainant confirmed of having received the amount of Rs.3,500/ in token of the compromise arrived between the parties. In para 1 of the cited decision the apex Court has observed : “.... But the High Court did not and indeed could not take into consideration that application since it has disposed of the matter already.” 10. Thus, it is the say of learned Public Prosecutor that when this Court has already rejected the revision application on merits, the parties or any one of them can be permitted to place compromise and to get an order of acquittal from the very Court, is the question. Therefore, in more than one decisions, the apex Court has observed that the petition invoking inherent powers under section 482 CrPC is not maintainable when the earlier revision application filed under section 397 CrPC read with section 401 CrPC seeking same or similar relief, when dismissed on merit, or has not pressed. However, in the same way the apex Court has observed in more than one cases that such petitions, though otherwise, are not maintainable; can even be entertained when special circumstances are made out. These observations are in reference to third part of section 482 of CrPC. 11. Considered the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respective party and some other decisions of the apex Court and I do not think it necessary to enlist those decisions which are taken into consideration for the purpose of the present proceedings. But ultimately one balanced principle has emerged that the petitions invoking inherent powers under section 482 CrPC after dismissal/disposal of revision application under section 397 CrPC read with section 401 CrPC, are not maintainable by the same party, more so, when no special circumstances are made out. The gist of this ratio is reflected in the decision reported in the case of Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir [ AIR 2001 SC 3524 ]. The gist of this ratio is reflected in the decision reported in the case of Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir [ AIR 2001 SC 3524 ]. In that case, it was contended before the apex Court that as the earlier revision petition filed by the accused persons under section 397 of the Code has been rejected by the High Court vide order dated 13.7.1990, they had no right to file the petition under section 482 of the Code with prayer for quashing the same order. While dealing with the above contention, the apex Court observed that : “We are of the opinion that no special circumstances were spelt out in the subsequent application for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 of the Code and the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this ground alone...” 12. So can be legitimately argued and inferred and held that in all cases where the petitioners are able to satisfy this Court that there are special circumstances which can be clearly spelt out, subsequent application invoking inherent powers under section 482 CrPC can be moved and cannot be thrown away on the technical argument as to its sustainability. 13. In the case of Krishan v. Krishnaveni, reported in (1997)4 SCC 241 ], the apex Court has held that though the inherent power of the High Court is very wide, yet the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may in its discretion prevent the abuse of process or miscarriage of justice by exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code. 14. For the purpose of the present decision, the facts stated hereinabove are very relevant. Here, the petitioners have attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court vested under setion 482 CrPC. The embargo of sub-section (6) of section 320 CrPC pointed out by learned Public Prosecutor would not come in the way so far as the relief prayed in both the petitions are concerned. At this juncture, Iwould like to reproduce the relevant part of section 320 of CrPC : “Section 320. The embargo of sub-section (6) of section 320 CrPC pointed out by learned Public Prosecutor would not come in the way so far as the relief prayed in both the petitions are concerned. At this juncture, Iwould like to reproduce the relevant part of section 320 of CrPC : “Section 320. (1) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code specified in the first two columns of the table next following may be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table. (2) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code specified in the first two columns of the table next following may, with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table. (3) .... (4) .... (5) .... (6) A High Court or Court of Sessions acting in the exercise of its powers of revision under section 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this section.” 15. I am not in agreement that when the adjudication of a criminal offence has reached to the stage of revisional level, there cannot be any compromise without permission of the Court in all case including the offence punishable under N.I. Act or the offence mentioned in Table 1 (one) can be compounded only if High Court or Court of Sessions grants permission for such purpose. The Court presently, concerned with an offence punishable under N.I. Act. So, it is relevant to quote section 147 of the N.I. Act, which is as under : “Section 147. Offences to be compoundable. -- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable.” 16. Section 147 of N.I. Act begins with a non obstante clause and such clause is being used in a provision to communicate that the provision shall prevail despite anything to the contrary in any other or different legal provisions. So, in light of the compass provided, a dispute in the nature of complaint under section 138 of N.I. Act, can be settled by way of compromise irrespective of any other legislation including CrPC in general and section 320(1)(2) or (6) of the CrPC in particular. So, in light of the compass provided, a dispute in the nature of complaint under section 138 of N.I. Act, can be settled by way of compromise irrespective of any other legislation including CrPC in general and section 320(1)(2) or (6) of the CrPC in particular. The scheme of section 320 CrPC deals mainly with procedural aspects; but it simultaneously crystallizes certain enforceable rights and obligation. Hence, this provision has an element of substantative legislation and therefore, it can be said that the scheme of section 320 does not lay down only procedure; but still, the status of the scheme remains under a general law of procedure and as per the accepted proposition of law, the special law would prevail over general law. It is not necessary to enlist the authorities propounding this proposition of law available on this point. But for the sake of convenience, I would like to quote what the apex Court has stated in the case of Municipal Corporation, Indore v. Ratnaprabha, reported in AIR 1977 SC 308 . In the said case, the apex Court was dealing with similar principle and proposition of law of interpretation. While dealing with the language of non obstante clause on the question of construction, it has been observed as under : “As has been stated, clause (b) of section 138 of the Act provides that the annual value of any building shall “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force” be deemed to be the gross annual rent for which the building might “reasonably at the time of the assessment be expected to be let from year to year”. While therefore, the requirement of the law is that the reasonable letting value should determine the annual value of the building, it has also been specifically provided that this would be so “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force”. While therefore, the requirement of the law is that the reasonable letting value should determine the annual value of the building, it has also been specifically provided that this would be so “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force”. It appears to us that it would be a proper interpretation of the provisions of clause (b) of section 138 of the Act to hold that in a case where the standard rent of a building has been fixed under section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, and there is nothing to show that there has been fraud or collusion, that would be its letting value, but, where this is not so, and the building has never been let out and is being used in a manner where the question of fixing its standard rent does not arise, it would be permissible to fix its reasonable rent without regard to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. This view will, in our opinion, give proper effect to the non obstante clause in clause (b) with due regard to its other provision that the letting value should be “reasonable”.” 17. The expression “special law” means a provision of law which is not applicable generally but which applies to a particular or specific subject or class of subjects. Section 41 of Indian Penal Code stands on the same footing and defines the phrase ‘special law’. Sometimes, a particular act or part of a procedural law may be considered as general and can be given effect to with reference to some act. But it may be special with reference to other act. In this connection I would like to quote the well accepted proposition of law emerging from various observations made by the apex Court in different decisions as a gist of the principle and it can be summarised as under : “When a special law or a statute is applicable to a particular subject, then the same would prevail over a general law with regard to the very subject, is the accepted principle in the field of interpretation of statute.” 18. The operation or effect of a general Act may be curtailed by special Act even if a general Act contains a non obstante clause. The operation or effect of a general Act may be curtailed by special Act even if a general Act contains a non obstante clause. But here is not a case where the language of section 320 CrPC would come in the way in recording the compromise or in compounding the offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I. Act. On the contrary provisions of section 147 of N.I. Act though starts with a non obstante clause, is an affirmative enactment and this is possible to infer from the scheme that has overriding effect on the intention of legislature reflected in section 320 CrPC. 19. The submission of the learned Public Prosecutor, if considered in this perspective, then also, it would be difficult to accept that sub-section (6) of section 401 of CrPC shall have an overriding effect or prevailing effect over the intention of the legislature reflected in section 147 of N.I. Act.Indisputably, the offence made punishable under section 138 N.I. Act is a subject not specifically dealt with by Indian Penal Code. The liabilities created by sections 138, 139, 141 and 143 of N.I. Act are in contemplation with an offence otherwise not contemplated by Indian Penal Code. In this back ground, section 147 of N.I. Act would prevail over the scheme including sub-section (6) of section 320 of CrPC. On a plain reading of section 147 of N.I. Act, it is clear that the same does not confer any obligation to obtain permission for entering into a compromise or to compound the offence. 20. Merely because the litigation has reached to a revisional stage or that even beyond that stage, the nature and character of the offence would not change automatically and it would be wrong to hold that at revisional stage, the nature of offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I. Act should be treated as if the same is falling under table II of section 320 CrPC. It will be difficult to accept the proposition put forward by learned Public Prosecutor that even if the offence made punishable under IPC and reference to section 1 of section 320, i.e., table I shown in section 320 CrPC it cannot be compounded without prior permission. It will be difficult to accept the proposition put forward by learned Public Prosecutor that even if the offence made punishable under IPC and reference to section 1 of section 320, i.e., table I shown in section 320 CrPC it cannot be compounded without prior permission. I would like to reproduce some part of the statement of objects and reasons of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 2002 : “The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was amended by the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 wherein a new Chapter XVII was incorporated for penalities in case of dishonour of cheques due to insufficiency of funds in the account of the drawer of the cheque. These provisions were incorporated with a view to encourage the culture of use of cheques and enhancing the credibility of the instrument.The existing provisions in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, namely, sections 138 to 142 in Chapter XVII have been found deficient in dealing with dishonour of cheques. Not only the punishment provided in the Act has proved to be inadequate, the procedure prescribed for the Courts to deal with such matters has been found to be cumbersome. The Courts are unable to dispose of such cases expeditiously in a time bound manner in view of the procedure contained in the Act. 2. A large number of cases are reported to be pending under sections 138 to 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in various Courts in the country. Keeping in view the large number of complaints under the said Act, pending in various Courts, a working group was constituted to review section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and make recommendations as to what changes were needed to effectively achieve the purpose of that section. 3. The recommendations of the working group along with other representations from various institutions and organisations were examined by the Government in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and other legal experts, and a Bill, namely, the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2001 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 24th July, 2011. The Bill was referred to Standing Committee on Finance which made certain recommendations in its report submitted to Lok Sabha in November, 2001. 4. The Bill was referred to Standing Committee on Finance which made certain recommendations in its report submitted to Lok Sabha in November, 2001. 4. Keeping in view the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Finance and other representations, it has been decided to bring out, inter alia, the following amendments in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, namely : (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx xxx (iii) xxx xxx xxx (iv) to prescribe procedure for dispensing with preliminary evidence of the complainant; (v) xxx xxx xxx (vi) xxx xxx xxx (vii) to make the offences under the Act compoundable. 5. xxx xxx xxx 6. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.” 21. So, the intention of the legislature and object of enacting “Banking”, Public Financial Institutions and the Negotiable Instrument Laws (Amended Act) 1988 and subsequent enactment i.e. Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 leads this Court to a conclusion that the offence made punishable under section 138 of N.I. Act is not only an offence qua property but it is also of the nature of an economic offence, though not covered in the list of statutes enacted in reference to section 468 of CrPC. Thus, parties, in reference to offence under section 138 N.I. Act read with section 147 of the said Act are at liberty to compound the matter at any stage even after the dismissal of the revision application. Even a convict undergoing imprisonment with the liability to pay the amount of fine imposed by the Court and/or under an obligation to pay the amount of compensation if awarded, as per the scheme of N.I. Act, can compound the matter. The complainant i.e. person or persons affected can pray to the Court that the accused, on compounding of the offence may be released by invoking jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 CrPC read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 22. The Court is also aware of other principle of law that when a thing is required to be done in a particular way (provided under a law or rules framed thereunder) then it should be done in that manner only. But when the jurisdiction of this Court being very wide under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with third part of section 482 CrPC is invoked, the Court can bring legal resolution. But when the jurisdiction of this Court being very wide under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with third part of section 482 CrPC is invoked, the Court can bring legal resolution. If all parties are asked to approach the apex Court then, what will be situation, is a question which is required to be considered in the back ground of another accepted progressive and pragmatic principle that, if possible, the parties should be provided justice at the door step. Of course, the parties compounding the offence under section 138 of N.I. Act obviously are bound to satisfy the conscious of the Court on facts, when the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with section 482 CrPC is invoked with readiness and willingness to pay the reasonable amount of costs, if awarded while dealing with such petitions. 23. As discussed above, the Court is inclined to hold accordingly only because there is no formal embargo in section 147 N.I. Act.This principle would not help any convict in any other law where other applicable independent provisions are existing as the offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I. Act is distinctly different from the normal offences made punishable under Chapter XVII of IPC (i.e. the offences qua property. In the circumstances, it is hereby declared that the compromise arrived between the parties to this litigation out of Court is accepted as genuine. Necessarily the conviction and sentence under section 138 of the N.I. Act stands annulled as this Court intends, otherwise to secure the ends of justice as provided under section 482 CrPC. Obviously the order dismissing revision petitions would not have any enforceable effect. 24. In view of the above, the petitioners shall be treated as acquitted on account of compounding of the offence with the complainant/person affected. The petitioners shall pay costs of Rs.2,500/- (Rs. Two thousand five hundred only) each to the respondent-State. 25. Accordingly, both the petitions are required to be allowed and they are allowed. .............