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Allahabad High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 260 (ALL)

RAM BISWASI v. STATE OF U. P.

2012-01-31

B.AMIT STHALEKAR

body2012
JUDGMENT Hon’ble B. Amit Sthalekar, J.—This writ petition was initially filed by the petitioner seeking the relief in the nature of mandamus directing the Management of Shri 108 Swami Naga Nirvan Ji Maharaj High Secondary School, Haswa, Fatehpur (hereinafter referred to as the Institution) to forward the papers of the petitioner for grant of approval for appointment to the District Inspector of Schools. Subsequently, during the pendency of the writ petition, the services of the petitioner were terminated by an order dated 1.6.2005 and therefore, an amendment application was filed seeking an additional relief for quashing the order of termination dated 1.6.2005. The said application was allowed by this Court vide order 24.9.2008 and the amendments have been incorporated in the petition on 29.9.2008. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the applications were invited in the year 1989 for appointment against Class IV posts and in pursuance thereof he had submitted his application and was given appointment letter dated 30.7.1989 and he joined his duties on 31.7.1989. Sometime in June, 2004 the petitioner came to know that five other Class IV employees, who were junior to him, had been granted approval by the District Inspector of Schools but the papers of the petitioner had not been forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools for grant of approval by the Institution. The case of the petitioner further is that persons junior to him namely, Rajesh Kumar, Ram Lakhan, Rakesh Kumar, Shashi Kumar and Rohit were granted approval by the District Inspector of Schools. The petitioner alongwith the writ petition has filed photo copy of the attendance register starting from September, 1993, filed as Annexure-7 to the petition, which shows that the petitioner had signed the register throughout. In the month of October, 1993 after the name of the petitioner, the name of one Rakesh Kumar has been shown. Thereafter after April, 1994 the name of one Shri Ram Lakhan has also been shown in the attendance register. After August, 1994 the name of Shashi Kumar Pandey appears in the attendance register. In the month of October, 1993 after the name of the petitioner, the name of one Rakesh Kumar has been shown. Thereafter after April, 1994 the name of one Shri Ram Lakhan has also been shown in the attendance register. After August, 1994 the name of Shashi Kumar Pandey appears in the attendance register. However for the month of October, 1994, the name of Ram Lakhan and Rakesh kumar are not shown the attendance register and this position continues for the subsequent months but what is to be noted is that the names of different persons namely one Shri Banshi Lal and Shyam Sunder appear in the attendance register after the name of the petitioner. In the month of April, 1996 the name of Rajesh Kumar Misra is shown after the name of the petitioner. Thus it can be seen that these persons have been appointed after the year 1993. 3. I have heard Shri S.M. Nazar Bokhari, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri V. Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 4,5 and 6, learned standing counsel appearing for the State and perused the materials on record. The contention of Shri V. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 is that the petitioner was never given appointment in the year 1989 and that the order of appointment which has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition is a forged document. Be that as it may, it is admitted to the petitioner in paragraph 12 of the writ petition that though he was given appointment in the year 1989 but he started signing the attendance register since September, 1993 onwards and this fact is also verified from the copy of attendance register, filed as Annexure-7 to the writ petition. It is admitted to both the learned counsels that the Institution was granted recognition sometime prior to 1986 but it came on grant-in-aid in the year 2005. It is also admitted to Shri V. Singh in his counter-affidavit that the petitioner continued in service from 1993 upto 2005 and thereafter since his name was not approved by the District Inspector of Schools, his services were terminated by the order 1.6.2005. 4. Shri V. Singh further submitted that the petitioner has been given retrenchment compensation which has been accepted by him and, therefore, he has no cause of action to challenge the order of termination. 4. Shri V. Singh further submitted that the petitioner has been given retrenchment compensation which has been accepted by him and, therefore, he has no cause of action to challenge the order of termination. However, from the records it is seen that from the year 1993 onwards there were five sanctioned post of Class IV in the Institution and the petitioner has been working continuously since 1993 till his services came to be terminated in the year 2005. In the order of termination dated 1.6.2005 it is mentioned that since the services of the petitioner were no longer required by the Institution and that since no approval was granted by the District Inspector of Schools, therefore, the services of the petitioner were terminated. No counter-affidavit has been filed by the learned standing counsel on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. 5. It is submitted by Shri Bokhari, learned counsel for the petitioner that prior to passing of the order dated 1.6.2005 no show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing has been given to him and even if it is assumed that he has been working from 1993 continuously the principles of natural justice demanded that he should be given an opportunity of hearing prior to terminating his services as more than 12 years had passed since he had put in service in the Institution. There is nothing on record to show whether the petitioner had been given any opportunity of hearing before passing of the order of termination and the order of termination dated 1.6.2005 is also silent on this aspect of the matter. Shri V. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nso. 4, 5 and 6 also could not dispute this position. In view of the above, in my opinion the order of termination dated 1.6.2005 is grossly illegal and is violative of principles of natural justice inasmuch as it has been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, therefore, the same is quashed. It shall, however, be open for the respondents to pass fresh order after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and holding such enquiry as may be necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. 6. The writ petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to cost. ——————