Judgment :- 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner, who is the Town Secretary of Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) which is a registered political party. In this writ petition, the challenge is to the impugned order passed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tindivanam, dated 30.5.2012 denying permission for the petitioner to conduct a public meeting explaining the policies of the party on 5.6.2012. The authority, i.e., the second respondent had denied permission to conduct the public meeting in the Gahdhiar Thidal, Tindivanam on the ground that Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861 is in force and also due to law and problem. 2. When the writ petition came up on 19.6.2012, this court ordered notice on admission. The learned Additional Government Pleader was directed to get instructions from the respondents. Accordingly, a counter affidavit, dated 21.6.2012 was filed by the second respondent. A copy of the promulgation, dated 5.6.2012 under Section 30(2) in the Tindivanam town for a period of 15 days from 5.6.2012 to 19.6.2012 and also the promulgation dated 20.6.2012 for a period of 15 days from 20.6.2012 to 04.07.2012 issued by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tindivanam were produced, thereby implying that in view of the promulgation order under Section 30(2), permission to hold public meetings cannot be granted. 3. Heard the arguments of Mr.K.Balu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.S.Shanmuga Velayutham, learned State Public Prosecutor assisted by Mr.V.Jaya Prakash Narayanan, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondents. 4. It must be noted that the petitioner's political party is registered with the Election Commission. It has been participating in the elections for the last several decades. They are entitled to hold public meeting in public places to explain their policy to the public from time to time. Unless holding of such meetings result in any disturbance of law and order, the respondents cannot deny permission on the specious ground of promulgation of Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861 is in force. In the counter affidavit, except by stating the existence of such a notification, no other reasons were set out. 5. The right of a citizen to conduct a demonstration is completely guaranteed in terms of Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. In the counter affidavit, except by stating the existence of such a notification, no other reasons were set out. 5. The right of a citizen to conduct a demonstration is completely guaranteed in terms of Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. Though such a right is subject to the reasonable restrictions, which may be made by the State in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 6. In this context, it is necessary to refer the judgment of the Supreme Court in Himat Lal K.Shah V. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad reported in AIR 1973 SC 87 = 1973(1) SCC 227 rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, wherein, the Court struck down Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act on the ground that Rule, which empowered the Commissioner of Police to refuse permission to hold meetings without giving any guidance under the Rule and thereby conferring an arbitrary discretion, was an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of assembly guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also held that the work ‘regulating’ in Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Act would include the power to prohibit and impose the condition that permission should be taken a few days before the holding of the meeting on a public street. Mathew, J., dissented from the view of the majority and held that the power to regulate did not include the right to prohibit and the permission sought for holding a meeting ought not be refused. The majority opinion was that regulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the various rights in crowded public streets, and that the State can make regulation in aid of the right of the assemble of each citizen and can impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of Public order. 7. Further, the Supreme Court also in S.Rangarajan V. P.Jagjivan Ram reported in 1989 (2) SCC 574 held that freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India means the right to express one's own opinion by word of mouth, printing, picture or is any one manner of ideas made through any and the communication of ideas made through any medium. Such right, however, was held to be subject to reasonable restrictions in the larger interest of the community and the country as set out in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Those restrictions are intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed, and the social interests specified under Article 19(2). The Court emphasised that the interest of freedom of expression and social interest cannot be regarded as of equal weight and the Court's commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched, but should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interests. It should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a ‘spark in a powder keg.’ 8. Therefore, it is too late for the respondents to refuse permission to hold a meeting on a matter of public importance. With respect to the respondents' reliance upon Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861, it can only be said that it enables the respondents to direct the control and conduct of all assemblies and processions on public road or in the public streets or thoroughfares and to prescribe the Rules by which and the times by which the processions may pass and Section 30(2) and (3) on which reliance was placed, is extracted below: “Sec 30(2): He may also, on being satisfied that it is intended by any persons or class of persons to convene or collect an assembly in any such road, street or thoroughfare, or to form a procession which would, in the judgment of the Magistrate of the district, or of the sub-division of a district, if uncontrolled, be likely to cause a breach of the peace, require by general or special notice, that the persons convening or collecting such assembly or directing or promoting such procession shall apply for a licence. (3) On such application being made, he may issue a licence, specifying the names of the licensees and defining the conditions on which alone such assembly or such procession is to be permitted to take place, and otherwise giving effect to this section.” 9. (3) On such application being made, he may issue a licence, specifying the names of the licensees and defining the conditions on which alone such assembly or such procession is to be permitted to take place, and otherwise giving effect to this section.” 9. Therefore, the said provision is only a regulatory power and not a blanket power to trifle any democratic dissent of the citizens by the Police. 10. This court in a similar circumstance had granted permission to conduct demonstration vide decision in K.T.Patchaimal, District Secretary, All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Kanniyakumari District Vs. The Superintendent of Police, Kanyakumari District and others reported in 2009 Writ L.R. 65. Therefore, the law cannot be different when a political party was in opposition and thereafter, when it becomes a ruling party trying to prevent the other parties from conducting meetings as had been done in the present case. 11. Further, a division bench of this court headed by P.K.Misra, J. (as he then was) vide its judgment in C.J.Rajan Vs. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mayiladuthurai and another reported in (2008) 3 MLJ 926 also took a similar view. 12. Therefore, in the light of the binding legal precedents and the legal positions, denial of permission to the petitioner for holding a meeting on 5.6.2012 is clearly illegal. Mr.K.Balu, learned counsel for the petitioner on instructions stated that since the date for the meeting has already concluded, they may be permitted to conduct the meeting on 04.07.2012. 13. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand allowed. The impugned order stands set aside. The respondents are hereby directed to permit the petitioner to conduct the public meeting in Gahdhiyar Thidal, Tindivanam on 04.07.2012 from 05.00 P.M. for the purpose for which originally permission was sought for. It is open to the respondents to grant appropriate police protection during public meeting. However, there will be no order as to costs.