JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—This petition, at the instance of the landlord, was filed for a direction to the District Magistrate/Delegated Authority under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘’Act’) to deliver vacant possession of Shop No. 573, Budhana Gate, Meerut, which was under the use and occupation of the unauthorized occupant Braj Bhushan-respondent No. 3, to the petitioner. The petition was subsequently amended and further reliefs were claimed for quashing the order dated 26th May, 2009 passed by the Prescribed Authority/District Supply Officer, Meerut by which the application filed by the landlord under Section 16 of the Act for release of the shop was rejected as also the order dated 28th May, 2009 passed by the Prescribed Authority by which the shop was allotted to respondent No. 4-Man Mohan Rastogi. An additional prayer was also made that the Prescribed Authority should decide the release application filed by the landlord after giving opportunity of hearing to the landlord. 2. The disputed shop No. 573, Budhana Gate, Meerut, of which the petitioner is the landlord, was allotted by the Prescribed Authority in favour of Mohan Lal but an application was filed by Girish Chandra Agarwal before the Prescribed Authority for alloting the shop in his favour after declaring vacancy as Mohan Lal had permitted it to be occupied by Braj Bhushan. The landlord also filed an application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act for release of the shop as the landlord bona fide required it for the purpose of carrying on his business of Cyber Cafe. The Prescribed Authority declared the shop to be vacant under Section 12 of the Act by the order dated 29th March, 2001. The said order declaring vacancy was assailed by Braj Bhushan in Writ Petition No. 12953 of 2001 in which initially an interim order was passed on 9th April, 2001 but the writ petition was eventually dismissed by the judgment and order dated 2nd April, 2009. 3. The landlord, therefore, filed an application before the Prescribed Authority on 28th April, 2009 for delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord and for passing appropriate orders on the release application. 4. 3. The landlord, therefore, filed an application before the Prescribed Authority on 28th April, 2009 for delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord and for passing appropriate orders on the release application. 4. Braj Bhushan, however, preferred Special Leave Petition No. 10738 of 2009 before the Supreme Court which petition was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 11th May, 2009 but Braj Bhushan was granted three months’ time to vacate the premises subject to his filing an undertaking in the Supreme Court within two weeks. Braj Bhushan did not file the undertaking in the Supreme Court within two weeks and as Braj Bhushan did not handover the possession of the shop to the landlord even after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the landlord filed Contempt Petition No. 277 of 2009 before the Supreme Court. In the Contempt Petition Braj Bhushan filed a compliance affidavit on 13th July, 2009 mentioning therein that he had vacated the premises on 29th May, 2009 in the presence of independent witnesses and had given possession to the landlord but the landlord did not issue any possession certificate to him. The Contempt Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court by the judgment and order dated 31st August, 2009 which is quoted below : “Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case as alleged by the petitioner, we do not find that any case has been made out for initiation of contempt proceedings against the contemnors. The Contempt Petition is accordingly dismissed. However, this order shall not prevent the petitioner from approaching the appropriate authority for redressal of the grievances.” 5. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an application dated 6th November, 2009 before the District Magistrate/Delegated Authority that appropriate orders for delivery of possession of the shop to the petitioner may be passed as Braj Bhushan had falsely stated that possession of the shop had been given to the landlord. This application was marked by the District Magistrate to the Prescribed Authority on 12th November, 2009. 6. As possession of the shop was still not given to the landlord, the present petition was filed by the landlord with the prayer that the District Magistrate may issue appropriate orders for giving possession of the shop to the petitioner. 7. This application was marked by the District Magistrate to the Prescribed Authority on 12th November, 2009. 6. As possession of the shop was still not given to the landlord, the present petition was filed by the landlord with the prayer that the District Magistrate may issue appropriate orders for giving possession of the shop to the petitioner. 7. On 9th December, 2009, the Court granted a week’s time to the learned Standing Counsel to file a counter-affidavit on behalf of the District Magistrate, Meerut to explain why possession of the shop was not delivered to the petitioner. 8. In response to the aforesaid order of the Court, the District Magistrate, Meerut filed a counter-affidavit stating that the application filed by the landlord for release of the shop was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by the order dated 26th May, 2009 and, thereafter, the Prescribed Authority allotted the shop in favour of Man Mohan Rastogi by the order dated 28th May, 2009. It was also stated in the counter-affidavit that after the allotment order was issued on 29th May, 2009 and the possession of the shop was handed over to the landlord by Braj Bhushan on 29th May, 2009 and thereafter the landlord delivered the possession of the shop to Man Mohan Rastogi on 29th May, 2009 and since then Man Mohan Rastogi is in actual physical possession of the shop. 9. The petitioner, therefore, filed an Amendment Application for adding paragraphs 23-A to 23-T in the writ petition and for adding prayers for quashing the orders dated 26th May, 2009 and 28th May, 2009 and for consideration of the release application filed by the petitioner after hearing him. A prayer for impleading Man Mohan Rastogi as respondent No. 4 was also made. This Amendment Application was allowed by the order dated 31st December, 2009 and the Court also directed the learned Standing Counsel to produce the original records relating to the allotment proceedings including the order sheet and the report submitted by the Process Server as well as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer regarding sufficiency of service upon the petitioner. Man Mohan Rastogi was also impleaded as respondent No. 4 in the Writ Petition and he has also filed a counter-affidavit to the writ petition. 10. The original records produced by the learned Standing Counsel have been perused by the Court. Man Mohan Rastogi was also impleaded as respondent No. 4 in the Writ Petition and he has also filed a counter-affidavit to the writ petition. 10. The original records produced by the learned Standing Counsel have been perused by the Court. It is disturbing to note that the order sheet of the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority has not been maintained in a chronological order and there is overwriting in the numbering of the pages also. The first page and the reverse of the first page contain the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority in 2010. The second page, however, contains the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority on 20th March, 2001, 29th March, 2001, 12th April, 2001 and 28th April, 2009. The next page contains the orders from 18th January, 2001 and the subsequent pages contain orders of the earlier dates upto 8th February, 1999. However, the last two pages of the order sheet again contain the orders dated 12th May, 2009, 19th May, 2009, 26th May, 2009 and 28th May, 2009 20th October, 2009, 3rd November, 2009, 17th November, 2009, 3rd December, 2009, 10th December, 2009, 17th December, 2009, 24th December, 2009, 7th January, 2010, 21st January, 2010 and 2nd February, 2010. 11. The order sheet is in Hindi and the English translation of the orders of the relevant dates is as follows : 12. The original records also indicate that on 15th May, 2009, Braj Bhushan filed an application for allotement of the shop and thereafter Man Mohan Rastogi also filed an application on 16th May, 2009 for allotment of the shop. The original records also contain the notices dated 28th April, 2009 meant to be served on Ashok Garg, Girish Chandra and Braj Bhushan in which 12th May, 2009 is mentioned as the date fixed before the Prescribed Authority. The endorsement made by the Peon Narendra Kumar on 30th April, 2009 on the notice meant to be served on Ashok Garg (landlord) mentions that the neighbours informed him that Ashok Garg was not residing for many years. The endorsement made by the Peon on 30th April, 2009 on the notice meant to be served on Girish Chandra mentions that some other person was residing in the house who informed that Girish Chandra had left many years back after locking the house. The endorsement made by the Peon on 30th April, 2009 on the notice meant to be served on Girish Chandra mentions that some other person was residing in the house who informed that Girish Chandra had left many years back after locking the house. The endorsement on the notice meant to be served on Braj Bhushan mentions that it was served on him on 30th April, 2009. 13. The order sheet of 28th April, 2009 or of any date subsequent to it does not contain a note of the office that the notices were actually issued and nor does it contain any order of the Prescribed Authority that the report dated 30th April, 2009 of the peon has been accepted and the landlord Ashok Garg and Girish Chandra shall be deemed to have been duly served. 14. The order dated 26th May, 2009 by which the release application filed by the landlord was rejected mentions that the dispute is with regard to Shop No. 573, Budhana Gate, Meerut. An application was filed by Girish Chandra Agarwal for allotment of the shop and the vacancy of the shop was declared on 29th March, 2001 which order was assailed by Braj Bhushan in Writ Petition No. 12953 of 2001 in which an interim order was passed by the High Court on 9th April, 2001 but thereafter the petition was dismissed on 2nd April, 2009. The landlord filed an application for release of the shop in his favour while Girish Chandra, Braj Bhushan and Man Mohan Rastogi filed separate applications for allotment of the shop in their favour. The release application filed by the landlord has to be considered first but the landlord has not filed any evidence with his release application though Man Mohan Rastogi, has filed evidence. The counsel for the prospective allottee-Man Mohan Rastogi submitted that the landlord does not require the shop as earlier also he had got shops released and thereafter sold them. In view of the evidence submitted by the prospective allottee, the application filed by the landlord for release of the shop is rejected. The file be placed for decision on the allotment applications on 28th May, 2009. 15. The order dated 28th May, 2009 by which the shop was alloted in favour of Man Mohan Rastogi mentions that Girish Chandra did not appear and nor did he file any evidence. The file be placed for decision on the allotment applications on 28th May, 2009. 15. The order dated 28th May, 2009 by which the shop was alloted in favour of Man Mohan Rastogi mentions that Girish Chandra did not appear and nor did he file any evidence. Man Mohan Rastogi had filed an affidavit in support of his need and had also filed an affidavit of Suresh Chandra Bansal and Girish Kumar that he does not have any employment. Thus, on the basis of the evidence filed by Man Mohan Rastogi, the shop is allotted in his favour on a monthly rent of Rs.110/-. A direction for issue of allotment order in favour of Man Mohan Rastogi was, accordingly, issued. 16. Sri Shiv Sagar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that no opportunity whatsoever was given by the Prescribed Authority to the landlord for making submissions on the release application and an incorrect finding has been recorded in the order sheet dated 26th May, 2009 that the counsel for the landlord was also heard. He has pointed out that after the dismissal of the writ petition filed by Braj Bhushan on 2nd April, 2009, the landlord filed an application on 28th April, 2009 before the Prescribed Authority that possession of the shop should be given to him and his release application should be decided and though the order dated 28th April, 2009 mentions that notice be issued to the parties but in fact notice was actually not issued because the certified copy of the dispatch register of the Prescribed Authority does not make any mention of the issuance of the notice to the parties on 28th April, 2009. It is his submission that the peon made an incorrect endorsement that the neighbours had informed that the landlord-Ashok Garg was not residing since the last many years though in fact he is still residing in the house. He has also pointed out that the order sheet also does not mention that the notice had been duly served on the landlord. He has, therefore, contended that the landlord could have not appeared on the date fixed as the notice was not served on him and nor did the landlord or his counsel appear before the Prescribed Authority on the date fixed. 17. He has, therefore, contended that the landlord could have not appeared on the date fixed as the notice was not served on him and nor did the landlord or his counsel appear before the Prescribed Authority on the date fixed. 17. He has also submitted that even the order dated 26th May, 2009 refers to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the prospective allottee Man Mohan Rastogi and so far as the landlord is concerned, it only refers to the averments made in the release application and does not make any reference to the submissions advanced by the counsel for the landlord. It is also his submission that in any view of the matter, the prospective allottee could not have been heard by the Prescribed Authority when the application for release filed by the landlord was being considered and nor the evidence filed by the prospective allottee could have been considered. He, therefore, submits that the order dated 26th May, 2009 passed by the Prescribed Authority, by which the application filed by the landlord for release of the shop was rejected, deserves to be set aside. 18. It is also his submission that Braj Bhushan or Man Mohan Rastogi cannot be heard in this petition which seeks the quashing of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 26th May, 2009 by which the release application filed by the landlord was rejected because if this order is set aside, the consequential order dated 28th May, 2009 for allotment of the shop cannot survive. 19. He has also pointed out that at no point of time Braj Bhushan had given possession of the shop to the landlord and the information given by Braj Bhushan on 29th May, 2009 that possession of the shop had been given to the landlord is absolutely false and likewise the information given by Man Mohan Rastogi that he had taken possession of the shop from the landlord on 29th May, 2009 is absolutely false. It is his submission that in fact the landlord had filed an application on 29th May, 2009 before the Prescribed Authority placing on record the judgment and order dated 11th May, 2009 passed by the Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition filed by Braj Bhushan against the order dated 2nd April, 2009 passed by the High Court and a request was also made that possession of the shop may be given to him but even at that stage the Prescribed Authority did not inform him that his release application had been rejected and the shop had been allotted in favour of Man Mohan Rastogi. He has also pointed out that subsequently on 6th November, 2009 the landlord had also complained to the District Magistrate that he had not been given possession of the shop despite the order passed by the High Court and the Supreme Court. 20. It is also his contention that in fact the erstwhile occupant Braj Bhushan is continuing to occupy the disputed shop because in Form No. 24 submitted by him to the Department of Commercial Taxes, Government of Uttar Pradesh regarding return of tax he has stated at Serial No. 5, the name/address of the dealer/firm as the ‘New Brij Shudh Desi Ghee Store, Budhana Gate, Meerut’ which is the same shop in which he was earlier doing business and in which Man Mohan Rastogi now claims to be doing business after allotment. He, therefore, submits that in fact Man Mohan Rastogi was set up by Braj Bhushan after the Supreme Court had dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed by him. 21. Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the allottee-Man Mohan Rastogi, assisted by Sri Rahul Mishra, has, however, submitted that the petitioner had concealed the orders dated 26th May, 2009 and 28th May, 2009 of the Prescribed Authority in the writ petition though he was aware of these orders and it is with ulterior motives that he filed the writ petition merely for a direction upon the respondents to give possession of the shop to the petitioner. In this connection he has pointed out that in the amendment application the petitioner has enclosed a photo-stat copy of the order sheet which indicates that the application for supply of certified copy of the order sheet was submitted on 19th November, 2009 and the order sheet was supplied on 3rd December, 2009 after which the writ petition was filed in the High Court on 7th December, 2009 but still mention was not made of the orders. He has also pointed out that even the photo-stat copy of the certified copy of the allotment order, which has been enclosed with the Amendment Application, shows that the certified copy was applied on 9th November, 2009 and it was provided on 12th November, 2009. It is also his submission that the order sheet dated 26th May, 2009 also mentions that the counsel for the landlord and the counsel for the prospective allottee were heard. Learned Senior Counsel has, therefore, submitted that since the petitioner concealed material facts from the Court, the writ petition should be dismissed. It is also his submission that there is no infirmity in the order dated 26th May, 2009 passed by the Prescribed Authority by which the application filed by the landlord for release of the shop was rejected and that the erstwhile occupant Braj Bhushan had also handed over possession of the shop to the landlord on 29th May, 2009 and the landlord had handed over the possession of the shop to the allottee on the same date and this fact was also brought to the notice of the Supreme Court by Braj Bhushan on 13th July, 2009 in the contempt proceedings initiated by the landlord. 22. Learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that the release application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on 26th May, 2009 after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and thereafter the shop was allotted in favour of Man Mohan Rastogi by the order dated 28th May, 2009 and the allotment letter was also issued on 29th May, 2009 but these facts were concealed by the petitioner. It is also his submission that possession of the shop was given to the landlord by the erstwhile occupant Braj Bhushan on 29th May, 2009 and thereafter the landlord had given possession of the shop to the allottee Man Mohan Rastogi. 23. It is also his submission that possession of the shop was given to the landlord by the erstwhile occupant Braj Bhushan on 29th May, 2009 and thereafter the landlord had given possession of the shop to the allottee Man Mohan Rastogi. 23. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 24. The issue, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether the landlord had at all been heard by the Prescribed Authority in support of the release application and whether the prospective allottee could have been heard by the Prescribed Authority or evidence filed by him could have been considered by the Prescribed Authority when the release application filed by the landlord was being decided. The other issue that will arise for consideration is whether the allottee can be heard in this petition. 25. It is seen that the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority were initiated by Girish Chandra Agarwal when he filed the application for allotment of the disputed shop on 22nd August, 1998 in Form-A under Rule 10(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘’Rules’). The Rent Control Inspector submitted a report and the proceedings were contested by Braj Bhushan through his lawyers Sri Ravindra Jain and Sri Anuj Jain. The Prescribed Authority/District Supply Officer passed the order dated 29th March, 2001 by which vacancy of the shop was declared under Section 12(1) of the Act for the reason that Braj Bhushan was in unauthorized occupation of the shop which had been allotted to Mohan Lal. Braj Bhushan is none other than the brother of Mohan Lal in whose favour the shop had been allotted. The landlord also filed an application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act for release of the shop which was received on 31st March, 2001. 26. Braj Bhushan assailed the order dated 29th March, 2001 passed by the Prescribed Authority by filing Writ Petition No. 12953 of 2001 in which initially an interim order was passed on 9th April, 2001 that proceedings pursuant to the order declaring vacancy shall remain stayed, but the writ petition was ultimately dismissed by the High Court by the judgment and order dated 2nd April, 2009. The landlord then filed an application before the Prescribed Authority on 28th April, 2009 with a prayer that direction be issued for giving possession of the shop to the landlord pursuant to the order declaring vacancy and the release application may be decided since the writ petition filed by Braj Bhushan had been dismissed. The noting made by the Prescribed Authority on the said application is that it should be put up on the date fixed. What further transpires from the records is that the judgment and order dated 2nd April, 2009 of the High Court was assailed by Braj Bhushan in the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition No. 10738 of 2009 which was dismissed on 11th May, 2009 but Braj Bhushan was granted three months’ time to vacate the shop subject to his filing an undertaking before the Supreme Court within two weeks. Braj Bhushan did not file the undertaking before the Supreme Court within the stipulated period of two weeks but what is seen from the records of the Prescribed Authority is that Braj Bhushan moved an application before the Prescribed Authority on 15th May, 2009 under Rule 10(1) of the Rules for allotment of the shop in his favour and Man Mohan Rastogi also moved an application under Rule 10(1) of the Rules for allotment of the shop in his favour on 16th May, 2009. It is seen from the original records that the same counsel Ravindra Kumar Jain and Anil Jain have filed Vakalatnamas on behalf of Man Mohan Rastogi as well as Braj Bhushan. 27. The order sheet dated 28th April, 2009, with respect to the application dated 28th April, 2009 filed by the landlord for giving possession of the shop and for passing orders on the release application, mentions that notice should be issued to the parties. The order sheet does not record as to when the notices were actually issued by the office, but the original records contains three notices dated 28th April, 2009 in respect of Case No. 69 of 1998 in which Girish Chandra has been shown as plaintiff while Ashok Kumar Garg, Girish Chandra and Braj Bhushan have been shown as respondents. The order sheet does not record as to when the notices were actually issued by the office, but the original records contains three notices dated 28th April, 2009 in respect of Case No. 69 of 1998 in which Girish Chandra has been shown as plaintiff while Ashok Kumar Garg, Girish Chandra and Braj Bhushan have been shown as respondents. The endorsement made on the reverse of the notice meant to be served on the landlord Ashok Kumar Garg by the peon Narendra Kumar on 30th April, 2009 mentions that the neighbours informed him that Ashok Kumar Garg was not residing there since the last many years. The endorsement does not mention that he found the house locked or that somebody in the house informed him that Ashok Kumar Garg was not residing there. The endorsement is based only on the information said to have been supplied to him by the neighbours but the neighbours whom he claims had informed him have not even signed as witnesses to the endorsement. The endorsement made by the peon on the notice meant to be served on Girish Chandra also mentions that somebody else was found to be living in the house who informed him that Girish Chandra had left the house many years back. Again this person has also not signed as a witness to the endorsement made by the peon. It is only in respect of the notice meant to be served on Braj Bhushan that the endorsement made by the peon mentions that the notice has been served upon him. 28. What is most surprising is that there is no note of the office in the order sheet that pursuant to the order passed by the Prescribed Authority notices were issued to the parties and nor does it contain any order of the Prescribed Authority recording its satisfaction that the notices were duly served on the landlord or Girish Chandra, particularly when the endorsement of the peon does not state that the notice had been served. 29. The Prescribed Authority should have applied its mind as to whether the endorsement made by the peon should be accepted or not, even if it is assumed that the notice was issued, because the landlord through the amendment application has filed the copy of the dispatch register which does not show that the notice was issued on the said date. The Prescribed Authority should have applied its mind as to whether the endorsement made by the peon should be accepted or not, even if it is assumed that the notice was issued, because the landlord through the amendment application has filed the copy of the dispatch register which does not show that the notice was issued on the said date. In the absence of such satisfaction recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the notice had been duly served, it was not appropriate for the Prescribed Authority to proceed with the hearing of the release application. What also needs to be noticed in this connection is that the same peon, while serving notice to the parties with regard to the objections filed by Girish Chandra Agarwal on 1st December, 2009, again made the endorsement on 7th December, 2009 that since notice could not be served on Girish Chandra and Ashok Kumar Garg, it was sent by Registered Post. Such a procedure should also have been adopted by the peon when he made the endorsement on 30th April, 2009. In any case, the Prescribed Authority should, in such circumstances, have directed for service of notice by Registered Post. 30. The next order that is recorded in the order sheet is the order dated 12th May, 2009 which mentions that the Prescribed Authority was busy in some other work and so the next date fixed for hearing is 19th May, 2009. 31. The order dated 19th May, 2009 mentions that the matter was called out and a Vakalatnama was filed on behalf of the prospective allottee. The Prescribed Authority, accordingly, fixed 26th May, 2009 for hearing. 32. The order dated 26th May, 2009 passed by the Prescribed Authority also does not make any mention of the issuance of the notice to the landlord or to any other party on 28th April, 2009 and nor does it record the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority that the landlord had been served with the notice. It only mentions that the landlord had filed an application for release of the shop on 25th March, 2001 and Girish Chandra, Braj Bhushan and Man Mohan Rastogi had filed applications for allotment of the shop. It only mentions that the landlord had filed an application for release of the shop on 25th March, 2001 and Girish Chandra, Braj Bhushan and Man Mohan Rastogi had filed applications for allotment of the shop. What also needs to be noticed is that the order dated 26th May, 2009 refers to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the prospective allottee and the evidence/affidavit filed by him and it does not refer to the submissions made by the counsel for the landlord and only refers to the averments made in the release application and the fact that the landlord did not file any evidence in support of the release application. The Prescribed Authority, after discussion of the evidence filed by the prospective allottee, rejected the release application filed by the landlord. 33. It is also seen from the records of the case that the copies of the objection filed by the prospective allottee or the evidence filed by him were not served on the landlord. If the landlord had engaged a counsel then such copies should have been served on the counsel and the Prescribed Authority should not have proceeded with the case without ensuring that copies had been served. 34. As noticed hereinabove, the original records of the case produced by the learned Standing Counsel do not show that notice of the date fixed was served on the landlord. It does not stand to reason that the landlord, who had been pursuing the release application filed by him and had also filed an application on 28th April, 2009 before the Prescribed Authority, after the writ petition filed by Braj Bhushan was dismissed by the High Court on 2nd April, 2009 for giving him possession of the shop as the vacancy order had been confirmed by the High Court and for deciding the release application, would not pursue the release application if the notice was served upon him. 35. Thus, from the discussion made above, it is more than apparent that an incorrect fact was recorded by the Prescribed Authority in the order sheet and the order also that the counsel for the landlord was heard by the Prescribed Authority on 26th May,2009. The order was passed after hearing the counsel for the prospective allottee only and the landlord had no notice of the hearing of the release application. The order was passed after hearing the counsel for the prospective allottee only and the landlord had no notice of the hearing of the release application. The contention of the landlord that he or his counsel did not appear before the Prescribed Authority on 26th May, 2009, therefore, deserves to be accepted. 36. What is also surprising is that the Prescribed Authority issued notice to the prospective allottee while hearing the release application and notice on the prospective allottee was served and the prospective allottee not only filed objections but also filed evidence and the Prescribed Authority considered the evidence and the objections of the prospective allottee when the law is well settled that a prospective allottee has not to be heard and nor can evidence be filed by him or considered when the release application filed by the landlord is being considered by the Prescribed Authority. 37. The preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord that a prospective allottee has no right to object to the release application filed by the landlord under Section 16 of the Act deserves to be accepted in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Talib Hasan and another v. 1st Additional District Judge and others, 1986 (1) ARC 1 (FB). The Full Bench of this Court was called upon examine whether a prospective allottee has a right to file an objection and contest the application for release made by the landlord even after the deletion of Rule 13 (4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The Full Bench observed that no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act can be made unless such an application is rejected and the right of a prospective allottee to have his application considered can, therefore, arise only after the rejection of the application of the landlord. The Full Bench also observed that neither the Act nor the Rules postulate any right in the prospective allottee to file an objection against the release application and nor does the prospective allottee have any right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to enable him to any hearing in the disposal of the release application. The Full Bench further observed that even after deletion of the old Rule 13 (4) there is no change in the legal position of a prospective allottee to have any locus standi in the disposal of the release application. The Full Bench made it clear that a prospective has only a contingent right which can be exercised only if the accommodation is not released in favour of the landlord. The relevant observations are : “The right of a prospective allottee is not an absolute right. It is contingent upon, firstly, the accommodation being vacant and, secondly, the building being available for allotment. Rule 13(4), as it stands, at present reinforces this conclusion. It provides that no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under Section 16 (1) (b) shall be made unless such application is rejected. The right of a prospective allottee to have his application considered hence arise only after the rejection of the landlord’s application under Section 16 (1) (b). A fortiori the prospective allottee comes into the picture only after the disposal of the landlord’s application for release under Section 16 (1) (b), and, only if the same is rejected. So far, therefore, as the scheme of the Act and the rules framed thereunder is concerned, the same, in our opinion, clearly points to the conclusion that a prospective allottee has no right of objection against the release application filed under Section 16 (1) (b). As mentioned above, this right to have this application considered for allotment accrues only after the rejection of the release application. Indeed the consideration of the applications for allotment is taken up only after the rejection of the application under Section 16 (1) (b). Neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder thus postulate any right in a prospective allottee to file objections against the release application. The prospective allottee has also no right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to be entitled to any hearing in the disposal of the release application on general principles or doctrine of audi alteram partem. We have reached the above conclusion on a systematic analysis of the statute even without the aid of the old Rule 13 (4). We have reached the above conclusion on a systematic analysis of the statute even without the aid of the old Rule 13 (4). The old Rule 13 (4), in our opinion, which was dropped in 1977, merely recognized the long settled legal position as spelled out by series of decisions rendered on the construction and scope of Rule 5 framed under the 1947 Act. It was purely declaratory in nature and appears to have been inserted by way of reiteration of the existing legal position. Its deletion hence did not, in our considered view, bring about any change in the legal position, namely, that prospective allottees have no locus standi in the disposal of an application for release under Section 16 (1) (b). ............................ Learned counsel for the petitioner next placed reliance on Section 16 (1) and submitted that the right of a prospective allottee to file an objection under Section 16 (1) (b) is implicit in that provision. We cannot accept the contention. The only right which the allottee has under Section 16 (1) is to apply for allotment of an accommodation if the same is vacant. There is nothing in Section 16 (1) (b) which may indicate directly or by implication that the prospective allottee has a right of objection under that provision. As discussed above, the prospective allottee has only a contingent right exercisable only in case the accommodation is vacant and only if the same is not released in favour of the landlord. The third submission of the learned counsel as that the rejection of the allottee’s application entails civil consequences and consequently on the principle of audi alteram partem the prospective allottee is entitled to be heard even in an application under Section 16 (1) (b). The submission is devoid of any merit. The principle of audi alteram partem presupposes existence of some right or interest in the subject-matter of the lis. We have demonstrated above that the prospective allottee has no right or claim against the landlord nor any interest in the accommodation in dispute. He has, therefore, no right to be heard in opposition to an application for release filed by the landlord even on the above principle. We have demonstrated above that the prospective allottee has no right or claim against the landlord nor any interest in the accommodation in dispute. He has, therefore, no right to be heard in opposition to an application for release filed by the landlord even on the above principle. Further, the allottee’s application is rejected on the accommodation being released in favour of the landlord not on the merits of his claim so as to justify giving of any hearing to the applicant but on the ground that the same is not entertainable because the accommodation is not available for allotment. If the District Magistrate is satisfied that the accommodation is bona fide required by the landlord, it goes out of the pool of allotment. (emphasis supplied) 38. The view taken by the Full Bench of this Court found approval of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Sonkar v. Incharge District Judge and others, 1995 (2) ARC 1: The distinction between the two orders envisaged in sub-section (1) is well marked. In the case of an allotment order the result is brought about by a dialogue between the prospective tenant and the District Magistrate, thereafter, under whose orders the landlord is required to let any building to the prospective tenant. On the other hand, in the case of a release order the dialogue takes place between the District Magistrates and the landlord and the prospective tenant does not figure in it at all. The allotment order and the release order, as the case may be, being mutually exclusive, have separate areas of operation permitting no encroachment of one over the other. The mere fact that the focal point is the District Magistrate from whom flow the respective orders is of no consequence. It is on this understanding of the law that the High Court relying on its Full Bench decision in the case of Talib Husain v. 1st Additional District Judge, 1986 (1) ARC 1 (SC), rejected the prayer of the prospective tenant that he had a right to be heard in a release application of the landlord based as it was on the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 16 on ground of bona fide requirement. On the allowing of the release application the premises in question ceased to be allotable and since the District Magistrate, thereafter would have no jurisdiction to make an allotment thereof and the prospective tenant consequently has no right to resist the landlord in release proceedings. The view of the High Court seems to us to be correct in the circumstances of the case as also in law because as of today no allotment order subsists in favour of the appellant and yet he continues to be in possession. (emphasis supplied) 39. A perusal of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 26th May, 2009, by which the release application filed by the landlord was rejected, shows that it has taken into consideration not only the submissions made by the learned counsel for the prospective allottee but has also considered the evidence filed by him. Thus, for this reason also the order dated 26th May, 2009 passed by the Prescribed Authority deserves to be set aside. 40. At this stage another important objection that has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that an allottee has no right to be heard in this petition even if the allotment order was passed after rejection of the release application, needs to be considered. 41. This controversy had arisen before this Court in Ved Prakash v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad and others, 1993 (1) ARC 442. After rejection of the release application of the landlord, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order on 11th April 1998 allotting the premises to the petitioner-Ved Prakash. The landlord filed a Revision under Section 18 of the Act for setting aside the order rejecting the release application. The Revision was allowed and the premises were released in favour of the landlord. Ved prakash then filed a Writ Petition in this Court. This Court, in view of the decision of the Full Bench in Talib Hasan, observed that there was no justification to interfere in the matter at the instance of the petitioner whose status was not above that of an authorized occupant or a prospective allottee in so far as the release application was concerned. This Court, in view of the decision of the Full Bench in Talib Hasan, observed that there was no justification to interfere in the matter at the instance of the petitioner whose status was not above that of an authorized occupant or a prospective allottee in so far as the release application was concerned. The relevant observations are : “A Full Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Talib Hasan and another v. 1st Additional District Judge and others, 1986 (1) ARC 1 (FB), had, after carefully considering the various provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the rules framed thereunder had observed that an application for release under Section 16 (1) (b) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord in which the out-going tenant or the prospective allottee does not have any right to object. It had further been observed that the prospective allottee comes into the picture only after the disposal of the landlord’s application for release under Section 16 (1) (b) and only if the same is rejected. The Full Bench went on to observe that the prospective allottee has no right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to be entitled to any hearing in the disposal of the release application and has no right to be heard in opposition to such an application. ............................ It may, further be noticed that in its decision in the case of Radhey Lal v. District Judge, Jhansi and others, 1990 (2) ARC 540, this Court had upheld the rejection of a revision under Section 18 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 at the instance of a prospective allottee holding it to be not maintainable as he had no right or interest in the subject-matter of the lis between the District Magistrate and the landlord in the matter of release contemplated under Section 16 of the Act. Again in its decision in the case of Smt. Krishna Rani, 1990 (1) ARC 442, it was held that a prospective allottee has no locus standi to be heard in the matter of release contemplated under the aforesaid provision. Again in its decision in the case of Smt. Krishna Rani, 1990 (1) ARC 442, it was held that a prospective allottee has no locus standi to be heard in the matter of release contemplated under the aforesaid provision. In the circumstances, therefore, it is obvious that the mere fact that subsequent to the rejection of an application for release the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order of allotment in favour of a prospective allottee such an order of allotment can be of no avail so as to vest the prospective allottee with a right of being heard in the matter of release of an accommodation contemplated under Section 16 of the Act which is taken up in revision under Section 18 of the said Act. The lis between the District Magistrate representing the State and the landlord so far as the matter of release of the accommodation declared to be vacant is concerned becomes pending when the revising authority entertains the revision against the order rejecting the application for release and in this matter the prospective allottee cannot be deemed to be entitled to have any right of being heard and his position remains the same as it was prior to the passing of the order of allotment. The Full Bench was quite emphatic when it pointed out that the application for release under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act is a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord in which the out-going tenant or the prospective allottee does not have any right to object. Since the order of allotment has to fall with the reversal of the order rejecting the application for release, it is obvious that the position of a prospective allottee cannot improve simply because proceeding on the basis of an erroneous order rejecting the release application, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has passed an order of allotment in favour of such a prospective allottee. Having regard to the Full Bench decision of this Court and the other decisions to which a reference has been made above. Having regard to the Full Bench decision of this Court and the other decisions to which a reference has been made above. I do not find any justifiable ground to interfere in the impugned order in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the petitioner whose status so far as the proceedings for release in question arising under Section 16 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 cannot be above that of an unauthorized occupant and a prospective allottee. (emphasis supplied) 42. As noticed above, this Court observed that once the Revision against the order rejecting the release application is entertained, the lis between the District Magistrate representing the State and the landlord in respect of the release application revives and even the allottee would have no right to be heard in the Revision in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Talib Hasan. The same principle will apply to a writ petition. The aforesaid decision, therefore, concludes the controversy in favour of the petitioner and the allottee is not required to be heard in this petition. 43. In Aditya Shukla v. Smt. Shanti Devi Srivastava, 2006 (2) ARC 261, a learned Judge of this Court also observed that even if the petitioner was in occupation of the premises on the basis of an allotment order, still he would not possess any right of being heard in the Revision filed by the landlord against the rejection of his release application and once the order rejecting the release application is set aside, the consequential order of allotment cannot survive. The observations are as follows : “In view of the ratio of Talib Hasan (supra), petitioner’s contentions, that the order was ex parte and that the petitioner was not a party to the revision and that he was not heard and ultimately since the petitioner is going to be affected by the order of release, cannot be accepted. The petitioner is in occupation by virtue of a consequential order of allotment which has been passed after the release application of the landlord was rejected. Thus, in my opinion, once the order rejecting the release application is set aside the consequential order of allotment automatically goes and no further right flows in favour of the petitioner.” 44. The petitioner is in occupation by virtue of a consequential order of allotment which has been passed after the release application of the landlord was rejected. Thus, in my opinion, once the order rejecting the release application is set aside the consequential order of allotment automatically goes and no further right flows in favour of the petitioner.” 44. In Sri Kant Dwivedi v. IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi and others, 1981 ARC 49, an allotment order was passed in favour of the petitioner. The landlord filed an appeal under the provisions of Section 18 of the Act as it then stood. The Appeal was allowed and the order of allotment was set aside and the case was remanded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The landlord then moved an application for release of the accommodation in his favour but it was rejected. The landlord again filed an appeal impleading the District Magistrate but the petitioner was not impleaded. This Appeal was allowed and the accommodation was released in favour of the landlord and it was also held that the allotment order had been rendered infructuous. The Division Bench observed : “The validity of Rule 13 (4) was upheld by a learned single Judge (S.D. Agarwal, J.) in Raghunandan Lal v. District Judge, 1978 ARC 347. He observed as follows in para-6 of the report: “Rule 13, sub-clause (4) does not lay down anything contrary to section 16 of the Act. Once the tenant vacates the property, then the property reverts to the landlord and thereafter the question as to whether the property should be released or not is a question between the District Magistrate and the landlord. Even if this was not there, then too, in my opinion, the out-going tenant or the prospective allottee cannot have a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord.” The view expressed by Agarwal, J. appears to us to be reasonable, and no serious argument was advanced before us to contest its correctness. Indeed the said view appears to be consistent with the Full Bench authority of Ram Surat Singh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, AIR 1965 All. Indeed the said view appears to be consistent with the Full Bench authority of Ram Surat Singh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, AIR 1965 All. 49 , wherein Desai, C.J. observed as follows in para-6 of the report: “I see nothing anomalous or improper in the State Government’s directing that whenever a landlord bona fide needs an accommodation for his own occupation the District Magistrate regardless of all circumstances should not order him to let it to any one. After all he is the owner of the accommodation and when he genuinely need it for own occupation there is no reason why another’s need, however pressing they may be, should have a prior claim. However, pressing the others needs may be, he has no claim against this accommodation or against the landlord and the State Government could very wisely refuse to consider them as against the landlord’s needs. No landlord is under an obligation to meet needs of others however pressing they may be his right as the owner of the accommodation is not subject to the pressing needs of another and it makes no difference whether the pressing needs are of an individual or of a public authority or institution.” This view was expressed in the context of the provisions of Rule 6 of the Rules made under the old Act (U.P. Act 3 of 1947) but the ratio is equally applicable to the instant case. Of course, the ruling does not strictly tally with the question as to whether a prospective allottee should be heard or not. But it does imply that he should have no right of hearing because his needs are irrelevant so for as the application of the landlord for release is concerned. Another learned Single Judge (Hon’ble K.S. Varma, J.) has also taken the same view in A.K. Sharma v. Smt. Shyam Rani, 1979 LLJ 199. We agree with Hon’ble S.D. Agarwal, J. and Hon’ble K.S. Varma, J. in their view that the deletion of Rule 13 (4) does not improve the position of a prospective allottee and does not give him a locus standi to challenge the landlord’s application for release. The mere fact that the said rule was deleted does not necessarily imply that the rule-making authority intended to confer a locus standi on the prospective allottee. The mere fact that the said rule was deleted does not necessarily imply that the rule-making authority intended to confer a locus standi on the prospective allottee. The deletion may have been made on the ground that the sub-rule was considered redundant. No provision was, however, made to provide a locus standi to prospective allottees to contest a landlord’s application for release. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the fact that the petitioner had been put in possession gave him a locus standi to contest the release application. ......................... The allotment order being void the fact that the petitioner was put into possession in pursuance thereof cannot confer on him a higher right than he would have had otherwise. ...........................” (emphasis supplied) 45. The allottee is, therefore, not required to be heard in this petition in view of the aforesaid decisions but the learned Standing Counsel has also made submissions. 46. Thus, once the order dated 26th May, 2009 passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting the release application is set aside, the allotment order dated 28th May, 2009 subsequently issued by the Prescribed Authority does not survive. 47. It now remains to be examined whether the petitioner had concealed material facts from the Court at the time of filing of the writ petition since the petitioner did not mention about the orders dated 26th May, 2009 or 28th May, 2009 or the allotment order dated 29th May, 2009. It is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that since photo-stat copies of the certified copies of the order sheet and the orders were brought on record through the amendment application and they indicate that the copies were made available to the applicant before filing of the writ petition, it must be taken that the petitioner was aware of these orders but he deliberately concealed these orders from the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has refuted these submissions and has contended that the petitioner was not aware of these orders and the certified copies of these orders were not applied by the petitioner but by Girish Chandra Agarwal and it is from him that the petitioner obtained photo-stat copies after he came to know of the orders from the counter-affidavit filed by the State to the writ petition. 48. 48. The original records have been perused and it is seen that the petitioner did not submit any application for obtaining certified copies of the orders or the order sheet which were actually applied either by Man Mohan Rastogi or Girish Chandra Agarwal through their counsel. The respondents are, therefore, not justified in asserting that the petitioner was aware of the orders since he had applied for obtaining certified copies of these orders. 49. It also needs to be emphasised that after the vacancy is declared, possession of the shop is required to be given by the landlord. For this purpose, it is pointed out by Braj Bhushan that he handed over possession of the shop to the landlord on 29th May, 2009 and it is stated by the allottee that the landlord thereafter handed over possession to him on 29th May, 2009. The landlord had throughout been making applications to the Prescribed Authority and to the District Magistrate that Braj Bhushan should handover possession to him and one such an application was also filed on 29th May, 2009 after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition filed by Braj Bhushan. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that the landlord will give possession of the shop to the allottee since the landlord was not even aware that his release application had been rejected and an allotment order was issued in favour of Man Mohan Rastogi. It also needs to be noticed that Braj Bhushan and Man Mohan Rastogi have also stated that the landlord did not give anything in writing to them regarding delivery of possession. 50. It is, therefore, more than apparent from the records produced before the Court that after the writ petition filed by Braj Bhushan was dismissed by the High Court, the Prescribed Authority acted with haste to reject the release application filed by the landlord so that allotment order of the shop could be issued in favour of Man Mohan Rastogi by keeping the landlord in dark. 51. The Prescribed Authority is expected to act in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules and what is most disturbing is that the Prescribed Authority has even heard the prospective allottee while rejecting the release application filed by the landlord when the law in this regard has been settled by the Court. 52. 51. The Prescribed Authority is expected to act in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules and what is most disturbing is that the Prescribed Authority has even heard the prospective allottee while rejecting the release application filed by the landlord when the law in this regard has been settled by the Court. 52. Thus, for all the reasons stated above, the order dated 26th May, 2009 passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting the release application filed by the landlord is set aside. The order dated 28th May, 2009 passed by the Prescribed Authority for allotment of the shop in favour of Man Mohan Rastogi, therefore, is also set aside. The Prescribed Authority shall now proceed to decide the release application filed by the landlord after giving adequate notice to the landlord. The order declaring vacancy has attained finality and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority shall ensure without delay and positively within three weeks from today that the landlord is put in possession of the shop. Learned Standing Counsel shall communicate the order to the Prescribed Authority immediately. 53. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. —————