Santhanagopal v. State rep. by Inspector of Police Oomangalam Police Station
2012-06-22
R.MALA
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The Criminal Appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 12.11.2002, made in S.C.No.262 of 2001, on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Court, Fast Track Court No. III, Virudhachalam, where by A1 was convicted for the offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. A1 was convicted for the offence under Section 304B IPC read with Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced him to undergo 7 years rigorous imprisonment and A1 was convicted for the offence under Section 498A and sentenced to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default in payment to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment and the accused/appellant shall run the sentence concurrently. 2. Respondent police has filed a final report stating that the first accused is the husband, who married the deceased Parvathy, two years ago. A2 and A3 are father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased. Even though all traditional gifts have been given to A1, he demanded more dowry from his wife Parvathy and treated her with cruelty and used to beat her for demanding 5 Sovereigns of gold. On 30.04.2001, at about 5.30 p.m., all the accused persons beat Parvathy in front of the house of A1 at Vridhagirikuppam, demanding 5 sovereigns of gold jewels and as she was not able to meet out the cruelty and ill-treatment, on the same day, at 6.30 p.m., Parvathy consumed poisonous substance and died. Hence, a charge sheet has been filed against the accused 1 to 3 for the offences under Sections 498A, 304B IPC read with Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 3. The case of the prosecution on the basis of the evidence let in by the prosecution witness is as follows: (i) The marriage was performed between the deceased Parvathy and A1 in the year 1998. During their lawful wedlock, she gave birth to a female child. A1 is her husband and A2 & A3 are her father-in-law and mother-in-law. After the marriage, she lived with her husband/A1 happily for one year. Thereafter, she was subjected to dowry demand then and there and she was assaulted by them. Hence, she went to her paternal home. (ii) P.W.5-Palanivelu and P.W.6-Elangovan went to the deceased home, one day prior to Tamil New Year, to compromise her.
After the marriage, she lived with her husband/A1 happily for one year. Thereafter, she was subjected to dowry demand then and there and she was assaulted by them. Hence, she went to her paternal home. (ii) P.W.5-Palanivelu and P.W.6-Elangovan went to the deceased home, one day prior to Tamil New Year, to compromise her. After the matter was settled, they took the deceased to her matrimonial home, 10 days prior to the incident. A1 demanded money for construction of house and Rs.28,000/-has been given through P.W.3 Rasaiya, who is the sister of the deceased. (iii) On 30.04.2001, at evening, P.W.3 received an information that his sister was died and that has also been corroborated by P.W.2/Purushothaman, who is the brother of deceased and P.W.4/Chinnaponnu, who is the mother of the deceased. Even though P.W.5 to P.W.7 were examined to prove the dowry demand and cruelty met out by the deceased, during the trial, they were turned hostile. They deposed only in respect of that they took back the deceased to her matrimonial home one day prior to Tamil New Year, after compromising the dispute. (iv) P.W.7/Ramaiah, P.W.8/Anbalagan and P.W.9/Poomalai were examined to prove that the deceased was subjected to dowry demand and she met out cruelty in the hands of the accused, but they were turned hostile. (v) On 01.05.2001, at 8.00 a.m., P.W.1/Sakthivel, who is the brother of the deceased, gave a complaint Ex.P1 before P.W.15/Balasubramanian, Sub-Inspector of Police, who received the same and registered a case in Crime No.101/2001 under Section 174(3) of Cr.P.C. and prepared the printed F.I.R. Ex.P7 and he intimated the same to P.W.14/Lakshmanan, an R.D.O. (vi) On 01.05.2001, P.W.14/R.D.O. received the report from Oomangalam police station (i.e.) Ex.P5. Then, he gone to the place of occurrence and conducted inquest and examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. The inquest report was marked as Ex.P6. Through him, Ex.D1-Final report of him has been marked. (vii) P.W.16/Murugaiyan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, has altered the offence under Section 304B IPC at 19.00 hours, on 01.05.2001. He prepared an alteration report and sent the same to the Court. Then he prepared Ex.P9-observation mahazar in the presence of P.W.10/Ramalingam and one Murugaiyan and he obtained the signature of P.W.10 Ramalingam in the observation mahazar, which was marked as Ex.P2. After conducting inquest, the body of the deceased has been sent for post-mortem. (viii) P.W.11 / Dr.
He prepared an alteration report and sent the same to the Court. Then he prepared Ex.P9-observation mahazar in the presence of P.W.10/Ramalingam and one Murugaiyan and he obtained the signature of P.W.10 Ramalingam in the observation mahazar, which was marked as Ex.P2. After conducting inquest, the body of the deceased has been sent for post-mortem. (viii) P.W.11 / Dr. Sabanayagam and P.W.12 / Dr. Chandravadivu conducted autopsy and gave post-mortem report Ex.P3. P.W.13/Panneerselvam, took photographs and the same was marked as Ex.P4 series. Then, P.W.16 drew Ex.P8/rough sketch and examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. (ix) On 20.06.2001, P.W.16 arrested A1/Santhanagopal, at 14.00 hours, in Veerareddikuppam bus stand and he was remanded to judicial custody. After completing investigation, he filed the charge sheet against the accused for the offences under Sections 498A, 304B IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 4. The learned Magistrate took up the matter and after furnishing the copies, committed the matter to the Sessions Court. The learned Sessions Judge took up the matter and after following the procedure, framed necessary charges against the accused. Since the accused pleaded not guilty, the trial Court examined P.W.1 to P.W.16 and marked Exs.P1 to P9. The trial Court placed the incriminating evidence before the accused and the accused denied the same in toto. On the side of the defence, no oral evidence was let in. During the cross-examination of P.W.14/R.D.O, a final report of R.D.O. was marked as Ex.D1. After considering the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Judge acquitted A2 and A3 and convicted A1 and sentenced him as stated above. 5. Challenging the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court, Mr. P. Venkatasubramanian, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would make the following submissions: (i) There was a delay in preferring the complaint. The alleged occurrence was said to have taken place on 30.04.2001 at about 5.30 p.m. The complaint was given by P.W.1 at 8.00 a.m., on 01.05.2001. (ii) P.W.1 to P.W.4, who are the interested witnesses, are relatives of the deceased. There is a contradiction between their oral evidence. But P.W.5 to P.W.9, who are the independent witnesses, are turned hostile. (iii) P.W.14/R.D.O., who conducted inquest, deposed that the death is not due to dowry demand. Furthermore, R.D.O.'s final report has not been marked before the Court.
(ii) P.W.1 to P.W.4, who are the interested witnesses, are relatives of the deceased. There is a contradiction between their oral evidence. But P.W.5 to P.W.9, who are the independent witnesses, are turned hostile. (iii) P.W.14/R.D.O., who conducted inquest, deposed that the death is not due to dowry demand. Furthermore, R.D.O.'s final report has not been marked before the Court. (v) Investigating Officer has investigated the case on his own, without receiving any report from R.D.O. Further, he altered the offence under Section 304B IPC, but he has not filed Alteration Report before the Court. Hence, he prayed for acquittal of the accused/appellant. To substantiate his arguments, he relied upon various judgments of Apex Court and this Court. 6. Resisting the same, Mr. C. Emalias, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side), would submit that delay in preferring complaint is not fatal to the case, since the case has been registered only under Section 174(3) Cr.P.C. In para-18 of the Judgment, the delay has been properly considered by the learned trial Judge. He further submitted that P.W.1 to P.W.4 are relatives of the deceased and there is no contradiction between their evidence. Hence, there is no reason for discarding their evidence. It is further submitted that non filing of R.D.O. report is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. Even though alteration report was not marked by P.W.16, he deposed in his evidence that after conducting inquest, he came to know that the deceased was committed suicide, due to dowry demand, hence, he altered the Section into 498A, 304B IPC r/w Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. So the trial Court considered all the aspects and came to the correct conclusion. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 7. Considered the rival submissions made on both sides and the materials available on record. 8. Admittedly, the marriage between the appellant/A1 and the deceased Parvathy was performed in the year 1998. Due to lawful wedlock, the deceased gave birth to a female child. She committed suicide on 30.04.2001, by consuming poison. That has been evidenced by the post-mortem certificate Ex.P3. When P.W.1/Sakthivel, who is the brother of the deceased, came to know that his sister died by consuming poison, he gave Ex.P1 complaint on the very next day (i.e.) on 01.05.2001. 9.
She committed suicide on 30.04.2001, by consuming poison. That has been evidenced by the post-mortem certificate Ex.P3. When P.W.1/Sakthivel, who is the brother of the deceased, came to know that his sister died by consuming poison, he gave Ex.P1 complaint on the very next day (i.e.) on 01.05.2001. 9. On perusal of Ex.P7/F.I.R., initially, the case was registered under Section 174(3) Cr.P.C., by P.W.15, Sub-Inspector of Police. He sent a communication to P.W.14/Lakshmanan, an R.D.O., who conducted inquest and the inquest report was marked as Ex.P6. He prepared Ex.D1 Final report. 10. It is pertinent to note that the learned Magistrate, received Ex.P7/F.I.R. On 13.06.2001. Initially, the case has been registered under Section 174(3) Cr.P.C. and immediately, the F.I.R. will be despatched to P.W.14/R.D.O for conducting inquest and enquiry. In such circumstances, merely because the learned Magistrate, who received F.I.R. from the R.D.O. only on 13.06.2001, will not shake the case of the prosecution. On considering the above factum, the delay in preferring the complaint is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. 11. The second limb of argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that except the relative witnesses namely, P.W.1 to P.W.4, who are the interested witnesses, the other independent witnesses namely, P.W.5 to P.W.9 were turned hostile. It is true, P.W.5 is the relative of A2. P.W.6/Elangovan is the brother of A2. As per the evidence of P.W.5 to P.W.7, they would depose that one day prior to Tamil New Year, P.W.5, P.W.6 and one Jeyapaul, who is the brother of A2, came to the house of P.W.1 and took the deceased Parvathy to her matrimonial home, after compromising her. But she committed suicide by consuming poison on 30.04.2001. This factum has been corroborated by the evidence of P.W.1. Even though P.W.5 and P.W.6 were turned hostile, they corroborated that they went to the house of P.W.1 to took back deceased Parvathy to her matrimonial home, before the occurrence. There is no reason for discarding the evidence of P.W.1, who is the brother of the deceased Parvathy, P.W.2/Purushothaman, another brother of the deceased, P.W.3/Rasaiya, sister of the deceased, P.W.4/Chinnaponnu, mother of the deceased, which is natural, cogent and trustworthy and hence, it is reliable. 12.
There is no reason for discarding the evidence of P.W.1, who is the brother of the deceased Parvathy, P.W.2/Purushothaman, another brother of the deceased, P.W.3/Rasaiya, sister of the deceased, P.W.4/Chinnaponnu, mother of the deceased, which is natural, cogent and trustworthy and hence, it is reliable. 12. As per the dictum of the Apex Court, on scrutinising the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 with great care and circumspection, there is no reason for discarding their evidence. It is pertinent to note that P.W.3/Rasaiya, who is the sister of the deceased, was given marriage to the same village, where the deceased was given marriage. It is also pertinent to note that P.W.1 and P.W.2 gave Rs.28,000/-to A1 for construction of house 10 days prior to the death of occurrence. It shows that the first accused/appellant, then and there demanded money from the deceased and tortured her. So I am of the view, considering the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 & P.W.5 to P.W.7, I do not find any reason for discarding their evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4. 13. Now this Court has to decide whether there is any contradiction between the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4. It is true, P.W.1 in his cross-examination, he stated that his sister is having some contusion. Even though a suggestion was posed to him that she committed suicide by consuming poison, because of stomach pain, he denied the same. P.W.2/Purushothaman also stated that she has not suffered stomach pain or any ailment. In the cross-examination of P.W.3, a suggestion was posed to her that the deceased consumed poison because of stomach pain, but she denied that suggestion. P.W.4, who is the mother of the deceased, also denied the same. On perusal of the chief and cross-examination of P.W.1 to P.W.4, it shows that there is no material contradiction and hence their evidence are natural, cogent, trustworthy and reliable. So the contradiction pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant is not a reason for setting aside the conviction. If it is a parrot like evidence, it is only by tutoring. Considering the chief-examination of P.W.1 to P.W.4, I am of the opinion, it is natural and trustworthy. 14. It is true, P.W.14/R.D.O. received F.I.R. from P.W.15/Sub-Inspector of Police. He conducted inquest and the inquest report was marked as Ex.P6 and the final report was marked as Ex.D1.
If it is a parrot like evidence, it is only by tutoring. Considering the chief-examination of P.W.1 to P.W.4, I am of the opinion, it is natural and trustworthy. 14. It is true, P.W.14/R.D.O. received F.I.R. from P.W.15/Sub-Inspector of Police. He conducted inquest and the inquest report was marked as Ex.P6 and the final report was marked as Ex.D1. P.W.14, in his evidence, stated that the death of the deceased is suspicious and hence, there is no proof to show that she committed suicide by consuming poison for dowry demand. 15. P.W.16/Murugaiyan, Deputy Superintendent of Police altered the offence under section 304B IPC, but he did not file the alteration report. In his chief examination itself, he stated that on 01.05.2001, at 19.00 hours, he altered the offence under Section 304B IPC and forwarded the alteration report to the Sessions Court, Neyveli and he arrested the accused on 20.06.2001, at 2.00 p.m. After inquest, the body of the deceased was sent for autopsy. So even though the case has been registered under Section 174(3) Cr.P.C., subsequently, it was altered, during investigation. Hence, non filing of alteration report is no way affected the case of the prosecution, because when P.W.16 was in witness box, he deposed that after altering the offence, he forwarded the same to the concerned Magistrate and during the trial, at the time of argument, the document was called for and the same was found place in the record. 16. It is well settled principle of law that R.D.O. report is not a substantial piece of evidence, if it can be used only for corroboration and contradiction. On perusal of Ex.D1, in which, he stated that there is no evidence for demanding dowry and the investigation has been conducted in accordance with law. On that basis only, P.W.15 investigated the matter and filed a charge sheet. Non filing of the final report and other material facts are not fatal to the case of the prosecution. But final report of R.D.O. was marked as Ex.D1. So the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that investigating officer shows much interest in inspecting the matter on his own, does not merit acceptance. 17. It is appropriate to consider the following decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant.
But final report of R.D.O. was marked as Ex.D1. So the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that investigating officer shows much interest in inspecting the matter on his own, does not merit acceptance. 17. It is appropriate to consider the following decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. (i) 2010 (7) SCC 667 (Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and another) in para-35, it is stated as follows: "(35.) The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a Herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. " (ii) 2010 (8) SCC 628 (Madan Mohan singh v. State of Gujarat and another), in para-10 to 13, it is stated as follows: "(10.) We are convinced that there is absolutely nothing in this suicide note or the FIR which would even distantly be viewed as an offence much less under Section 306 IPC. We could not find anything in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note which could be suggested as abetment to commit suicide. In such matters there must be an allegation that the accused had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or secondly, had engaged with some other person in a conspiracy and lastly, that the accused had in any way aided any act or illegal omission to bring about the suicide. (11.) In spite of our best efforts and microscopic examination of the suicide note and the FIR, all that we find is that the suicide note is a rhetoric document in the nature of a departmental complaint. It also suggests some mental imbalance on the part of the deceased which he himself describes as depression.
(11.) In spite of our best efforts and microscopic examination of the suicide note and the FIR, all that we find is that the suicide note is a rhetoric document in the nature of a departmental complaint. It also suggests some mental imbalance on the part of the deceased which he himself describes as depression. In the so-called suicide note, it cannot be said that the accused ever intended that the driver under him should commit suicide or should end his life and did anything in that behalf. Even if it is accepted that the accused changed the duty of the driver or that the accused asked him not to take the keys of the car and to keep the keys of the car in the office itself, it does not mean that the accused intended or knew that the driver should commit suicide because of this. (12.) In order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring out the suicide of the concerned person as a result of that abetment is required. The intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for this particular offence under Section 306 IPC. We are of the clear opinion that there is no question of there being any material for offence under Section 306 IPC either in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note. (13.) It is absurd to even think that a superior officer like the appellant would intend to bring about suicide of his driver and, therefore, abet the offence. In fact, there is no nexus between the so-called suicide (if at all it is one for which also there is no material on record) and any of the alleged acts on the part of the appellant. There is no proximity either. In the prosecution under Section 306 IPC, much more material is required. The Courts have to be extremely careful as the main person is not available for cross-examination by the appellant/accused. Unless, therefore, there is specific allegation and material of definite nature (not imaginary or inferential one), it would be hazardous to ask the appellant/accused to face the trial. A criminal trial is not exactly a pleasant experience.
The Courts have to be extremely careful as the main person is not available for cross-examination by the appellant/accused. Unless, therefore, there is specific allegation and material of definite nature (not imaginary or inferential one), it would be hazardous to ask the appellant/accused to face the trial. A criminal trial is not exactly a pleasant experience. The person like the appellant in the present case who is serving in a responsible post would certainly suffer great prejudice, were he to face prosecution on absurd allegations of irrelevant nature." In the above decision, a final report has been filed for the offence under Section 306 IPC. But in the case on hand, the accused is punishable for the offence under Sections 304B, 498A and Sections 4 and 5 of Dowry Prohibition Act, hence, the above citation is not applicable to the facts of the present case. (iii) 2003 (1) SCC 217 (K. Prema S. Rao and another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and others), in which, it was stated that the accused was charged under Sections 498A and 304B IPC, held on the same facts and evidence can be convicted under Section 306 IPC. The above decision is not applicable for the present case, because the learned counsel for the appellants herein argued for the acquittal of the accused. (iv) 2003 (2) SCC 698 (Gurucharan kumar and another v. State of Rajasthan), in which, para-30 and 31 are extracted hereunder: "(30.) The letters which we have noticed are substantially contemporaneous, written at a time when it is alleged she was being subjected to cruelty at the hands of her husband, father-in-law and brother-in-law. Rather than supporting the case of the prosecution, these letters support the case of the defence that so far as they were concerned, they had showered love and affection on Geetu and not subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. We are of the view that Geetu may have committed suicide, as she was unable to adjust herself in the changed surroundings of her matrimonial home being a highly emotional person. The evidence on record does not suggest that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by her father and mother-in-law for or in connection with any demand for dowry.
The evidence on record does not suggest that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by her father and mother-in-law for or in connection with any demand for dowry. (31.) We are, therefore, of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the appellants are entitled to acquittal. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court as well as that of the trial court and acquit the appellants of the charges levelled against them. They are on bail. Their bail bonds stand discharged." (v) 1975 (4) SCC 511 (Balaka singh and others v. The State of Punjab), in para-7, it is held as follows: "If the prosecution could go to the extent of implicating four innocent persons by inserting their names in the inquest report and in the F.I.R., which was written subsequent to the inquest report they could very well have put in the names of the other five appellants also because they were inimical to the prosecution party, and there could be no difficulty in doing so because it is found by the High Court that all the prosecution witnesses belonged to one party who are on inimical terms with the accused. " (vi) 2010 (4) Crimes 38 (SC) (Rakesh Chand and another v. State of Punjab), in which, it was held as follows: "Deceased married accused on 4.12.1998. Prosecution case that sufficient dowry had been given to accused at the time of marriage. However in July 2000, a demand was made for Rs.20,000/- for the purpose of buying a motor cycle or scooter. A motor cycle was thereafter purchased for accused husband. Allegation that thereafter accused started demanding Rs.50,000/- in order to construct a room in house. Dead body of deceased was spotted on the embankment of a seepage drain in the area of Barnala on 25.04.2003. Trial Court convicted accused husband and appellants, his parents for offence punishable under Section 304B and 201 of IPC, but acquitted them of offence of murder.
Dead body of deceased was spotted on the embankment of a seepage drain in the area of Barnala on 25.04.2003. Trial Court convicted accused husband and appellants, his parents for offence punishable under Section 304B and 201 of IPC, but acquitted them of offence of murder. " (vii) 2010 (2) crimes 24 Madras (Periasamy v. State by Inspector of Police), in which, it is stated as follows: "Where in a dowry death case deceased was brought to matrimonial home in a compromise and there was no evidence if she was subjected to any cruelty or harassment on account of demand thereafter charge of dowry death could not be said to have been proved." (viii) AIR 1975 SC 1925 (Kodali Puranchandra Rao and another, v. The Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh) in para-35, it reads as follows: "(35.) A mere glance at this report betrays its falsity. This shows how in his anxiety to suppress the truth he tried to reinforce and cover up one falsehood with another. In this connection, it may be noted that the D.S.P. persistently pressed A-2 to send the copies of the F.I.R. and the Inquest Report. A-2 was unable to supply any copy of the F.I.R. before the 12th of June, when the D.S.P. himself came to the Police Station and collected it. The D.S.P. (P.W. 59) testified that on the 11th June, 1971, he had questioned A-2 about the First Information Report and the inquest report. As a result he received a copy of the F.I.R. on the 12th but did not receive any copy of the inquest report. Consequently on 14.6.1971, he telephoned to A2 to send the case diaries and inquest report without further delay. Despite these efforts, the D.S.P. did not receive those records on that day. On 15.6.1971, he issued a memo to A-2 directing the latter to produce immediately the complaint of N. Subba Rao, the inquest report and the case diaries. It was only then that A2 produced the persistently requisitioned records." (ix) 2012 (1) SCC (cri) 892 (Madhu v. State of Kerala) in para-5, it reads as follows: "(5.) The care and caution with which circumstantial evidence has to be evaluated stands recognized by judicial precedent. Only circumstantial evidence of a very high order can satisfy the test of proof in a criminal prosecution.
Only circumstantial evidence of a very high order can satisfy the test of proof in a criminal prosecution. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete unbroken chain of events leading to the determination that the inference being drawn from the evidence is the only inescapable conclusion. In the absence of convincing circumstantial evidence, an accused would be entitled to the benefit of doubt." Considering the above decisions along with the facts of the present case, as already stated that the delay in preferring the complaint is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. The evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4 would clearly prove that the accused had demanded money, which forced the deceased/wife to commit suicide. As per their evidence, 10 days prior to the incident, the deceased had given Rs.28,000/- to A1 for construction of a house. Further, the accused demanded 5 sovereigns of gold jewels. So that factum has been clearly proved that because of dowry demand, the deceased was subjected to cruelty, which forced her to commit suicide by way of consuming poison. It is pertinent to note that the in-laws/A2 and A3 are residing somewhere. The husband and wife alone was residing in the house. It shows that appellant/A1 alone is a competent person to speak about as to why his wife committed suicide. While perusing Section 313 Cr.P.C. questioning of the accused, the accused did not give any explanation as to why his wife committed suicide and he stated that his wife Parvathy died after consuming poison and he is no way connected with the death of the deceased Parvathy. But, the death was occurred in the matrimonial home, wherein A1 and the deceased alone were residing. Therefore, A1 is the competent person to give explanation as to why his wife committed suicide. 18. Now it is appropriate to incorporate Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, which reads as follows: "(113.) B -Presumption as to dowry death When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
The presumption shall be raised only a proof of the following essentials: (i) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304B, IPC) (ii) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (iii) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with, any demand for dowry. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. " It has to be noted that the deceased was taken to her matrimonial home one day prior to Tamil New Year, after compromise was made. Ten days prior to her death, a sum of Rs.28,000/- has been given to A1 for construction of house. It would clearly prove that since the accused demanded dowry from the deceased (i.e.) 5 sovereigns, the deceased was forced to commit suicide by consuming poison. The prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused/appellant under Sections 498A and 304B IPC beyond reasonable doubt. So I am of the view, learned Sessions Judge considered all the aspects in proper perspective and came to the correct conclusion that the accused had assaulted her by demanding dowry. Since the deceased Parvathy unable to meet out the cruelty at the hands of her husband, she committed suicide by consuming poison, which leads to instantaneous death. Hence, I am of the view, the conviction passed by the trial Court does not warrant any interference and hence, it is hereby confirmed. 19. As per the quantum of the sentence imposed on the accused is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that if the Court comes to the conclusion that the appellant/accused is found guilty for the offence, some leniency may be shown to him. 20. On perusal of the trial Court's Judgment, the trial Court awarded minimum punishment on the accused for the offence under Section 304B IPC, whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not less than 7 years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore, I am of the considered view, the trial Court awarded minimum sentence and hence, it is fair and proper. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. 21.
Therefore, I am of the considered view, the trial Court awarded minimum sentence and hence, it is fair and proper. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. 21. In fine, (i) Criminal appeal is dismissed. (ii) The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. (iii) Bail bond, executed by the appellant/accused, if any, shall stand cancelled. (iv) The trial Court is directed to secure the custody of the accused to undergo the remaining period of sentence.