JUDGMENT : Thisis tenant's/defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated9-9-2003 passed by learned First Additional District Judge, Katni in Civil Appeal No. 41 -A/2002, whereby the judgment and decree dated 29-4-2002passed by learned Second Civil Judge, Class II, Katni in Civil Suit No. 11-A/1998 decreeing the suit of plaintiff/respondent has beenaffirmed. 2.The facts necessary for disposal of this second appeal lie in narrow compass.Suffice it is to say that the plaintiff/respondent on the basis of relationshipof landlord and tenant filed a suit for eviction against defendant/appellant onthe ground envisaged under Section 12 (1) (c) and (f) of M.P. AccommodationControl Act, 1961 (for brevity "Act"). 3.The appellants are the L.Rs . of defendant/tenant whohad died during the pendency of this second appeal.In brief the case of plaintiff is that he is the landlord of the tenantedpremises which is non-residential and he gave the suit premises on monthly rentof Rs . 1600/- shown in the map annexed with theplaint, to the defendant. According to the plaintiff, no rent is due upon thetenant/defendant. The suit accommodation is required by plaintiff for himselfand for his two major sons who after graduation are sitting idle and are notserving anywhere. The need of plaintiff is bonafide and he is not having any reasonably suitable non-residential vacantaccommodation of his own in the town in which he along with his two major sonscould start the business of Seeds and Fertilisers andthe suit premises is a suitable place to carry on such type of business becausenearby the suit premises there are several other shops of Seeds and Fertilisers . The tenant/defendant is quite aware about the bonafide need of the landlord/plaintiff and he also gaveassurance that he would vacate the suit premises on 1-4-1997 , but, despite the assurance given by him,he has not vacated it nor delivered its possession to the plaintiff. Hence, adecree of eviction on the ground of bonafide need asenvisaged under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was originally sought by theplaintiff at the time of the filing of the suit. 4.The defendant by filing written statement denied the bonafide need of plaintiff, although he admitted the rate of rent to be Rs . 1600/- per month of the suit premises. The factum of tenancy has not been denied by him in the writtenstatement. 4.The defendant by filing written statement denied the bonafide need of plaintiff, although he admitted the rate of rent to be Rs . 1600/- per month of the suit premises. The factum of tenancy has not been denied by him in the writtenstatement. On the other hand he has admitted that he is the tenant of plaintiffof the suit accommodation given for non-residential purpose. However, so far asthe ownership of the suit premises is concerned, the tenant has pleaded that heis requesting that the ownership part be proved by the plaintiff and this isalso indispensable because in respect to ownership for the year 1977-78 to1995-96 in the record of Municipal Corporation Mudwara ( Katni ) the name of plaintiff as owner of the suitproperty is not mentioned and hence defendant by paying respect to the law andwithout prejudicing the plaintiffs right in order to provide justice pleaded inthe written statement and prayed to the Court that plaintiff may be asked toprove his ownership. Further, defendant pleaded that in the year 1996-97 alsoin the municipal record plaintiff has not been shown to be owner of the suitpremises however, anyhow, he got his name entered in the municipal record inthe later year. Although, earlier to 1996-97 throughout Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar andKrishna Kumar have been shown to be the owners of the suit premises. 5.The defendant also specifically denied in so many words in the writtenstatement about the alleged bonafide need of theplaintiff for himself and for his two major sons and also denied that plaintiffis not having any other reasonably suitable vacant non-residential place of hisown in the township. Further, he had denied the allegations of plaintiff thathe (defendant) ever gave any assurance to plaintiff that suit accommodationwould be vacated by him till 1-4-1997 and hence it has been prayed that suit be dismissed. 6.After the written statement was filed, looking to its averments, the plaintiffamended his plaint and pleaded that earlier the owner of the suit property wasone Mahadev Prasad Agrawal and plaintiff was his Purohit (a Brahmin who oftenoffers Puja in the house of a person) and becauseplaintiff was offering Puja etc., therefore, said Mahadev Prasad in consideration of service of Puja rendered by the plaintiff, gave the suit property tohim and declared him to be the owner of the suit property. Said Mahadev Prasad also delivered possession of the suitproperty to the plaintiff and thereafter the plaintiff inducted the defendantas his tenant 20 years ago and the defendant by accepting to be his landlord ispaying monthly rent to him regularly. In the rent receipts also the plaintiff hasbeen mentioned as the landlord of the defendant and the defendant by acceptingthe plaintiff to be his landlord has signed the rent receipts. Further, it hasbeen pleaded by the plaintiff by way of amendment that defendant never objectedthat plaintiff is not his landlord. Not only this by accepting the plaintiff tobe his landlord, the defendant in Case No. 11/A/90 (3) 1996-97 filed a caseunder Section 25 of the Act before the Rent Controlling Authority praying thesaid authority to permit him to deposit the rent and before the said authority,he also deposited the rent. Hence, the defendant cannot challenge the title ofthe landlord/plaintiff. 7.Simultaneously, plaintiff further amended his plaint praying the Court thatsince the defendant has denied his title of the plaintiff, therefore, a decreeof eviction on the ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act be also passed. 8.After the plaint was amended, the defendant also amended his written statementand denied the averments of plaintiff pleaded by him. According to defendant,at the time of obtaining the suit premises on tenancy basis by him and by hisfather Kishan Chand , theycontacted Dhanya Kumar Agrawal and his father Dharamdas Agrawal and indeed they inducted the defendant in the suit premises and it was told tothem that because several disputes often arise in the Income Tax Department andin other Government departments in regard to tax etc., hence rent receiptsshall be issued mentioning the name of plaintiff to be the landlord. Accordingto the defendant, since he and his father were keen to obtain the suitpremises, therefore, they obtained the suit premises with the aforesaidunderstanding provided to them by Dhanya Kumar Agrawal and his father Dharamdas .It is relevant to mention that Dharamdas is the sonof Mahadev Prasad for whom it is pleaded by plaintiffby amending his plaint that on account of consideration of the services of Puja , said Mahadev Prasad gavethe suit property to the plaintiff declaring him to be the owner of the same.Hence, in this manner the defendant is paying rent to the plaintiff acceptinghim to be his landlord of the suit premises. Further, it has been pleaded bydefendant that the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit premises inaccordance with law. According to defendant in regard to theassessment of house tax etc. Dhanya Kumar and plaintiff themselves have submitted several objectionsin the Municipal Corporation, which are pending for its decision. 9.On the basis of averments made in the plaint and denial in the writtenstatement, learned Trial Court framed necessary issues and after recording theevidence of the parties found that the plaintiff is entitled for decree ofeviction under Section 12 (1) (c) and (f) of the Act. 10.The defendant being dissatisfied by the judgment and decree of Trial Courtfiled first appeal before the learned First Appellate Court, which has alsobeen dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 11.In this manner, this second appeal has been filed by defendant/tenant in thisCourt, which was admitted on 20-8-2004 on the following substantial questions of law : - "(1)Whether in view of there being no authentic registered document in relation toownership of the plaintiff, the Courts below seriously erred in law, in passingdecree of eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation ControlAct, 1961 ? (2)Whether in view of there being no legal evidence in relation to bonafide requirement of the suit shop to the plaintiff andhis sons, the Courts below erred in law in passing a decree of eviction underSection 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ?" 12. Shri S.K. Dwivedi , learnedCounsel for appellant/defendant by inviting my attention to clause (c) ofSection 12 (1) of the Act has submitted that nowhere the defendant has set-upthe title of suit premises in himself and very clearly he has pleaded that bypaying all the respect to the law and without prejudicing the right of theplaintiff in order to serve the justice, the tenant is requesting the Courtthat plaintiff be asked to prove his ownership because nowhere earlier to1996-97 his name was ever entered in the municipal record as owner of the suitproperty, on the contrary the names of Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar and Krishna Kumar Agrawal were entered as owner of the suit property. 13.Further, it has been contended by learned Counsel that after the plaintiffamended his written statement by pleading that at the time of obtaining thesuit premises from Dhanya Kumar and his father Dharamdas Agrawal on theirassurance and understanding provided to defendant and his father Kishan Chand that because severaldisputes would rise in regard to income tax and property tax etc., therefore,plaintiff shall issue receipt in his name to the defendant mentioning him to bethe landlord of defendant, and because the defendant was in need of the suitpremises, therefore, in such a situation, he accepted the plaintiff to be hislandlord and therefore, in these facts and circumstances, if the clear pictureis shown it cannot be said that on the basis of such pleading the tenant hasdenied the title of plaintiff and his pleading will never adversely orsubstantially affect the interest of the landlord/ plaintiff. In support of hiscontention, learned Counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision oflearned Single Judge of this Court (Justice R.C. Lahoti ,J. as His Lordship then was) in Nirvikar Gupta Vs.Ram Kumar, AIR 1992 MP 115 . Learned Counsel submits that similar view was takenby the Hon'ble Justice R.C. Lahoti in the Supreme Court in Sheela and others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash , (2002) 3 SCC 375 . Learned Counsel byinviting my attention to Paras 10,12 and 14 onwardsof the said decision has submitted that the decision of Supreme Court in Sheela (supra), is squarely applicable in the present caseand the facts of the case of Sheela (supra), and thepleadings of the written statement of that case are akin to the pleadings ofpresent case also, and therefore, said decision of Supreme Court is squarelyapplicable in the present case and hence, it has been submitted that no decreeof eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act can be passed against thedefendant/appellant. 14.By addressing on the second substantial question of law it has been propoundedby Shri Dwivedi , learnedCounsel for appellant that bonafide need envisagedunder Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act can be conveniently divided into two categories.According to learned Counsel in the first category the bonafide need of the landlord can be considered for the purpose of continuing orstarting his business or that for his any major son or unmarried daughter if heis owner thereof and the second category contemplates and authorises the landlord to file suit on the ground of bonafide need of any other person for whose benefit the accommodation is held with afurther stipulation in both the categories the landlord must not have any otherreasonably suitable vacant non-residential accommodation of his own in the cityor town concerned. Thus, according to learned Counsel the word"owner" is having great significance for the purpose of this clausein passing the decree of eviction. Specifically, learned Counsel argued that itis not his submission that in order to prove the ownership in a suit ofeviction under Rent control Legislation, the landlord is required to provestrict legal title as the same is required to be proved in a title suit,however, still it is having some significance although in a narrow sense, but,certainly it is having some wider connotation for the purpose of this clause incomparison to the other clauses of Section 12 (1) of the Act. Learned Counselsubmitted that after amending the plaint, the pleadings of ownership whichplaintiff has pleaded, he cannot be accepted under the law to be the owner ofthe suit property because according to plaintiff the suit property wasoriginally belonged to Mahadev Prasad Agrawal whose son was Dharamdas and Dharamdas's son is Dhanya Kumar and without alienating the suit property by way of sale, gift or anyother mode of a valid conveyance recognised by law,the suit property cannot be alienated to plaintiff. According to learnedCounsel admittedly there is no registered document of conveyance of the suitproperty which is immovable, in favour of theplaintiff. 15.Learned Counsel further submits that had the case been filed by presentplaintiff in the second category of Section 12 (1) (f), the matter would havebeen different. According to learnedCounsel admittedly there is no registered document of conveyance of the suitproperty which is immovable, in favour of theplaintiff. 15.Learned Counsel further submits that had the case been filed by presentplaintiff in the second category of Section 12 (1) (f), the matter would havebeen different. But, in order to bring the case within the ambit and scope offirst category of clause (f) of Section 12(1) of the Act, the plaintiff waslegally bound to prove his ownership which may be narrower in comparison to thetitle suit, but, it is wider than that of other clauses envisaged under Section12 (1) of the Act. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has placedreliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Sheela (supra) and also another decision of Supreme Court in Prem Narayan Barchhiha Vs. Hakimuddin Saifi ,(1999) 6 SCC381. Learned Counsel submits that although in Prem Narayan's case, the appeal of landlord was allowed by theApex Court by passing a decree of eviction but in Para 12 how clause (f) toSection 12(1) is to be interpreted, the Supreme Court has thrown sufficientlight on it and the present appeal is to be examined on the anvil andtouchstone of norms fixed by the Supreme Court in Para 12 of the said decision.Learned Counsel has also placed reliance on Single Bench decision of this Courtin Manorama Bahadur andothers Vs. A.C.M. Swami, 1978 JLJ 416 . Hence, according to learned Counsel forappellant since the grounds envisaged under Section 12 (1) (c) and (f) are notproved, by allowing this appeal the impugned judgment passed by two Courtsbelow be set aside and the suit be dismissed. 16.On the other hand, Shri Jain, learned Counsel for respondent/plaintiff submitted that admittedly defendant ispaying rent to plaintiff for a considerable long period, and therefore, underSection 116 of the Evidence Act, he is estopped fromchallenging the plaintiffs title. Learned Counsel submits that admitting theplaintiff to be his landlord, the defendant submitted the application underSection 25 before the Rent Controlling Authority praying to the said Authorityto permit defendant to deposit the rent. Hence, if now the defendant isdisowning the title of the plaintiff, he (plaintiff)s entitled to a decree ofeviction as envisaged under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. Hence, if now the defendant isdisowning the title of the plaintiff, he (plaintiff)s entitled to a decree ofeviction as envisaged under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. According to thelearned Counsel, provision of Section 12 (1) (c) cannot be interpreted in amanner that if a title is denied by a tenant then only it would be a ground foreviction but according to this provision if any act has been done by thetenant, which is likely to affect adversely and substantially to the interestof landlord, he can be evicted from the tenanted premises. Learned Counsel byinviting my attention to Section 111 (g) of Transfer of Property Act hassubmitted that denial of title of the landlord by a tenant amounts toforfeiture of tenancy but said analogy cannot be accepted for the Rent ControlLegislation because the present Act is a special creature of the statute andeviction decree can be passed in terms of any of the grounds envisaged underSection 12 (1) of the Act. Learned Counsel submits that for last 20 years thedefendant accepted the plaintiff to be his landlord and therefore, his act insetting up the title in Dhanya Kumar cannot be saidto be bonafide and hence by such an act of thetenant/defendant the right of plaintiff has been adversely affected because itamounts to setting up title in a third person. In support of his contention,learned Counsel has invited by attention to Single Bench decision in Devraj s/o Baldev Prasad SharmaVs. Naina Devnani w/o Ramesh Devnani and others, 2008(3) MPLJ 239 Para 12. 17.It has been then contended by learned Counsel for respondent that if the tenantis denying the title of his landlord without setting up a title in himself orin third person then it would mean that although hers denying the title of hislandlord and is not setting up his title in himself or in third person, but, hecannot be evicted from the suit premises and this cannot be the intention ofthe Legislature and, therefore, in this backdrop the decisions of Sheela (supra) and Devraj (supra), should be considered. 18.Further, it has been contended by learned Counsel for the respondent that forall practical purposes, the plaintiff being owner of the suit premises so faras the defendant is concerned, therefore, rightly a decree of eviction underSection 12 (1) (f) of the Act has been passed. 18.Further, it has been contended by learned Counsel for the respondent that forall practical purposes, the plaintiff being owner of the suit premises so faras the defendant is concerned, therefore, rightly a decree of eviction underSection 12 (1) (f) of the Act has been passed. Learned Counsel has also placedheavy reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Anar Devi ( Smt .) Vs. Nathu Ram, (1994) 4 SCC 250 , and argued that what is themeaning of word "owner" used in Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act shouldbe seen on the touchstone of principles laid down by the Supreme Court in thisdecision. On the aforesaid submissions, it has been submitted by learnedCounsel for respondent that this appeal is having no force and, therefore, thesame be dismissed. 19.Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appealof tenant deserves to be allowed. Regardingsubstantial question of law No. 1 : 20.To deal with the rival contentions of learned Counsel for parties on thetouchstone and anvil of grounds of eviction envisaged under Section 12 (1) (c)and (f) of the Act, it would be appropriate to go through the Preamble, objectand nature of the Act. ThePreamble of the Act is : - "AnAct to provide for the regulation and control of letting and rent ofaccommodations, for expeditious trial of eviction cases on ground of " bonafide " requirement of certain categories oflandlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants fromaccommodations and for other matter connected therewith or incidentalthereto." Onbare perusal of the Preamble, it is gathered that the Act has been enacted toregulate and control eviction of tenants from accommodation. The words"regulate" and "control" of tenants are deliberately used by the Legislature so that it may be beneficial to landlordsas well as to the tenants. According to me, the Legislature will never use surplusage words. The object of the Act is to provide protection to the tenants bypreventing unscrupulous and veracious landlords from evicting the tenants.Looking to the aim of the Legislature obviously it is not to extinguish all therights of landlords and the reasonable restrictions are provided under the Actitself to the extent that they are necessary for the purpose of preventing rackrenting and ejectment of tenants. According to me,one of the acts of legislating the Rent ControlLegislation is to restrict landlord to eject the tenant at his wishes and sweetwill. According to me,one of the acts of legislating the Rent ControlLegislation is to restrict landlord to eject the tenant at his wishes and sweetwill. Therefore, the paramount object of the Act is to provide the safeguardsto the tenants against their exploitation by landlords but simultaneously toprovide certain grounds of eviction to the landlords. 21.The grounds of eviction envisaged under clause (c) of Section (2 (1) of the Actcan be further sub-divided into three clauses. Under the first sub-clause thelandlord is entitled to have a decree of eviction if the tenant or any personresiding with him has created a nuisance. The second sub-clause authorises landlord to seek a decree of eviction if thetenant has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he isadmitted to the tenancy of the accommodation and under the third sub-clause adecree of eviction shall be passed if any act has been done by the tenant whichis likely to affect adversely and substantially to the interest of thelandlord. It would be germane to quote Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act in itsentirety, which reads thus : - "Section12 (1) (c) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created anuisance or has done any act, which is inconsistent with the purpose for whichhe was admitted to the tenancy of the recommendation, or which is likely toaffect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein.Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as hisoffice shall not be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for whichhe was admitted to the tenancy." 22.In the present case, the plaintiff/respondent has filed the suit of evictionunder the third sub-clause to clause (c). Hence, in order to give any findingwhether the plaintiffs suit is liable to be decreed under the said clause, itis to be seen whether defendant/appellant has done any act, which is likely toaffect adversely and substantially the interest of plaintiff and in order toarrive at a conclusion in this regard it would be condign to see the pleadingof the defendant because originally the suit was not filed by the plaintiffseeking decree of eviction under this clause, but it was filed on the soleground of bonafide requirement envisaged underSection 12(1) (f) of the Act. Indeed, after filing of the written statement adecree of eviction under sub-clause (c) of Section 12 (1) of the Act has beensought by the landlord. Hence, in order to take out the grain from the chaffwhether any such act has been done by the defendant, which has adversely andsubstantially affected the right of the plaintiff, the pleading of thedefendant in the written statement is required to be seen and it would beappropriate to quote necessary pleading made by defendant in Para 1 of hiswritten statement, which reads thus : - xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 23.On bare perusal of Para 1 of the written statement this Court finds that veryhumbly the defendant has prayed to the Court that without prejudicing andadversely affecting the right of the plaintiff and by paying full respect tothe law, he is pleading that the burden of proof of ownership of the suitpremises is on the plaintiff and he may be asked to prove it. Further, it ismore necessary because in respect to ownership of the suit premises for aconsiderable long period of 20 years, i.e., 1977-78 to 1995-96 his name wasnever entered as owner of the suit premises. At this juncture, we are remindedthat somewhere in the year 1977-78 the defendant was inducted as tenant in thesuit premises. Only in the year 1996-97 the name of plaintiff has been enteredas owner in the municipal record. It would also be relevant to go through thesituation that when suit was filed on 20-2-1998 ,immediately before filing of the suit, the name of plaintiff was anyhow gotentered in the municipal record. If Court goes earlier to 1996-97 nowhereplaintiff has been shown to be the owner of the suit premises in the municipalrecord. It is well settled in law that civil cases are decided on the basis ofpreponderance and probabilities and, therefore, one can think that in order toevict the defendant from the suit premises, first the plaintiff got his nameentered as owner in the municipal record during the year 1996-97 and thereafterthe eviction suit has been filed. The plaintiff himself has admitted in Para 22 of his examination that his name as owner of the suit premises was neverentered during the long period of 1978 to 1996. The plaintiff himself has admitted in Para 22 of his examination that his name as owner of the suit premises was neverentered during the long period of 1978 to 1996. Further he has admitted in Para23 of his cross-examination that after the death of original owner Mahadev Prasad, the suit property was entered in the nameof Dhanya Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Rajkumar and Kishore in the municipal record who are sons of Dharamdas and Dharamdas was theson of Mahadev Prasad. 24.A very interesting part in the present case is that the plaintiff examined Dhanya Kumar as P.W. 2 and when cross-examination wasstarted upon him, unfortunately, it was not completed because Court's time wasover and, therefore, this witness was given-up by plaintiff later on and wasnever called for further cross-examination and, therefore, again one can inferwhy he was given-up and not put for cross-examination. Because in cross-examinationwhen this witness was cornered, he has admitted that his name along with thenames of his other brothers has been entered as owner in the municipal recordnot only in regard to the suit property but also in respect to several otherimmovable properties in the township. This point was further cross-examined butunfortunately Court's time was over and the cross-examination was deferred tonext date of hearing 14-5-2001 .On 14-5-2001 plaintiff'suncrossed witness Dhanya Kumar was not present and adate was sought on behalf of plaintiff and matter was adjourned to 27-7-2001 . On this date and also on 24-8-2001 said witness Dhanya Kumar was not present although other witnesses ofplaintiff were examined. Similarly, on next date 19-9-2001 some more witnesses of plaintiff were examinedbut said witness Dhanya Kumar did not remain present.Ultimately on 24-9-2001 plaintiffs Counsel stated to the Court that his evidence is over and he doesnot want to examine any more witness and in this manner said witness Dhanya Kumar was not further cross-examined. Similarly, on next date 19-9-2001 some more witnesses of plaintiff were examinedbut said witness Dhanya Kumar did not remain present.Ultimately on 24-9-2001 plaintiffs Counsel stated to the Court that his evidence is over and he doesnot want to examine any more witness and in this manner said witness Dhanya Kumar was not further cross-examined. 25.In the aforesaid backdrop, if we uplift the veil, the hidden malafide idea of seeking eviction of defendant is exposedthat in order to create a ground of eviction of alleged bonafide need firstly the name of plaintiff was entered in the municipal record as ownerand thereafter the truth may not come out from the mouth of witness Dhanya Kumar when he was cornered during cross-examinationthat indeed plaintiff is not the owner of the suit property and this witnessalong with his brothers, is the owner of the suit property and thedefendant/tenant was asked to accept the plaintiff as his landlord on theassurance and the Understanding provided by the true owners to him, the presentsuit for eviction has been filed. Hence, the said witness was not produced forcross-examination so as to save him from saying the truth. As a matter of fact,the purpose of quoting the Preamble, aims, object and nature of the Acthereinabove was only in order to visualise thepleadings of the parties on the touchstone and anvil of ground of evictionwhich plaintiff has taken and whether in the facts and circumstances of thecase, can a decree of eviction be passed or not. 26.According to me, the principles laid down in the decision of Supreme Court in Sheela (supra) and that of decision of this Court in Nirvikar Gupta (supra), are squarely applicable in thepresent case. In the decision of Sheela (supra),although defendant pleaded inter alia , that theplaintiffs were not the owner of the suit premises and therefore, tenant wasnot liable to be evicted but in that very written statement at other places thedefendant admitted the plaintiffs to be his landlords. The purpose of quotingthe relevant portion of Para 1 of the written statementwas only this much that how and in what manner the facts of two cases are moreor less akin to each other. Nowhere defendant of Sheela's case (supra ), had setup title of his own and prayedthat plaintiffs may be directed to prove their title although defendant isaccepting that they are his landlords. Nowhere defendant of Sheela's case (supra ), had setup title of his own and prayedthat plaintiffs may be directed to prove their title although defendant isaccepting that they are his landlords. In the case at hand also thedefendant/appellant has never set up the title of his own and respectfullyprayed to the Court that without prejudicing and adversely affecting the rightof plaintiff and accepting him to be his landlord, the plaintiff be directed toprove his ownership. 27.On going through the pleadings of the defendant this Court finds that defendanthas never renounced his character as tenant and in a clear and unequivocal termnowhere he has setup title of the suit premises in him or in a third party andhe is bonafidely calling upon the plaintiff to provehis ownership or putting landlord to prove his title so as to protect himself(defendant) or to earn a protection made available to him under the Act, butwithout disowning his character of possession over the tenanted premises as tenant.In these facts and circumstances, according to me, it cannot be said that hisact was anyway injurious to landlord/plaintiff and he had not done any actwhich may likely to affect adversely and substantially to the interest of theplaintiff. Hence, according to me, a decree of eviction under Section 12 (1)(c) of the Act cannot be passed. 28.The substantial question of law No. 1 is thus answered that the Courts belowhave erred in law in passing the judgment under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. Regardingsubstantial question of law No. 2 : 29.At the cost of repetition, I may again state here that initially the suit foreviction was filed by plaintiff for bonafide need ofhimself and for his two major sons to start the business of Seeds and Fertilisers in the suit premises. After the writtenstatement was filed, the plaintiff amended his plaint and pleaded in Para 1 (a) that because the then owner of the suit property Mahadev Prasad Agrawal was pleased on account of services ofoffering Puja etc., by the plaintiff, he gave thesuit property to the plaintiff, which was in consideration of the Puja etc. Further it has been pleaded by the plaintiff thatsaid Mahadev Prasad also declared him to be the ownerof the property and delivered its possession. According to me, for no scintillaof imagination it can be said that any title of the suit property whose valueis admittedly more than Rs . Further it has been pleaded by the plaintiff thatsaid Mahadev Prasad also declared him to be the ownerof the property and delivered its possession. According to me, for no scintillaof imagination it can be said that any title of the suit property whose valueis admittedly more than Rs . 100/- was conveyed in theplaintiff because no registered document and a valid conveyance deed has beenexecuted in favour of plaintiff. True, as rightlycontended by learned Counsel for respondent that inquiry in respect toownership in eviction suit under the Rent Control Legislation is not that muchwider as that of title suit. But according to me, it is equally true that it ishaving some wider connotation (though in narrow sense) than that of othergrounds of eviction envisaged under Section 12 (1) of the Act and the plaintiffis legally bound to prove his ownership in narrow sense so as to bring his casewithin the ambit and scope of word "owner" used in Section 12 (1) ofthe Act. 30.The word "owner" has not been defined in the Act although words"landlord" and "tenant" are defined in Section 2 (b) and ( i ) respectively. In order to obtain a decree of eviction onthe ground of bonafide requirement envisaged inclause (f) of the Act, according to me, the plaintiff is required to prove notonly that he is a landlord but at the same time he has to prove that he is alsothe owner of the premises for the simple reason that the word "owner"has been deliberately used by Legislature under clause (f) of the Act. Asalready held hereinabove by me that Legislature will never use any surplus ageword while enacting a particular provision of the statute and therefore,according to me if bonafidely the tenant is disputingthe ownership of the plaintiff then upto certainextent within the ambit and scope of narrow sense, the plaintiff is required toprove his ownership. True, a person who is receiving or is entitled to receivethe rent of any accommodation would come within the ambit of definition of"landlord" but merely he is receiving or is having right to receivethe rent, cannot be said that he would be the owner of the said accommodationunless and until he proves it. True, a person who is receiving or is entitled to receivethe rent of any accommodation would come within the ambit of definition of"landlord" but merely he is receiving or is having right to receivethe rent, cannot be said that he would be the owner of the said accommodationunless and until he proves it. The plaintiff has already admitted in the firstline of cross-examination that his name was never recorded as owner in therecord of Municipal Corporation for long period from the year 1978 to 1996 andfurther admitted that suit property has been recorded in the name of Dhanya Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Rajkumar and Kishore . The defendant Dayaldas (D.W. 1) has specifically stated in Paras 1 and 7 ofhis testimony that he took the suit premises from Dhanya Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Rajkumar and Dharamdas Agrawal and on beingsaid by these persons he accepted the rent receipts in the name of plaintiffshowing him to be landlord. Indeed this is the initial pleading of thedefendant in his written statement. The limited purpose of quoting this vitalpiece of evidence going to the root of the matter is to take out the grain fromthe chaff whether plaintiff is entitled to a decree of eviction under Section12(1 )( f) of the Act. Hence, according to me, theplaintiff was only collecting rent from the defendant for the true owners Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar , KrishnaKumar and Dharamdas and if that would be the positionhe cannot be said to be "owner" even in narrow sense so as to evictthe appellant from the suit premises under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. 31.By keeping these situations in mind as well as the proposition of provisions ofSection 116 of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court in the decision of Sheela (supra), has thrown sufficient light in Para 10 ofthe said decision. Further on bare perusal of Para 7 of the said decision, theSupreme Court by clarifying that although the ground under Section 12(1) (f) ofthe Act was not the point in hand in the Supreme Court, but, in order tointerpret clause (c) of the Act effectively the Apex Court in Para 10 has laiddown the law in regard to bonafide need also. On theaforesaid backdrop, the decision of Supreme Court in Anar Devi (supra), and thedecision of this Court in Devraj (supra), relied bylearned Counsel for respondent are not applicable. On theaforesaid backdrop, the decision of Supreme Court in Anar Devi (supra), and thedecision of this Court in Devraj (supra), relied bylearned Counsel for respondent are not applicable. 32.Apart from what I have held hereinabove, had the suit been filed by theplaintiff/respondent under the second category of Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act(i.e., the non-residential accommodation is bonafide needed by landlord for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held) , matter would have been altogether different. But thepresent case has not been filed by the plaintiff by pleading that for thebenefit of Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar ,Krishna Kumar and Dharamdas the accommodation washeld by him and they are in need of the suit accommodation and for that plaintiffor those persons do not have any reasonably suitable vacant accommodation oftheir own in the city or town. Hence, I am of the view that a decree ofeviction under Section 12 (1) (f) also cannot be passed. 33.Substantial question of law No. 2 is thus answered that because plaintiff isnot found to be the owner of the suit property, it cannot be said that suitaccommodation is needed by him bonafide for his ownrequirement and for his sons and Courts below have erred in passing the decreeof eviction under Section 12(1 )( f) of the Act. 34.Resultantly, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgmentand decree passed by learned two Courts below are hereby set aside and the suitof the plaintiff is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.