JUDGMENT : S.C. Sharma, J. The present appeal (MA No. 1555/2010) has been preferred by the claimant being aggrieved by the Award dated 29/1/2010, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jhabua in Claim Case No. 10 2008 (Hakka s/o Narsingh v. Pappu and 2 others). 2. The other cases arising out of the same accident which took place on 11/11/2007, are also being disposed of by this common order. 3. The undisputed facts of the accident are that a motor vehicle (Jeep) carrying certain persons, bearing Registration No. MP10 A 1245 was going from Hat Bazar, at Jhabua to their respective place of residence and the Jeep met with an accident on account of rash and negligent driving of the Driver. About 7 persons sitting in the Jeep sustained injuries and 7 claim cases were preferred by the injured persons. The claims Tribunal has passed 7 awards by passing a common order dated 29/1/2010 and in all 7 cases compensation has been granted for injuries suffered by the passengers. The award also reflects that there was a breach of the Insurance Policy and the statements recorded during trial also reflects that the Jeep was being used as a transport vehicle by the Driver and the Owner and therefore the Tribunal has exonerated the Insurance Company. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has fairly stated before this Court that there was enough evidence to establish that the vehicle was being used as a Transport Vehicle, however, he has prayed for enhancement of the awarded amount and has also prayed for issuance of a direction to the Insurance Company to deposit the awarded amount and to recover the same from the Driver and Owner of the Vehicle, keeping in view the judgment delivered by the apex court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd., v. Swaran Singh and others reported in 2004 ACJ 1(SC). 5. Learned counsel for the respondent - Insurance Company has vehemently argued before this Court that there was a breach of policy as the vehicle was being used as a Transport Vehicle though it was registered as a Private Vehicle for private use only. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent - Insurance Company has vehemently argued before this Court that there was a breach of policy as the vehicle was being used as a Transport Vehicle though it was registered as a Private Vehicle for private use only. He has also argued before this Court that the question of directing the Insurance Company to deposit the awarded amount does not arise keeping in view the breach of the policy and the matter in respect of pay and recover has been referred to a Larger Bench and the same is pending before the Apex Court. He has also argued before this Court that the amount awarded by the Tribunal is just and proper and no case for enhancement is made out in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 7. In the present case, it is an undisputed fact that the vehicle was being used as a transport vehicle though it was registered as a private vehicle and there is certainly a breach of policy, as held by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Keeping in view the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the award to the extent the Insurance Company has been exonerated, does not warrant any interference. 8. So far as the quantum of compensation which has been awarded to the claimant, is concerned, in the case of Hakka, (MA No. 1555/2010), he has been awarded a sum of Rs. 25000/- for a simple elbow fracture. This Court has carefully gone through the impugned award and is of the considered opinion that the amount of Rs. 25000/- has rightly been awarded keeping in view the various factors and based upon the finding of facts. The quantum of amount which has been awarded does not warrant any interference. In the case of Smt. Kali, (MA No. 1585/2010) a sum of Rs. 4,000/- has been awarded for a simple injury and therefore, the amount awarded in the case of Smt. Kali also does not warrant any interference. In the case of Tersingh, (MA NO. 1586/2010) Rs. 4,000/- has been awarded for a simple injury and therefore the same also does not warrant any interference. In the case of Jhumla, (MA No. 1583/2010) a sum of Rs. In the case of Tersingh, (MA NO. 1586/2010) Rs. 4,000/- has been awarded for a simple injury and therefore the same also does not warrant any interference. In the case of Jhumla, (MA No. 1583/2010) a sum of Rs. 7000/- has been awarded, again for a simple injury, and therefore, this court does not find to be a fit case for interference. In the case of Smt. Basanti, (MA No. 1587/2010), Rs. 5,000/- has been awarded for a simple injury and in the case of Mathu, (MA No. 1584/2010), Rs. 6000/- has been awarded for a simple injury and keeping in view the findings arrived at in the award and also keeping in view the injuries suffered by them, this court does not find it to be a fit case for enhancement of the amount. Similarly, in the case of Deewan, (MA No. 1556 2010), a sum of Rs. 30200/- has been awarded and he was having a fracture of frontal bone and was admitted in the Hospital from 11/11/2007 to 19/11/2007 and therefore this court is of the considered opinion that the aforesaid amount has rightly been awarded to Deewan who was aged about 8 years. 9. Keeping in view the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Claims Tribunal has awarded just and proper compensation and no interference is called for in the matter. However, the basic question involved in the present case is whether the Insurance Company is liable to satisfy the liability by applying the principle of pay and recover, or not. The apex court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd., v. Swaran Singh and others reported in 2004 ACJ 1 in para 96, 97, 98 and 99 has held as under : (96) It is, therefore, evident from the discussions made hereinbefore that the liability of the insurance company to satisfy the decree at the first instance and to recover the awarded amount from the owner or driver thereof has been holding the field for a long time. (97) Apart from the reasons stated hereinbefore the doctrine of stare decisis persuades us not to deviate from the said principle. (98) It is well-settled rule of law and should not ordinarily be deviated from. (See The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and others, (1955) 2 SCR 603 at 630-632; Keshav Mills Co. (97) Apart from the reasons stated hereinbefore the doctrine of stare decisis persuades us not to deviate from the said principle. (98) It is well-settled rule of law and should not ordinarily be deviated from. (See The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and others, (1955) 2 SCR 603 at 630-632; Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North, (1965) 2 SCR 908 at 921-922; Union of India and another v. Reghubir Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. etc., (1989) 3 SCR 316 at 323, 327, 334; M/s. Gannon Dunkerle and Co. and others v. State of Rajasthan and others, (1993) 1 SCC 364 ; Belgaum Gardeners Co-operative Production Supply and Sale Society Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96; Hanumantappa Krishnappa Mantur and others v. State of Karnataka (1992 Supp (2) SCC 213). (99) We may, however, hasten to add that the Tribunal and the Court must, however, exercise their jurisdiction to issue such a direction upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case and in the event such a direction has been issued despite arriving at a finding of fact to the effect that the insurer has been able to establish that the insured has committed a breach of contract of insurance as envisaged under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, the insurance company shall be entitled to realise the awarded amount from the owner or driver and the vehicle, as the case may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Sections 165 and 168 of the Act. However, in the event, having regard to the limited scope of inquiry in the proceedings before the Tribunal it had not been able to do so, the insurance company may initiate a separate action therefor against the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both, as the case may be. Those exceptional cases may arise when the evidence becomes available to or comes to the notice of the insurer at a subsequent stage or for one reason or the other, the insurer was not given opportunity to defend at all. Those exceptional cases may arise when the evidence becomes available to or comes to the notice of the insurer at a subsequent stage or for one reason or the other, the insurer was not given opportunity to defend at all. Such a course of action may also be resorted when a fraud or collusion between the victim and the owner of the vehicle is detected or comes to the knowledge of the insurer at a later stage." 10. Keeping in view the judgment delivered by the apex court, it is the liability of the Insurance Company to satisfy the decree at the first instance and to recover the awarded amount from the Owner or Driver. 11. The judgment delivered by the apex court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd., v. Swaran Singh and others reported in 2004 ACJ 1 makes it very clear that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and the High Courts can exercise their jurisdiction to issue a direction to the Insurance Company to satisfy the decree at the first instance and to recover the awarded amount from the Owner or Driver thereof and therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that such a direction specially keeping in view, para 99 of the aforesaid judgment, can be issued by the Tribunals as well as by the Courts. 12. Resultantly, the appeals are allowed and the award is modified accordingly. The claimant shall be free to recover the awarded amount from the Insurance Company and the Insurance Company in turn shall be free to recover the same, later on, from the Owner and the Driver of the vehicle in question. The Insurance Company shall deposit the aforesaid amount as awarded by the Tribunal, within 30 days from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. 13. All the connected appeals are also partly allowed. No order as to costs.