JUDGMENT : 1. This is tenant's/defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 9-9-2003 passed by learned First Additional District Judge, Katni in Civil Appeal No. 41-A/2002, whereby the judgment and decree dated 29-4-2002 passed by learned Second Civil Judge, Class II, Katni in Civil Suit No. 11-A/1998 decreeing the suit of plaintiff/respondent has been affirmed. 2. The facts necessary for disposal of this second appeal lie in narrow compass. Suffice it is to say that the plaintiff/respondent on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant filed a suit for eviction against defendant/ appellant on the ground envisaged under section 12(1)(c) and (f) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity "Act"). 3. The appellants are the L.Rs. of defendant/tenant who had died during the pendency of this second appeal. In brief the case of plaintiff is that, he is the landlord of the tenanted premises which is non-residential and he gave the suit premises on monthly rent of Rs. 1600/- shown in the map annexed with the plaint, to the defendant. According to the plaintiff, no rent is due upon the tenant/ defendant. The suit accommodation is required by plaintiff for himself and for his two major sons who after graduation are sitting idle and are not serving anywhere. The need of plaintiff is bona fide and he is not having any reasonably suitable non-residential vacant accommodation of his own in the town in which he along with his two major sons could start the business of Seeds and Fertilisers and the suit premises is a suitable place to carry on such type of business because nearby the suit premises there are several other shops of Seeds and Fertilisers. The tenant/defendant is quite aware about the bona fide need of the landlord/ plaintiff and he also gave assurance that he would vacate the suit premises on 1-4-1997, but, despite the assurance given by him, he has not vacated it nor delivered its possession to the plaintiff. Hence, a decree of eviction on the ground of bona fide need as envisaged under section 12(1)(f) of the Act was originally sought by the plaintiff at the time of the filing of the suit. 4. The defendant by filing written statement denied the bona fide need of plaintiff, although he admitted the rate of rent to be Rs. 1600/- per month of the suit premises. 4. The defendant by filing written statement denied the bona fide need of plaintiff, although he admitted the rate of rent to be Rs. 1600/- per month of the suit premises. The factum of tenancy has not been denied by him in the written statement. On the other hand he has admitted that he is the tenant of plaintiff of the suit accommodation given for non-residential purpose. However, so far as the ownership of the suit premises is concerned, the tenant has pleaded that he is requesting that the ownership part be proved by the plaintiff and this is also indispensable because in respect to ownership for the year 1977-78 to 1995-96 in the record of Municipal Corporation Mudwara (Katni) the name of plaintiff as owner of the suit property is not mentioned and hence defendant by paying respect to the law and without prejudicing the plaintiff's right in order to provide justice pleaded in the written statement and prayed to the Court that plaintiff may be asked to prove his ownership. Further, defendant pleaded that in the year 1996-97 also in the municipal record plaintiff has not been shown to be owner of the suit premises however, anyhow, he got his name entered in the municipal record in the later year. Although, earlier to 1996-97 throughout Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar and Krishna Kumar have been shown to be the owners of the suit premises. 5. The defendant also specifically denied in so many words in the written statement about the alleged bona fide need of the plaintiff for himself and for his two major sons and also denied that plaintiff is not having any other reasonably suitable vacant non-residential place of his own in the township. Further, he had denied the allegations of plaintiff that he (defendant) ever gave any assurance to plaintiff that suit accommodation would be vacated by him till 1-4-1997 and hence it has been prayed that suit be dismissed. 6. Further, he had denied the allegations of plaintiff that he (defendant) ever gave any assurance to plaintiff that suit accommodation would be vacated by him till 1-4-1997 and hence it has been prayed that suit be dismissed. 6. After the written statement was filed, looking to its averments, the plaintiff amended his plaint and pleaded that earlier the owner of the suit property was one Mahadev Prasad Agrawal and plaintiff was his Purohit (a Brahmin who often offers Puja in the house of a person) and because plaintiff was offering Puja etc., therefore, said Mahadev Prasad in consideration of service of Puja rendered by the plaintiff, gave the suit property to him and declared him to be the owner of the suit property. Said Mahadev Prasad also delivered possession of the suit property to the plaintiff and thereafter the plaintiff inducted the defendant as his tenant 20 years ago and the defendant by accepting to be his landlord is paying monthly rent to him regularly. In the rent receipts also the plaintiff has been mentioned as the landlord of the defendant and the defendant by accepting the plaintiff to be his landlord has signed the rent receipts. Further, it has been pleaded by the plaintiff by way of amendment that defendant never objected that plaintiff is not his landlord. Not only this by accepting the plaintiff to be his landlord, the defendant in Case No. 11/A/90 (3) 1996-97 filed a case under section 25 of the Act before the Rent Controlling Authority praying the said authority to permit him to deposit the rent and before the said authority, he also deposited the rent. Hence, the defendant cannot challenge the title of the landlord/plaintiff. 7. Simultaneously, plaintiff further amended his plaint praying the Court that since the defendant has denied his title of the plaintiff, therefore, a decree of eviction on the ground under section 12(1)(c) of the Act be also passed. 8. After the plaint was amended, the defendant also amended his written statement and denied the averments of plaintiff pleaded by him. 7. Simultaneously, plaintiff further amended his plaint praying the Court that since the defendant has denied his title of the plaintiff, therefore, a decree of eviction on the ground under section 12(1)(c) of the Act be also passed. 8. After the plaint was amended, the defendant also amended his written statement and denied the averments of plaintiff pleaded by him. According to defendant, at the time of obtaining the suit premises on tenancy basis by him and by his father Kishan Chand, they contacted Dhanya Kumar Agrawal and his father Dharamdas Agrawal and indeed they inducted the defendant in the suit premises and it was told to them that because several disputes often arise in the Income Tax Department and in other Government departments in regard to tax etc., hence rent receipts shall be issued mentioning the name of plaintiff to be the landlord. According to the defendant, since he and his father were keen to obtain the suit premises, therefore, they obtained the suit premises with the aforesaid understanding provided to them by Dhanya Kumar Agrawal and his father Dharamdas. It is relevant to mention that Dharamdas is the son of Mahadev Prasad for whom it is pleaded by plaintiff by amending his plaint that on account of consideration of the services of Puja, said Mahadev Prasad gave the suit property to the plaintiff declaring him to be the owner of the same. Hence, in this manner the defendant is paying rent to the plaintiff accepting him to be his landlord of the suit premises. Further, it has been pleaded by defendant that the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit premises in accordance with law. According to defendant in regard to the assessment of house tax etc. Dhanya Kumar and plaintiff themselves have submitted several objections in the Municipal Corporation, which are pending for its decision. 9. On the basis of averments made in the plaint and denial in the written statement, learned trial Court framed necessary issues and after recording the evidence of the parties found that the plaintiff is entitled for decree of eviction under section 12(1)(c) and (f) of the Act. 10. The defendant being dissatisfied by the judgment and decree of trial Court filed first appeal before the learned First Appellate Court, which has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 11. 10. The defendant being dissatisfied by the judgment and decree of trial Court filed first appeal before the learned First Appellate Court, which has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 11. In this manner, this second appeal has been filed by defendant/tenant in this Court, which was admitted on 20-8-2004 on the following substantial questions of law :- "(1) Whether in view of there being no authentic registered document in relation to ownership of the plaintiff, the Courts below seriously erred in law, in passing decree of eviction under section 12(1)(c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961? (2) Whether in view of there being no legal evidence in relation to bona fide requirement of the suit shop to the plaintiff and his sons, the Courts below erred in law in passing a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ?" 12. Shri S. K. Dwivedi, learned Counsel for appellant/defendant by inviting my attention to clause (c) of section 12(1) of the Act has submitted that nowhere the defendant has set-up the title of suit premises in himself and very clearly he has pleaded that by paying all the respect to the law and without prejudicing the right of the plaintiff in order to serve the justice, the tenant is requesting the Court that plaintiff be asked to prove his ownership because nowhere earlier to 1996-97 his name was ever entered in the municipal record as owner of the suit property, on the contrary the names of Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar and Krishna Kumar Agrawal were entered as owner of the suit property. 13. 13. Further, it has been contended by learned Counsel that after the plaintiff amended his written statement by pleading that at the time of obtaining the suit premises from Dhanya Kumar and his father Dharamdas Agrawal on their assurance and understanding provided to defendant and his father Kishan Chand that because several disputes would rise in regard to income tax and property tax etc., therefore, plaintiff shall issue receipt in his name to the defendant mentioning him to be the landlord of defendant, and because the defendant was in need of the suit premises, therefore, in such a situation, he accepted the plaintiff to be his landlord and therefore, in these facts and circumstances, if the clear picture is shown it cannot be said that on the basis of such pleading the tenant has denied the title of plaintiff and his pleading will never adversely or substantially affect the interest of the landlord/ plaintiff. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court (Justice R. C. Lahoti, J. as His Lordship then was) in Nirvikar Gupta vs. Ram Kumar, AIR 1992 MP 115 . Learned Counsel submits that similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Justice R. C. Lahoti in the Supreme Court in Sheela and others vs. Firm PrahladRai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375 . Learned Counsel by inviting my attention to Paras 10, 12 and 14 onwards of the said decision has submitted that the decision of Supreme Court in Sheela (supra), is squarely applicable in the present case and the facts of the case of Sheela (supra), and the pleadings of the written statement of that case are akin to the pleadings of present case also, and therefore, said decision of Supreme Court is squarely applicable in the present case and hence, it has been submitted that no decree of eviction under section 12(1)(c) of the Act can be passed against the defendant/appellant. 14. By addressing on the second substantial question of law it has been propounded by Shri Dwivedi, learned Counsel for appellant that bona fide need envisaged under section 12(1)(f) of the Act can be conveniently divided into two categories. 14. By addressing on the second substantial question of law it has been propounded by Shri Dwivedi, learned Counsel for appellant that bona fide need envisaged under section 12(1)(f) of the Act can be conveniently divided into two categories. According to learned Counsel in the first category the bona fide need of the landlord can be considered for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that for his any major son or unmarried daughter if he is owner thereof and the second category contemplates and authorises the landlord to file suit on the ground of bona fide need of any other person for whose benefit the accommodation is held with a further stipulation in both the categories the landlord must not have any other reasonably suitable vacant non-residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. Thus, according to learned Counsel the word "owner" is having great significance for the purpose of this clause in passing the decree of eviction. Specifically, learned Counsel argued that it is not his submission that in order to prove the ownership in a suit of eviction under Rent control Legislation, the landlord is required to prove strict legal title as the same is required to be proved in a title suit, however, still it is having some significance although in a narrow sense, but, certainly it is having some wider connotation for the purpose of this clause in comparison to the other clauses of section 12(1) of the Act. Learned Counsel submitted that after amending the plaint, the pleadings of ownership which plaintiff has pleaded, he cannot be accepted under the law to be the owner of the suit property because according to plaintiff the suit property was originally belonged to Mahadev Prasad Agrawal whose son was Dharamdas and Dharamdas's son is Dhanya Kumar and without alienating the suit property by way of sale, gift or any other mode of a valid conveyance recognised by law, the suit property cannot be alienated to plaintiff. According to learned Counsel admittedly there is no registered document of conveyance of the suit property which is immovable, in favour of the plaintiff. 15. Learned Counsel further submits that had the case been filed by present plaintiff in the second category of section 12(1)(f), the matter would have been different. According to learned Counsel admittedly there is no registered document of conveyance of the suit property which is immovable, in favour of the plaintiff. 15. Learned Counsel further submits that had the case been filed by present plaintiff in the second category of section 12(1)(f), the matter would have been different. But, in order to bring the case within the ambit and scope of first category of clause (f) of section 12(1) of the Act, the plaintiff was legally bound to prove his ownership which may be narrower in comparison to the title suit, but, it is wider than that of other clauses envisaged under section 12(1) of the Act. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Sheela (supra) and also another decision of Supreme Court in Prem Narayan Barchhiha vs. Hakimuddin Saifi, (1999) 6 SCC 381 . Learned Counsel submits that although in Prem Narayan's case, the appeal of landlord was allowed by the Apex Court by passing a decree of eviction but in Para 12 how clause (f) to section 12(1) is to be interpreted, the Supreme Court has thrown sufficient light on it and the present appeal is to be examined on the anvil and touchstone of norms fixed by the Supreme Court in Para 12 of the said decision. Learned Counsel has also placed reliance on Single Bench decision of this Court in Manorama Bahadur and others vs. A.C.M. Swami, 1978 JLJ 416 . Hence, according to learned Counsel for appellant since the grounds envisaged under section 12(1)(c) and (f) are not proved, by allowing this appeal the impugned judgment passed by two Courts below be set aside and the suit be dismissed. 16. On the other hand, Shri Jain, learned Counsel for respondent/plaintiff submitted that admittedly defendant is paying rent to plaintiff for a considerable long period, and therefore, under section 116 of the Evidence Act, he is estopped from challenging the plaintiff's title. Learned Counsel submits that admitting the plaintiff to be his landlord, the defendant submitted the application under section 25 before the Rent Controlling Authority praying to the said Authority to permit defendant to deposit the rent. Hence, if now the defendant is disowning the title of the plaintiff, he (plaintiff) is entitled to a decree of eviction as envisaged under section 12(1)(c) of the Act. Hence, if now the defendant is disowning the title of the plaintiff, he (plaintiff) is entitled to a decree of eviction as envisaged under section 12(1)(c) of the Act. According to the learned Counsel, provision of section 12(1)(c) cannot be interpreted in a manner that if a title is denied by a tenant then only it would be a ground for eviction but according to this provision if any act has been done by the tenant, which is likely to affect adversely and substantially to the interest of landlord, he can be evicted from the tenanted premises. Learned Counsel by inviting my attention to section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act has submitted that denial of title of the landlord by a tenant amounts to forfeiture of tenancy but said analogy cannot be accepted for the Rent Control Legislation because the present Act is a special creature of the statute and eviction decree can be passed in terms of any of the grounds envisaged under section 12(1) of the Act. Learned Counsel submits that for last 20 years the defendant accepted the plaintiff to be his landlord and therefore, his act in setting up the title in Dhanya Kumar cannot be said to be bona fide and hence by such an act of the tenant/defendant the right of plaintiff has been adversely affected because it amounts to setting up title in a third person. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has invited by attention to Single Bench decision in Devraj s/o Baldev Prasad Sharma vs. Naina Devnani w/o Ramesh Devnani and others, 2008(3) MPLJ 239 Para 12. 17. It has been then contended by learned Counsel for respondent that if the tenant is denying the title of his landlord without setting up a title in himself or in third person then it would mean that although he is denying the title of his landlord and is not setting up his title in himself or in third person, but, he cannot be evicted from the suit premises and this cannot be the intention of the Legislature and, therefore, in this backdrop the decisions of Sheela (supra) and Devraj (supra), should be considered. 18. 18. Further, it has been contended by learned Counsel for the respondent that for all practical purposes, the plaintiff being owner of the suit premises so far as the defendant is concerned, therefore, rightly a decree of eviction under section 12(1) (f) of the Act has been passed. Learned Counsel has also placed heavy reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Anar Devi (Smt.) vs. Nathu Ram, (1994) 4 SCC 250 , and argued that what is the meaning of word "owner" used in section 12(1)(f) of the Act should be seen on the touchstone of principles laid down by the Supreme Court in this decision. On the aforesaid submissions, it has been submitted by learned Counsel for respondent that this appeal is having no force and, therefore, the same be dismissed. 19. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal of tenant deserves to be allowed. Regarding substantial question of law No. 1 : 20. To deal with the rival contentions of learned Counsel for parties on the touchstone and anvil of grounds of eviction envisaged under section 12(1)(c) and (f) of the Act, it would be appropriate to go through the Preamble, object and nature of the Act. The Preamble of the Act is :- "An Act to provide for the regulation and control of letting and rent of accommodations, for expeditious trial of eviction cases on ground of "bona fide" requirement of certain categories of landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants from accommodations and for other matter connected therewith or incidental thereto." On bare perusal of the Preamble, it is gathered that the Act has been enacted to regulate and control eviction of tenants from accommodation. The words "regulate" and "control" of tenants are deliberately used by the Legislature so that it may be beneficial to landlords as well as to the tenants. According to me, the Legislature will never use surplusage words. The object of the Act is to provide protection to the tenants by preventing unscrupulous and veracious landlords from evicting the tenants. Looking to the aim of the Legislature obviously it is not to extinguish all the rights of landlords and the reasonable restrictions are provided under the Act itself to the extent that they are necessary for the purpose of preventing rack renting and ejectment of tenants. Looking to the aim of the Legislature obviously it is not to extinguish all the rights of landlords and the reasonable restrictions are provided under the Act itself to the extent that they are necessary for the purpose of preventing rack renting and ejectment of tenants. According to me, one of the acts of legislating the Rent Control Legislation is to restrict landlord to eject the tenant at his wishes and sweet will. Therefore, the paramount object of the Act is to provide the safeguards to the tenants against their exploitation by landlords but simultaneously to provide certain grounds of eviction to the landlords. 21. The grounds of eviction envisaged under clause (c) of section 12(1) of the Act can be further sub-divided into three clauses. Under the first sub-clause the landlord is entitled to have a decree of eviction if the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance. The second sub-clause authorises landlord to seek a decree of eviction if the tenant has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he is admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation and under the third sub-clause a decree of eviction shall be passed if any act has been done by the tenant which is likely to affect adversely and substantially to the interest of the landlord. It would be germane to quote section 12(1)(c) of the Act in its entirety, which reads thus :- "Section 12(1)(c) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance or has done any act, which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the recommendation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein. Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy." 22. In the present case, the plaintiff/respondent has filed the suit of eviction under the third sub-clause to clause (c). Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy." 22. In the present case, the plaintiff/respondent has filed the suit of eviction under the third sub-clause to clause (c). Hence, in order to give any finding whether the plaintiff's suit is liable to be decreed under the said clause, it is to be seen whether defendant/appellant has done any act, which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of plaintiff and in order to arrive at a conclusion in this regard it would be condign to see the pleading of the defendant because originally the suit was not filed by the plaintiff seeking decree of eviction under this clause, but it was filed on the sole ground of bona fide requirement envisaged under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. Indeed, after filing of the written statement a decree of eviction under sub-clause (c) of section 12(1) of the Act has been sought by the landlord. Hence, in order to take out the grain from the chaff whether any such act has been done by the defendant, which has adversely and substantially affected the right of the plaintiff, the pleading of the defendant in the written statement is required to be seen and it would be appropriate to quote necessary pleading made by defendant in Para 1 of his written statement, which reads thus :- 23. On bare perusal of Para 1 of the written statement this Court finds that very humbly the defendant has prayed to the Court that without prejudicing and adversely affecting the right of the plaintiff and by paying full respect to the law, he is pleading that the burden of proof of ownership of the suit premises is on the plaintiff and he may be asked to prove it. Further, it is more necessary because in respect to ownership of the suit premises for a considerable long period of 20 years, i.e., 1977-78 to 1995-96 his name was never entered as owner of the suit premises. At this juncture, we are reminded that somewhere in the year 1977-78 the defendant was inducted as tenant in the suit premises. Only in the year 1996-97 the name of plaintiff has been entered as owner in the municipal record. At this juncture, we are reminded that somewhere in the year 1977-78 the defendant was inducted as tenant in the suit premises. Only in the year 1996-97 the name of plaintiff has been entered as owner in the municipal record. It would also be relevant to go through the situation that when suit was filed on 20-2-1998, immediately before filing of the suit, the name of plaintiff was anyhow got entered in the municipal record. If Court goes earlier to 1996-97 nowhere plaintiff has been shown to be the owner of the suit premises in the municipal record. It is well settled in law that civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance and probabilities and, therefore, one can think that in order to evict the defendant from the suit premises, first the plaintiff got his name entered as owner in the municipal record during the year 1996-97 and thereafter the eviction suit has been filed. The plaintiff himself has admitted in Para 22 of his examination that his name as owner of the suit premises was never entered during the long period of 1978 to 1996. Further he has admitted in Para 23 of his cross-examination that after the death of original owner Mahadev Prasad, the suit property was entered in the name of Dhanya Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Rajkumar and Kishore in the municipal record who are sons of Dharamdas and Dharamdas was the son of Mahadev Prasad. 24. A very interesting part in the present case is that the plaintiff examined Dhanya Kumar as P.W. 2 and when cross-examination was started upon him, unfortunately, it was not completed because Court's time was over and, therefore, this witness was given-up by plaintiff later on and was never called for further cross-examination and, therefore, again one can infer why he was given-up and not put for cross-examination. Because in cross-examination when this witness was cornered, he has admitted that his name along with the names of his other brothers has been entered as owner in the municipal record not only in regard to the suit property but also in respect to several other immovable properties in the township. This point was further cross-examined but unfortunately Court's time was over and the cross-examination was deferred to next date of hearing 14-5-2001. This point was further cross-examined but unfortunately Court's time was over and the cross-examination was deferred to next date of hearing 14-5-2001. On 14-5-2001 plaintiffs uncrossed witness Dhanya Kumar was not present and a date was sought on behalf of plaintiff and matter was adjourned to 27-7-2001. On this date and also on 24-8-2001 said witness Dhanya Kumar was not present although other witnesses of plaintiff were examined. Similarly, on next date 19-9-2001 some more witnesses of plaintiff were examined but said witness Dhanya Kumar did not remain present. Ultimately on 24-9-2001 plaintiffs Counsel stated to the Court that his evidence is over and he does not want to examine any more witness and in this manner said witness Dhanya Kumar was not further cross-examined. 25. In the aforesaid backdrop, if we uplift the veil, the hidden mala fide idea of seeking eviction of defendant is exposed that in order to create a ground of eviction of alleged bona fide need firstly the name of plaintiff was entered in the municipal record as owner and thereafter the truth may not come out from the mouth of witness Dhanya Kumar when he was cornered during cross-examination that indeed plaintiff is not the owner of the suit property and this witness along with his brothers, is the owner of the suit property and the defendant/tenant was asked to accept the plaintiff as his landlord on the assurance and the understanding provided by the true owners to him, the present suit for eviction has been filed. Hence, the said witness was not produced for cross-examination so as to save him from saying the truth. As a matter of fact, the purpose of quoting the Preamble, aims, object and nature of the Act hereinabove was only in order to visualise the pleadings of the parties on the touchstone and anvil of ground of eviction which plaintiff has taken and whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, can a decree of eviction be passed or not. 26. According to me, the principles laid down in the decision of Supreme Court in Sheela (supra) and that of decision of this Court in Nirvikar Gupta (supra), are squarely applicable in the present case. 26. According to me, the principles laid down in the decision of Supreme Court in Sheela (supra) and that of decision of this Court in Nirvikar Gupta (supra), are squarely applicable in the present case. In the decision of Sheela (supra), although defendant pleaded inter alia, that the plaintiffs were not the owner of the suit premises and therefore, tenant was not liable to be evicted but in that very written statement at other places the defendant admitted the plaintiffs to be his landlords. The purpose of quoting the relevant portion of Para 1 of the written statement was only this much that how and in what manner the facts of two cases are more or less akin to each other. Nowhere defendant of Sheela's case (supra), had setup title of his own and prayed that plaintiffs may be directed to prove their title although defendant is accepting that they are his landlords. In the case at hand also the defendant/appellant has never set up the title of his own and respectfully prayed to the Court that without prejudicing and adversely affecting the right of plaintiff and accepting him to be his landlord, the plaintiff be directed to prove his ownership. 27. On going through the pleadings of the defendant this Court finds that defendant has never renounced his character as tenant and in a clear and unequivocal term nowhere he has setup title of the suit premises in him or in a third party and he is bona fidely calling upon the plaintiff to prove his ownership or putting landlord to prove his title so as to protect himself (defendant) or to earn a protection made available to him under the Act, but without disowning his character of possession over the tenanted premises as tenant. In these facts and circumstances, according to me, it cannot be said that his act was anyway injurious to landlord/plaintiff and he had not done any act which may likely to affect adversely and substantially to the interest of the plaintiff. Hence, according to me, a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(c) of the Act cannot be passed. 28. The substantial question of law No. 1 is thus answered that the Courts below have erred in law in passing the judgment under section 12(1)(c) of the Act. Regarding substantial question of law No. 2 : 29. Hence, according to me, a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(c) of the Act cannot be passed. 28. The substantial question of law No. 1 is thus answered that the Courts below have erred in law in passing the judgment under section 12(1)(c) of the Act. Regarding substantial question of law No. 2 : 29. At the cost of repetition, I may again state here that initially the suit for eviction was filed by plaintiff for bona fide need of himself and for his two major sons to start the business of Seeds and Fertilisers in the suit premises. After the written statement was filed, the plaintiff amended his plaint and pleaded in Para 1 (a) that because the then owner of the suit property Mahadev Prasad Agrawal was pleased on account of services of offering Puja etc., by the plaintiff, he gave the suit property to the plaintiff, which was in consideration of the Puja etc. Further it has been pleaded by the plaintiff that said Mahadev Prasad also declared him to be the owner of the property and delivered its possession. According to me, for no scintilla of imagination it can be said that any title of the suit property whose value is admittedly more than Rs. 100/- was conveyed in the plaintiff because no registered document and a valid conveyance deed has been executed in favour of plaintiff. True, as rightly contended by learned Counsel for respondent that inquiry in respect to ownership in eviction suit under the Rent Control Legislation is not that much wider as that of title suit. But according to me, it is equally true that it is having some wider connotation (though in narrow sense) than that of other grounds of eviction envisaged under section 12(1) of the Act and the plaintiff is legally bound to prove his ownership in narrow sense so as to bring his case within the ambit and scope of word "owner" used in section 12(1) of the Act. 30. The word "owner" has not been defined in the Act although words "landlord" and "tenant" are defined in section 2 (b) and (i) respectively. 30. The word "owner" has not been defined in the Act although words "landlord" and "tenant" are defined in section 2 (b) and (i) respectively. In order to obtain a decree of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement envisaged in clause (f) of the Act, according to me, the plaintiff is required to prove not only that he is a landlord but at the same time he has to prove that he is also the owner of the premises for the simple reason that the word "owner" has been deliberately used by Legislature under clause (f) of the Act. As already held hereinabove by me that Legislature will never use any surplusage word while enacting a particular provision of the statute and therefore, according to me if bona fidely the tenant is disputing the ownership of the plaintiff then upto certain extent within the ambit and scope of narrow sense, the plaintiff is required to prove his ownership. True, a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any accommodation would come within the ambit of definition of "landlord" but merely he is receiving or is having right to receive the rent, cannot be said that he would be the owner of the said accommodation unless and until he proves it. The plaintiff has already admitted in the first line of cross-examination that his name was never recorded as owner in the record of Municipal Corporation for long period from the year 1978 to 1996 and further admitted that suit property has been recorded in the name of Dhanya Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Rajkumar and Kishore. The defendant Dayaldas (D.W. 1) has specifically stated in Paras 1 and 7 of his testimony that he took the suit premises from Dhanya Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Rajkumar and Dharamdas Agrawal and on being said by these persons he accepted the rent receipts in the name of plaintiff showing him to be landlord. Indeed this is the initial pleading of the defendant in his written statement. The limited purpose of quoting this vital piece of evidence going to the root of the matter is to take out the grain from the chaff whether plaintiff is entitled to a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. Indeed this is the initial pleading of the defendant in his written statement. The limited purpose of quoting this vital piece of evidence going to the root of the matter is to take out the grain from the chaff whether plaintiff is entitled to a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. Hence, according to me, the plaintiff was only collecting rent from the defendant for the true owners Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar, Krishna Kumar and Dharamdas and if that would be the position he cannot be said to be "owner" even in narrow sense so as to evict the appellant from the suit premises under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. 31. By keeping these situations in mind as well as the proposition of provisions of section 116 of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court in the decision of Sheela (supra), has thrown sufficient light in Para 10 of the said decision. Further on bare perusal of Para 7 of the said decision, the Supreme Court by clarifying that although the ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act was not the point in hand in the Supreme Court, but, in order to interpret clause (c) of the Act effectively the Apex Court in Para 10 has laid down the law in regard to bona fide need also. On the aforesaid backdrop, the decision of Supreme Court in Anar Devi (supra), and the decision of this Court in Devraj (supra), relied by learned Counsel for respondent are not applicable. 32. Apart from what I have held hereinabove, had the suit been filed by the plaintiff/respondent under the second category of section 12(1)(f) of the Act (i.e., the non-residential accommodation is bona fide needed by landlord for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held), matter would have been altogether different. But the present case has not been filed by the plaintiff by pleading that for the benefit of Dhanya Kumar, Rajkumar, Krishna Kumar and Dharamdas the accommodation was held by him and they are in need of the suit accommodation and for that plaintiff or those persons do not have any reasonably suitable vacant accommodation of their own in the city or town. Hence, I am of the view that a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(f) also cannot be passed. 33. Hence, I am of the view that a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(f) also cannot be passed. 33. Substantial question of law No. 2 is thus answered that because plaintiff is not found to be the owner of the suit property, it cannot be said that suit accommodation is needed by him bona fide for his own requirement and for his sons and Courts below have erred in passing the decree of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. 34. Resultantly, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and decree passed by learned two Courts below are hereby set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.