JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pankaj Mithal, J.—Supplementary affidavit filed is taken on record. 2. Heard Sri Swapnil Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Anadi Krishna, learned counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 2/1 to 2/9. 3. The Original Suit No. 423 of 1972 (Rishi Kumar v. Ramesh Chandra Sharma and others) for mandatory injunction for possession of the property in dispute was decreed by appellate Court and the said decree attained finality. The decree holder has put the said decree in execution. The petitioners are resisting the execution of the decree on the ground that they are purchasers of the part of the suit land from Smt. Surya Mukhi, the wife of one of the judgment debtors who was not substituted in appeal. In short the claim of the petitioners is that they are persons other than the judgment debtors in possession of the property. 4. The petitioners applied under Order 21 Rule 97/99 CPC that the decree may not be executed against them as their rights have intervened and the decree is not binding upon them. In order to substantiate their claim they moved application to adduce evidence but the application has been rejected by the impugned order dated 24.8.2012 which has been upheld in revision vide order dated 10.10.2012. 5. The above two orders have been impugned in the present writ petition. 6. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that application under Order 21 Rule 97/99 CPC cannot be decided without allowing the parties opportunity to adduce evidence. 7. Sri Anadi Krishna, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/9 submits that the above application is actually an application under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC. The petitioners have earlier filed objections under Section 47 CPC and resisted the execution. The matter had come up to the High Court and it was remanded to the executing Court with the direction to decide them afresh considering as to whether petitioners are the representatives of one of the judgment debtors Ramesh Chandra Sharma or not. 8. In view of submissions made above, it is apparent that the petitioners objections alleged to have been filed under Section 47 CPC as well as an application under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC are pending consideration before the executing Court. 9. 8. In view of submissions made above, it is apparent that the petitioners objections alleged to have been filed under Section 47 CPC as well as an application under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC are pending consideration before the executing Court. 9. However, in this petition, the only controversy is as to whether petitioners can be permitted to lead evidence in support of the application under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC before the executing Court. 10. A composite reading of Rules 97-106 of Order 21 CPC reveals that wherever delivery of possession of an immovable property in execution is obstructed by any person, the decree holder is entitle to make a complain under Rule 97 and where a stranger to a decree is dispossessed he can make an application/objection under Rule 99 to get back the possession. In either of the case the executing Court is enjoined upon to decide the rights, title and interest of the obstructionist in the property in the execution itself and such adjudication/order is appealable as a decree under Rule 103 of Order 21 CPC. 11. The said rights are liable to be adjudicated before the obstructionist is dispossessed as has been held in various decisions of the Apex Court.[Bhanwar Lal v. Staya Narain, AIR 1995 SC 358 ; Babulal v. Raj Kumar and others, AIR 1996 SC 2050 ; Brhamdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another, AIR 1997 SC 856 ; Silverline Forum (P) Limited v. Rajiv Trust and another, AIR 1998 SC 1754 and Anwarbi v. Pramod D.A. Joshi, (2000) 10 SCC 405 .] 12. The above rights of a person in an immovable property are valuable rights protected by Article 300 A of the Constitution of India. Therefore, no one can be deprived of the same without following the due procedure prescribed or in violation of the principles of natural justice unless their applicability is specifically dispensed with by any statue. 13. Previously, these rights were required to be adjudicated by a separate suit but with the amendment of the CPC w.e.f. 1.2.1977 to prevent filing of a separate suit in this regard so as to expedite the execution of a a decree, all such rights have been permitted to be determined by the executing Court seized of the execution of the decree. Thus, it envisages a full fledged trial as against the summary determination permitted earlier which was subject to the result of a separate suit in that connection. 14. The power of adjudication vested in the executing Court under the above provisions is a substantial one which has to be exercised like a regular trial of a suit as the order thereon is to be treated as a decree. 15. In N.S.S. Narayana Sarma and others v. Goldstone Exports (P) Limited and others, (2002) 1 SCC 662 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions Rule 97/99 of Order 21 CPC alongwith Rules 101 and 103 CPC observed that the position is manifest that when any person claiming title to the property in his possession obstructs the attempt by the decree-holder to dispossess him from the said property the executing Court is competent to consider all questions raised by the person offering obstruction against execution of the decree and pass appropriate order which under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 103 CPC is to be treated as a decree and would be appellable as such, meaning thereby that all questions or issue raised or arising between the parties have to be finally decided by the executing Court itself and since the person obstructing the decree had not been given any opportunity to adduce evidence earlier, it by implication necessitates opportunity to adduce evidence to him in support of the objections. 16. The obstructionist has to establish by evidence that he has an independent right in the property and that he is in possession before the institution of the suit etc. This cannot be done unless he is given opportunity to adduce evidence. 17. Similarly, in P.Janardhana Rao v. Kannan and others, (2004) 11 SCC 511 , it has been observed that right to immovable property is a substantive right and wherever dispute relating to such rights arises justice demand that such rights be adjudicated upon conclusively as in the suit. In case there was no evidence to show that obstructionist is not in possession, he would not be entitle to any protection. 18. In case there was no evidence to show that obstructionist is not in possession, he would not be entitle to any protection. 18. In Kazi Akeel Ahmad v. Ibrahim and another, JT 1996 (4) 444, their Lordships of the Supreme Court turned down the plea of the obstructionist to the decree as there was no evidence from his side to prove his claim, meaning thereby that evidence plays a crucial role in determination of such rights by the executing Court. 19. In another decision in Samiullah v. Mohammad Yasin and others, 1988 (2) CCC 285, learned Single Judge of this Court in dealing with Rule 97 of Order 21 CPC observed that it is advisable for the Court to frame issues on the controversy raised between the parties and to call upon them to lead their evidence on all those issues. 20. Thus, in the totality of facts and circumstances, it appears that framing of issues arising between the parties on application under Order 21 Rule 97/99 CPC and allowing the parties opportunity to adduce evidence in deciding the same is always advisable. 21. Thus, looking from this aspect of the matter, I find that the Courts below have erred in not permitting the petitioners to adduce the evidence in support of application under Order 21 Rule 97/99 CPC merely for the reason that the execution happens to be pending for long. 22. Accordingly, impugned orders dated 28.8.2012 and 10.10.2012 are set aside and the executing Court is directed to permit the petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC and to decide the same as well as objections purported to be filed under Section 47 CPC in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of the certified copy of this order by either of the parties. —————