Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has come forward to challenge an order dated 23.3.2011 and after setting aside the same seeks for a direction to get the consequential benefits. 2. The petitioner who was working as a Cashier in the Regional Office, TCMF Ltd., at Thiruthuraipoondi was relieved from duty on 29.2.2008 without prejudice to the investigation by the Director of Vigilance and Anti Corruption. By the impugned order, dated 23.3.2011, he was issued with a charge memo setting out several charges which are to be proved by the list of witnesses found in Annexure-III and also list of documents found in Annexure-IV. The list of witnesses runs into as many as 77 persons and that the list of documents listed therein are around 52 documents. 3. The contention raised by the petitioner was that the charge memo was framed after 11 years. Therefore, it has to be quashed on the ground of delay. In similar cases, this court has quashed the charge memo. 4. However, in this case, it is not clear as to why, though the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Madurai Bench, the petitioner has chosen to move this court. Even otherwise, admittedly, the petitioner was an employee of the Cooperative Society, i.e., Thanjavur Cooperative Marketing Federation Limited and no writ will lie in the light of the larger bench judgment of this court inK.Marappan Vs. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Namakkal Circle, Namakkal-636 001 and another reported in 2006 (4) CTC 689 . Further merely because the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation, it does not mean that the enquiry cannot be proceeded with. 5. In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the division bench of this court in T.K.K.TharmarVs. Registrar, Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench, Chennai-104 and others reported in 2008 (3) MLJ 877 , wherein after reviewing all the previous cases including the subsequent pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it was held in paragraphs 27 and 28 as follows: "27. Therefore, in the light of the above, it has to be held that even after retirement, if there are statutory Rules providing for continuation of the disciplinary proceedings, no exception can be taken for continuing a disciplinary action by an employer. 28. In the present case, Rule 9 is a complete answer for the contention raised by the petitioner. Therefore, in the light of the above, it has to be held that even after retirement, if there are statutory Rules providing for continuation of the disciplinary proceedings, no exception can be taken for continuing a disciplinary action by an employer. 28. In the present case, Rule 9 is a complete answer for the contention raised by the petitioner. It must also be noted that very recently, the Supreme Court in the judgment in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and others Vs. Kamal Swaroop Tondon (2008) 2 SCC 41 dealt with a case of the employers right to initiate action even after retirement. The following passage found in paragraphs 27 and 28 may be usefully reproduced: Para27:"In UCO Bank v. SanwarMal (2004) 4 SCC 412 , the Court held that two concepts: (i) resignation; and (ii) retirement were different and employed for different purposes and in different contexts. Resignation brings about complete cessation of master and servant relationship, but retirement does not do so. In case of retirement, master and servant relationship continues for grant of retiral benefits. Para 28:If it is so, the appellant Corporation, in our opinion, is right in submitting that the proceedings could have been continued after the retirement of the respondent employee as far as the financial loss caused to the Corporation because of negligence on the part of employee and the benefit claimed by the respondent workman on his terminal benefits are concerned. 6. A division bench of this court in The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kilpauk, Chennai-10 and another Vs. G.Manoharan reported in 2010 (2) CTC 234 , after reviewing the case laws in paragraph 33 held as follows : "33. From the records produced in this case, the following facts are obvious:- (a) The activities of the first respondent had caused a great deal of consternation among the authorities and they were forced to transfer him from the place where, according to them, he was causing a lot of damage. (b) The disciplinary proceedings had been actually initiated before his age of superannuation, since the first charge memo is dated 6.6.2003, whereas his age of superannuation is 31.6.2003. (c) He had also given a reply to the charge memo dated 6.6.2003, but had not chosen to reveal the fact of the issuance of this earlier charge memo in his writ affidavit. (c) He had also given a reply to the charge memo dated 6.6.2003, but had not chosen to reveal the fact of the issuance of this earlier charge memo in his writ affidavit. (d) No orders had been passed permitting him to retire; on the contrary, he was suspended on the eve of his attaining the age of superannuation. (e) The Supreme Court has held that even if a person had retired, if it is proved that he had caused loss to the establishment, then proceedings can be initiated to recover the amount of loss from him. (f) Even if a person has attained the age of superannuation, it is possible to dismiss him, in which event, he will not be entitled to his terminal dues vide (2007) 9 S.C.C. 15 (supra). (g) In any event, Section 87 of the Act gives the power to proceed against even a past employee for recovery and restoration of the financial loss caused to the Society." 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a decision of a division bench of this court in W.A.No.1390 of 2008 and batch cases, dated 8.9.2010 in relation to the Tamil Nadu State Apex Cooperative Bank Ltd., wherein this court held that a writ petition was maintainable and a direction to pay pension was given. However, the circumstances under which the division bench got over the larger bench judgment is not clearly spelt out. 8. On the other hand, subsequent to the decision of the larger bench judgment in Marappans case, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the maintainability of a Writ Petition in respect of a Cooperative Society in more than one judgment. 9. The Supreme Court vide its judgment in GurcharanSingh v. Registrar, Coop. Societies, H.P., reported in (2005) 7 SCC 565 , at page 566 in paragraph 2 observed as follows: "2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted with reference to a seven-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in PradeepKumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology1 that the writ petition is maintainable. By the said judgment, the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of SabhajitTewary v. Union of India was overruled. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted with reference to a seven-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in PradeepKumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology1 that the writ petition is maintainable. By the said judgment, the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of SabhajitTewary v. Union of India was overruled. The Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Ajay Hasia v. KhalidMujib Sehravardi was explained and multiple tests for determining whether a particular corporation or body can be held to be included within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution, were laid down. It was inter alia held as follows: (SCC p. 134, para 40) “40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia case3 are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be — whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control ofthe Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.” (emphasis supplied) It appears that the basic factual aspects were not placed before the High Court to determine the question whether the respondent Society was “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In view of the aforesaid, we feel that it would be appropriate for the High Court to examine the question regarding the maintainability in the background of what has been stated in PradeepKumar case1. The parties shall be permitted to place materials in support of their respective stands in this regard. As the matter is pending since 1995 and involves the question of legality or otherwise of termination of services of the appellant, it would be in the interest of the parties if the writ petition is disposed of as early as practicable, preferably within four months from the date of receipt of our order." 10. As the matter is pending since 1995 and involves the question of legality or otherwise of termination of services of the appellant, it would be in the interest of the parties if the writ petition is disposed of as early as practicable, preferably within four months from the date of receipt of our order." 10. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in BhadraShahakari S.K. Niyamita v. Chitradurga Mazdoor Sangh, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 552, considered the scope of maintainability of a Writ Petition and in paragraph 3, it was observed as follows: "3. Mr Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the appellant being a cooperative sugar factory registered under the Cooperative Societies Act with a view to earn profit for the members of its society is purely a non-governmental organisation and will not fall within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the writ petition filed by the respondent Union was not maintainable. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel placed strong reliance on the judgments in G.M., Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. SatrughanNishad; Federal Bank Ltd. v. SagarThomas; GayatriDe v. MousumiCoop. Housing Society Ltd.; Shrikant v. Vasantrao and PradeepKumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology. We have perused the above judgments. In our opinion, the writ petition filed by the respondent Union against the cooperative sugar factory is not maintainable. We, therefore answer the said issue of maintainability of the writ petition in favour of the appellant management." 11. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in S.S. Rana v. Registrar, Coop. Societies, reported in (2006) 11 SCC 634 , at page 642 in paragraph No.11, considered the entire issue once again and in paragraph 12, observed as follows: "11. Respondent 2, the Society does not answer any of the aforementioned tests. In the case of a non-statutory society, the control thereover would mean that the same satisfies the tests laid down by this Court in Ajay Hasia v. KhalidMujib Sehravardi. [See Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Distt. Registrar, Coop. Societies (Urban).] 12. It is well settled that general regulations under an Act, like the Companies Act or the Cooperative Societies Act, would not render the activities of a company or a society as subject to control of the State. [See Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Distt. Registrar, Coop. Societies (Urban).] 12. It is well settled that general regulations under an Act, like the Companies Act or the Cooperative Societies Act, would not render the activities of a company or a society as subject to control of the State. Such control in terms of the provisions of the Act are meant to ensure proper functioning of the society and the State or statutory authorities would have nothing to do with its day-to-day functions." 12. Thereafter, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the employees of the Cooperative Society in approaching the High Court for appropriate relief in respect of their service conditions, once again considered the issue of maintainability of the Writ Petition vide its judgment in State of Assam v. Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha, reported in (2009) 5 SCC 694, and in paragraph 13, it was observed as follows: "13. If the salaries are not paid, the remedy of the employees of CAMUL is to proceed against CAMUL, in accordance with law, by approaching the forum under the appropriate labour legislation or the Cooperative Societies Act. But a trade union representing the employees of a cooperative society cannot, by filing a writ petition, require the Government to bear and pay the salaries of the employees of the cooperative society, howsoever pervasive, the control of the State Government, over such society. Nor is any right created to demand the continuance of financial assistance to a cooperative society, on the ground that such assistance has been extended by the Government, for several years." 13. Further, the Supreme Court in Govt. of A.P. v. V. Appala Swamy reported in (2007) 14 SCC 49 held the parameters of interfering with a charge sheet on the ground of delay in paragraphs 12, 14 and 15 which read as follows: 12. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are: (1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee; (2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are: (1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee; (2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the inquiry officer. ....... 14. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court in M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India( 2006 (5) SCC 88 ). That case was decided on its peculiar facts. In that case, even the basic material on which departmental proceedings could be initiated was absent. The departmental proceedings were initiated after 6 years and continued for a period of 7 years. In that fact situation, it was held that the appellant therein was prejudiced. 15. Bijlani, therefore, is not an authority and, in fact, as would appear from the decision in P.D. Agrawal4 for the proposition that only on the ground of delay the entire proceedings can be quashed without considering the other relevant factors therefor. 14. In the light of the above, the writ petition will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.