Sudhir Agarwal, J.;— 1. Heard Sri Anuj Agarwal, holding brief of Sri M.K. Gupta, learned counsel for petitioner. None appeared on behalf of respondents though service has already been deemed sufficient. 2. The dispute relates to a shop. Petitioner-landlord filed application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") stating that he needs shop in question for running his own business, since he was selling some food items etc. on a Thela which is causing lot of problems on account of no fixed and specified place and problems created by administration. The Prescribed Authority dismissed petitioner-landlord's application by judgment dated 8.8.1995. In the appeal filed by petitioner-landlord, Appellate Court reversed the finding of the Prescribed Authority, so far as bona fide need is concerned, and held that need of petitioner-landlord is not genuine and bona fide. 3. On the question of comparative hardship, however, it refers to Rule 16 (2) (a) U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1972") and says that tenant is doing business in shop in dispute since 1983, and, hence, he is an old tenant while landlord is already doing his business, may be on a Thela, yet he would not suffer that much inconvenience as the tenant, who has no other premises to continue his business. 4. On this ground only the petitioner-landlord has been non suited by the Appellate Court by dismissing his appeal. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner, in my view, has rightly submitted that mere fact that the tenant was an old tenant would not be a valid justification to reject release application of the petitioner, particularly, when it is not disputed that landlord himself has no other accommodation to run his business and his necessity of accommodation to be released in his favour, so as to run his business own business, is genuine and bona fide. It is not the case where landlord was also having any other accommodation. A casual type of business run through a Thela cannot be deemed to be a well established self employment or effective business run by landlord. It is not the case where landlord was also having any other accommodation. A casual type of business run through a Thela cannot be deemed to be a well established self employment or effective business run by landlord. In my view once the landlord has established his personal need and this fact is also evident that he has no other accommodation, the comparative hardship, prima facie, would lie in his favour unless shown otherwise. 6. Further, it cannot be disputed that it is the privilege of landlord to determine his way of living and accommodate himself and his family according to his status, requirement etc. He cannot be compelled to live in a particular manner either by tenant or any other agency. Even the Court of law must not dictate such terms to a landlord to live an a particular manner and adjust his needs accordingly. 7. In Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the Apex Court said that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. Therein the Court considered the age of landlord and doubted his need on the ground that in such advanced age, he would be requiring somebody to take care and therefore should live with other family members instead of alone. The Apex Court observed that High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. That is a lookout of landlord and not of High Court. The Apex Court disapproved the approach of High Court and observed: "We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property." 8. Similarly, in R. C. Tamrakar Vs. Nidi Lekha AIR 2001 SC 3806 , the Court in para 10 and 11 said: "10. Law is well settled that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. Similarly, in R. C. Tamrakar Vs. Nidi Lekha AIR 2001 SC 3806 , the Court in para 10 and 11 said: "10. Law is well settled that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. In deciding the question of the bonafide requirement, it is unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else landlord could have adjusted himself. 11. Though the son of the landlady is a doctor and has constructed his own house, the landlady wants to stay in the suit premises. It is not the case of the tenant that landlady has any other suitable accommodation. Therefore, the High Court rightly set aside the finding of the First Appellate Court holding that landlady could not be compelled to reside with her son as her case was that she wanted to stay by herself in the suit premises because of her health condition and the climatic condition of that place suit her." 9. The above referred authorities though, were in the context of residential accommodation, but the principle that the landlord is the master of arranging his own affairs applies not only in respect to his residential accommodation but also the manner and method etc. of earning his livelihood for maintaining himself and family. Obviously it cannot be controlled by requiring him to continue to do business on a moving Thela while allowing his non residential accommodation i.e. shop to be occupied by a tenant. Such insistence on the part of Appellate Court is clearly erroneous, illegal and, in my view, has resulted in miscarriage of justice to the landlord concerned. 10. The lower Appellate Court on this aspect has not looked into the matter correctly and, therefore, impugned appellate order cannot sustain. 11. In the result, writ petition is allowed. Impugned appellate order dated 4.11.1999 (Annexure 4 to writ petition) is hereby set aside. 12. Matter is remanded to Appellate Court to look into the question of comparative hardship in accordance with law after taking in consideration the observations made hereinabove and decide the matter afresh expeditiously, and, in any case within three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. _____________