JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—All these appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. The learned counsel for the parties jointly stated that common questions of law and fact are involved and all the appeals are directed against a common judgment dated 11.12.1997 delivered by Third Additional District Judge, Aligarh. The background facts may be noticed in brief. 2. The Court below by a common judgment decided six land acquisition references wherein LAR No. 222 of 1987 (Dauli Ram and others v. State of U.P. and others) was entertained as the lead case. 3. The evidence was recorded in that very case with the understanding that it will be read in all other five connected references. A piece of land of village Rasoolpur Swad, Pargana and Tehsil Koal, District Aligarh was acquired for the purposes of construction of workshop and office of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, by issuing a notification dated 12th of May, 1978 published on 3.6.1978 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was followed by notification dated 23.2.1979 published in the Gazette on 31st of March, 1979 under Section 6 of the Act. Special Land Acquisition Officer by its award dated 23rd September, 1986 offered the compensation at the rate of Rs. 11.24 per sq. yard to the landholders which was considered by them inadequate. Applications for making reference for determining the market value of the land were preferred and the matter was referred to the Civil Court and the Civil Court by the judgment and award under appeals has fixed the market value at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. yard. Feeling aggrieved, the present appeals have been filed. 4. Heard Sri Sameer Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents. 5. The only point urged in these appeals is with regard to the market value of the acquired land. Sri Sameer Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was no justification for making any enhancement in the market value of the land. Elaborating the argument, he submitted that the sale-deeds relied upon by the Reference Curt relate to a small pieces of land. These sale-deeds could not be considered as the best guide to determine the market value of the land in question. Elaborating the argument, he submitted that the sale-deeds relied upon by the Reference Curt relate to a small pieces of land. These sale-deeds could not be considered as the best guide to determine the market value of the land in question. The land in question are comparatively many-times big in area than the land sold under the relied upon sale-deeds. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the judgment and decree under the appeal. 7. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. The appeal No. 168 of 1998 arises out of LAR No. 222 of 1987 with respect to plot No. 12 measuring two bighas and eleven biswas. The First Appeal No. 167 of 1998 (UPSRTC v. Raghuveer Dayal) arises out of LAR No. 225 of 1987 and it relates to plot No. 20 having area six bighas, eight biswas and fourteen biswansis. Appeal No. 166 of 1998 (UPSRTC v. Subhash and others) arises out of LAR No. 226 of 1987 and it relates to plot Nos. 21A and 21B, area six bighas, two biswas and nineteen biswansis. The appeal No. 170 of 1998 arises out of LAR No. 228 of 1987 (UPSRTC v. Lal Singh), Plot Nos. 15A and 15B, area five bighas, thirteen biswas and five biswansis. 9. The record further reveals that, on an earlier occasion, against the judgment and order awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 25/- per sq. yard on the basis of two sale-deeds, the matter had travelled up to the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 4980-4986 of 1995. The Apex Court by its judgment dated 27th of March, 1997 had set aside the judgment of the Reference Court as well as of the High Court and restored the matter to the Reference Court with a direction “to give opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence afresh, consider the same in the light of law laid down by this Court and then decide compensation accordingly within six months from the receipt of this order.” 10. It may be placed on record that after remand by the Apex Court, the appellants failed to adduce evidence in support of their case. The application filed by the appellants was rejected being belated one. It may be placed on record that after remand by the Apex Court, the appellants failed to adduce evidence in support of their case. The application filed by the appellants was rejected being belated one. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the Court below was not justified in not giving afresh opportunity to the appellants in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court dated 27th of March, 1997. The appellants had filed various sale-deeds as exemplars and had requested the Court to summon the witnesses but the Court below refused to summon the witnesses on the ground that the six months time granted by the Apex Court was about to expire. Sri Sameer Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants pressed that the matter should again be remanded to the Court below for giving an opportunity to the appellants to adduce evidence afresh. Looking to the fact that the appellants failed to avail the opportunity granted by the Apex Court, it would be travesty of justice to remand the matter back again as it would amount premium for non action or inaction of the appellants in not complying with the directions of the Apex Court within the stipulated time. On being asked by the Court to justify the stand of not filing the requisite evidence, if any, within the stipulated time granted by the Apex Court, Sri Sameer Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants, did not pursue the matter any further and proceeded to argue out the appeal on its merit on the basis of the material available on record. He also referred the following two rulings in support of his contention that there had been amendment in the Land Acquisition Act by adding Section 51A therein : 1. Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah, (2001) 3 SCC 530 . 2. State of Haryana v. Ram Singh, (2001) 6 SCC 254 . For the sake of convenience, Section 51A is reproduced below : 51A. Acceptance of certified copy as evidence. In any proceeding under this Act, a certified copy of a document registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), including a copy given under Section 57 of that Act, may he accepted as evidence of the transaction recorded in such document. 11. Acceptance of certified copy as evidence. In any proceeding under this Act, a certified copy of a document registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), including a copy given under Section 57 of that Act, may he accepted as evidence of the transaction recorded in such document. 11. After its insertion, the Apex Court has now laid down that the certified copy of a sale-deed may be treated as evidence just like any other evidence, it is for the Court to weigh all the pros and cons to decide whether such transaction can be relied upon for understanding a real price of land concerned. 12. Then the Court was taken through two sale-deeds relied upon by the Tribunal to show that the relied upon the sale-deeds are in respect of very small area. 13. Now, I proceed to consider the main issue involved in the appeal. 14. The matter was decided by the Civil Court on reference earlier on 18.2.1993 by awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 25/- per sq. yard alongwith other statutory benefits vide order dated 18.2.1993. The appellants carried the matter to this Court and the appeals were dismissed as barred by time. It ultimately reached before the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 4980-4986 of 1956: UPSRTC, Aligarh v. State of U.P. and others. The Supreme Court by the judgment dated 27th of March, 1997 set aside the judgment of the Reference Court and the High Court as well and restored the matter back to the Reference Court on the ground that two sale-deeds filed in support of the claim for higher compensation but neither the vendor nor the vendee has been examined to substantiate those documents, legally which is neither admissible in evidence nor liable to be considered. The Supreme Court without expressing any opinion on merits of the case restored the matter back to the Reference Court with a direction to give opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence afresh, consider the same in the light of law laid down by its judgment and then decide the compensation accordingly within six months from the receipt of its order. 15. Indisputably, the claimants did not file any appeal either before the High Court or before the Apex Court for further enhancement of compensation. It logically follows that they accepted the award of compensation at the rate of Rs. 25/- per sq. 15. Indisputably, the claimants did not file any appeal either before the High Court or before the Apex Court for further enhancement of compensation. It logically follows that they accepted the award of compensation at the rate of Rs. 25/- per sq. yard as final. The Reference Court after remand has awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. yard which it could not do as the earlier order awarding the compensation at the rate of Rs. 25/- per sq. yard had become final qua the claimants at least. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the Reference Court awarding the compensation at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. yard cannot be sustained. 16. The other aspect of the case is that the Reference Court while fixing the compensation at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. yard has placed reliance upon two sale-deeds Exhibit-Ka-1 dated 17.5.1977 and Exhibit-Ka-2 dated 22nd of July, 1977. Jivanand, vendor of the Exhibit Ka-1 has been examined as PW/2, after remand. Through this sale-deed a small piece of land measuring 200 sq. yard was sold for Rs. 7,000/- at the rate of Rs. 35/- per sq. yard. Besides the fact that the sale-deed is in respect of a very small piece of land, it has come in the deposition of the witness that the land covered under the said sale-deed is three kilometers away from the land in question. How this sale-deed could be treated as an exemplar is difficult to understand. 17. The next and the last document is Exhibit 2 Ka. It is dated 22nd of July, 1977 executed by Smt. Laxmi Devi wife of Hoti Lal. Through this sale-deed the land measuring 316 sq. yards of plot Nos. 158 and 157 of Khata No. 151 was sold for a sum of Rs. 9,480/-. This gives the selling rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. yard. This sale-deed is also in respect of a very small piece of land and could not be considered as exemplar for the purposes of determining large area of land. Besides the aforesaid two sale-deeds, the claimants have not filed any other document to establish their claim for enhancement in compensation. 18. 30/- per sq. yard. This sale-deed is also in respect of a very small piece of land and could not be considered as exemplar for the purposes of determining large area of land. Besides the aforesaid two sale-deeds, the claimants have not filed any other document to establish their claim for enhancement in compensation. 18. In the case of Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1988 SC 1652 , the Apex Court has laid down as below : “While determining market value of land, the following factors have to be borne in mind : (1) Determined as on the crucial date of publication of the modification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (dates of Notification under Sections 6 and 9 are irrelevant). (2) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price. (3) In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value. (4) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of Acquisition of Land). (5) Even post notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects. (6) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations: (i) proximity from time angle. (ii) proximity from situation angle. (7) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. (8) A balance sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do. (8) A balance sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do. (9) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors. The exercise indicated in clauses (1) to (10) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors : The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds. cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say 10000 sq. yds. or more. Firstly while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a layout, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approx. between 20% to 50% to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards. Every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the Judge must place himself. These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense.” 19. The Apex Court has held that the burden to prove that the compensation offered by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was inadequate is on the claimants. These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense.” 19. The Apex Court has held that the burden to prove that the compensation offered by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was inadequate is on the claimants. The claimant in a reference proceeding is in a position of plaintiff and he has to prove his case. 20. Besides the aforesaid two sale-deeds, the claimants have not produced any other evidence to show the market value of the land, as determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, was inadequate in any manner. 21. The other aspect of the case is that these two sale-deeds are in respect of plots situated far away from the acquired land. Smt. Kusum Sharma has been examined as PW/3 to prove the sale-deed executed by her. She has stated that the acquired land is one kilometer away from the land sold by her. Similarly, Jiwanand, PW/2 who was produced to prove the Exhibit Ka-1 has stated in his cross examination that the acquired land is about three kilometers away from the land covered under the said sale-deed. 22. In view of the geographical position of the lands sold through the aforesaid two sale-deeds, it would not be proper to treat the aforesaid two sale-deeds as exemplar. This is all with regard to the evidence produced by the claimants. 23. So far as, the present appellant/respondents are concerned, they did not file any sale-deed or documentary evidence to justify the compensation amount as was awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The matter was remanded by the Apex Court at the instance of the present appellant to enable it to file evidence afresh, with the direction that the case shall be decided within a period of six months. The appellants sought to file certain sale-deeds at the fag end of the stipulated period of six months. Certified copies of certain sale-deeds were sought to be filed but they could not examine any witness to prove those sale-deeds, on the pretext that the vendors and vendees are not prepared to depose before the Court and the Court may compel their attendance. The Court by its detailed order dated 17th of November, 1997 rejected the said prayer of the appellant and rightly so as the matter was adjourned earlier at the instance of the appellant and the period was going to expire shortly. 24. The Court by its detailed order dated 17th of November, 1997 rejected the said prayer of the appellant and rightly so as the matter was adjourned earlier at the instance of the appellant and the period was going to expire shortly. 24. Virtually, it is a case of no evidence so far as the appellants are concerned. The appellants have included the copies of those sale-deeds in the paper book. In absence of any evidence to show their geographical position viz. a vis. the acquired land, it is not proper to consider those sale-deeds as exemplars particularly when the appellants have failed to avail the opportunity offered to them by the Apex Court. But that is not the end of matter. 25. The Apex Court in the case of Trishala Jain v. State of Uttaranchal, (2011) 6 SCC 47 , has held the following : “39. The law with regard to applying the principle of deduction to the determined market value of the acquired land is quite consistent, though, of course, the extent of deduction has varied very widely depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. In other words, it is not possible to state precisely the exact deduction which could be made uniformly applicable to all the cases. Normally the rule stated by this Court consistently, in its different judgments, is that deduction is to be applied on account of carrying out development activities like providing roads or civic amenities such as electricity, water, etc. when the land has been acquired for construction of residential, commercial or institutional projects. It shall also be applied where the sale instances (exemplars) relate to smaller pieces of land and in comparison the acquisition relates to a large tract of land. In addition thereto, deduction can also be applied on account of wastage of land.” 26. The Apex Court in the case of Trishala Jain (supra) has held that when there is evidence the Court may estimate the market value of the land in question. Taking into consideration that small pieces of land were sold, as is evident from the two sale-deeds relied upon by the claimants at the rate of Rs. 30/- to Rs. 35/- per sq. yard, it would be appropriate to grant the compensation at the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. yard, specially when the acquired land is abutting the GT Road. 30/- to Rs. 35/- per sq. yard, it would be appropriate to grant the compensation at the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. yard, specially when the acquired land is abutting the GT Road. This would serve the end of justice. The fact that the acquisition was made long ago and the matter had travelled up to the Apex Court, is also a relevant circumstance. The statement of one of the claimants PW/1 recorded before the remand would show the pathetic condition of the claimants. In para 3 he has stated that their entire land has been taken away, they have become landless labourer. The claimants have been left with no source of income except to work as labourer. 27. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and decree of the Court below needs modification. It is modified by providing that the claimant-respondents are entitled to receive compensation at the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. yard alongwith other statutory benefits with regard to which no dispute was raised by the present appellants. 28. Before parting with the case, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, it is provided that the amount of compensation already paid in excess of Rs. 20/- per sq. yard, shall not be recovered from the claimants. It is further provided that the claimants shall also not be entitled to claim any unpaid amount over and above @ Rs. 20/- per sq. yard in view of the Apex Court judgment in Stanes Higher Secondary School v. Spl. Tahsildar (L.A.), Coimbatore, 2010(4) ADJ 202 (SC), followed in State of U.P. v. Smt. Mahdevi, 2012(7) ADJ 2 (NOC). 29. In the result, all the appeals are hereby allowed in part subject to above. But no order as to costs. ——————