Ran Vijai Singh, J. Through this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 16.8.2012 and 24.9.2011 passed by respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively. Heard Sri Anand Mohan Pandey, holding brief of Sri K. Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. It appears, respondent no. 3 filed an appeal against the order dated 14.7.2008 passed by the Consolidation Officer. The appeal was also accompanied with an application for condonation of delay. The Settlement Officer of Consolidation, after hearing both the sides, condoned the delay and fixed 30.11.2011 for passing the order in the appeal. The petitioner herein has filed revision no. 101 ( Mithlesh Kumari Vs. Ramwati). The said revision was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 16.8.2012. Sri Pandey has vehemently contended that after the order dated 14.7.2008 passed by the Consolidation Officer, the notification under section 52 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 ( hereinafter referred to as, 'the Act') was issued on 25.4.2009, whereas the appeal was filed on 4.1.2010. Taking shelter of sub-section ( 2) of section 52 of the Act, he has further contended that the cognizance by the consolidation courts could only be taken with respect to the pending proceedings and no fresh proceeding could be instituted in view of sub-section ( 1) of section 52 of the Act. In his submissions, since in this case, no appeal was pending, before notification under section 52 of the Act, therefore, both the courts below have erred in passing the impugned orders. Sri S.K. Mourya, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State contended that the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived in view of the provisions contained under section 53B of the Act, which provides for applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act in the consolidation proceedings. In his submissions, if the statute provides right of filing appeal, along with an application for condonation of delay, in that circumstances, if the delay is condoned, the appeal would be treated well within time and in that eventuality, the provisions contained under section 52 of the Act would not be attracted as the appeal is nothing but a creation of statute and continuation of the suit proceedings. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. In order to resolve the controversy, it would be useful to go through the provisions contained in sub-sections ( 1) & ( 2) of section 52 of the Act, which reads as under: "52. Close of consolidation operations - ( 1) As soon as may be, after fresh maps and records have been prepared under sub-section ( 1) of Section 27, the State Government shall issue a notification in the Official Gazette that the consolidation operations have been closed in the unit and the village or villages forming a part of the unit shall then cease to be under consolidation operations. Provided that the issue of the notification under this section shall not affect the powers of the State Government to fix, distribute and record the cost of operations under this Act. ( 2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section ( 1), any order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction in cases of writs filed under the provisions of the Constitution of India, or in cases of proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of the notification under sub-section ( 1), shall be given effect to by such authorities, as may be prescribed and the consolidation operation shall, for that purpose, be deemed to have not been closed." From the bare reading of sub-sections ( 1) & ( 2) of section 52 of the Act, it would transpire that effect of notification under sub-section ( 1) of section 52 of the Act would be closing of the consolidation proceedings, but exception has been carved out in sub-section ( 2) of section 52 of the Act, according to which, any order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction in cases of writs filed under the provisions of the Constitution of India, or in cases of proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of the notification under sub-section ( 1), shall be given effect to by such authorities, as may be prescribed and the consolidation operation shall, for that purpose, be deemed to have not been closed, meaning thereby, the pending proceeding may be concluded on its own merit without influenced by the notification under section 52 of the Act. The learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the appeal is the continuation of the suit proceedings. The learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the appeal is the continuation of the suit proceedings. I find substance in the submission of learned Standing Counsel, in view of the judgment of the apex Court in Garikapati Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry and Others AIR 1957 SC 540 , wherein following observation has been made: "23. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge: ( i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. ( ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. ( iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. ( iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. ( v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise." A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Lal Vs. Shagun Chand AIR 1967 ALD 214has held as under: "....The question that was the cardinal question was whether the word 'suit' in section 15 of the Act included an appeal and as we have already held, there could be, on decided cases and on general principles of law as well, no escape from the position that an appeal was a continuation of a suit." A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Bahadur Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1973 All. 414 relying upon another Division Bench judgment in the case of Dilawar Singh Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1973 All. 414 relying upon another Division Bench judgment in the case of Dilawar Singh Vs. Gram Samaj and Others, AIR 1973 All 411 has held that an appeal does not initiate a fresh proceeding. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that on the date of notification under section 52 of the Act, no appeal was pending, therefore, it could not be instituted after the said notification. For testing this argument, the meaning of word 'pending' has to be looked into. The word 'pending' has been defined in "( Law Lexicon), The Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, General Editor Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, 1997 Edition" as under: "Pending: The term 'pending' means nothing more than undecided. 'PENDING' is defined to mean depending remaining undecided; not terminated. An action is considered as pending from the time of its commencement of the proceeding. An legal proceeding is "pending" as soon as commenced and until it is concluded, i.e., so long as the Court having original cognizance of it can make an order on the matters in issue, or to be dealt with, therein. Asgarali Nazarali Singapore Walla V. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 503 , 509. Pending that matter is not concluded and court having cognizance of it can make order on matter in issue, until the case is concluded it is pending. Lt. Col. S.K. Kashyap and Another V. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1971 SC 1120 , 1128. An action would not cease to be a pending action, so as to prevent thte operation of the statute of limitation, because the clerk of the court had failed for several terms to place it upon the docket or court calendar. A suit is pending until final judgment is rendered. An action is pending until the judgment is fully satisfied. A pending action is an action which has been commenced and in which some proceeding may be taken. So long as it is possible for any proceeding to be taken in a case, such cause is still pending. For the purposes of sec. 24( 5) and ( 7) of the Judicature Act, 1873, and action is pending after final judgment so long as the judgment remains unsatisfied. So long as it is possible for any proceeding to be taken in a case, such cause is still pending. For the purposes of sec. 24( 5) and ( 7) of the Judicature Act, 1873, and action is pending after final judgment so long as the judgment remains unsatisfied. An action is pending the entire time from the beginning of the action until final judgment has been pronounced and entered up, for until final judgment there cannot be said to be a termination of the action and it is therefore still pending. A prosecution will not be deemed pending where no indictment has been filed, but only preliminary proceedings begun before a magistrate. A suit filed in a court on the averments in the suit giving jurisdiction to the court to try the suit, but later on the averments giving jurisdiction having been found not correct, even then the suit was legally pending before the court. A criminal case is pending against one as early as his arrest and commitment for a crime for which he is afterwards indicted. The appeal preferred to the Subordinate Judge ( Under the Madras Buildings ( Lease & Rent Control Act) must be deemed to be pending though it was actually disposal of before Act 8 of 1951 so long as the application to quash the order is pending in the High Court. Literally hanging in suspense; remaining undecided or awaiting settlement." On perusal of the meaning of the word 'pending', it is clear that the matter, which is undecided or awaiting settlement, shall be treated to be pending. Here in this case, the appeal was filed after the notification under section 52 of the Act along with an application for condonation of delay. The delay was condoned, meaning thereby, the appeal came into existence and since the Settlement Officer of Consolidation has fixed the date for passing order on the appeal, therefore, the same shall be treated to be pending and would be unaffected with the rigor of sub-section ( 1) of section 52 of the Act. The matter may be examined from another angle also. In this case, the order impugned in the appeal was passed on 14.7.2008 and the notification under section 52 of the Act was issued on 25.4.2009. The matter may be examined from another angle also. In this case, the order impugned in the appeal was passed on 14.7.2008 and the notification under section 52 of the Act was issued on 25.4.2009. Section 53B of the Act provides that section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in the consolidation proceedings, meaning thereby, for the sufficient reason, appeal could be filed even after expiry of the period of limitation, along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for extending the period of limitation/condonation of delay in filing the appeal and in case delay was condoned, the appeal would be treated well within time and shall be treated to be instituted even before issuance of notification under section 52 of the Act. Therefore also, no infirmity can be attached to the orders passed by the consolidation courts. The last limb of the argument of Sri Pandey is that the delay has wrongly been condoned, as there was no sufficient material to condone the delay. On that count, it may be observed that this Court as well as the apex Court in a number of cases has observed that in the matter of condonation of delay, the Court should take liberal view as the law of limitation is not meant to take away the right of appeal. This has also been held by the apex Court that every efforts should be made by the courts to impart substantial justice to the parties instead of scuttling the process of justice on technicalities. The reference may be given in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. ( JT 1987 ( 1) SC 537 = 1987 ( 2) SCR 387 ), Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala Vs. K.V. Ayisumma JT 1996 ( 7) SC 204, Nand Kishore Vs. State of Punjab JT 1995 ( 7) SC 69 and N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy JT 1998 ( 6) SC 242. Further, once the delay has been condoned, the higher Court normally should not interfere with the positive exercise of the discretion of the court in condoning the delay unless order is perverse. The apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others Vs. M. Krishnamurthy JT 1998 ( 6) SC 242. Further, once the delay has been condoned, the higher Court normally should not interfere with the positive exercise of the discretion of the court in condoning the delay unless order is perverse. The apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others Vs. Kameshwar Singh and Others JT 2000 ( 5) 389, has held as under: "........Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court." In view of that, I do not find any illegality in the impugned judgments. The petitioner has failed to make out any good ground for interference with the orders impugned. The writ petition is dismissed summarily.