Judgment :- T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J. 1. In all these writ petitions the various complaints regarding the implementation of the VIIIth Pay Revision Order in the year 2004 arise for consideration and therefore they are disposed of together. The petitioners have contended that the date of effect as 1.7.2004 is illegal and arbitrary and the same should have been made effective from 1.3.2002. 2. The VIIIth Pay Revision order was implemented with effect from 1.7.2004. The five year period of the VIIth Pay Revision order came to an end on 29.2.2002. The petitioners are retirees who had continued in service from 1.3.2002 and retired from service upto 30.6.2004. Their main grievance is regarding the alleged discrimination in not implementing the pay revision with effect from 1.3.2002. Certain allied contentions are also there. 3. Heard learned Senior Counsel Shri M.K. Damodaran appearing for the petitioners in W.P.(C).No.7569/2008, Smt. V.P. Seemanthini, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.23346/2008 and Shri Parthasarathi, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.37644/2008 and the learned Government Pleader Smt. Nisha Bose for the respondents. 4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.7569/2008, Shri M.K. Damodaran elaborated the contentions raised by the petitioners therein. The facts of the case show that the first petitioner is a registered association of retired Government Employees, Teachers and Staff of Aided Educational Institutions and petitioners 2 to 15 are retired employees. It is mainly point out that the policy of the Government is to have revision of pay of Government employees and teachers by every 5th year which was consistently being followed from the year 1968 till 29.2.2002. The Pay Revision Commission was appointed by the Government as per G.O.(MS) No.115/2005/Fin. Dated 14.3.2005. They had to consider the pay revision from 29.2.2002, but recommended implementation of the same only from 1.7.2004. It is pointed out that the normal practice ought to have been followed herein and there is no rationale in adopting 1.7.2004 as the date of implementation and therefore it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. A group of employees who had retired from service from 1.3.2002 to 30.6.2004 did not get the benefit of the VIIIth Pay Revision Commission’s recommendation. A group of employees who had retired from service from 1.3.2002 to 30.6.2004 did not get the benefit of the VIIIth Pay Revision Commission’s recommendation. The date of effect recommended by the Pay Revision Commission ought not have been automatically accepted by the Government and by the adoption of the date as 1.7.2004, 35000 and odd employees have been denied the benefit of the pay revision. The stand taken by the Government that huge financial liability would have occurred if it is implemented retrospectively from 1.3.2002, is not correct. The denial of benefits violates Articles 14, 16 as well as Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India. The common practice followed by the State from 1968 ought to have been adopted. Ext.P2 is the introductory chapter of the Pay Revision Report and Ext.P3 is the Government Order dated 25.3.2006 by which the Government approved the recommendation of the Pay Commission. Ext.P4 is the representation submitted by the petitioners for reconsidering the matter. Exts.P5 and P6 are copies of answers given in the Legislative Assembly. The petitioners are relying upon Exts.P7 to P9, the copies of Editorials appeared in certain Dailies, which support their case. 5. It is submitted that there is great disparity in the terminal benefits as regards persons who have retired on 30.6.2004 and 31.7.2004 and in the same rank. The persons retired on 30.6.2004 gets only the benefits of Pay Revision Order of 25.11.1998 and persons of the same cadre who retired on 31.7.2004 will be entitled for the benefits under the Pay Revision Order of 25.3.2006 which was implemented from 1.7.2004. It is submitted that the same amounts to gross discrimination. 6. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.7569/2008 Shri M.K. Damodaran by relying upon the excerpts from the IVth Pay Revision Commission Report, elaborated the history with regard to the appointment of Pay Revision Commissions, the principles thereon and other matters. Emphasis was laid on the fact that there was a practice to appoint Pay Revision Commission during the interval of five years in the State and ten years in the Centre. It is submitted that the said practice had matured into a binding one and therefore the employees had acquired a right for the pay revision to be effected every five years. It is submitted that the said practice had matured into a binding one and therefore the employees had acquired a right for the pay revision to be effected every five years. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that after the submission of the Pay Revision Commission’s report an issue arose with regard to the implementation of the same in the light of the Model Code of Conduct published by the Election Commission which was taken up before this Court in W.P.(C) No.6668/2006. In the judgment rendered therein, the resolution of the Kerala Legislative Assembly dated 15.3.2006 has been extracted, which will also support the case of the petitioners that pay revision is due every five years. It is therefore submitted that the Cabinet while implementing the same, ought not have accepted the recommendation of the Pay Revision Commission to implement it from 1.7.2004. 7. It is further pointed out that persons who were continuing in service from 1.3.2002 to 30.6.2004 and have retired during this period and persons who are the beneficiaries of the pay revision order from 1.7.2004 form a homogeneous class. Since all these persons form a homogeneous class, the benefit of the pay revision cannot be denied by arbitrarily fixing a cut off date. The pay revision was due for all these classes of persons. Herein by implementing it only from 1.7.2004, the persons who had to be covered by the pay revision from 1.3.2002 to 30.6.2004 are taken out of the same which is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Various decisions of the Apex Court including the decision of the Constitution Bench in D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 and other decisions following the principles stated therein, were relied upon in this context. Thus, the forceful argument projected by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is that as far as retirees for the period from 1.3.2002 to 30.6.2004 are concerned, they are getting pension only based on the pay which they were earning as per the pay revision order which was implemented from 1.3.1997. It makes a lot of difference as far as retirees upto 30.6.2004 and persons who retired from 1.7.2004 are concerned. It is submitted that by putting such an artificial barrier persons who are similarly placed are denied the due benefits which has resulted in great disparity. It makes a lot of difference as far as retirees upto 30.6.2004 and persons who retired from 1.7.2004 are concerned. It is submitted that by putting such an artificial barrier persons who are similarly placed are denied the due benefits which has resulted in great disparity. Learned Senior Counsel invited my attention to the principle of equal pay for equal work under Article 39(d) of the Constitution and submitted that persons who were working in the same cadre and rank cannot be denied such rights. Thus, it is pointed out that persons retiring in same rank are treated differently and are denied benefits without any justification. It is also pointed out that the Government, in not considering the grievances of the petitioners, has lend a deaf ear by taking recourse to the plea that it will add huge financial burden, which also is not correct. It is pointed out that during the pendency of the writ petitions the Government passed a fresh order as far as the pensioners are concerned, as per G.O.(P) No.602/2010/Fin. Dated 19.11.2010 which is produced as Ext.P15 in W.P.(C) No.7569/2008. By the said order even though certain benefits have been granted, it is only effective from 1.4.2009 and the benefits are only marginal and therefore the same does not satisfy the demands of the petitioners. 8. The petitioners in W.P.(C) No.23346/2008 consist of an Association as well as persons who have retired from service between 1.3.2002 to 30.6.2004. The petitioners in W.P.(C) No.37644/2008 include an Association and other similarly placed retirees. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.23346/2008, Smt. V.P. Seemanthini supported the arguments raised by learned Senior Counsel Shri M.K. Damodaran. It is further pointed out that actually persons like the petitioners are entitled for the benefits of pay revision itself, apart from pension revisions. It is argued that the classification adopted is unreasonable and discriminatory. There is violation of Articles 39(d) and 43 of the Constitution. Various decisions of the Apex Court were cited in support of the argument. Both the learned Senior Counsel submitted that by implementing the pay revision from 1.3.2002, there will not be huge financial burden for the Government apart from the fact that the petitioners’ right for such revision of pay cannot be taken away by the arbitrary fixation of the cut off date. 10. Both the learned Senior Counsel submitted that by implementing the pay revision from 1.3.2002, there will not be huge financial burden for the Government apart from the fact that the petitioners’ right for such revision of pay cannot be taken away by the arbitrary fixation of the cut off date. 10. As far as W.P.(C) No.37644/2008 is concerned also, the same reliefs have been sought for. Learned counsel Shri Parthasarathy explained the detailed grounds taken therein. Shri Damodaran, learned Senior Counsel further submitted that if due weightage is given, it will redress the grievance of the petitioners in a long way. 11. Before going into the niceties of the questions posed, I will briefly refer to the historical background relied on by the petitioners. In the IVth Pay Revision Commission’s Report, Chapter III contains various historical aspects relating to the efforts taken by the various Governments for redressing the grievance of the Government employees and teachers under different strata. It shows that after the State was formed on 1.11.1956, the first attempt was taken in March 1957 for unifying the pay scales of employees of the State to be effective from 1.11.1956. Orders were passed in respect of various sections, viz. gazetted officers, primary school teachers, aided school teachers and nurses, etc. initially. The Pay Revision Committee appointed for the task was headed by Shri R. Sankaranarayana Iyer, Retired Judge of the Travancore High Court, which was appointed in September, 1957. New pay scales became effective from 1.4.1958. During the succeeding years, it appears that Pay Commissions were being appointed during different intervals. In January 1965, the first one chaired by Shri KM. Unnithan, ICS (Ex. Chief Secretary of the Government of Andhra) was appointed. In 1968, it was chaired by Shri V.K. Velayudhan, former Chairman, Kerala Public Service Commission. There was another revision in 1974, based on the recommendation of a Sub Committee of Council of Ministers. In 1977, the Third Pay Commission, namely, a Single Member Commission was formed and Shri N. Chhandrabhanu, Ext-Chief Secretary of the State was appointed as the Commission. The fourth one was in 1983 which was chaired by former Chief Justice Shri V.P. Gopalan Nambiar, the Vth one was chaired by Justice T. Chandrasekhara Menon, the next one by Shri G. Gopalakrishna Pillai, followed by the one headed by Shri P,M. Abraham in 1997. The fourth one was in 1983 which was chaired by former Chief Justice Shri V.P. Gopalan Nambiar, the Vth one was chaired by Justice T. Chandrasekhara Menon, the next one by Shri G. Gopalakrishna Pillai, followed by the one headed by Shri P,M. Abraham in 1997. In para 15 of Chapter III of the above mentioned report, after tracing out the various historical factors, in sub para (ii) it is noted as follows: “The timing of the present Pay Commission calls for notice. It seems to be the practice to appoint these commissions at intervals of (roughly) ten years in the Centre, and (roughly) at intervals of 5 years in our State.” This observation is heavily relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners for contending that the said practice ought to have resulted in implementation of the VIIIth Pay Commission report from 1.3.2002. 12. The effective dates of the various pay revisions were 1.4.1958, 1.1.1966, 1.7.1968, 1.7.1973, 1.7.1983, 1.7.1988 and 1.3.1992 which fact is recorded in para 6.2 of Chapter VI of the Pay Commission report in 1997, wherein the date of effect was 1.3.1997. Therein also, it is mentioned that the intervals have generally been five years between two revisions by the 1992 revision took place after 3 years and 8 months. In the said part of the Report, after stating various aspects for implementing the said pay revision, the Commission was of the view that the effective date can be 1.3.1997 which will mark the expiry of five years since the last revision. This is also relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. 13. Now I will come to the decision of the Division Bench in W.P.(C) Nos.6668/2006 and 6829/2006. The said writ petitions were filed by the Kerala Land Revenue Staff Association and another challenging the decision of the Election Commission to put on hold the decision to implement the recommendations of the Pay Commission. During the course of discussion of various matters, the Bench referred to the resolution adopted by the Legislative Assembly on 15.3.2006. The resolution was one addressed to the Central Election Commission to give permission to implement the Pay Commission’s recommendations, in the light of the declaration in the Budget Speech of the Finance Minister made on 10.2.2006. During the course of discussion of various matters, the Bench referred to the resolution adopted by the Legislative Assembly on 15.3.2006. The resolution was one addressed to the Central Election Commission to give permission to implement the Pay Commission’s recommendations, in the light of the declaration in the Budget Speech of the Finance Minister made on 10.2.2006. The following is the body of the resolution: “This Legislative Assembly request to the Central Election Commission to grant permission to implement immediately the recommendations of Pay Revision Commission in the circumstance that, it has been declared in the Budget Speech of the Finance Minister in the Legislative Assembly on 10.2.2006 in respect of the pay revision, which was to be given on 1.3.2002 in Kerala where the principle of implementation of pay revision once in every 5 years is accepted, and the required amount is allocated in 2006-2007 Budget. The Cabinet meeting held on 1st March 2006 accepted the recommendations of the Pay Revision Commission in principle and deterred it for the consideration of the Special Cabinet meeting of 2nd March. The Legislative Assembly unanimously request to the Election Commission to grant approval for the decision of the Government that, the recommendations of the pay revision commission submitted on 22.2.2006 to the Government alone need be implemented, in the circumstance that the declaration of election has been issued.” The Bench was of the view that the restrictions imposed by the Election Commission on the basis of the Model Code of Conduct of election cannot be accepted. 14. The larger questions therefore are mainly whether: (i0 Revision of pay is due in every five years; and (ii) The cut off date fixed is arbitrary. I shall discuss these points, now, but separately. (i) Pay revision, if to be effective every five years. 15. Before I dwell on the said question, another important question that arises is whether the right to have a pay revision, is a statutory one. The nature of the power exercised by the Government in appointing the Pay Revision Commission is also important while considering this issue. 16. No particular statutory provision covers the field. There is nothing to show that any of the relevant statutes confer a right on the Government employees and teachers, etc. to have a pay revision, that too at the end of every fifth year. 16. No particular statutory provision covers the field. There is nothing to show that any of the relevant statutes confer a right on the Government employees and teachers, etc. to have a pay revision, that too at the end of every fifth year. The appointment of Pay Revision Commissions is also not based on any provision under any particular statute. It can only be in terms of the executive power available to the State under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. The Pay Revision Commission cannot therefore be described as a statutory body. It is not one appointed under the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952 also. Therefore, as far as fixation of pay scales are concerned, it is only an executive function. The Government leaves it to an expert body like Pay Revision Commission to go into various aspects, after reference to social factors and other general conditions, including the paying capacity of the State. The question whether the date for implementation of a new pay revision should be from a date which should tally with the expiry of the fifth year of the pay revision order previously effected, is therefore to be considered in the light of these vital aspects. the issue is no longer res integra in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Chandrasekhar A.K. v. State of Kerala and another, (2009) 1 SCC 73 = 2008 (4) KLT 597; 2008 (4) KHC 784, relied upon by the learned Government Pleader, Smt. Nisha Bose. Therein, in para 18 it has been held thus: “18. The question as to whether the scale of pay would be revised or not is a matter of policy decision for the State. No legal right exists in a person to get a revised scale of pay implemented. It may be recommended by a body but ultimately it has to be accepted by the employer or by the State, who has to bear the financial burden.” Therefore, essentially it is a policy decision of the State and no legal right exists in a person to get a revised scale of pay implemented. It is upto the Government to accept or reject a particular recommendation of the Pay Revision commission and the absolute freedom is for the State in the matter. It is upto the Government to accept or reject a particular recommendation of the Pay Revision commission and the absolute freedom is for the State in the matter. Therefore, even though there was a practice (except the one in 1992 which was after 3 years and 8 months) as far as implementation of pay revision from 1.4.1958 is concerned to give effective dates roughly after the expiry of the five years of the previous revision, it cannot be said that automatically the employees get a right to have a pay revision on the expiry of the fifth year. The appointment of Pay Revision Commission being an executive fiat of that State, and as the Commission cannot be described as a statutory body and since the appointment of the Commission as well as the implementation of their recommendation amounts to a policy decision of the State, as held by the Apex Court in Chandrasekhar’s case, (2009) 1 SCC 73, it can be safely concluded that there is no statutory right vested on the employees to have a pay revision on the expiry of the fifth year of the last pay revision. 17. The history of pay revisions effected in the State therefore may not help to advance the case of the petitioners that it was due on completion of every fifth year. Of course various Commissions have been appointed from time to time during a span of five years roughly and evidently, as noticed already, in 1992 the pay revision was effected after 3 years and 8 months. Therefore, 5th year practice was not followed therein also. Therefore, the decision whether it should be a lesser term, namely, below five years or whether it should be five years or above, comes within the realm of policy of the State. There is no legal right as far as the employees and teachers, etc. are concerned to have a pay revision on the expiry of every five years. The practice claimed cannot mature into a legally enforceable right at all. Hence as contended by the petitioners, the date for implementation need not be 1.3.2002, and the choice is of the Government. (ii) Choice of the date 1.7.2004, whether an arbitrary one. 18. The date 1.7.2004 is one recommended by the Pay Commission. The practice claimed cannot mature into a legally enforceable right at all. Hence as contended by the petitioners, the date for implementation need not be 1.3.2002, and the choice is of the Government. (ii) Choice of the date 1.7.2004, whether an arbitrary one. 18. The date 1.7.2004 is one recommended by the Pay Commission. In Ext.P2 produced in W.P.(C) No.7569/2008, para 1.17 dealing with the same reads as follows: “The demands of most of the Unions/Associations were that the new pay scales should be effective from 1.3.2002 on the ground that the five year period after the effective date of the previous Pay Revision Commission is over on that date. This demand has however not found favour with the Commission. The new pay structure has been evolved by merging 59% of DA to the basic pay and then stepping it up by a fitment which is in consonance with the pattern of the change of the pay structure at the Central Government. At the Centre, the change was effected with effect from 1.4.2004 when 50% of DA was set apart as dearness pay. Pay plus Dearness Pay constituted the basic pay from 1.4.2004. There is therefore no case for granting revision in our State on a date earlier than 1.4.2004. In Kerala, where there are a large number of teachers in educational institutions including aided institutions, revision of pay structure effective from 1st of July has been found to be more appropriate. The Commission would therefore recommend that the revised pay scales may be granted from 1.7.2004 but that arrears from 1.7.2004 to 31.3.2005 may be treated as notional and actual monetary benefit be granted with effect from 1.4.2005 after adjusting the interim relief.” The date 1.7.2004 is suggested therein on different grounds. The Commission would therefore recommend that the revised pay scales may be granted from 1.7.2004 but that arrears from 1.7.2004 to 31.3.2005 may be treated as notional and actual monetary benefit be granted with effect from 1.4.2005 after adjusting the interim relief.” The date 1.7.2004 is suggested therein on different grounds. They are: (a) the new pay structure has been evolved by merging 59% of DA to the basic pay and then stepping it up by a fitment which is in consonance with the pattern of the change of the pay structure at the Central Government and at the Centre the change was effected with effect from 1.4.2004 when 50% of DA was set apart as dearness pay; (b) In the light of the above, there is no case for granting a revision in the State earlier than 1.4.2004; and (c) Since there are large number of teachers in educational institutions including aided institutions, the revision of pay can be effective from 1st of July. 19. The Government accepted the report of the Pay Commission by issuing order dated 25.3.2006, produced as Ext.P3. Therein, in para 5 it is stated that “the existing scales of pay will be revised with effect from 1.7.2004” and finally, in para 53, the date of effect is given as the following: “Date of effect of revised scales will be from 1.7.2004, Date of effect of revised time bound higher-grade scheme, various allowances and other benefits (except surrender of earned leave) will be from 1.3.2006. Date of effect of improved ratio/percentage based higher grades will be from the date of this order. Modification to rules 28A and 37 (a) Part I KSR (vide clauses 47 to 52 above) will apply to promotions, etc. taking place after the date of this order.” The background of the choice of the date as 1.7.2004 in these. The question is whether the same is arbitrary. 20. With regard to the fixation of a cut of date, in various decisions of the Apex Court, the relevant questions have been examined. Herein as already noticed, the status of the Pay Revision Commission is that of an expert body. The question is whether the same is arbitrary. 20. With regard to the fixation of a cut of date, in various decisions of the Apex Court, the relevant questions have been examined. Herein as already noticed, the status of the Pay Revision Commission is that of an expert body. The principle which has been evolved in various decisions will also show that normally with regard to the deliberation of an expert body like the Pay Revision Commission, the Courts will be slow in interfering with their recommendations, unless it is so arbitrary and whimsical. While considering the effect of the recommendations of the Pay Commission, the Apex Court in Secretary; Finance Department and others v. West Bengal Registration Service Association and others, (1993) Supp (1) SCC 153, examined and laid down the limits of the power of the Court to go into the validity of such recommendations of the Pay Commission. In para 12, it was held thus: “We do not consider it necessary to traverse the case law on which reliance as been placed by counsel for the appellants as it is well settled that equation of posts and determination of pay scales is the primary function of the executive and not the judiciary and, therefore, ordinarily courts will not enter upon the task of job evaluation which is generally left to expert bodies like the Pay Commission, etc. But that it’s not to say that the Court has no jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees have no remedy if they are unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction. But that it’s not to say that the Court has no jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees have no remedy if they are unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction. Courts must, however, realize that job evaluation is both a difficult and time consuming task which even expert bodies having the assistance of staff with requisite expertise have found difficult to undertake sometimes on account of want of relevant data and scales for evaluating performances of different groups of employees…..There can, therefore, be no doubt that equation of posts and equation of salaries is a complex matter which is best left to an expert body unless there is cogent material on record to come to a firm conclusion that a grave error had crept in while fixing the pay scale for a given post and Court’s interference is absolutely necessary to undo the injustice.” Of course, the above observations were made while considering the scope of interference on the principles adopted by the Pay Commission, but these principles will have to be born in mind while considering the questions posed herein and the validity of the recommendation made by the Commission in Ext.P2, regarding the date of effect. 21. As regards fixation of cut off date and the scope of interference by Courts, the relevant principles were examined in State of West Bengal and others v. Ratan Behari Dey and others, (1993) 4 SCC 62, in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 and finally it was held thus: “It is open to the State or to the Corporation, as the case may be, to change the conditions of service unilaterally. Terminal benefits as well as pensionary benefits constitute conditions of service. The employer has the undoubted power to revise the salaries and/or the pay scales as also terminal benefits/pensionary benefits. The power to specify a date fro which the revision of pay scales or terminal benefits/pensionary benefits, as the case may be, shall take effect is a concomitant of the said power. The State can specify a date with effect from which the Regulations framed, or amended, as the case may be, shall come into force. It was within the power of the Corporation to enforce the Regulations either prospectively or with retrospective effect from such date as they might specify. Only condition is that in such cases the State cannot pick a date out of its hat. It was within the power of the Corporation to enforce the Regulations either prospectively or with retrospective effect from such date as they might specify. Only condition is that in such cases the State cannot pick a date out of its hat. It has to prescribe the date in a reasonable manner, having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances. So long as such date is specified in a reasonable manner, i.e. without bringing about a discrimination between similarly situated persons, no interference is called for by the Court in that behalf on ground of discrimination.” (Emphasis supplied). Herein, the principles stated in D.S. Nakara’s case, (1983) 1 SCC 305 have been distinguished. The relevant principles laid down by the Apex Court therein would show that it is the power of the employer to revise the salaries and/or the pay scales as also terminal benefits/pensionary benefits. Therefore, the power to fix a cut off date is the concomitant of the said power. The date has to be fixed in a reasonable manner. 22. Relying on the above decision, in a later case in State of Rajasthan and another v. Amril Lal Gandhi and others, AIR 1997 SC 782, it was held that financial impact can be a sole consideration while fixing the cut off date. 23. In this context, Shri Damodaran relied upon the decision of a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in D.S. Nakara’s case, 1983 (1) SCC 305. Para 42 of the said judgment reads as follows: “If it appears to be indisputable, as it does to us that the pensioners for the purpose of pension benefits form a class, would its upward revision, permit a homogeneous class to be divided by arbitrarily fixing an eligibility criteria unrelated to purpose of revision, and would such classification be founded on some rational principle? The classification has to be based, as is well settled, on some rational principle and the rational principle must have nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. We have set out the objects underlying the payment of pension. If the State considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme, we find no rational principle behind if for granting these benefits only to those who retired subsequent to that that date simultaneously denying the same to those who retired prior to that date. We have set out the objects underlying the payment of pension. If the State considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme, we find no rational principle behind if for granting these benefits only to those who retired subsequent to that that date simultaneously denying the same to those who retired prior to that date. If the liberalisation was considered necessary for augmenting social security in old age to government servants then those who retired earlier cannot be worst off than those who retire later. Therefore, this division which classified pensioners into two classes is not based on any rational principle and if the rational principle is the one of dividing pensioners with a view to giving something more to persons otherwise equally placed, it would be discriminatory. To illustrate, take two persons, one retired just a day prior and another a day just succeeding the specified date. Both were in the same pay bracket, the average emolument was the same and both had put in equal number of years of service. How does a fortuitous circumstance of retiring a day earlier or a day later will permit totally unequal treatment in the manner of pension? One retiring a day earlier will have to be subject to ceiling of Rs.8100 p.a. and average emolument to be worked out on 36 months; salary while the other will have a ceiling of Rs.12,000 p.a. and a average emolument will be computed on the basis of last 10 months average. The artificial division stares into face and is unrelated to any principle and whatever principle, if there be any, has absolutely no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by liberalizing the pension scheme. In fact, this arbitrary division has not only no nexus to the liberalised pension scheme but it is counterproductive and runs counter to the whole gamut of pension scheme. The equal treatment guaranteed in Article 14 is wholly violated inasmuch as the pension rules being statutory in character, since the specified date, the rules accord differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of commutation of pension. A 48 hours’ difference in matter of retirement would have a traumatic effect. Division is thus both arbitrary and unprincipled. The equal treatment guaranteed in Article 14 is wholly violated inasmuch as the pension rules being statutory in character, since the specified date, the rules accord differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of commutation of pension. A 48 hours’ difference in matter of retirement would have a traumatic effect. Division is thus both arbitrary and unprincipled. Therefore, the classification does not stand the test of Article 14.” Of course, the principles stated therein would show that when the pensioners form a class, such a homogeneous class cannot be divided by arbitrarily fixing an eligibility criteria. It was held that the classifications in such cases will not stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. The said decision of the Apex Court was considered in various later decisions with regard to the universal applicability of the principles stated, as quoted above. In fact, the said judgment considered a case where a liberalized pension scheme was introduced for computation of pension as far as pensioners are concerned. The said liberalized pension formula was made applicable prospectively to those who were in service and retired on or after March 31, 1979 in respect of Government employees. Therefore, actually it was the liberalization of an existing formula and it was not the introduction of a new formula. This is the distinguishing feature as far as the said case is concerned, as explained by the Apex Court in subsequent decision including Constitution Bench decisions. In fact, in para 46 of the judgment in Nakara’s case (supra), it was held thus: “And beware that it is not a new scheme, it is only a revision of existing scheme. It is not a new retrial benefit. It is an upward revision of an existing benefit. If it was a wholly new concept, a new retrial benefit, one could have appreciated an argument that those who had already retired could not expect it.” These observations are quite important. 24. I shall now refer to certain decisions of the Apex Court wherein the principles stated in Nakara’s case (supra) have been explained and distinguished. In Union of India v. P.N. Menon and others, (1994) 4 SCC 68, the dictum laid down in D.S. Nakara’s case, (1983) 1 SCC 305 was distinguished. 24. I shall now refer to certain decisions of the Apex Court wherein the principles stated in Nakara’s case (supra) have been explained and distinguished. In Union of India v. P.N. Menon and others, (1994) 4 SCC 68, the dictum laid down in D.S. Nakara’s case, (1983) 1 SCC 305 was distinguished. While considering the question whether a cut off date fixed can be termed as arbitrary, the relevant principles were laid down thus in para 8: “Whenever the Government or an authority, which can be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, frames a scheme for persons who have superannuated from service, due to many constraints, it is not always possible to extend the same benefits to one and all, irrespective of the dates of superannuation. As such any revised scheme in respect of post-retirement benefits, if implemented with a cut-off date, which can be held to be reasonable and rational in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution, need not be held to be invalid. It shall not amount to “picking out a date from the hat”, as was said by this Court in the case of D.R. Nim v. Union of India (AIR 1967 SC 1301) in connection with fixation of seniority. Whenever a revision takes place, a cut-off date becomes imperative because the benefit has to be allowed within the financial resources available with the Government.” (emphasis supplied) It will be evident from the said paragraph that the financial resources available to the Government is also a relevant criterion. It was held further thus in para 14 wherein the explanation given by the Central Government with regard to the choice date, was accepted. “According to us, for the reasons disclosed on behalf of the appellant-Union of India for fixing 30.9.1977 as the cut-off date, which date was fixed when the price index level was 272, cannot be held to be arbitrary. The decision to merge a part of the dearness allowance with pay, when the price index level was at 272, appears to have been taken on basis of the recommendation of the Third Pay Commission. As such it cannot be held that the cut-off date has been selected in an arbitrary manner. The decision to merge a part of the dearness allowance with pay, when the price index level was at 272, appears to have been taken on basis of the recommendation of the Third Pay Commission. As such it cannot be held that the cut-off date has been selected in an arbitrary manner. Not only in matters of revising the pensionary benefits, but even in respect of revision of scales of pay, a cut-off date on some rational or reasonable basis, has to be fixed for extending the benefits. This can be illustrated. The Government decides to revise the pay scale of its employees and fixes the 1st day of January of the next year for implementing the same or the 1 day of January of the last year. In either case, a big section of its employees are bound to miss the said revision of the scale of pay, having superannuated before this date. An employee, who has retired on 31st December of the year in question, will miss the pay scale only by a day, which may affect his pensionary benefits throughout his life. No scheme can be held to be foolproof, so as to cover and keep in view all persons who were at one time in active service. As such the concern of the court should only be, while examining any such grievance, to see, as to whether a particular date for extending a particular benefit or scheme, has been fixed, on objective and rational considerations.” Therefore, it is evident that whenever the Government fixes the date of implementation of a pay revision order starting from the first day of a month, any employee who retired on 31st of the previous month, will miss the new pay scale which may affect the pensionary benefits. But such alone shall not be the consideration, going by the principles stated by the Apex Court in the above decision. In taking this view, the Apex Court relied upon two decisions of the Constitution Benches, viz. KrishenaKumar v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207 and Indian Ex-Services League v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 104 both of which explained and distinguished the principles laid down in D.S. Nakara’s case (supra). In taking this view, the Apex Court relied upon two decisions of the Constitution Benches, viz. KrishenaKumar v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207 and Indian Ex-Services League v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 104 both of which explained and distinguished the principles laid down in D.S. Nakara’s case (supra). In fact, the Constitution Bench in Indian Ex-services League’s case (supra) held that the conclusion in D.S. Nakara’s case (supra) was in the context of the benefits of liberalization given in accordance with the liberalized pension scheme which had to be given equally to all retirees irrespective of their date of retirement and those benefits could not be confined to only persons who retire on or after a specific date. In Amril Lal Gandhi’s case, AIR 1997 SC 782, the Apex Court, after considering the dictum laid down in Ratan Behari Dey’s case (supra) and P.N. Menon’s case (supra) held in paragraph 17 that “financial impact of making the regulations retrospective, can be the sole consideration while fixing a cut off date. In our opinion, it cannot be said that this cut off date was fixed arbitrarily or without any reason. The High Court was clearly in error in allowing the writ petition by submitting the date 1.1.1986 by 1.1.1990.” 25. In State of W.B. v. Monotosh Roy and another, (1999) 2 SCC 71 an officer who retired long prior to the acceptance of the Pay Commission’s recommendations which provided revised pension, sought for the benefit of the same by contending that the cut off date fixed is arbitrary. The Bench noticed that the new provision for payment of pension was only consequent to the restructuring of the pay scale. Therein, in para 10 the legal position was explained thus: “We have already referred to the fact that the new provisions for payment of pension introduced by the amendment of 1987 were only consequent to the restructuring of the pay scales of the members of the Service. Therein, in para 10 the legal position was explained thus: “We have already referred to the fact that the new provisions for payment of pension introduced by the amendment of 1987 were only consequent to the restructuring of the pay scales of the members of the Service. The Division Bench of the High Court has recognized the position that the writ petitioner cannot claim benefit of higher pay scale, having retired from service long before the introduction of such pay scales.” The decisions of the Apex Court in D.S. Nakara’s case, (1983) 1 SCC 305 was explained and reliance was placed on various decisions including P.N. Menon’s case (1994) 4 SCC 68 and Amril Lal Gandhi’s case, AIR 1997 SC 782. Similar is the case considered by the Apex Court in State of Punjab and others v. Boota Singh and another, (2000) 3 SCC 733 wherein also the petitioners sought the benefits conferred by orders/notifications issued subsequent to their retirement. It was held that conferment of additional benefits from a particular date, cannot be termed as arbitrary. It was held thus in paragraph 7. “On merits we find that the retirement benefits which are claimed by the respondent are benefits which are conferred by subsequent orders/notifications. Therefore, persons who retired after the coming into force of these notifications and order are governed by different rules of retirement than those who retired under the old rules and were governed by the old rules. The two categories of persons, who retired were governed by two different sets of rules. They cannot, therefore, be equated. Further, granting of additional benefits has financial implications also. Hence, specifying the date for the conferment of such additional benefits cannot be considered as arbitrary.” Obviously, the fact that the two sets of persons are governed by different set of rules was emphasised, to drive home the point. Another important factor is that the Apex Court was of the view that granting of additional benefits will result in financial implications and therefore the specification of the date cannot be considered as arbitrary. Another important factor is that the Apex Court was of the view that granting of additional benefits will result in financial implications and therefore the specification of the date cannot be considered as arbitrary. Therein also, D.S. Nakara’s case (supra) was explained and it was held thus in para 8: “The latest decision is in the case of K.L. Rathee v. Union of India-(1997) 6 SCC 7 where this Court, after referring to various judgments of this Court, has held that Nakara case-(1983) 1 SCC 305 cannot be interpreted to mean that emoluments of persons who retired after a notified date holding the same status must be treated to be the same….” It may be worth mentioning here that it was a case where, the new benefits were granted to retirees on or after 31.3.1985, whereas the petitioners therein retired in the year 1982. 26. I will now refer to some of the recent decisions also wherein the same view has been taken, after elaborately considering the decision in D.S. Nakara’s case (supra). 27. In State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal, (2005) 6 SCC 754, the cut off date was adopted to give benefits to the retirees-on are after 1.4.1995 and one of the reasons pointed out by the Government was financial constraints which was held to be a valid ground by the Apex Court. A reading of the judgment will show that the new benefits were granted based on the recommendation of the Pay Commission. In paragraph 26 the legal position was explained as follows: “It is difficult to accede to the argument on behalf of the employees that a decision of the Central Government/State Governments to limit the benefits only to employees, who retire or die on or after 1.4.1995, after calculating the financial implications thereon, was either irrational or arbitrary. Financial and economic implications are very relevant and germane for any policy decision toughing the administration of the Government, at the Centre or at the State level.” Thus, it is important to notice that financial and economic implications are always relevant as far as evolving of any policy decision touching the administration of the Government at Central and State level. Therein also, it was held that the Pay Commission’s recommendations were not always binding on the Government. Therein also, it was held that the Pay Commission’s recommendations were not always binding on the Government. In fact, in that case also the cut off date was suggested by the 5th Pay Commission and the acceptance of the same by the Government was held to be not irrational or arbitrary or infringement of the right under Article-14 of the Constitution of India. The said view is clear from the following findings in paragraph 28: “As we have already noticed, 1.4.1995 was the date suggested by the Fifth Central Pay Commission (“Pay commission”) in its Interim Report. The Central Government took a conscious stand that the consequential financial burden would be unbearable. It, therefore, chose to taper down the financial burden by making the benefits available only from 1.4.1995. It is trite that, the final recommendations of the Pay Commission were not ipso facto binding on the Government, as the Government had to accept the implement the recommendations of the Pay Commission consistent with its financial position. This is precisely what the Government did. Such an action on the part of the Government can neither be characterized as irrational, nor as arbitrary so as to infringe Article 14 of the Constitution.” The above principle will be of much application in the facts and circumstances of the present cases. In fact, various decisions of the Apex Court starting from D.S. Nakara’s case (supra) and followed by P.N. Menon’s case (supra) and other decisions were discussed while arriving at the said conclusion and finally from paragraphs 31 to 37 various judgments were discussed and it was held that the cut off date 1.4.1995 was fixed based on a very valid ground, viz. financial constraint. For easy reference the said paragraphs are reproduced below: “31. In Action Committee South Eastern Rly. Pensioners v. Union of India (1991 Supp. (2) SCC 544), it was held that on merger of a part of dearness allowance as dearness pay on Average Price Index Level at 272 with reference to different pay ranges, fixing a cut-off date in such a manner was not arbitrary and the principle enunciated in D.S. Nakara (1983) 1 SCC 305, was not applicable. In this connection, the ratios in KrishenaKumar v. Union of India-(1990) 4 SCC 207, Indian Ex-Services League v. Union of India-(1991) 2 SCC 104, State Govt. Pensioners Assn. In this connection, the ratios in KrishenaKumar v. Union of India-(1990) 4 SCC 207, Indian Ex-Services League v. Union of India-(1991) 2 SCC 104, State Govt. Pensioners Assn. v. State of A.P.-(1986) 3 SCC 501 and All India Reserve Bank Retired Officer’s Assn. v. Union of India-(1992 Supp.(1) SCC 664) are apt. in all these cases, the prescription of a cut-off date for implementation of such benefits was held not to be arbitrary, irrational or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 32. The importance of considering financial implications, while providing benefits for employees, has been noted by this Court in numerous judgments including the following two cases. In State of Rajasthan v. Amril Lal Gandhi-AIR 1997 SC 782 this Court went so as far as to note that: “Financial impact of making the Regulations retrospective can be the sole consideration while fixing a cut-off date. In our opinion, it cannot be said that this cut-off date was fixed arbitrarily or without any reason. The High Court was clearly in error in allowing the writ petitions and substituting the date of 1.1.1986 for 1.1.1990, at AIR p.784 para 17.” 33. More recently, in Veeraswamy-(1999) 3 SCC 414 this Court observed that, financial constraints could be a valid ground for introducing a cut-off date while implementing a pension scheme on a revised basis (SCC page 421). In that case, the pension scheme applied differently to persons who had retired from service before 1.7.1986, and those who were in employment on the said date. It was held that they could not be treated alike as they did not belong to one class and they formed separate classes. 34. In State of Punjab v. Boota Singh-(2000) 3 SCC 733 (“Boota Singh”) after considering several judgments of this Court in D.S. Nakara (1983) 1 SCC 305 to K.L. Rathee v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 7, it was held that D.S. Nakara should not be interpreted to mean that the emoluments of persons who retired after a notified date holding the same status, must be treated to be the same. (SCC at page 735) 35. (SCC at page 735) 35. In State of Punjab v. J.L. Gupta (2000) 3 SCC 736, where one of us was on the Bench (Sabharwal, J.) the views expressed in Boota Singh were reiterated, and it was held that for the grant of additional benefit, which had financial implications, the prescription of a specific date for conferment of additional benefit, could not be considered arbitrary. (SCC at page 737) 36. In Ramarao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn.,(2004) 2 SCC 76, a Division Bench of this Court said, even for the purpose of effecting promotion, fixing of a cut-off date was neither arbitrary, unreasonable nor did it offend Article 14 of the Constitution. Moreover, the Court held that possible hardship to be endured by a person as a result did not make cut-off dates violative of Article 14. (SCC at page 88) 37. In the instant case before us, the cut-off date has been fixed as 1.4.1995 on a very valid ground, namely, that of financial constraints. Consequently, we reject the contention that fixing of the cut-off date was arbitrary, irrational or had no rational basis or that it offends Article 14.” Herein also, the Government’s stand is that by adopting the date 1.3.2002 will result in huge financial liabilities to the Government. Going by the dictum laid down in the above said case, the said stand cannot be said to be irrational and consequently the cut off date fixed cannot be said to be arbitrary. 28. The above decision of the Apex Court was relied upon in State of A.P. and another v. A.P. Pensioners’ Association and others, (2005) 13 SCC 161. Therein, it was held that financial constraint is a relevant criterion for determining grant of benefits by a State Government by fixing a cut-off date. The said case also was one which considered the implications of Pay Revision Commission’s recommendation and the argument regarding the arbitrary nature of the cut off date was repelled by relying upon the judgment in AmarNath Goyal’s case (2005) 6 SCC 754 and it was held thus in paragraph 39: “It is, therefore, beyond any shadow of doubt that the financial implication is a relevant criterion for the State Government to determine as to what benefits can be granted pursuant to or in furtherance of the recommendations made by PRC. PRC also said that while revision of pay shall take effect from 1.7.1998, the monetary benefit would be payable only from 1.4.1999. If monetary benefit was payable only from 1.4.1999, all rights to get the benefits computed on the basis of the revised scale of pay would only be for the purpose of payment of pay with effect from 1.4.1999 or payment of the recurring amount of pension with effect from the date.” 29. In Government of A.P. v. Subbarayudu, 2008 (2) KLT 681-SC these principles were reiterated in paragraphs 4 to 7 as follows: “4. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab & Ors. v. Amar Nalh Goyal & others, (2005) 6 SCC 754. 5. No doubt in D.S. Nakara & Ors. v Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 this Court had struck down the cut off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara’s case (supra), as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Amar Nath Goyal & Ors. (supra). 6. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The Court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 7. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The Court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 7. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter affidavit filed by the Government, (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical) vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, (1990) 3 SCC 368, Union of India & Anr. v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, (1994) 4 SCC 212 (vide para 5), Ramrao& Ors. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 76 (vide para 31), University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary & Ors., (1996) 10 SCC 536 etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut off date has been chosen, the Court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 unless the said cut off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result.” The above decision will show that there can be different considerations, viz. economic conditions, financial constraint, administrative exigencies, etc. in fixing a cut-off date and the court should not normally interfere with the same.