U.B. Saha, J.;— 1. Heard. Mr. K. Roy learned counsel for the convict-appellant, as well as Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned P.P in-charge, appearing for the State. 2. The appellant, in this appeal, has challenged the judgment and order dated 30th April, 2008 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Khowai, West Tripura, in Case No.ST(WT/K) 14 of 2008, whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted under section 302, read with section 34, Indian Pencal Code (‘IPC'), and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and, in addition, to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000, default of which to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one year more. 3. When the appeal had been pending, the accused-appellant filed an application being Crl. MC No. 248 of 2011, contending, inter alia, that at the time of committing the alleged offence, he was a juvenile and, therefore, the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Trial court is wholly unsustainable. By an order passed in the said Crl MC, this court directed an enquiry to be made to determine as to the juvenility of the appellant on the date of the alleged offence. Following the direction, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Khowai, has held an enquiry and submitted his report, on the basis of an ossification test conducted by a medical board of the G.B. hospital, Agartala, which was communicated to him by the Medical Superintendent of the said hospital on 7.2.2012. It appears from the report that at the time of the alleged occurrence, the appellant was a seventeen-year-five-month-twenty-four-day-old boy. It also appears from the ossification report given by the medical board that on 4.2.2012, the age of the appellant was between 23 and 25 years and, therefore, on the day of the alleged occurrence (that is, on 30.10.2004), the age of the appellant was, admittedly, below eighteen years. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Roy submits that neither the date of the arrest nor the date of the conviction should be the determining factor to consider as to whether the accused was a juvenile at the relevant point in time or not. According to him the age of the accused/appellant on the date of alleged occurrence is to be considered for determing juvenility. Roy submits that neither the date of the arrest nor the date of the conviction should be the determining factor to consider as to whether the accused was a juvenile at the relevant point in time or not. According to him the age of the accused/appellant on the date of alleged occurrence is to be considered for determing juvenility. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Lakhan Lal with Pappu Lal alias Manoj Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, AIR 2011 SC 842 , and submitted that the appellant has been in custody since his date of conviction (that is, since 30.4.2008) and even before his conviction also, he had been in custody for some time. 5. Mr. Debnath, P.P. in-charge, in his usual fairness, submits that the normal course would be to set aside that order of conviction and sentence and remit the matter to the appropriate court to decide the matter under the appropriate Act, that is the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, but as in the instant case, the appellant has already suffered more than the statutory period of punishment as prescribed under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, he may be released forthwith, upholding the conviction. 6. We have minutely examined the report of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Khowai, as well as the report relating to the ossification test conducted by a medical board of the G.B. hospital, Agartala, and we are of the considered opinion that at the relevant time of the alleged offence, the appellant was a juvenile, and as such, he could not have been tried as has been done in the present case. This case ought to have been dealt with in accordance with the provision of section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Act, 2006. But, at the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that has been placed before us, sating, inter alia, that the appellant has already suffered a period of sentence more than the period of sentence prescribed under section 15 of the Act. If the case is sent to the juvenile board, then also, the board would not be in a position to punish more than the period the appellant as has already been suffered. 7. If the case is sent to the juvenile board, then also, the board would not be in a position to punish more than the period the appellant as has already been suffered. 7. In Lakhan Lal with Pappu Lal alias Manoj Kumar Srivastava (supra), the Apex Court held as follows : "The next question for our consideration is as to what order and sentence is to be passe against the appellants for the offences committed by them under section 302 read with section 34 of the IPC? Both the appellants have crossed the age of 40 years as at present and, therefore, it will not be conducive to the environment in the special home and at any rate, they have undergone and actual period of sentence of more than three years the maximum period provided under section 15 of the 2000 Act. In the circumstances, while sustaining the conviction of the appellants for the offences punishable under section 302 read with section 34 of the IPC, the sentences awarded to them are set aside. They are accordingly directed to be released forthwith. Thus view of ours to set aside the sentence is supported by the decision of this court in Dharambir (supra)". 8. We are of the further opinion that it would be appropriate to sustain the order of conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under section 302, read with section 34, IPC and modify the order of sentence passed by the learned trial court to the period already undergone by the accused/appellant. Ordered accordingly. The appellant-accused namely Sri Atul Debbarma be released forthwith, if he is not wanted in connection with any other case. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed. _____________