Judgment :- 1. This Writ Petition is filed praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for records pertaining to the Government Letter bearing No.21215/Ni-a1/2008-11 dated 3.8.2010 issued by the first respondent and quash the same and further direct the first respondent to consider the claim of the petitioner for re-conveyance of acquired lands at Survey Nos.166/1A, 166/2A, 166/3A, 166/4, 166/1B, 166/2B, 166/3B of Gopalsamudaram Village, Ambasamudaram Taluk, Tirunelveli District. 2. Ms. V.M Velumani, learned Special Government Pleader takes notice on behalf of the respondents. By consent, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 3. The lands subject matter of which present writ petition has been filed, has been acquired under the Act 31 of 1978. Petitioner seeks reconveyance of the lands on the ground that the acquired lands have not been utilised for long number of years and the request for reconveyance has been rejected by the order of the Government stating that the lands have been acquired and handed over to the beneficiaries. Assuming for the movement, the petitioner's plea of non user is taken on face value, The Act 31 of 78 does not provide for reconveyance of the land under any circumstances. This is in contrast with the provisions of the Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act. This Court has taken a consistent view that the provisions of the Section 48-B of the Act will not be applicable to the land acquired under Act 31 of 1978. In W.P.No.34140 of 2005 (Panayamma and three others – vs. - The Government of Tamil Nadu and two others), this Court by order dated 22.12.2009 held that the Special enactment bars reconveyance of the land. The relevant portion reads as follows:- "7. ....... Reconveyance as contemplated under section 48-B of the Central Act cannot be read into or made applicable to Act 31 of 1978. In this regard, I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Mr. The relevant portion reads as follows:- "7. ....... Reconveyance as contemplated under section 48-B of the Central Act cannot be read into or made applicable to Act 31 of 1978. In this regard, I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Mr. Justice Paul Vasanthkumar in the case of R. Ananthakrishnan and others VS The Secretary, State of Tamil nadu, Adi Drvidar and Tribal Welfare Department, Chepauk, Chennai and three others reported in 2008 (3) CTC 447 , wherein, in paragraph 12 it has been held as follows: "Act 31 of 1978 being a special enactment and admittedly there is no provision for dropping the notification already issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, it has to be ascertained whether the respondents have any right to issue withdrawal notification for any reason. Even though the power of reconveyance is vested under the Central Act and after vesting of the land with the Government free from all encumbrances, whether it can be reassigned or reconveyed to the original owner as a matter of right, was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Govt. of A.P. VS Syed Akbar 2004(5) CTC 506: 2005(1) SCC 558 and in paragraphs 10 and 14 the Supreme Court held as follows: "10. It is neither debated nor disputed as regards the valid acquisition of the land in question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the possession of the land had been taken. By virtue of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land has vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, Government could withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. In the instant case, even under Section 48, the Government could not withdraw from acquisition or to reconvey the said land to the respondent as the possession of the land had already been taken. The position of law is well settled. In state of Kerala VS M. Bhaskaran pillai para 4 of the said judgment reads: "4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,1894, by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,1894, by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the directive principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value." 14. From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances, (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilised for any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the Government free from all encumbrances cannot be reassigned or reconveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order. Even under the Central Act, Section 48(1) clearly says that the Government shall be at liberty, except in the case provided for in Section 36, to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. Thus, legal position emerges is that if the possession of the land has been taken, the de-notification is not legally possible. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Special Land Acquisition Officer Vs Godrej and boyce, 1988(1) SCC 50 , in paragraph 5 held as follows: "5.... Thus, legal position emerges is that if the possession of the land has been taken, the de-notification is not legally possible. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Special Land Acquisition Officer Vs Godrej and boyce, 1988(1) SCC 50 , in paragraph 5 held as follows: "5.... Till that point of time, the land continues to be with the original owner and he is also free (except where there is specific legislation to the contrary) to deal with the land just as he likes, although it may be that on account of the pendency of proceedings for acquisition intending purchasers may be chary of coming near the land. So long as possession is not taken over, the mere fact of a notification under Section 4 or declaration under Section 6 having been made does not divest the owner of his rights in respect of the land or relieve him of the duty to take care of the land and protect it against encroachments. Again, such a notification does not either confer on the State Government any right to interfere with the ownership or other rights in the land or impose on it any duty to remove encroachments therefrom or in any other way safeguard the interests of the original owner of the land. It is in view of this position, that the owner's interests remain unaffected until possession is taken, that Section 48 gives a liberty to the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition at any stage before possession is taken........" Here in this case, there is a specific legislation to the contrary under Section 4(1) of Act 31 of 1978, specifically stating that as and when the notification is issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, the land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances including that of the original owner. The special enactment, therefore, bars re-conveyance and therefore, Government order is bad.” 4. In view of the above decision, the order under challenge is perfectly in order. There is no illegality or irregularity in the order. The relief sought for is contrary to the law and the same cannot be granted. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.