JUDGMENT:- 1. Animadverting upon the order dated 06.08.2007 passed in I.A.No.198 of 2005 in O.S.No.56 of 2004, by the learned Subordinate Judge, Mettur, this civil revision petition is focussed. 2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts in a few broad strokes, could be encapsulated thus: The first respondent herein filed the suit O.S.No.56 of 2004 seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell. After filing the written statement, the defendant remained ex parte; whereupon an ex parte decree was passed and subsequently, an I.A. was filed to get the delay of 95 days condoned in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC. The said application was dismissed. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, this revision was filed with a miscellaneous petition, to get the delay condoned, but that application was returned and it was re-presented with delay of 1045 days and that the delay in re-presentation application was condoned. Thereafter, an application to get the delay of 17 days condoned in filing the CRP, was allowed and now this civil revision petition has come before me. 3. It so happened that when the CRP was at the SR stage, the second petitioner, namely Ramalingam Chettiar died and wherefore, his LRs were impleaded, in addition to the already existing L.R. Thulasi, the wife of the deceased. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on the records, would develop his argument to the effect that the original defendants happened to be senior citizens and they could not pursue their defence, because of their illness and old age . The lower Court could have very well condoned the meagre delay of 95 days, but taking a strict view of the matter, the application was dismissed and that alone resulted in further delay having been caused in the matter. There is no willful negligence on the part of the original defendants in prosecuting the matter. 5. Whereas, the learned counsel for the first respondent, would put forth and set forth his arguments, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: The affidavit accompanying the application to get the delay of 95 days condoned in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 was fraught with mendacity and falsity, and it was nothing but a load of baloney and the lower court seeing the reality dismissed that application, warranting no interference in the revision. Even in the process of filing the revision, no diligence was shown by the revision petitioner and on that account also no mercy need be shown towards her. For re-presentation 1045 days was taken, and that itself would exemplify and portray, demonstrate and display that the revision petitioner is bent upon dragging on the proceedings. Virtually she is dilly-dallying and shilly-shallying with the matter and she cannot be heard to contend that she is having any genuine reason for getting the original delay condoned. 6. The point for consideration is as to whether the lower Court was justified in dismissing the I.A. for getting the delay of 95 days condoned in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC? 7. Trite, the proposition of law, is that normally small delays could be condoned and that too in suits relating to title as well as specific performance, but in this case, the lower Court failed to apply that principle. No doubt, the plaintiff as well as the defendants happened to be senior citizens. In fact, Ramalingam Chettiear died pendente lite also; Thulasi, being the wife of Ramalingam Chettiar was a septuagenerian even at that time. It appears the lower Court expected production of medical records to fortify and buttress the averments as found set out in the affidavit accompanying the said application. In my considered opinion in view of the fact that the delay was not huge, a lenient view could have been taken by the lower Court and that would have obviated and avoided the subsequent protraction of the matter. 8. I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court: (i) 2010(2) Supreme 115 (Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd., vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another) and an excerpt from it would run thus: "8. ............The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and other similar statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106 . ..........................." (ii) AIR 2002 SC 1201 (Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and aothers v. Gobardhan Sao and others) also could fruitfully be cited; certain excerpts from it would run thus: "13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses." (emphasis added) 9. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses." (emphasis added) 9. It is clear that this is a fit case, wherein the lower Court could have condoned the delay of 95 days in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC, subject to imposition of cost, but that was not done so. 10. The learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff would submit that already non judicial stamp papers were deposited in the process of getting the sale deed executed in his favour as per the ex parte decree and that the plaintiff incurred loss also. Keeping in mind all those facts, I am of the view that the delay of 95 days as found set out in the I.A. could be allowed, by setting aside the order of the lower Court, subject to imposition of cost of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) payable by the revision petitioner in favour of the first respondent, within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On such compliance, the lower Court shall number the application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC and process it and in the event of setting aside the ex parte decree, the suit shall be disposed of within a period of three months thereafter. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.