Rajiv Sharma, J.;- Heard learned Counsel for the parties. In short compass, facts which lead to the filing of the instant writ petition are that one Mohd. Mateen filed a Regular Suit No. 227 of 1970 for recovery of ` 2,137.80 based on pronote and during pendency of the suit, the plaintiff moved an application for attachment of the property before judgment, which was allowed on 27.7.1970 and the Trial Court directed for attachment of residential house and shop of the petitioner. Later on, the aforesaid Regular Suit was decreed by the Trial Court on 12.1.1973. As the decree was not satisfied, Mohd. Mateen, the decree holder moved an application for execution of the above decree for a sum of ` 4297/28p against the petitioner-judgment debtor, which was registered as Execution Case No. 83 of 1973 on which notice was issued to the judgment debtor on 4.1.1974. On 27.7.1974, a sale proclamation was issued for recovery of 4311/30p fixing the date of auction sale on 24.9.1974 through public auction. Opposite Party no.3-Chhotey Lal purchased the aforesaid property through public auction held on 24.9.1974. The aforesaid sale was confirmed on 30.11.1974 in accordance with Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Execution Case No. 83 of 1973; Mohd. Mateen vs. Ganga Prasad decided on 6.12.1980 and a sale certificate was also prepared. It is to be noted that opposite party no.3-Chhotey Lal moved an application for delivery of possession, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 128 of 1980.Petitioner filed objections stating therein that the petitioner is entitled in law for a fair value of the property auctioned. It was also indicated that the property was not identifiable and moreover, the amount for which execution was filed was only ` 2,137/- and it should have been realized even selling a portion of the house and not the entire house. It has further been urged that there are serious irregularities in the procedure for auction sale and even the auction sale was conducted within 30 days and there was no statutory time gap of at least 30 days provided under Order 21 Rule 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has further been urged that there are serious irregularities in the procedure for auction sale and even the auction sale was conducted within 30 days and there was no statutory time gap of at least 30 days provided under Order 21 Rule 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Apart from the above, it has been urged that no prior notice in any manner was given to or served on the judgment-debtor before the process or action of drawing up of sale proclamation was initiated or taken up and as a result thereof no value or estimation of the value of the property could be given by the judgment-debtor and the property was auctioned on a very low and throw away price. Counsel for the petitioner while inviting attention towards Order 21 and the relevant rules viz. Rule 54, 66 and 68 contended that the court below failed to consider whether the decree could be satisfied by sale of a part of the immovable property only. Further, rules were also violated in so far as no notice was served upon the petitioner/judgment debtor nor mind was applied by the executing court on the question as to whether the sale of a part of the property could satisfy the decree in question. In support of aforesaid arguments, petitioners' Counsel has relied upon Mohan Lal Bagla vs. Board of Revenue, Lucknow and others 2005(23) LCD 86, Hari Shanker Prasad vs. IInd Additional District Judge, Azamgarh and others; 2007(67) ALR 622, Desh Bandhu Gupta vs. Anil Anand (1994)1 SCC 131 , Balrakrishnan vs. Malayindi (2006) 3 SCC 49 and other cases. On behalf of contesting respondent i.e. opposite party no.3-Chhotey Lal, it has been submitted that he had purchased the house in question through auction held on 24.9.1974 and the auction sale was also confirmed by the competent authority in his favour. Therefore, he is entitled for the delivery of possession. As regard to the irregularities, if any, in auction proceedings, learned Counsel for the opposite party has stated that the allegations are absolutely false and incorrect. As a matter of fact, the petitioner was served with the notice on 4.1.1974 in the execution case. Therefore, he is entitled for the delivery of possession. As regard to the irregularities, if any, in auction proceedings, learned Counsel for the opposite party has stated that the allegations are absolutely false and incorrect. As a matter of fact, the petitioner was served with the notice on 4.1.1974 in the execution case. He also pointed out that Smt. Banshraji wife of Ganga prasad (judgment debtor) preferred a Regular Suit No. 340 of 1974; Smt. Banshraji vs. Mateen and others in the Court of Munsif South, Sultanpur in respect of the same disputed house and the said suit was dismissed by the learned Munsif on 11.4.1980. It has also been argued on behalf of the contesting respondent that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of concealment and suppression of material facts. In the writ petition, the filing of objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure dated 14.12.1977 in Misc. Case No. 90 of 77, passing of order dated 10.4.1981, judgment passed in Civil Revision No. 61 of 1981 decided on 29.8.1981 was not disclosed. It was also not disclosed that on the back of the notice dated 2.1.1974 served on 4.1.1974, there is endorsement made by the petitioner. Thus when the petitioner had omitted to mention material facts in the writ petition, it amounts to suppression of material facts. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India : (2007) 8 SCC 449 , the Apex Court held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty bound to place all the facts before the court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Apex Court Court while referring to the judgment of Scrutton, LJ. in R v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, observed as under:- "In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. The Apex Court Court while referring to the judgment of Scrutton, LJ. in R v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, observed as under:- "In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise-guilty of misleading the Court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible." In Welcome Hotel and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. etc. AIR 1983 SC 1015 , the Apex Court has held that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors.,[2008 (12) SCC 481] the Apex Court has held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was reiterated in G. Jayshree and Ors. v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and Ors.: (2009) 3 SCC 141 . In a recent decision of Dalip Singh Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(2010) 2 Supreme Court Cases 114], the Apex Court seriously criticized the making of false statement on oath and the attempt of a litigant in misleading the Court. It is to be noted that initially, the petitioner in his writ petition did not disclose about the filing of a Regular Suit by his wife and its dismissal. It is to be noted that initially, the petitioner in his writ petition did not disclose about the filing of a Regular Suit by his wife and its dismissal. Not only this fact, but also the dismissal of the First Appeal as also the Second Appeal by the High Court was not disclosed when the writ petition was presented before this Court. The court below in Civil Appeal No. 284 of 1980, which was filed by Smt. Banshraji after dismissal of the suit filed by her, observed as under while dismissing the appeal vide order dated 23.8.1988:- " Moreover, admittedly, the house in suit was attached before judgment in suit no. 227/70 under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. The appellant did not file any objection against the attachment of above house nor Ganga Prasad contended that above house did not belong to him and was exclusive property of his wife. The appellant Bansraji, no doubt, stated that she had no knowledge about the attachment of house before judgment. Her above explanation does not appear convincing because she is wife of Ganga Prasad and it cannot be said that she could not be knowing as to what was happening in respect of the house in which she was residing with her husband. As mentioned above, after the death of Smt. Sirtaji, it was Ganga Prasad, who applied for mutation and Bansraji-appellant did not file any application for mutation." It is settled law that one should approach the court with clean heart and clean mind to get a relief and one who does not come with clean heart and clean mind dis-entitles himself from getting any relief from the Court. From what has been mentioned above, it is clear that the petitioner has filed this writ petition with oblique motives and has not presented the correct facts just to gain undue advantage. Such type of practice should always be discouraged and is highly deprecated. They belong to the category of persons who not only attempt, but succeed in polluting the course of justice. Therefore, the court do not find any justification to interfere with the order under challenge or entertain the petitioner's prayer for setting aside the impugned orders and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. They belong to the category of persons who not only attempt, but succeed in polluting the course of justice. Therefore, the court do not find any justification to interfere with the order under challenge or entertain the petitioner's prayer for setting aside the impugned orders and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. However, I have gone through the record and it reveals that the sale proclamation was prepared on 27.7.1974 and the same was served and affixed on the notice board of the Court on 28.8.1974, which was also served on the spot by affixation on 29.8.1984, as would be evident from the endorsement of affixation. The date of preparation of sale proclamation does not affect the sale proceedings because the petitioner did not file any objection either under Rule 89 or 90 of Order 21 CPC within the period prescribed therein or thereafter before the executing court. In contrast, the petitioner Ganga Prasad preferred objections under Section 47 CPC, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 90 of 1977 and the same was rejected on 10.4.1981. After rejection of objections, the petitioner filed a Civil Revision No. 61 of 1981 before the District Judge, Sultanpur which too was dismissed on 28.8.1981. Apart from this, the petitioner abused the process of law by getting the objection filed by his wife Smt. Bansraji under Order 21 Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure but same was also rejected by the Executing Court and thereafter, the wife of Ganga Prasad filed a Regular Suit, of which description has been given in preceding paragraphs. All these facts would be evident from the judgment dated 20.9.1988 passed by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 498 of 1988 whereby the appeal filed by Smt. Bansraji wife of Ganga Prasad was dismissed:- "This second appeal has been filed by a wife, who filed suit under Order 21 Rule 63 CPC against attachment of a house made an execution of a decree against her husband. The respondents are her husband Ganga Prasad (No.2) Mohd. Mateen, Decree Holder(No.2) and Chotey Lal auction purchaser(No.3). She lost the case in both the courts and undaunted she has come before this Court. I have seen judgment of both the courts. The respondents are her husband Ganga Prasad (No.2) Mohd. Mateen, Decree Holder(No.2) and Chotey Lal auction purchaser(No.3). She lost the case in both the courts and undaunted she has come before this Court. I have seen judgment of both the courts. It appears that the decree holder filed a suit against husband ( petitioner's husband) in the year 1970 for recovery of a certain amount. The house in dispute was attached before judgment. Against it, no objection was filed. Then execution started in 1973. It was then that the appellant's wife filed objection under Order 21 Rule 58 C.P.C. It was dismissed in 1974 in default. The wife appellant applied for its restoration. It was rejected. Revision against it was rejected. Then she filed suit under Order 21 Rule 63. It was dismissed and now this appeal has been filed. Thus the litigation is continuing from 1979. The wife claimed that the house belonged to her because she inherited it from her mother Sirtaji. She said that Sirtaji was a widow and she started living with appellant's husband father. The house was in her name and after her death the appellant's name was mutated. According to him, her husband was son of one Hubraji, who was married to her husband's father. The case of decree-holder and auction was purchased was that Smt. Sartaji was not the mother of appellant rather she was mother of her husband and was married to her husband's father. Thus according to them the husband got this house from Smt. Sartaji. Thus the main question was whether Smt. Sartaji was the mother of the appellant or her husband. The learned lower appellate court after considering the evidence recorded the finding that Smt. Sirtaji was the mother of appellant's husband and appellant's husband was sole heir of Sartaji. It is a finding of fact and there is no dispute that the house originally belong to Smt. Sirtaji. In reaching the above conclusion the lower appellate court also referred to the circumstances under which mutation of appellant's name was made against this house. It is a finding of fact and there is no dispute that the house originally belong to Smt. Sirtaji. In reaching the above conclusion the lower appellate court also referred to the circumstances under which mutation of appellant's name was made against this house. The learned appellate court pointed out that for mutation of appellant's name her husband gave a statement in 1968 that is near about the time when appellant's husband took the loan, regarding which the suit was filed by the decree holder and this statement was that the house belonged to Smt. Sirtaji mother of the appellant's husband and his mother had given the house in suit to the appellant in her life time. In the litigation the appellant did not say that she was given housed by Sirtaji rather she maintained that she got it after the death of Sirtaji. It was thus after consideration of evidence that the courts found that the house belonged to Smt. Sirtaji who,was mother of appellant's husband and thus house devolved on appellant's husband. These are findings of fact which cannot be disturbed in second appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant has not pointed out any specific legal point that may be involved in this case. He rather says that the entire approach of the court below is wrong and there was no occasion for collusion between husband and wife and unnecessarily, the previous statement of the husband was read. I have seen the judgments. There is nothing wrong in the approach. The statement was read just to see as to how the name of the appellant came to be recorded, so no ground for interference has been made out. The result is that this second appeal should be dismissed. The second appeal is dismissed and stay order is vacated." As regard the auction before the expiry of 30 days, the assertion of the petitioner is wholly misconceived. The period of 30 days mentioned in Rule 68 of Order 21 is not mandatory. It could be less than 30 days as per consent of parties. It is relevant to point out that Rule 68 of Order 21 has been amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 and a period of 15 days has been prescribed in place of 30 days. It could be less than 30 days as per consent of parties. It is relevant to point out that Rule 68 of Order 21 has been amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 and a period of 15 days has been prescribed in place of 30 days. Moreover, the petitioner had an opportunity of filing objection under Rule 90 of Order 21, which he failed to avail. In Jagat Pal v. State of U.P. and others [1994 (12) LCD 612], this Court observed that every irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting the auction is not the valid ground for setting aside the sale. A person has to satisfy that he has suffered some substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or mistake. The auction sale and market prices are distant neighbours. What has to be established is that there was not only inadequacy of the price but that inadequacy was caused by reason of the material irregularity or fraud. There must be a connection between the inadequacy of the price and the material irregularity. The assertion of the petitioner that the property was auctioned for a meager amount which consisted of house and shops is also misconceived as this Court in the case of Munni Lal v. Smt. Sona alias Sonia and others [ 1982 AWC 354 ] relying upon several cases including the decisions rendered by Apex Court held that whether the property has been auctioned for inadequate price or not is purely a question of fact which cannot be considered by the Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. From the facts averred above, it is imminently clear that ample opportunities were afforded to the petitioner to pay the amount as per terms of the decree but he failed to grab any opportunity. It seems that the petitioner was interested in litigation rather in paying the dues. The series of events described above shows that the petitioner was not interested in complying the court's order and has misused the process of law by getting the proceedings initiated through his wife. So viewed, I am satisfied that the court below/authorities had exercised a conscientious and lively discretion in concluding the sale. The series of events described above shows that the petitioner was not interested in complying the court's order and has misused the process of law by getting the proceedings initiated through his wife. So viewed, I am satisfied that the court below/authorities had exercised a conscientious and lively discretion in concluding the sale. It is pertinent to add that while exercising extra ordinary civil jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction and it does not hear the writ petition like an appeal or revision. The High Court under this jurisdiction cannot re-appraise the evidence on record. Therefore, the petitioner cannot derive any benefits from case laws relied upon by him. In my view any other conclusion would lead to incongruous and unjust results. The legal position being clear, this petition has to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. Costs easy.