Ram Narain Gupta (Dead) and others v. Hari Om Agarwal and another
2012-01-31
DILIP GUPTA
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Dilip Gupta, J.;- The application filed by the petitioner-defendant of SCC Suit No.169 of 2008 for stay of the proceedings of the suit under Section 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ''CPC') was rejected by the Judge, Court of Small Causes by the order dated 4th August, 2010. This order was assailed by the petitioner under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act') by filing a Revision which was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 21st November, 2011. These two orders have been assailed in this petition. Original Suit No.197 of 2008 was filed on 28th February, 2008 by Hari Om Agarwal and Savitri Agarwal (respondents-in this petition) against Ram Narain Gupta (since deceased) for permanent injunction with respect to the plot situate in the eastern part of the property described at the foot of the plaint i.e. House No.107/263, Nehru Nagar, Kanpur and for restraining the defendant from obstructing the light and air facilities of the plaintiffs. A written statement was filed by the defendant that the plaintiffs were not the owners or landlord of the strip of the land and it was claimed that the said land was owned and possessed by the defendant. The said Original Suit is pending. Subsequently, Hari Om Agarwal and Savitri Agarwal filed SCC Suit No.169 of 2008 on 2nd July, 2008 for eviction of Ram Narain Gupta from the portion in his tenancy (since deceased) as he was in arrears of rent and had raised constructions without the consent of the landlords and had not vacated the premises despite termination of tenancy. A written statement has been filed by the defendant. The defendant Ram Narain Gupta (since deceased) also filed an application under Section 10 read with Section 151 CPC for stay of the proceedings in the subsequent SCC Suit. A reply was filed by the plaintiffs.
A written statement has been filed by the defendant. The defendant Ram Narain Gupta (since deceased) also filed an application under Section 10 read with Section 151 CPC for stay of the proceedings in the subsequent SCC Suit. A reply was filed by the plaintiffs. The Judge, Court of Small Causes after noticing that the parties in both the suits were same observed that SCC Suit No.169 of 2008 had been filed for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent whereas Original Suit No.197 of 2008 had been filed for restraining the respondents from raising constructions on the open plot of land and the relief in the SCC Suit could only be granted by the Judge, Court of Small Causes and not by the Civil Court whereas the relief in Original Suit No.197 of 2008 could be granted only by the Civil Judge and not by the Judge, Court of Small Causes. The application filed by the defendant was, accordingly, rejected. The Revision filed by the defendant was also dismissed by the judgment and order dated 4th August, 2010. It is submitted by Sri Nirvikar Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners that the Courts below committed an illegality in rejecting the application filed by the defendant. It is his submission that what is required to be considered under Section 10 CPC is whether the matter in issue in the subsequent suit is also directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit and whether both the suits are between the same parties. It is his submission that when the parties in both the suits are same and the issue involved in both the suits is also same, the proceedings in the subsequent suit should be stayed. It is also his submission that the Court of Small Causes is a Court of preferential jurisdiction and not of exclusive jurisdiction. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In order to appreciate the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, it will be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section 10 CPC which are as follows:- "10.
I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In order to appreciate the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, it will be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section 10 CPC which are as follows:- "10. Stay of suit.-No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court. Explanation-The pendency of a suit in a foreign Court does not preclude the Court in India from trying a suit founded on the same cause of action." It is clear from a perusal of the said Section 10 CPC that there should be two Suits instituted between the same parties. It is also necessary that the matter in the subsequent suit should also be directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit between the same parties or between the parties under whom they are litigating. It will also be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Sections 15 as amended in the State and 16 of the Act which are as follows:- "15. Cognizance of suits by Courts of Small Causes.--(1) A Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the Second Schedule as suits expected from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes.
Cognizance of suits by Courts of Small Causes.--(1) A Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the Second Schedule as suits expected from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. (2) Subject to the exceptions specified in that Schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes: Provided that in relation to suits by the lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease or for recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for use and occupation thereof after the determination of the lease, the reference in this sub-section to five thousand rupees shall be construed as a reference of twenty-five thousand rupees. Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression ''building' has the same meaning as in Art. (4) in the Second Schedule. 16. Exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of Small Causes.-- Save as expressly provided by this Act or by any other enactment for the time being in force, a suit cognizable by a Court of Small Causes shall not be tried by any other Court having jurisdiction within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes by which the suit is triable." In the present, case the previously instituted suit is Original Suit No.197 of 2008. The relief claimed in this suit is for permanent injunction and for restraining the defendant-tenant from obstructing the light and air facilities of the plaintiffs. The subsequent suit is SCC Suit No.169 of 2008 pending before the Judge, Court of Small Causes for eviction of the defendant as he was in arrears of rent and had raised constructions without the consent of the landlords. The subsequent suit is required to be decided in a summary manner provided under the Act and the reliefs in the two suits is different. The Supreme Court in Radha Devi Vs.
The subsequent suit is required to be decided in a summary manner provided under the Act and the reliefs in the two suits is different. The Supreme Court in Radha Devi Vs. Deep Narayan Mandal & Ors., (2003) 11 SCC 759 observed, while dealing with the provisions of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982, that the aid of Section 10 CPC cannot be taken if one suit is a title suit and the other is a suit filed for eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 and the observations are as follows:- "The appellant herein purchased the premises in dispute by registered sale deed on 5-12-1973. According to the appellant, she in the year 1991, let out the premises to the respondents on rent. It is alleged that a dispute arose between the appellant and the respondents when the appellant called upon the respondents to vacate the premises. It is further alleged that under such circumstances, the respondents filed Title Suit No.71 of 1998 for declaration and partition, that the property of which they are tenants is a joint family property and, as such, they have 1/3rd share in it. Since the appellant required the premises for her bona fide need she filed a suit for eviction of the respondents under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as "the Bihar Act"). Subsequently, in the said eviction suit, the respondents filed an application under Section 10 CPC for staying the proceedings in eviction suit till the disposal of the title suit filed by them in the civil court. The learned Munsif allowed the said application and stayed the proceedings of the eviction suit. The appellant thereafter preferred a revision before the High Court, but the same was dismissed. It is against the said order the appellant has filed the instant appeal by way of special leave petition. After we have heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the Bihar Rent Act is a special Act providing for speedy disposal of eviction suit on certain grounds enumerated therein. Under the said Act eviction suit is required to be tried under summary procedure provided under the Act.
After we have heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the Bihar Rent Act is a special Act providing for speedy disposal of eviction suit on certain grounds enumerated therein. Under the said Act eviction suit is required to be tried under summary procedure provided under the Act. To succeed in the eviction suit under the Bihar Rent Act the landlord is required to prove contract of tenancy between her and the tenant and also the ground on which the eviction is sought. In such a suit the Rent Court is not required to go into the serious question of title otherwise the purpose of the Act would stand frustrated. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the view that the courts below were not justified in staying the proceedings in the eviction suit." (emphasis supplied) In view of the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the Courts below committed no illegality in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Section 10 CPC as even under the Act the eviction suit is required to be tried in the summary manner provided under the Act. In Minocher Behramji Damania Vs. Hema N. Dadachanji & Ors., AIR 1982 Bombay 151, the Bombay High Court also examined this issue. A suit had been filed in the Civil Court for possession. Though the Court found that the subject matter in both the suits, i.e. City Civil Court Suit and the Small Cause Court Suit, were the same but the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the City Civil Court Suit and, therefore, the application filed under Section 10 CPC was rejected and the observations are as follows:- "Mr. Variava for the petitioner contends that this order is wrongly passed as on a true construction of S. 10 of the Civil P. C. one of the requirements for passing such an order is that previously instituted suit must be pending in the same or in the other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit. Mr.
Mr. Variava does not dispute that the subject matter of both the suits i.e. the City Civil Court suit and the Small Cause Court suit are the same, but he contends that the Small Cause Court has no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed in the City Civil Court suit. The said reliefs are that it may be declared that the defendants are trespassers in the suit premises as also in respect of the goodwill, tenancy rights and the assets lying in the said premises, for possession on the ground of the defendants being trespassers and for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and also as the total value of the subject matter of this suit is over Rs. 15,000. In my view the contention of Mr. Variava that it is not enough that there is substantial identity of the subject matter of the suit but that the Court in earlier suit should have jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed in the later suit is correct. It is also clear that the Small Cause Court has no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs which are claimed in the City Civil Court suit, under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 of the Bombay Rent Act. In the Small Cause Courts Act amendments were carried out in 1976 which are not relevant as both the suits were filed before the said amendments. By virtue of S. 19 of the Small Cause Courts Act 1882 the Small Cause Court has no jurisdiction in the suit for the recovery of immovable property, suits to obtain an injunction and suits for declamatory decrees. Small Cause Court has, however, jurisdiction to entertain the suits between the landlord and tenants by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Act and also to decide whether the relationship between the landlord and the tenant existed by virtue of S. 39 of the said Act. However, it is clear that the question of jurisdiction under this Special Act can be assumed only when the suit as filed was on the face of it between landlord and tenant. Once the Small Cause Court came to the conclusion that such a relationship did not exist, admittedly it cannot further decide as to what the relationship between the parties was.
Once the Small Cause Court came to the conclusion that such a relationship did not exist, admittedly it cannot further decide as to what the relationship between the parties was. It is, therefore, clear that the Small Cause Court does not have jurisdiction to grant reliefs prayed for in the present suit, the plaintiff wherein clearly denies any existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant." (emphasis supplied) The same is the position in the present case. The Judge, Court of Small Causes cannot grant the relief claimed in the Original Suit. It is for this reason that the application filed by the defendant for stay of the proceedings in the subsequent suit had been rejected. The matter can also be examined from another aspect as to whether Section 10 CPC would be applicable to proceedings before the Judge, Court of Small Causes. The Supreme Court in National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences Vs. C. Parameshwara, 2004 AIR SCW 6900, examined whether Section 10 CPC will be applicable to proceedings before the Labour Court. It was held that the proceedings before the Labour Court cannot be equated with the proceedings before the Civil Court and so Section 10 CPC cannot be applied. The relevant observations are :- "8. The object underlying section 10 is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. The object underlying section 10 is to avoid two parallel trials on the same issue by two Courts and to avoid recording of conflicting findings on issues which are directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suit. The language of section 10 suggests that it is referable to a suit instituted in the civil Court and it cannot apply to proceedings of other nature instituted under any other statute. The object of section 10 is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the same parties in respect of the same matter in issue. The fundamental test to attract section 10 is, whether on final decision being reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit.............. .............. 10. As stated above, section 10, CPC is referable to a suit instituted in a civil Court. The proceedings before the Labour Court cannot be equated with the proceedings before the Civil Court.
.............. 10. As stated above, section 10, CPC is referable to a suit instituted in a civil Court. The proceedings before the Labour Court cannot be equated with the proceedings before the Civil Court. They are not the Courts of concurrent jurisdiction. In the circumstances, section 10, CPC has no application to the facts of this case." (emphasis supplied) Similar issue was examined by the Full Bench of this Court in Ram Charan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., 1979 A.L.J. 166. It was held that proceedings under the Ceiling Act cannot be stayed under Section 10 of CPC and the observations are as follows:- "27. Learned counsel then submitted that proceedings under the Ceiling Act having been launched later, they were liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 28. In Kshetrapal Singh v. State of U. P., 1975 All WC 618, a Bench of this Court has repelled a similar submission. It was held that Section 10, C. P. C. is not applicable to proceedings under the Ceiling Act, because by virtue of Section 37 only the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure for trial of suits has been made applicable. Section 10 relates to jurisdiction of Courts. The same will not apply. In my opinion this decision lays down the correct law." In Usha Rani & Ors. Vs. M/s Indermal & Sons & Ors., AIR 1988 RAJASTHAN 223, the Rajasthan High Court also examined whether Section 10 CPC will apply to proceedings under the Arbitration Act and it was observed :- "4. It may be stated straightway that the order dt. Oct. 15, 1982 cannot be sustained One test of the applicability of S.10, C.P.C. to a particular case is whether, on the final decision being reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. Proceedings under S.8 read with S.20 of the Act by virtue of Sub-Sec. (2) of S.20 of the Act have to be numbered and registered as a suit between one or more parties as plaintiff and the other as defendant, as it is well known that the suit is registered by filing a plaint.
Proceedings under S.8 read with S.20 of the Act by virtue of Sub-Sec. (2) of S.20 of the Act have to be numbered and registered as a suit between one or more parties as plaintiff and the other as defendant, as it is well known that the suit is registered by filing a plaint. In Inderpal Singh Hassanwalia v. M/s. Bir Tibetan Woollen Mills, AIR 1974 Delhi 95, an application under S.20 of the Act was filed by Inderpal Singh praying that the agreement be filed in the Court and arbitrator may be appointed. An objection was raised on behalf of the defendants that on Nov. 24, 1969 a suit for injunction was filed in the Court and the suit was based on agreement dt. Mar. 10, 1969. It is further stated that the application under S.34 of the Act was filed and that the suit should be stayed. The question before the Court was as to whether S.10, C.P.C. can apply where one of the two proceedings is not a suit. The Court in paras 12 and 13 of its judgement referred to the case law on the point and observed that : "This argument can be disposed of on the short ground that S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies only to suits and cannot apply where one of the two proceedings is not a suit." Reference in that case was made to the case of Gurbakhsh Singh v. Sant Ram, AIR 1929 Lah 533 and it was held that S.10 did not apply to applications under para 20 Schedule 2, C.P.C. as they are not the plaint or registered as suit. Another case on which reliance was placed in the aforesaid case is Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bharat Bank Ltd., AIR 1950 East Punj 352, wherein it was held that the proceedings under S.20 Arbitration Act are not suit. In re Mrs. Violet Peterson, AIR 1940 Oudh 113, a view has been taken that in the case of an application for grant of probate the procedure of a suit shall be followed and not that proceedings on becoming contentious, shall become regular suit instituted on the date of their becoming contentious, and therefore S.10, C.P.C. is not strictly applicable.
In re Mrs. Violet Peterson, AIR 1940 Oudh 113, a view has been taken that in the case of an application for grant of probate the procedure of a suit shall be followed and not that proceedings on becoming contentious, shall become regular suit instituted on the date of their becoming contentious, and therefore S.10, C.P.C. is not strictly applicable. Therefore, merely because Sub-Sec. (2) of S.20 of the Act provides, that the application shall be numbered and shall be registered as suit it cannot be said that S.10, C.P.C. will apply. It may be stated that earlier a suit for dissolution of partnership was filed by the petitioner and an application under S.34 of the Act was made and thereafter this Court had stayed the trial of the suit with the observations that the petitioner is directed to have the dispute which is the subject matter of the suit adjudicated by arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement contained in the partnership deed. Thus, the suit was stayed. It has already been stated that it was under the orders of the Court that the petitioners filed an application under S.8 read with S.20 of the Act. I am of the opinion that if a suit for compensation or other proceedings is pending under the Arbitration Act, S.10, C.P.C. cannot apply and the proceedings under the Act cannot be stayed. Merely because the application under S.20 of the Act is registered as a suit, it does not become the suit within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure, and S.10, C.P.C. will have no application." (emphasis supplied) The Madras High Court in S.D. Dhandapani Vs. The Branch Manager, Indian Overseas Bank, AIR 2002 MADRAS 442, also examined whether Section 10 CPC shall apply to Company proceedings. The Court held that it does not apply and the observations are:- "4. At the outset, I shall state that Section 10 C.P.C. would not at all apply in this case, because the company petition pending before this Court cannot be termed to be a suit and therefore, Section 10 C.P.C. cannot be invoked by the Court, in which the suit for recovery of money is pending, to stay the proceedings of the suit. 5.
5. As per Section 10 C.P.C., no court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. 6. The word 'suit' is important for our purpose. As per the provisions of Order 4 Rule 1, C.P.C. every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in its behalf. Therefore, the word 'suit' ordinarily means a civil proceeding instituted by presenting a plaint. 7. In a company proceedings, no plaint is presented and hence, it cannot be regarded as a proceeding based on a suit. Therefore, when the proceedings are not based on a suit, they cannot be regarded as a trial of a suit and hence, the suit for recovery of money is pending before the trial Court could not be stayed. 8. This is very clear from the reading of Section 10 C.P.C. While interpreting the said Section, the Rajasthan High Court gave the same ruling in Punjab National Bank v. Gajendra Singh (2001 (1) Civ. L.R. 431 (Raj.)); Jaipur Vastra Vyopar Sangh Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Lal Patodia AIR 1970 Raj 91 ); and Ladu Lal Jain v. Manager, Bank of Baroda (1997 DNJ (Raj) 260)." (emphasis supplied) The aforesaid decisions clearly hold that for Section 10 CPC to apply, both the proceedings should be in suits between the same parties and it will not apply to proceedings initiated under any other Statute. In the present case SCC Suit has been filed under the provisions of the Act. It has, therefore, to be held that Section 10 CPC will not apply to proceedings initiated under the Act. There is, therefore, no illegality in the order passed by the Judge, Court of Small Causes and the Revisional Court in rejecting the application filed by the defendant under Section 10 CPC. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.