JUDGMENT Ghulam Mohammed, J. 1. All these writ appeals are directed against the order dated 07-12-2007 passed in WP Nos. 4061, 4173, 4368, 4427 & 4557 of 2007 respectively. The appellant in these appeals is Vasavi Co-operative Urban Bank Limited, Hyderabad, represented by its Managing Director, for short, "the Bank". The party-respondents herein are the writ petitioners, for short, "the petitioners". The petitioners filed the above noted writ petitions seeking to issue a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the Bank in orally threatening to remove them from service of the Bank in the name of restructuring its cadre strength as arbitrary, unjust, illegal, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and principles of natural justice. By the impugned common order, the said writ petitions were allowed by the learned single Judge of this Court. Hence these writ appeals by the Bank. Since the subject matter in these appeals is connected, they are heard and disposed of together. It would suffice if facts in WA No. 1179 of 2008 are adverted to. 2. The facts stated are:-The petitioners are working in the Bank in various cadres for the last 20 years viz., Assistant Account, Clerk-cum-Cashier, Sub-Staff etc. The Bank has 18 branches all over the State and the same are being run by 550 employees including temporary till 2002-2003. They have been working to the utmost satisfaction of the Bank and the general public at large and there was no complaint whatsoever from any quarter and they have unblemished record of service to their credit for all these years. In the guise of restructuring its cadre strength, the Bank in the year 2003, removed 121 temporary employees and subsequently in the month of August 2005, removed 232 regular employees. Having done so, the authorities are resorting to remove the petitioners from service without any rationale whatsoever and without issuing notice of any kind. That the action of the Bank was in gross violation of principles of natural justice, discriminatory apart from being contrary to the principle of last come first go. 3. That when the Bank terminated the services of regular employees in the month of August 2003, some of them have approached the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court set aside the termination orders and directed reinstatement of workmen into service. 3. That when the Bank terminated the services of regular employees in the month of August 2003, some of them have approached the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court set aside the termination orders and directed reinstatement of workmen into service. Challenging the same, the Bank carried the matter by way of WP No. 15872 of 2006 before this Court and the same was dismissed by order dated 20-12-2006. By virtue of this, all those persons who are far juniors to the petitioners are being continued, whereas petitioners who are seniors are being subjected to removal. 4. It is the case of the petitioners that the Bank is under the control of Reserve Bank of India, therefore, the Bank should have obtained prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India, before taking any steps for removing them, but no such permission was taken. Apart from this, a revival package has been announced by the State Government recently. The appellant-Bank has got deposits of 34.00 crores lying with APCOB in various branches and an amount of ` 8.00 crores is lying in the form of Government deposits and a cash reserve of ` 8.00 crores is being spared and the cash on hand is ` 30.00 lakhs and the deposits in various Current Accounts lying with other banks is to a tune of ` 12.00 lakhs while other recovery debts running to a tune of `109.00 crores. Thus, it comes to ` 159.42 crores, out of which, deposits of ` 34.00 crores lying with APCOB would be alone sufficient to accrue to the Bank an amount of` 27.00 lakhs per month at the rate of 8% interest. The total burden on the appellant-Bank towards payment of salaries to the petitioners would be ` 9.00 lakhs. Therefore, the entire episode of periodical de-strengthening is only to ensure the closure, but not revival. Thus, the action of the Bank in terminating the services of the petitioners in the guise of restructuring is bad and without any reason as no opportunity of hearing or notice was given to the petitioners. 5. On the other hand, the case of the Bank is that the Bank is a Co-operative Urban Bank registered under the AP Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 and it is governed by the Co-operative Societies Act and the Banking Regulation Act. 5. On the other hand, the case of the Bank is that the Bank is a Co-operative Urban Bank registered under the AP Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 and it is governed by the Co-operative Societies Act and the Banking Regulation Act. The Bank has been granted licence vide letter of the Reserve Bank of India dated 13-7-1982 to carry on banking business in terms of Section 22(i) read with Section 56(o) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It is stated that the Bank went into financial crunch in the year 2002-2003 and so as to see that funds of the Bank do not further drain, the Reserve Bank of India, by invoking powers under Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 gave directions vide letter dated 7-3-2003 restraining the Bank from incurring any liability or sanctioning/renewing loans/advances or making payments or discharge any liabilities or obligations except in accordance with the directions contained therein and directed to give statement of accounts every month. The portion relevant of the RBI directive read thus: The Reserve Bank of India is satisfied that in the public interest, it is necessary to issue certain directions to Vasavi Co-operative Urban Batik Ltd., Hyderabad. Accordingly, the Reserve Bank of India in exercise of the powers vested in it under sub-section 91 of Section35-A of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 (as applicable to Cooperative schemes) read with Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, hereby directs that Vasavi Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd., Hyderabad from close of Business of 7th March, 2003 shall not without prior approval in writing from the Reserve Bank of India grant of renew any loans and advances make any investment incur any liability including borrowal of funds and acceptance of fresh deposits to disburse or agree to disburse any payment whether in discharge of its liabilities and obligations or otherwise either into any compromise of arrangements and sell transfer or otherwise dispose of any of its properties or assets except to the extent and in the manner provided hereunder: (i)................ (v) Incurring any expenditure that may be required to be met by the Bank in respect of the following terms: (a) salaries of employees. 6. (v) Incurring any expenditure that may be required to be met by the Bank in respect of the following terms: (a) salaries of employees. 6. It is further stated that there was severe liquidity crisis in the Bank resulting in imposition of restrictions by the Reserve Bank of India under Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 with effect from 7-3-2003. The Government of Andhra Pradesh by invoking powers under Section 32(7)(a) of AP Co-operative Societies Act (for short 'the Act') issued orders in G.O.Rt. No. 170, Agricultural and Cooperation Department dated 6-3-2003 appointing a Person In-charge Committee to manage the affairs of the Bank. It appears since the Bank was restrained from incurring any liability or sanctioning/renewing loans/advances or making payments or discharge any liabilities or obligations except in accordance with the directions contained in the directive, the financial position of the Bank could not be improved, and under those circumstances the Commissioner for Co-operation and Registrar of Co-operative Societies by invoking powers under Section 116-C of the Act, vide proceedings dated 20-6-2006 directed to reduce the cadre strength of the Bank by duly indicating the strength to be retained in different disciplines. The Reserve Bank of India in its inspection report communicated vide letter dated 23-1-1997 also directed the Bank to take action on the basis of inspection report and submit compliance within six weeks. Among other directives, the Bank was directed to take steps to reduce the staff as approved by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The Bank has accumulated net loss of ` 97.13 crores as on the end of financial year 2005-2006, whereas the expenditure on salaries is around ` 17.00 lakhs per month. Before issuance of the orders dated 28-2-2007, the strength of the staff is 128 and there is no work for more than 75% of the staff. The reduction in the staff would save the expenses at ` 10.76 lakhs per month and the same can be utilized for discharge of depositors' liabilities. Before issuance of the orders dated 28-2-2007, the strength of the staff is 128 and there is no work for more than 75% of the staff. The reduction in the staff would save the expenses at ` 10.76 lakhs per month and the same can be utilized for discharge of depositors' liabilities. That the Bank has reviewed the staff position by appointing a staff committee and the staff committee has recommended for dispensing with the services of the surplus staff over and above the cadre strength approved by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies duly paying the amount of one month salary in lieu of one month notice and gratuity, as admissible under the Payment of Gratuity Act to the respective Savings Bank Accounts of the employees whose services were to be dispensed with. The Person-in-charge Committee in its meeting held on 27-2-2007 accepted recommendations of staff committee. On coming to know the decision of the Person-in-charge Committee dated 27-2-2007, some of the writ petitioners and others whose services were sought to be dispensed with have abstained from attending to duties on 28-2-2007 and some of the employees though attended to duty, refused to receive orders. Therefore, notices were affixed at the notice board of the Bank's Head Office and the branches and individual notices were dispatched to the last known addresses available with the Bank. Thus, there is no illegality in dispensing with the services of the petitioners. 7. Heard Sri D.V. Sitharam Murthy, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri Meherchand Nori, learned counsel for the appellant-Bank, Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri K.R. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the petitioners-respondents, Sri M.P. Ugle, learned counsel for respondent-Reserve Bank of India and learned GP for Cooperation for Commissioner for Cooperation and Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Government of AP. 8. Sri D.V. Sitharam Murthy, learned senior counsel appearing for the Bank submitted that the Bank had to downsize the staff on account of directives by the RBI in view of its fiscal crunch and it had downsized its branches from 18 to 3. It is stated that if posts exist, removal can be on equity, but if posts are abolished, the posts and employees go with it. It is stated that if posts exist, removal can be on equity, but if posts are abolished, the posts and employees go with it. Learned counsel further contended that downsizing of employees of the Bank is within the realm of the Bank and unless such policy decision of the bank violates fundamental rights, Courts should not interfere. Learned counsel also stated that the services of the employees had to be dispensed with as there was no work and from 2007 onwards an amount of ` 9,70,000/- per month is paid to the employees towards salaries. It is further contended that the Bank employees are governed by the provisions of Shops and Establishment Act and not Industrial Disputes Act, hence, Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act does not apply and the compensation as payable under the provisions of the Shops and Establishment Act was already paid to the petitioners. It is also stated that reasonable cause as stipulated under Section 47 of the Shops and Establishment Act is the directive of the RBI to close the business, except otherwise provided by it and ignoring all these aspects of the matter the learned single Judge grossly erred in allowing the writ petitions. It is also submitted that the writ does not lie as the Bank registered under the provisions of the AP Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 is not State or an instrumentality of the State, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 9. Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners-employees, on the other hand, submitted that the petitioners-employees were terminated from the service of the Bank after the writ petitions were filed. No termination orders were served, but allegedly pasted on the notice boards of the branches of the bank. It is stated that the petitioners are governed by the service rules of Vasavi Bank and they were regularized in their posts, confirmed and some of them were also promoted and all the employees put up unblemished services. It is further stated that even the Vasavi Bank rules do not provide for wholesale sacking of termination of employees from services. It is stated that though the petitioners are working for more than 20 to 25 years, no notice was issued before termination and any termination without satisfying law is bad in law and cannot be sustained. It is further stated that even the Vasavi Bank rules do not provide for wholesale sacking of termination of employees from services. It is stated that though the petitioners are working for more than 20 to 25 years, no notice was issued before termination and any termination without satisfying law is bad in law and cannot be sustained. It is also stated that the Bank entered into a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and when once they invoked the provisions of the ID Act, the Bank cannot contend that the provisions of the ID Act are inapplicable. It is stated that termination of services of the petitioners is void-ab-initio for gross violation of mandatory provisions of industrial and other labour laws and therefore the impugned order does not warrant any interference by this Court. 10. Now the point that arise for consideration for us is whether the writ petitions filed were maintainable, whether the termination of the petitioners is bad in law and whether the impugned order is sustainable? 11. If we proceed to answer the issue of maintainability first, the Bank is now managed by a Person-in-charge Committee appointed by the Government in GO Rt. No. 170, dated 6-3-2003, and such Person-in-charge Committee should be regarded as a public authority. We are fortified in our view in the light of decision of the Supreme Court in Gayatri De v. Mousumi Co-op, Housing Society Limited (2004) 5 SCC 90 Para 50 of the decision in Gayatri De's case (1 supra) reads thus: 50.......... Thus it is seen that the subject matter of the writ petition is the order passed by the Special Officer in discharging of his statutory functions, the writ petition is maintainable in law. The Special Officer is appointed under the provisions of the Act and as such he is a statutory officer and, therefore, he should be regarded as a public authority. Apart from that Article 226 of the Constitution is not confined to issue of writ only to a public authority, the power extends also to issue directions to any person. In our opinion, in a case where the Cooperative Society is under the control of a Special Officer, a writ would lie. 12. In Federal Bank Limited v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733 the Supreme Court at para 28 held thus: 28. In our opinion, in a case where the Cooperative Society is under the control of a Special Officer, a writ would lie. 12. In Federal Bank Limited v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733 the Supreme Court at para 28 held thus: 28. Such private companies would normally not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But in certain circumstances a writ may issue to such private bodies or persons as there may be statutes which need to be complied with by all concerned including the private companies. For example, there are certain legislations like the Industrial Disputes Act, the Minimum Wages Act the Factories Act or for maintaining proper environment, say Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 or Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 etc. or statutes of the like nature which fasten certain duties and responsibilities statutorily upon such private bodies which they are bound to comply with. If they violate such a statutory provision a writ would certainly be issued for compliance of those provisions. For instance, if a private employer dispense with the service of its employee in violation of the provisions contained under the Industrial Disputes Act, in innumerable cases the High Court interfered and have issued the writ to the private bodies and the companies in that regard. But the difficulty in issuing a writ may arise where there may not be any non-compliance or violation of any statutory provision by the private body. In that event a writ may not be issued at all. Other remedies, as may be available, may have to be resorted to. 13. In MP Rajya Sahakari Bank Maryadit v. State of MP 2007(5) SCJ 748 : (2007) 12 SCC 529 : 2008(2) ALT 19.1 (DN SC) the Supreme Court at para 13 held thus: 13. It has been held that the writ would be maintainable against a cooperative society, if it is established that a mandatory statutory provision of a statute has been violated. 14. P.R. Venkataiah v. A.P. Co-op. Central Agricultural Development Bank Limited 1991(2) ALT 536 this Court at para 17 held thus:- 17............ It has been held that the writ would be maintainable against a cooperative society, if it is established that a mandatory statutory provision of a statute has been violated. 14. P.R. Venkataiah v. A.P. Co-op. Central Agricultural Development Bank Limited 1991(2) ALT 536 this Court at para 17 held thus:- 17............ That statutory duties could be enforced against a co-operative society is expressly accepted even in V. Narasinga Rao's case and the only qualification that can be read into the statement of law in that case because of the decision of the Bench in I.D.L. Chemical's case (supra) and the last mentioned recent judgment of the Supreme Court is that the writ could issue either for enforcement of statutory duties or in the alternative for enforcement of public duties and it is not necessary that the statutory duties should also be of a public nature.....I hold on point No. 3 that a writ lies against the Central Bank which is a society, for enforcing Rule 20 of the Rules made under the A.P. Shops & Establishments Act, 1966 (now 1988). 15. This Court in Sadhu Varahala Babu v. Government of AP 2005(5) ALT 126 at para 77 observed thus: 77. The co-operative societies are established under the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964. The rules regarding the functioning of the societies were framed from time to time giving statutory recognition. The bye-laws of the societies are also given statutory flavour on account of their enforcement after getting approval from the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. Though the authorities of the State are not directly involving in the ordinary functioning of the societies, the authorities under the statute are regulating the functioning of the societies by fixing the staffing pattern, regulating the expenditure towards establishment charges, supervising the elections to the respective societies, conducting audit of the accounts of the societies, instructing the concerned authorities to take disciplinary actions against the erring officials and to reduce the members of the establishment in tune with the ceiling provided under the Act. In the first set of decisions mentioned in the aforementioned paragraphs, though the Courts held that a cooperative society is not a "State" or "other authority" under Article12 of the Constitution, they did not put any embargo for treating it as "an authority" mentioned under Article 12 of the Constitution and for issuing necessary directions by invoking powers under Article 226of the Constitution. The second set of decisions are to the effect that a cooperative society would also come within the purview of Article12 of the Constitution. Keeping in view the above trend of decisions rendered by various Courts, I wish to summarize as under: (1) Article 226 empowers the High Court to issue writs to 'persons' or 'authorities' to enforce ordinary rights. (2) An order can be issued against private persons by granting appropriate relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. (3) Even if a society cannot be characterized as a "State" within the meaning of Article12, a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty. (4) In the matter of termination of service of the employees of a co-operative society, Section 47of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act provides certain protection and since the said protection is based upon public policy, it will be enforced, in an appropriate case, by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. (5) A writ can be maintained under Article226 if there is flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, which are required to be followed under a statute. (6) The power of the High Court is not confined only to issue of writs to a public authority. It can also issue directions to enforce any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. (7) The scope of Article 226 has been widened by maintaining the writ petition against other authorities and persons also. (8) Mandamus under Article 226 may issue even to a private person or a body regarded as a government instrumentality even when it is incorporated or registered under a statute viz., a co-operative society or a limited company. 16. Learned senior counsel appearing for the Bank relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms Limited v. Union of India 2005(2) SCJ 121 : (2005) 4 SCC 649 : 2005(3) ALT 10.3 (DN SC) to substantiate that the Bank does not come within meaning Article 12 of the Constitution. He contended that the facts demonstrated by the Bank do not cumulatively show that the Bank is financially, functionally or administratively dominated by or is under the control of the Government. Thus the little control that the Government may be said to have on the Bank is not pervasive in nature and such limited control is purely regulatory in nature. 17. Thus the little control that the Government may be said to have on the Bank is not pervasive in nature and such limited control is purely regulatory in nature. 17. As observed by the Supreme Court and this Court in the decisions cited supra, it is not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed, need be a public official or an official body. A mandamus can issue to an official of the Bank to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the Bank is constituted or governed. In the circumstances, the contention of the learned senior counsel that a writ would not lie against the Bank, cannot be countenanced. 18. Admittedly, the petitioners are working in the Bank for more than 20 to 25 years to the satisfaction of one and all. The Bank can be regarded as an 'Industry' if it satisfies the requirements of the definition of 'Industry' under Section 2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and once it is treated as 'Industry' certain protection would be available to its employees in the matter of termination. Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, reads thus: (j) 'industry' means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling service, employment handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. 19. It cannot be disputed that the petitioners have completed more than 240 days of service in the Bank, hence they are 'workman' for the purpose of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 since they are employed in the different cadres with the Bank, which is an 'industry' under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The termination of the petitioners' services was, therefore, retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it could be done only in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The termination of the petitioners' services was, therefore, retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it could be done only in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Since the petitioners are deemed to be 'workman' and the Bank is an 'industry' under the Industrial Disputes Act, the action taken by the Bank in terminating the services of the petitioners amounts to 'retrenchment' and since the petitioners had worked continuously for more than 240 days, their retrenchment or whatever nomenclature used by the Bank as 'dispensed with', could be done only in accordance with provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said provision is admittedly not complied with in the instant case. It has been held by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court, to name a few in Anoop Sharma v. Public Health Division, Haryana 2010(4) SCJ 432 : (2010) 5 SCC 497 that compliance of Sections 25-F(a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is mandatory and noncompliance therewith renders the retrenchment of an employee a nullity. Paras 17 & 18 of the said decision read thus: 17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee nullity........ 18. This Court has used different expressions for describing the consequence of terminating a workman's service/employment/engagement by way of retrenchment without complying with the mandate of Section 25F of the Act. Sometimes it has been termed as ab initio void, sometimes as illegal per se, sometimes as nullity and sometimes as non est, Leaving aside the legal semantics, we have no hesitation to hold that termination of service of an employee by way of retrenchment without complying with the requirement of giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof and compensation in terms of Section 25F(a) and (b) has the effect of rendering the action of the employer as nullity and the employee is entitled to continue in employment as if his service was not terminated. 20. The legal position on this aspect has been more lucidly summarized by the Supreme Court in Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar 2003 LLR 419 Para 10 reads thus: ........The underlying object of Section 25F is two fold. 20. The legal position on this aspect has been more lucidly summarized by the Supreme Court in Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar 2003 LLR 419 Para 10 reads thus: ........The underlying object of Section 25F is two fold. Firstly, a retrenched employee must have one month's time available at his disposal to search for alternate employment, and so, either he should be given one mouth's notice of the proposed termination or he should be paid wages for the notice period. Secondly, the workman must be paid retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment, or before, so that once having been retrenched there should be no need for him to go to his employer demanding retrenchment compensation and the compensation so paid is not only a reward earned for his previous services rendered to the employer but is also a sustenance to the worker for the period which may be spent in searching for another employment. Section 25F nowhere speaks of the retrenchment compensation being paid or tendered to the worker along with one month's notice; on the contrary clause (b) expressly provides for the payment of compensation being made at the time of retrenchment and by implication it would be permissible to pay the same before retrenchment. Payment or tender of compensation after the time when the retrenchment has taken effect would vitiate the retrenchment and non-compliance with the mandatory provision which has a beneficial purpose and a public policy behind would result in nullifying the retrenchment. 21. In the guise of restructuring its cadre strength, juniors to the petitioners are retained in a pick and choose manner which is arbitrary, discriminatory apart from being contrary to the principle of last come first go. Downsizing in a pick and choose manner in the name of appraisal that too behind the back of the employees is not proper. An order termed as a policy decision is not beyond the pale of judicial review. An organization can always downsize its establishment but while so doing it should safeguard the interests of its employees and it should be one of the concerns of any organization. In this connection reference can be made to the observation in Balco Employees Union v. Union of India AIR 2002 SC 350 by the Supreme Court. Para 57 is thus: 57. In this connection reference can be made to the observation in Balco Employees Union v. Union of India AIR 2002 SC 350 by the Supreme Court. Para 57 is thus: 57. Even though the employees of the company may have an interest in seeing as to how the company is managed, it will not be possible to accept the contentions that in the process of disinvestments, the principles of natural justice would be applicable and that the workers, or for that matter any other party having an interest therein, would have a right of being heard. As a matter of good governance and administration whenever such policy decisions are taken, it is desirable that there should be wide range of consultations including considering any representations which may have been filed, but there is no provision in law which would require a hearing to be granted before taking a policy decision. In exercise of executive powers, policy decisions have to be taken from time to time. It will be impossible and impracticable to give a formal hearing to those who may be affected whenever a policy decision is taken. One of the objects of giving a hearing in application of the principles of natural justice is to see that an illegal action or decision does not take place. Any wrong order may adversely affect a person and it is essentially for this reason that a reasonable opportunity may have to be granted before passing of an administrative order. In case of the policy decision, however, it is impracticable, and at times against the public interest, to do so, but this does not mean that a policy decision which is contrary to law cannot be challenged. Not giving the workmen an opportunity of being heard cannot per se be a ground of vitiating the decision. If the decision is otherwise illegal as being contrary to law or any constitutional provision, the persons affected like the workmen, can impugn the same, but not giving a pre-decisional hearing cannot be a ground for quashing the decision. 22. This Court is not finding fault with the reason for downsizing of the staff, as there may be compelling reasons, but only with its process. 22. This Court is not finding fault with the reason for downsizing of the staff, as there may be compelling reasons, but only with its process. In the instant case the policy decision to down size the staff on account of its fiscal position, is within the realm of the Bank, but any decision even it be a policy decision should meet the requirement of law. Any decision telling on the rights of employees, contrary to the statute governing the field or fundamental rights and principles of natural justice, this Court can test such decision by invoking the power of judicial review. In the light of the above reasons, we hold that the retrenchment of the petitioners is per-se illegal as the mandatory statutory provisions have not been followed and, therefore, we do not find any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order passed by the single Judge. In the result, the writ appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.