JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud, J (oral) This is the tenant’s revision petition against the concurrent findings of the two Courts below ordering his eviction from the suit premises. 2.The respondent-landlord petitioned the learned Rent Controller under Section 14 (3) (iv) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) praying for an order of eviction against the petitioner herein from House No. 237/3 situated at Jail road, Mandi town consisting of one room, one kitchen and one bathroom on the third floor of the building. The eviction was sought under the Act on the ground that the petitioner herein had acquired a residential house LIG-57 in Bhiuli, Housing Board Colony, Mandi town allotted to him by the H.P. Housing Board on 2 1.2.1989. This accommodation according to the landlord was sufficient for the needs of the petitioner- tenant. The second ground urged was that the respondents- landlords have only two rooms in their occupation which are not sufficient for their need. The mother of respondent No.1 and mother-in-law of respondent No. 2 are not keeping fit, so she requires to stay with them. 3.These averments were denied by the tenant. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed five issues. The first was whether the tenant-petitioner had acquired his own accommodation which was allotted to him by the H.P. Housing Board, the second whether the premises in dispute are required for bonafide use and occupation of the landlord, the third whether the petition was not maintainable, and the fourth was whether the house allotted to the tenant was not fit for habitation. The onus of the first two issues was on the landlord and of last two issues it was on the respondent-petitioner herein. The issue with respect to personal requirement of the landlord was not pressed. Section 14(3) (a) (iv) of the Act provides: “the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built or acquired vacant possession or of been allotted, a residence reasonably sufficient for his requirement.” 4.It is the interpretation of this provision on the facts established on record which is called into question in these revisional proceedings. Adverting to the evidence on record, the learned Rent Controller adverting to the evidence of RW2 Dr. D.K. Arora, concludes that the premises were reasonably sufficient for the requirement of the respondent-petitioner who was a bachelor. Adverting to the evidence on record, the learned Rent Controller adverting to the evidence of RW2 Dr. D.K. Arora, concludes that the premises were reasonably sufficient for the requirement of the respondent-petitioner who was a bachelor. This accommodation consisted of one room, WC, kitchen which was sufficient for a single person, but not for a person with a family. The Court also holds that the respondent did not place on record the approved plan of the house. It was also established on record that the respondent-tenant-petitioner herein had acquired this house and sold it and no reasonable cause was proved on record as to why he restored to this step. 5. It was urged before the learned Rent Controller that the house acquired was not within the limits of the urban area and therefore, the provisions of Section 14 (3) (iv) of the Act are not attracted. Reliance was placed upon Section 2(k) of the Act which defines: “urban area” means any area administered by a municipal corporation, a municipal committee, a cantonment board, or a notified area committee or any area declared by the State Govt., by notification, to be an urban area for the purposes of this Act.” On the facts, the learned Rent Controller finds that the Housing Pardhan of Gram Panchayat, Tung. He further stated that no tax was paid to the Panchayat for maintenance etc., but it was paid to the Housing Board for this purpose. The Panchayat never maintained this area. But it is the Board which was looking after the entire maintenance of the entire colony. 6. It was proved that this colony has a number of officers posted in Mandi who have built their residences there. There are also a number of Government offices, Semi- government undertakings etc. The residences of the Judicial Officers are also situated in this colony. The area has been built to decongest Mandi town. It was located at a distance of 2 K.m. from Mandi. So much so, people daily walk from this colony to Mandi for their work. Learned Court thereafter proceeded to allow the eviction petition. 7. This was challenged in appeal before the learned Appellate Authority. The area has been built to decongest Mandi town. It was located at a distance of 2 K.m. from Mandi. So much so, people daily walk from this colony to Mandi for their work. Learned Court thereafter proceeded to allow the eviction petition. 7. This was challenged in appeal before the learned Appellate Authority. Before averting to the point of law on which the learned Appellate Authority proceeded, the learned Court holds that there is no rebuttal to the findings that the distance of the colony is less than 2 K.m. from Mandi town and Government officers/Judicial Officers are also residing there; there are offices of various departments as also residences of the officers etc. The mere fact that the colony was situated in Panchayat area, for whatever reason could not be used to deny the landlord possession of the premises on the suggested interpretation that the colony was not in the urban area, more so when the Pardhan himself admitted that no work etc. was undertaken by the Panchayat for maintenance of this area/colony. The learned Appellate Authority also holds on the facts of the case that the landlord has specifically pleaded that the tenant has acquired residential house built by the H.P. Housing Board which is reasonably sufficient for his residential requirements. The foundation of the pleading is in para 8-A of the petition to which there is no specific denial. The learned Courts hold that premises in possession of the tenant were one room, bathroom and kitchen which he was having since 1983. 8.The basic question raised for consideration of this Court is the interpretation of the provision of Section 14 (3) (a) (iv). It is urged by learned counsel appearing for the tenant- petitioner that the acquisition of the accommodation must be within the urban area/municipal area and in case such premises are outside the urban area, the tenant cannot be evicted. He relies upon the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Budh Ram Sharma vs. Banwari Lal and another 1971 RCR 828. This judgment was delivered by Hon’ble Mr. V.D. Misra, J. (later on the Chief Justice of this Court) to support this submission. In this case, the Court held: “3. He relies upon the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Budh Ram Sharma vs. Banwari Lal and another 1971 RCR 828. This judgment was delivered by Hon’ble Mr. V.D. Misra, J. (later on the Chief Justice of this Court) to support this submission. In this case, the Court held: “3. The short question for determination is whether a tenant who has built or acquired vacant possession of a house for his residence outside Delhi would fall under Cl.(h) of the Proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.” Section 14(1) (h) is as under:- “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant: Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only namely,: (h) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted a residence”.This clause makes a tenant liable for eviction if he has built a house for residence. But can it be said that he would be liable for eviction if he has built a house for residence anywhere in India: or is that he becomes liable for eviction if he has built the house in the area to which this Act extends. 4.The rapid growth of population of Delhi resulting in a serious shortage of housing accommodation resulted in un­proportionately high rents. Landlords were tempted to terminate the tenancies of the existing tenants and ask for their eviction in order to let out premises to the new tenants at exorbitant rents. In order to meet the situation necessary legislation for controlling the rent and eviction of tenants was enacted. As the preamble of this Act shows it was enacted to provide for the control of rents and evictions in certain areas in the Union territory of Delhi. This underlying object of Section 14(1)(h) was that in view of the growing shortage of housing accommodation in Delhi a tenant should not be allowed to have more than one house for residence in Delhi. This underlying object of Section 14(1)(h) was that in view of the growing shortage of housing accommodation in Delhi a tenant should not be allowed to have more than one house for residence in Delhi. It was provided that in case a tenant built a residence, the landlord could get his house vacated. It would not have been the intention that a tenant should not have another house for residence anywhere in India. Usually a person has a house, may be in a village in remote corner of the country. To put his tenancy in jeopardy in Delhi for that reason is unwarranted. Section 1 (2) of the Act lays down the area of Delhi to which the Act extends, which does not include rural areas within the limits of Municipal Corporation of Delhi. It is thus reasonable to infer that before a tenant becomes liable to ejectment under section 14(1)(h), it should be proved that he has built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted a residence within the areas to which this Act extends.5.The learned counsel for the landlord contends that if the tenant builds a residence anywhere in India, he would make himself liable for eviction. Reliance is placed on an unreported decision of the Punjab High Court in Kishan Chand Bhargawa V. Hari Nath Rustogi decided on 31st October, 1961. In this case the learned single Judge was interpreting section 13(1)(h) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, which was exactly in the same words as clause (h) referred to above, except that the word “suitable” before the word “residence” has been omitted in the present clause. I find that in this case the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to the fact that the Act extended only to those areas of Delhi which were mentioned therein.6.The result is that the house built by the tenant being in area to which the Act does not extend, he cannot be evicted on the ground mentioned in section 14 (1)(h) of the Act. 7. The appeal, therefore, is accepted and the order of the Rent Control Tribunal is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs” (pp. 829 & 830) 9. The Hon’ble Judge rightly holds that acquisition of a residence in a remote area would not constitute a disqualification for residing within the urban area. The appeal, therefore, is accepted and the order of the Rent Control Tribunal is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs” (pp. 829 & 830) 9. The Hon’ble Judge rightly holds that acquisition of a residence in a remote area would not constitute a disqualification for residing within the urban area. This is but the natural interpretation. To stretch it any further would be rendering the provision unworkable and would go against the legislative intent of the provision. It would deprive the owner of the building from the enacted rights under the Act. 10. Learned counsel also emphasizes that the Court of Allahaband in Dool Chand vs. Smt. Shail Sharma and others, 1989(1) RCR 138 considering the provision of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 holds that such acquisition must be within the municipal area where the petitioner-tenant resides. The Court therein holds: “3. The landlady filed an application for release of the accommodation in dispute on the ground that she requires the accommodation for herself and the members of her family and also on the ground that since she has been suffering from hypertension and has been advised not to climb up stairs, she requires the accommodation on the grout floor, which is the accommodation in dispute. 4.The need of the landlady was contested by the petitioner, the tenant. Ultimately, by an order dated 11th July, 1983, the Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the need of the landlady was bonafide and genuine and that greater hardship will be caused to her in case the release application is not allowed and, consequently, the Prescribed Authority allowed the release application and directed the property to be released in favour of the landlady. 5.Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority, an appeal was filed before the lower Appellate Court under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 10th July, 1985. 5.Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority, an appeal was filed before the lower Appellate Court under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 10th July, 1985. The orders of the Appellate as well as the Prescribed Authority have been challenged by means of the present petition.7.Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the Explanation (i)to Section 21(1) of the Act did not apply to the facts of the present case and since the Appellate Authority has relied upon the said Explanation, the finding in regard to bona fide need is vitiated in law. He has also urged that the question as to whether the petitioner has got a property at Mussoorie or he is carrying on the business at Mussoorie, could not have been considered for the purpose of recording a finding in regard to the question of hardship.8.In so far as the first submission of the learned counsel is concerned, the finding of the appellate Authority is that the petitioner has not a house in Mussoorie. He is also carrying on the business at Mussoorie. Explanation (i) Section 21(1) applies to a case where the tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. In the instant case, the property was alleged to have been acquired in Mussoorie. It is a different municipality and, consequently, so far as the Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the Act is concerned, the submission of the learned counsel is correct that the said Explanation could not apply to the facts of the present case. (P139) Adverting to the decision in Dool Chand’case, what in fact was found was that the situs of the premises was in two different places namely Dehradun and Mussoorie. In interpretation of statutes, it is the fact situation also which calls for interpreting the provision invoked to make it workable rather than adopting a theoretical approach. I am not persuaded to hold in the present fact situation that the interpretation urged can be accepted as it would render the provision unworkable and introduce in the statute words which have been otherwise not provided for by the Legislature in the Act. I am not persuaded to hold in the present fact situation that the interpretation urged can be accepted as it would render the provision unworkable and introduce in the statute words which have been otherwise not provided for by the Legislature in the Act. I am not persuaded to hold that this is a case of Casus Omissus as when a plain reading of the statute/provision does not lead to such an inference even remotely. Casus Omissus cannot be lightly attributed to the Legislature. The Courts cannot interpret a statute to create a case of casus Omissus when there is none. In State of Karanataka v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 68, the Supreme Court holds: “80. To advance the balder and broader proposition that what is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution must be deemed to be deliberately excluded from its purview, so that nothing short if a Constitutional amendment could authorize legislation upon it, is really to invent a “Casus Omissus” so as to apply the rule that, where there is such a gap in the law, the Court cannot fill it. The rule, however, is equally clear that the Court cannot so interpret a statute as “to produce a casus omissus” where there is really non (See: The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson Brothers, (1888) 13 AC 595 at p. 602). If our Constitution itself provides for legislation to fill what is sought to be construed as a lacuna how can legislation seeking to do this be held to be void because it performs its intended function by an exercise of an expressly conferred legislative power? In declaring the purpose of the provisions so made and the authority for making it, Courts do not supply an omission or fill up a gap at all. It is Parliament which can do so and has done it. To hold that Parliament is incompetent to do this is to substitute an indefensible theory or a figment of one’s imagination-that the Constitution stands in the way somehow-for that which only a clear Constitutional bar could achieve.” (at p. 107) In Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta vs. National Taj Traders (1980)1 SCC 370 the Court holds: “10. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole-appear to be well settled. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole-appear to be well settled. In regard to the former the following statement of law appears in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) at p. 33: Omissions not to be inferred-It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. Lord Morsey said: ‘It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not, there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do.’ ‘We are not entitled’, said Lord Loreburn L.C., ‘to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself’. A case not provided for in a statute is not to be dealt with merely because there seems no good reason why it should have been omitted, and the omission appears in consequence to have been unintentional. In regard to the latter principle the following statement of law appears in Maxwell at page 47: A statute is to be read as a whole-It was resolved in the case of Lincoln College ((1595)3 Co. Rep. 58b at p. 59b) that the good expositor of an Act of Parliament should ‘make construction on all the parts together and not of one part only by itself’. Every clause of a statute is to ‘be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute’. (Per Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co. Every clause of a statute is to ‘be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute’. (Per Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. R., 1898 AC 735) In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. “An intention to produce an unreasonable result” said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopion (1966 1 QB 878), “is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available.” Where to apply words literally would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result” we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C. (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he also observed: “this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges”.) In the light of these principles we will have to construe sub­section (2)(b) with reference to the context and other clauses of Section 33-B.”(at p. 376)In Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. vs. U.P. Financial Corporation and others (2003)2 SCC 455 these principles were re-affirmed by holding: “10. Since a plea of casus omissus for purposes of interpretation was urged, we think it necessary to deal with that plea also. 11.It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. 11.It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said, “Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid” , Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them”. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547.) This view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990)1 SCC 277 (SCC p. 284, para 16). 12.In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. (1977)2 SCC 273 it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 13.While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. (2000)5 SCC 515) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) Ed.: Of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka (1996)3 SCC 88. In State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996)10 SCC 619 the period was further stretched to have the time period run from the date of service of the High Court’s order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent. “(at pp. 461-462) In Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi and others, (2004)5 SCC 409 the rules for interpretation have been succinctly summed up and the Court holds: “12. In the case of Knowled v. Zoological Society of London (1959)1 WLR 823 it has been held by the Court of Appeal that the expression “majority of fellows entitled to vote” in the bye-laws of a society would mean the majority of those present at a meeting and entitled to vote and note the majority of the whole electorate whether present or not. Before us, as stated above, it was urged that the respondent is claiming casus omissus in support of his argument that the words “whole number of members” must be construed as “whole number of elected members”. We do not find any merit in this argument. In the case of State of Karnataka v. Union of India (1977)4 SCC 608 (SCC p. 663, para 81 : AIR at p. 107), it has been observed by this Court that although a court cannot supply casus omissus, it is equally clear that it should not interpret a statute so as to create a casus omissus when there is really none. 33. In Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004)5 SCC 385 a Bench of this Court laid emphasis that the object underlying the statute is required to be given effect to by applying the principles of purposive construction holding: (SCC p. 405, para 56) “56. It is now well-settled that for the purposes of interpretation of statute, same is to be read in its entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect. (See High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Krishan Mazdoor Panchayat (2003)4 SCC 712, Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India (2003)7 SCC 589, Ameer Trading Corpn. It is now well-settled that for the purposes of interpretation of statute, same is to be read in its entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect. (See High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Krishan Mazdoor Panchayat (2003)4 SCC 712, Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India (2003)7 SCC 589, Ameer Trading Corpn. Ltd. v. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd. (2004)1 SCC 702 and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. (2004)3 SCC 1.) The object underlying the statute is required to be given effect to by applying the principles of purposive construction.” (See also Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004)3 SCC 199.” (at pp. 423, 427) Precedent need not be multiplied further. Interpreting the statute which in this case is the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, as a whole and in a purposeful manner, it is not only the rights of the tenants which need protection and enforcement but also those of the landlords who cannot be kept out of possession of their property in perpetuity. 11.The facts in the present case are telling. The tenant has acquired accommodation in an area which though not within the urban/municipality but are at a stone’s throw away from the outer periphery of the municipal area. It is not such a place which is inaccessible or remote but one where a number of officers/officials are residing and this area has been built by the Housing Development Authority for decongesting the pressure of houses in Mandi town and maintained by the authority. To treat this area as a remote place inaccessible to the tenant, would be taxing credulity. 12. Learned counsel then submits that interpretation of a statute which provides protection to a tenant should lean in favour of the tenant. This proposition in so wide terms cannot be accepted. The statute which is meant for protection cannot be used as a handle for exploitation of landlords by tenants. The evidence in the present case facts prove and which facts have not been rebutted or disputed that the area i.e. Bhueli where the petitioner resides being developed by the Housing Development Authority is at a distance of 700 metres from the Court premises. Surely, this situation does not call for an interpretation as urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Surely, this situation does not call for an interpretation as urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. In case the meaning as sought to be ascribed to the provision by the petitioner herein is accepted, it would lead to ridiculous results of holding landlords to ransom. The emphasis in interpretation of the provision/statute must be in the context of the fact situation on balanced consideration of the rights of the parties and not on theoretical surmises.13.I must notice in fairness the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein that under the Act, interpretation favouring the tenant is to be adopted. For which purpose, he places reliance on judgment in Kannan and another vs. Tamil Tahlir Kalvi Kazhagam (1998)5 SCC 21. Learned counsel in particular places reliance the Supreme Court holds: “14. When two or more interpretations are possible, the one which subserves to the object should be accepted. We find sub-section (3) of Section 9 contemplates deposit of rent in case of bona fide doubt or dispute. This is to salvage the tenant from eviction. However, this would depend on the facts of each case. Thus, where there are two possible interpretations, the one which prevents a tenant from unreasonable eviction be accepted.” (at p.27) 14.True, the settled law does not call for any further that the tenant has been successfully fighting with the landlord since the year 1998. A period of more than 14 years has elapsed. I cannot persuade myself to hold that interpretation of the provision as urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner can be accepted that since the premises are not situated within the urban area no eviction order can follow. Words cannot be added to a provision to cure a defect in legislation where none exists. To repeat as noted by me on facts, the area where the tenant has acquired and disposed of the property is at a distance of only 700-800 metres from the Court. I do not find any illegality or irregularity in the judgment of the learned Courts below nor do I find any perversity in the appreciation of evidence. This revision petition is therefore dismissed with costs throughout.