Judgment :- 1. PHOENIX, at least, needed its ashes to come alive again whereas out of nothing the petitioner wants the acquired land which was acquired by the Government as early as in 1949 for expansion of graveyard. Phoenix is a unique mythological bird of the Arabian desert, worshipped in ancient Egypt, that burned itself on a funeral pyre every five or six centuries and rose from its ashes with renewed youth. The petitioner is knocking the doors of this Court for the relief, which he could not even imagine in his dream. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the property belonging to his father was acquired by the first respondent for the purpose of extension of Otteri burial ground by issuing 4(1) Notification dated 23.02.1949. After hearing his father's objection, declaration under Section 6 was made on 27.12.1949. The quantum of compensation payable for the acquired land also attained finality in Appeal No.811 of 1952, by order dated 28.11.1956 passed by the First Bench of this court. 3. After 5 decades, on 18.08.2005, the petitioner gave a representation to the authorities under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act for re-conveyance of the land as the acquired land has not been utilised for burial ground. The petitioner filed W.P.No.9230 of 2006 for a direction to consider the representation dated 18.08.2005. Pursuant to the direction issued by this Court on 03.04.2006 in W.P.No.9230 of 2006, the impugned order has been passed rejecting the claim of the petitioner, that is being challenged before this Court. 4. Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the land acquired is no more required for extension of burial ground. After coming to know about the non-requirement of the land, the petitioner gave a representation on 18.08.2005 under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act for re-conveyance and the same was rejected mechanically without any material details stating that the acquired land is utilised for burial ground purpose only. According to him, the impugned order is silent about the details. Moreover, the counter filed by the respondent does not specially deal with what has been contended in ground No.(E) and (F) which state that the subject land is still lying vacant without serving any purpose and the land is not utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired. According to him, the impugned order is silent about the details. Moreover, the counter filed by the respondent does not specially deal with what has been contended in ground No.(E) and (F) which state that the subject land is still lying vacant without serving any purpose and the land is not utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired. The learned senior counsel relied upon the following Judgments:- (i) "L.Selvam v. The Government of Tamil Nadu" reported in 2010(5) CTC 261 . (ii) "Malarkodi v. The Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu" reported in 2008(4) CTC 193 . (iii) "Shanmugam, R v. The State of Tamil Nadu" reported in 2006 (4) CTC 290 . Relying upon those judgements, the learned senior counsel submitted that the impugned order has been passed without giving material details and no reason is given as to how the lands have been utilised for extension of burial ground. Therefore, the impugned order has to be quashed. 5. On the other hand, Ms.Hepziba appearing for Mr.T.Mathi, learned counsel for the second respondent-Corporation submitted that the land is required for further extension of burial ground and it is for public purpose. The details are given in paragraphs 4 and 7 of the impugned order. She particularly pointed out that the writ petition has been filed after six decades and more over the population is increasing day by day and therefore, it cannot be said that there is no possibility of extension of burial ground. Mr.K.V.Dhanapalan, learned Additional Government Pleader supported the contention of the Corporation and further submitted that the Writ Petition has to be dismissed on the ground of delay. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records carefully. 7. It is seen that the property belonging to the petitioner's father was acquired for the purpose of extension of Otteri Burial ground under Section 4(1) Notification on 23.02.1949. The requisitioning body was the second respondent-Corporation. The petitioner's father raised objection and after that a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made on 27.12.1949 and the award was passed on 24.07.1950. Against the award, a reference was made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and it was heard by the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai and by award dated 21.12.1951 dismissed the said reference. Against the award, a reference was made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and it was heard by the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai and by award dated 21.12.1951 dismissed the said reference. Against the said reference, an appeal was filed in Appeal No.811 of 1952 before the First Bench of this Court consisting their Lordships Mr. Justice P.V.Rajamannar, Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Panchapakesa Ayyar. The said Bench confirmed the award passed by the Chief Small Causes Court, Madras. As per the above facts, it is clear that the petitioner's father objected to the acquisition and it was rejected and declaration was made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The quantum of compensation was also decided by this Court. Therefore, in all aspects and respects, the proceedings attained finality on 28.11.1956. After six decades, the petitioner gave petition under Section 48-B of the Act on 18.8.2005 which was rejected and the said order is the subject matter of this writ petition. 8. Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act has to be looked into. Section 48-B of the Act reads as follows:- "48-B. Transfer of land to original owner in certain cases.-Where the Government are satisfied that the land vest in the Government under this Act is not required for the purpose for which it was acquired, or for any other public purpose, the Government may transfer such land to the original owner who is willing to repay the amount paid to him under this Act for the acquisition of such land inclusive of the amount referred to in subsection (A-1) and (2) of Section 23, if any, paid under this Act." A reading of the above provision would reveal that for invoking Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act. (i) The Government should be satisfied that the land vested with it under the Act is not required for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose. (ii) In that event, the Government may transfer such land to the original owner, who is willing to repay the amount paid to him for the acquisition. Only after subjective satisfaction when that the land is not required for the purpose, the Government may transfer. (ii) In that event, the Government may transfer such land to the original owner, who is willing to repay the amount paid to him for the acquisition. Only after subjective satisfaction when that the land is not required for the purpose, the Government may transfer. It is not mandatory / obligatory on the part of the Government to transfer such land and it is evident by employment of word "may" in the said Section. Therefore, the petitioner cannot compel the Government to re-convey the land, that too after six long decades. In this case, the Government categorically stated that the land is needed for public purpose. 9. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.N.Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal reported in (2007) 9 SCC 255 , that once a piece of land has been duly acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the land becomes the property of the State and the State can dispose of the property. Further, it has been held in that case that Section 48B was introduced into the Act only in the State of Tamil Nadu as an exception and such provision has to be strictly construed and strict compliance with its terms should be insisted upon. The above dictum is reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. L.Chandrasekaran (Dead) by LRs and others reported in 2010 (2) SCC 786 . In Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai vs. R.Sivasankara Mehta and another reported in 2011 (5) SCALE 114, the Apex Court in held that the land owners had no right to apply for re-conveyance of land vested long ago. In this case, there is no compliance of ingredients of Section 48-B. In such a scenario, the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. The petitioner states in paragraph 6 of the affidavit that the existing burial ground which is to an extent of 16 acres of land has not been completely utilised and the extent of 35 grounds which was acquired for the purpose of extension has not been utilised for the purpose for which it has been acquired for over 60 years ago. Therefore, the second respondent-Corporation does not have any intention to utilise the said land. In view of that, he gave a representation on 18.08.2005 under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act to re-convey the property. Therefore, the second respondent-Corporation does not have any intention to utilise the said land. In view of that, he gave a representation on 18.08.2005 under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act to re-convey the property. The affidavit of the petitioner is silent as to how he came to know that the land which was acquired in 1949 is not utilised and on which date and through which source he came to know that the land is not utilised. When a person comes to the Court for re-conveyance of the acquired property is duty bound to give the material details, which are necessary to give cause of action for approaching this Court and for that matter even for giving representation. In the absence of material particulars, the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 11. The petitioner makes a contention in paragraph 6 of the petitioner that the lands have not been utilised for the purpose for which they were acquired and still lying vacant and not serving the purpose. As already observed above, no material details is given by the petitioner that the subject lands are not serving any purpose. In fact, the respondent filed a very short counter affidavit which contains all the material details. Paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit reads as follows:- "I submit that an extent of 35 grounds of land in R.S.No.3077 to 3081 was acquired for the purpose of extension of Otteri Burial Ground and it is utilised for Burial Ground purpose only. The vacant land on southern side is needed for further extension of the Burial Ground and hence the land acquired earlier has been utilised already for the public purpose. Further all the burial grounds in Chennai city are modernising, fixing gasifies system, electrical cremation and surrounding area also utilised for extension purpose. Due to the increasing population strength, every burial ground are also utilising by the Corporation." Therefore, the claim under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be sustained which was rightly negatived by the impugned order. 12. As far as the contention of the petitioner in Ground No. (F) that nothing has happened in the acquired land is concerned, it has been stated in paragraph "7" of the counter affidavit that the above land is absolutely under the possession and control of the second respondent-Corporation and it is under the use for larger interest of general public. As far as the contention of the petitioner in Ground No. (F) that nothing has happened in the acquired land is concerned, it has been stated in paragraph "7" of the counter affidavit that the above land is absolutely under the possession and control of the second respondent-Corporation and it is under the use for larger interest of general public. Paragraph "7" of the counter affidavitt is extracted as follows:- "I further submit that the entire land was acquired by an award dated 24.07.1950 vide Gazette publication dated 23.02.1949 and the issue was already over more than six decades ago. The above said land is absolutely under the possession of Corporation of Chennai and it is under use to the larger interest of general public. Mainly the above said land was acquired for the public purpose of extension of the Otteri Burial Ground. Now the land is fully utilised by the Corporation of Chennai for public purpose." 13. The counter affidavit filed by the respondent is in consonance with the impugned order, which states that the acquisition is for expansion and is being utilised for burial ground purpose only and the vacant land on the southern side is needed for future extension of the burial ground and hence the land acquired has been utilised for the public purpose. The last paragraph of the impugned order reads as follows:- "The land acquired for the purpose of the extension of Burial Ground is utilised for Burial Ground purpose only. The vacant land on southern side is needed for future expansion of the Burial Ground and hence the land is acquired has been utilised for the public purpose for which it was acquired." As the impugned order gives the material particulars and details for rejection of the claim of the petitioner properly, the impugned order cannot be interfered with. 14. As far as the Fist Bench Judgment relied upon by the petitioner in "L.Selvam v. The Government of Tamil Nadu" reported in 2010(5) CTC 261 is concerned, in that case, a number of properties were acquired and certain owners were re-conveyed their properties subsequently. The property of the petitioner therein alone was treated differently and his land alone was not conveyed. The property of the petitioner therein alone was treated differently and his land alone was not conveyed. Moreover, in the facts of that case, it is seen that the land was not required for the public purpose and therefore in those circumstances, the First Bench Judgment held that the rejection of the claim of the petitioner therein was without any valid reason and highly arbitrary and discriminatory. The facts are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present case. 15. In fact, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner in "Malarkodi v. The Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu" reported in 2008(4) CTC 193 , is against the petitioner. The dictum laid down by the First Bench in that case is that the provisions under Section 48-B should be complied with for re-conveyance. Paragraphs 22 and 26 are extracted here-under:- 22.The conditions precedent are that the Government must be satisfied that the land vested in the Government under this Act is (a) not required for the purpose for which it was acquired; or (b) not required for any other public purpose. The conditions consequent is that the Government can transfer such land to the original owner who is (a) willing to repay the amount paid to him under the Act for such acquisition; and (b) this amount would include also the amount referred to in sub-section (1-A) and (2) of Section 23 of the said Act, if any paid. 26. That being the clear factual position, this Court cannot persuade itself to hold that the order for return of the land to the original owner has been passed in accordance with the provisions under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu Amendment) A5, 1996." (Emphasis supplied) 16. 26. That being the clear factual position, this Court cannot persuade itself to hold that the order for return of the land to the original owner has been passed in accordance with the provisions under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu Amendment) A5, 1996." (Emphasis supplied) 16. As far as other judgment in "Shanmugam, R v. The State of Tamil Nadu" reported in 2006 (4) CTC 290 is concerned, the petitioner relies upon paragraphs 23 and 33 which speak about the compliance of 48-B. Paragraphs 23 and 33 are reads as follows:- "23.The inserted provision contemplates that in case the Government are satisfied that the land vest in the Government is not required for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public, they may transfer such land to the original owner who is willing to repay the amount paid to him for the acquisition of such land inclusive of the amount referred to in sub-sections (1-A) and (2) of the Section 23, if any, paid under the Act. When once the land vest in Government under Section 16-B, it is obligated to consider the request to the original owner who is willing to repay the amount for transfer of the land to such original owner. 33. As the provision of Section 48-B is unique and is contemplated only by Tamil Nadu Amendment Act, the purport of that Section must be considered with reference to the object and reasons. By the above provision, the erstwhile owners are entitled to make request to the Government for re-conveyance of the land, of course, subject to their willingness to repay the amount paid to them under the Act for acquisition of land inclusive of the amount referred to in sub-sections (1-A) and (2) of Section 23, if any, paid under this Act. By the provision of Section 48-B an element of right to repossess the land by way of re-conveyance is conferred on the owners, of course, subject to the compliance of Section 48-B. Issue of re-conveyance under Section 48-B, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in Southern Railways, etc. v. S.Palaniappan and others, 2005(2) LW 325 . v. S.Palaniappan and others, 2005(2) LW 325 . In the said judgment, the Division Bench while considering the issue as to the willingness of the land owners and the right of the Government to accept the willingness, has held in paras 33, 34 and 35 as follows:- 33.Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned senior counsel for the respondent-land owners placed reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge in M.Manimegalai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2004 W.L.R.789 (vide paragraph-10) wherein it was observed: Section 48-B has been introduced with a view to protect the interest of the persons from whom the land has been acquired but not utilised. Such provision is a benevolent provision. Even though it is not specially indicated in Section 48-B regarding the right of such a person to file application, it is obvious that such a person has to indicate his willingness to get the land back subject to repayment of the compensation. 34. We respectfully do not agree with the learned single Judge that Section 48-B has been introduced only to protect the interest of the persons from whom the land has been acquired. In our opinion, Section 48-B can also protect the interest of the State Government which wants to re-convey the land which it had acquired, but in such a case the State Government must get the consent of the erstwhile land owner before it can re-convey the land to him under Section 48-B. The State Government cannot act unilaterally in this connection as already held above. 35. For the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 03.12.2003 does not fall within the ambit of Section 48-B as it is a unilateral act and hence, it has to be declared as invalid, because by a mere executive order, unsupported by statute, land which stands vested in the State Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be unilaterally re-conveyed by the State Government to the erstwhile land owners." (Emphasis supplied) From the above, it is very clear, only when the Government is satisfied that the land is not required for the purpose for which it was required, the Government may return the property. After having made such a categorical declaration, the Court observed in the last sentence of paragraph 23 that once the land vested with the Government under Section 16, it is its obligation to consider the request of the original owner, who is willing to repay the amount for transfer of the land in his favour. The last sentence in paragraph 23 cannot be read in isolation to give different meaning and the Judgment in to-to has to be read and understood. In fact, the opening sentence of paragraph 23 speaks about the condition that only when the property is not required for the Government, the rest will come into operation. Therefore the said paragraph is not helpful to the petitioner. Even in paragraph 33 also it has been categorically stated that right to repossess the land by re-conveyance is not conferred on the owners, subject to the compliance of Section 48-B. The said proposition of law has been held by the Division Bench in "Southern Railways, etc v. S.Palaniappan and others reported in 2005 2 L.W. 325. 17. As the value of the property has gone up. The petitioner attempts to get the property by abusing the process of Court, after a lapse of 60 years. As the value of the properties is sky rocketing, the petitioner is trying his luck by these proceedings and such a claim is not sustainable in law. If the claims like petitioner's, are entertained by this Court, it will open a Pandora's box thereby many claims by erstwhile owners, whose properties were acquired for public purposes, would be made and it would not be in the interest of public. The matters already reached finality about 50 years ago and the same cannot be reopened. Rights of the parties already got crystallised long back and the needle of the clock cannot be put in reverse. The claim itself is against the public interest, which has to be rejected in limini. Though the earlier writ petition in W.P.No.224593 of 2006 and W.P.No.9230 of 2006 have been filed by the petitioner, for the reasons best known to him, he has not chosen to file the copies of those proceedings in this writ petition. 18. Moreover, the impugned order has been passed on the belated claim of the petitioner viz., after 50 years pursuant to orders of this Court. 18. Moreover, the impugned order has been passed on the belated claim of the petitioner viz., after 50 years pursuant to orders of this Court. It is seen that for lands acquired in 1949, the petitioner gave a representation on 18.8.2005 for re-conveyance under Section 48-B of the Act and he approached this Court by W.P.No.9230 of 2006 seeking direction to dispose of the representation. Since it was only a Writ of Mandamus, this Court issued such direction to dispose of the representation dated 18.8.2005. The petitioner attempts to get life from the order of this Court dated 03.04.2006 in W.P.No.9230 of 2006. Even then, the order passed by the authority pursuant to the directions given by this Court cannot give cause of action. Courts should be slow while issuing Mandamus regarding stale/false claims. Such claim should not get any legal colour or create any right by court's order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.Jacob Vs. Director of Geology & Mining and Another reported in 2008 AIR SCW 7233 held that stale cause of action can never be revived. Similar view has been taken in Union of India and Others Vs. M.K.Sarkar reported in 2010 (2) SCC 59. Paragraphs 14 to 16 are usefully extracted as follows:- "14. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and directing the appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-effects of such directions have been considered by this Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining: (SCC pp. 122-23, para 9) “9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any ‘decision’ on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to ‘consider’. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to ‘consider’. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.” 15. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. 16. A court or tribunal, before directing “consideration” of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a “live” issue or whether it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue. If it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue or dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or tribunal deciding to direct “consideration” without itself examining the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect." 19. If the court or tribunal deciding to direct “consideration” without itself examining the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect." 19. If the land owners, who lost the property in the land acquisition proceedings and the acquisition already attained finality very long ago, the petitioner should not even make an attempt to reopen the issue under the guise petition under Section of 48-B. Especially, in the present case, the land was acquired for extension of burial ground in 1949 and the property was vested with the government. That apart there is no connection or whatsoever between the petitioner and the property. The petitioner is not even having traces of right. In the absence of any right over the property, at the best he can only be called as "stranger" with false claim. 20. As rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent-Corporation, day-by-day the population of the State is increasing and it cannot be said that the use of burial ground would be reduced. It is common fact that due to increase in population which generally increase the rate of death and the expansion of burial ground is certainly a necessity. Recently, the KilpaukCemetery has to be closed for want of space for burying dead bodies. When such is the position, the petitioner cannot approach the respondents for re-conveyance of the land which was acquired over decades ago. 21. The attempt of the petitioner is nothing but an abuse of process of law. For having indulged in abuse of process of law and sought for re-conveyance of the property, which was acquired as early as 1949, the petitioner is liable to be slapped with very heavy cost. However, due to judicial restraint, this Court is not awarding any cost. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed with the above observations. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are dismissed. No costs.