M. Rajamanickam v. Commissioner, Tuticorin Municipality
2012-07-02
S.MANIKUMAR
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The Petitioner, a lease, no respect of a shop, bearing Door Nos.498 & 499, Victoria Extension Road, Tuticorin, belonging to Tuticorin Municipality, has sought for a Mandamus, forbearing the Respondents from evicting him from the abovesaid shop. 2. It is the case of the Petitioner that the shop was allotted in the year 1975 on lease basis. Though the lease amount was periodically increased, he has been regular in payment. The shop as built in the year 1960. The area of shop was roughly about 600 sq.ft. He is running a Bakery and Sweet Stall. He has paid the licence fee for retail sale of sweets under the Madras Food Adulteration Act. There was no Complaint whatsoever in amount of lease amount to the municipality. 3. The Petitioner has further submitted that the neibouring shop keeper. Door No.497, demolished his portion and constructed a pucca single stored building and running a medical shop in the name and style of “Sri Kani Medicals”. While constructing the abovesaid building, the filed roof of the Petitioner’s shop was damaged, due to the building materials, falling on the roof on the Petitioner’s leased out premises. The eatable items were exposed to sun and rain due to the damaged roof and in these circumstances, he made an Application, dated 8.11.2000 to the Municipality on 8.11.2000, stating that his building roof was damaged and that the side wall of the shop was under threat of falling at any moment and therefore, requested reconstruction of the side wall from his own funds. Though the representation was received, steps were no taken to repair the same. As the Municipality did not carry and any repairing work, the Petitioner lessee was constrained to make the repair works, at his own cost. According to him, he is entitled to do so under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. 4. The Petitioner has further submitted that as per Section 197 r/w, Section 202(2) of the District Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), if no orders are passed on the representation, within one month, by the competent authority, then the request is deemed to have been accepted.
4. The Petitioner has further submitted that as per Section 197 r/w, Section 202(2) of the District Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), if no orders are passed on the representation, within one month, by the competent authority, then the request is deemed to have been accepted. Further, when the Commissioner of Municipalities filed a Suit in O.S. No.25 of 2001, on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Tuticorin, or a permanent injunction and mandatory injunction, the same has been dismissed by the judgment and decree, dated 30.4.2002. Therefore, the construction made by the Petitioner cannot be said to be illegal or contrary to the provisions of the Act. 5. The Petitioner has further submitted that though the Government have issued orders in G.O.(2D) No.147, Municipal Administration and Water Supply (Na.Ni.4) Department, dated 30.12.2002, directing renewal of licences with an increase in the rent, at the rate of 15%, the Respondents have not chosen to renew the lease. He further submitted that when there was a threat of eviction in May 2003, he has filed a Writ Petition in W.P. No.15581/2003 for a Mandamus, directing the Commissioner of Municipality, to forbear from interfering with the peaceful running of the abovesaid shop, except by due process of law. The said Writ Petition came to be disposed on 27.5.2003, when the Respondent submitted that there was no threat of dispossession. 6. After the dismissal of the abovesaid Writ Petition, Tuticorin Municipality is said to have been passed a resolution, cancelling the lease, in respect of the abovesaid shops. Copy of the resolution was not served on the Petitioner. In these circumstances, the Petitioner was constrained to challenge the said resolution in W.P.No.22648 of 2003, to quash the same. However, the said Writ Petition was withdrawn. 7. It is the further case of the Petitioner that though rent was paid by Pay Order through Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due, for the month of September 2001 and October 2001, the same was refused. On 11.08.2003, the authorities have over locked the shop and thus, interfered with the possession and enjoyment of the premises and thereby, attempted to evict him, without serving any notice or order. In the abovesaid circumstances, left with no other option, the Petitioner has preferred the preset Writ Petition for a Mandamus, as stated supra. 8. On the above pleadings, Mr.
In the abovesaid circumstances, left with no other option, the Petitioner has preferred the preset Writ Petition for a Mandamus, as stated supra. 8. On the above pleadings, Mr. V. Sanjeevi, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that though there were many shops within the said municipal limits, others were allowed to continue, with increase in rent from time to time. Whereas, vindictively a resolution has been passed to evict the Petitioner alone. Thus, there is a discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. According to the learned Counsel, the Petitioner has been running the sweet stall for more than a decade and spend considerable amounts for repairing the damaged roof and side wall, which he was constrained to do so, on account of the failure of the municipality to repair. He further submitted that such action is permissible under Section 202(2) of the District Municipalities Act and therefore, the lease ought to have been renewed periodically, which was also legitimately expected. 10. Referring to the judgment made in O.S.NO.25 of 2001, on the file of the learned Principal District Munsif Court, Tuticorin, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Respondents have erroneously interpreted the Civil Court judgment, as if, the Civil Court has permitted the Respondents to resort to Eviction proceedings, when the Court refused to grant for mandatory injunction. According to him, even assuming that there was any observation made in the Suit, that would be beyond the scope of the Suit and therefore, the same is not binding on the Petitioner and considering the age of the building, the steps taken by the Petitioner for repairing the building, ought not to have been taken as a ground for evicting the Petitioner from the shop, which is, his bread and butter. 11. According to the learned Counsel, as per G.O.(2D) No.147, Municipal Administration and Water Supply (Na.Ni.4) Department, dated 30.12.2002, the existing lessees are entitled to continue the lease with an increase of 15% rent of the prevailing rent and in such circumstances, the action of the Respondents in preventing the Petitioner from running the sweet stall by putting up a lock on 11.8.2002, is nothing but an arbitrary and vindictive action by the Respondents. For the abovesaid reasons, prayed for issuance of a Mandamus. 12. In response to the above, Mr.
For the abovesaid reasons, prayed for issuance of a Mandamus. 12. In response to the above, Mr. V. Subbarayan, learned Counsel for the Municipality submitted that the provisions under Sections 107 & 202(2) of the District Municipalities Act, are not applicable to a lease and that it is always open to the lessor to take appropriate action, when there is a violation of the terms and conditions of the lease or after the expiry of the lease period. He further submitted that insofar as the lease granted to the Petitioner is concerned, the same came to an end on 31.3.2002. 13. Learned Counsel for the Respondents further submitted that the dismissal of the Sit in O.S.No.25 of 2001, on the file of the learned Principal District Munsif, Tuticorin, for a mandatory injunction to remove the construction made by the Petitioner, would not preclude the Municipality from taking a decision not to renew the lease, when the lease period had come to an end. He also submitted that no lessee has a right to compel a local body to extend the lease forever, despite violation or breach of terms and conditions of the lease or the auction notice. 14. Learned Counsel for the Respondents further submitted that the contention that on 11.8.2003, the authorities have put up a lock in the shop bearing Door Nos.498 & 499, is made only for the purpose of filing a fresh Writ Petition, alleging interference and it is intended to prevent the authorities from taking any action, pursuant to the resolution passed on 31.7.2003 and therefore, such contention deserves to be rejected. 15. Learned Counsel for the Respondents further submitted that virtually, the Petitioner has challenged the resolution and having withdrawn W.P. No.22648 of 2003, filed earlier, against the resolution it is not open to indirectly assail the same, in the present Writ Petition filed in quick succession. According to him, renewed of lease is not a matter of right to any lessee and for the abovesaid reasons. Submitted that the Petitioner is not entitled to seek for a Mandamus. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 16. Before adverting to the facts of the case, a cursory look at Section 197 & 202 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, referred to by the learned Counsel for both parties, is necessary and hence extracted. “197.
Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 16. Before adverting to the facts of the case, a cursory look at Section 197 & 202 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, referred to by the learned Counsel for both parties, is necessary and hence extracted. “197. Application to construct or reconstruct building.- (1) If any person intends to construct or reconstruct a building other than a hut, he shall send to the execute authority: a. An Application in writing for approval of the site, together with a site plan of the land, and b. An Application in writing for permission to execute the work together with a ground-plan, elevations and sections of the building, and a specification of the work. Explanation._ “Building in the sub-section shall include a wall or fence of whatever height bounding or abutting on any public street. 2.) Every document furnished under sub-section (1) shall contain such particulars and be prepared in such manner as may be required under rules or by laws. 202. Reference to council if executive authority delays grant or refusal of approval or permission.- (1) If, within the period prescribed by Section 200 or Section 201, as the case may be, the Executive Authority has neither given nor refused his approval of a building site, or his permission to execute any work, as the case may be, the council shall be hound, on the written request of the Applicant, to determine by written order whether such approval or permission should be given or not. 2) If the council does not, within one month from the receipt of such written request, determine whether such approval or permission should be given or not, such approval or permission shall be deemed to have been given, and the Applicant may proceed to execute the work, but not so as to contravene any of the provisions of this Act or any rules or by-laws made under this Act.” 17. The contentions made by the Petitioner that the leased out building, shop bearing Door Nos.498 & 499. Victoria Extension Road, Tuticorin, belonging to the Tuticorin Municipality, was old, lease granted in the year 1974 has been periodically renewed and that he has been running the sweet stall, after obtaining necessary licence, from the Competent Authority, have not been disputed nu the respondents. 18.
Victoria Extension Road, Tuticorin, belonging to the Tuticorin Municipality, was old, lease granted in the year 1974 has been periodically renewed and that he has been running the sweet stall, after obtaining necessary licence, from the Competent Authority, have not been disputed nu the respondents. 18. It is the case of the petitioner that due to re-construction of the neighbouring shop, the side wall of his shop and the tiled roof were damaged. Since he was dealing with eatables and running a sweet stall, by letter, dated 8.11.2000, he requested First Respondent for repairing and reconstruction of the side wall t this own cost and since no orders were passed he was constrained to do repair works, with a view to protect and safeguard the building. 19. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, as per Section 197 of the Act, if any person intends to construct or reconstruct a building other than a hut, he shall, an Application in writing to the Executive Authority, for approval of the site and as per Section 202(2) of the Act, if the council does not, within one month from the receipt of such written request, determine whether such approval or permission should be given or not, such approval or permission shall be deemed to have been given, and the Applicant may proceed to execute the work. The petitioner has also contended that as per the provisions of the transfer of Property Act, a lessor is entitled to do repair works. Per contra, it is the contention of the Respondent-Municipality that permission for construction or reconstruction can be sought for, only in respect of a property owned by a local body, in the case on hand, Municipality. 20.
Per contra, it is the contention of the Respondent-Municipality that permission for construction or reconstruction can be sought for, only in respect of a property owned by a local body, in the case on hand, Municipality. 20. The grounds on which, approval of site for, or licence to construct or reconstruct building, may be refused, are state din Section 203 of the Act and as per sub-section (1) of the said Section, if the work or use of the site for the work or any of the particulars comprised in the site plan, ground plan, elevations, Sections or specification contravene some specified provision of any law, or some specified order, rule, declaration or by-law made under any law and as per sub-section (6) of the said Section, if the proposed building is an encroachment upon Government or Municipal and, refusal to approve building site or grant permission to construct or reconstruct a building can be made and the reasons for such refusal shall be specifically stated in the order or resolution. 21. A conjoint reading of sub-sections (1) & (6) of Section 203 of the Act makes it clear that if the proposed construction is on the encroached property, whether Government or local body, as the case may be, permission to construct or reconstruct any building, can be refused, meaning thereby, the property, for which, construction should be on a private property and not owned or controlled by the Government or local body, as the case may be, and in such circumstances, the Council is empowered to grant or deny permission for construction or reconstruction, as the case may be, subject to the Applicant satisfying the conditions set out in the Act. 22. Provisions in the District Municipalities Act, do not indicate that a lessee under the Act, without valid permission, can put up any construction or reconstruction or make any repair work of the property, owned and maintained by the Municipality. A lease Deed is entered into between the parties, is subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed, if any. By such construction of the provisions, the lessor, a local body, who has got a right to terminate the lease, for breach of the terms and conditions of the lease, would be restrained from exercising its right.
A lease Deed is entered into between the parties, is subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed, if any. By such construction of the provisions, the lessor, a local body, who has got a right to terminate the lease, for breach of the terms and conditions of the lease, would be restrained from exercising its right. Whereas, in the case of owner of a private property, he stands on a different footing, as he has a legal right to expect that permission should be granted, within the statutory period. Under the Act, a lessee of a Government or Municipal property, cannot be equated with the owner of a private property. The right of a lessee flows only from the terms and conditions of the lease, subject to the provisions of the Statute, and that too, during the subsistence of lease and continuity or renewal of the lease would become automatic. The building is stated to be old and that the lease of the said shop has been periodically renewed from 1974 onwards, without any interruption and the dispute has started in the year 2000, when the Petitioner made some repair works. 23. In view of the above, this Court is not inclined to subscribe to the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that if the lessee makes an Application for construction or reconstruction or to do repair works of the property, taken on lease and if it is not granted within the statutory period of one month, by virtue of the deeming provision under Section 202(2) of the Act, the lessee gets a right under the Act to proceed with the construction or reconstruction or carry out repair works, as the case may be. If such an interpretation and construction of the statute have to be made, then a fresh construction can be made on any property, owned by the Government or Municipality, as the case may be, immediately after the expiry of one month’s period, and that would run contrary to the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed, executed between a lessee and local body and may even result in a spate of litigation. 24.
24. But, at the same time, one cannot lose sight of the fact that when the Petitioner has made a request to the Respondents to permit him to make some repair works, considering the age of the building and the damage said to have been some response, atleast the Respondents should have come forward to do the repair works or granted permission to do the repair works, taking an undertaking that it would not confer any right to seek for refund of repair charges or right to demand renewal of lease. 25. Perusal of the judgment in O.S. No.25 of 2001, dated 30.4.2002, shows that when the Municipality, sought for a permanent injunction and mandatory injunction to remove the construction, during cross-examination, PW1, examined on behalf of the Plaintiff-Municipality, has deposed that about 4 to 5 years, prior to the institution of the Suit, there was a fire accident and thereafter, the shop owners, represented to the Municipality to put up construction. He has also deposed that in the market, buildings have been constructed with RCC Roof and Column and depending upon the financial capacity, the shop owners have put up constructions. However, PW1, has deposed that he has not aware, as to whether any written permission was given. He has also admitted that the Defendant in the Suit, i.e., the Writ Petitioner herein had not altered the area, which was allotted to him. PW2, in his cross-examination, ha admitted that the market falls within the Municipality. Old buildings have been removed and new buildings have been constructed. However, he has also deposed that he was not aware, as to whether the lessees have put up constructions on their own or not. Thus, it could be seen from the testimony of the witnesses examined on behalf of the Municipality, constructions seemed to have been made by the lessees and that the Municipality, Plaintiff therein, ha not taken any punitive action for cancellation of the leases on that ground. 26. Perusal of the judgment also shows that eth Municipality ha not placed any material before the Civil Court to prove that they neither made repairs or put up new constructions. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the Municipality has not taken any action, when the repair works or constructions were made by the Writ petitioner.
26. Perusal of the judgment also shows that eth Municipality ha not placed any material before the Civil Court to prove that they neither made repairs or put up new constructions. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the Municipality has not taken any action, when the repair works or constructions were made by the Writ petitioner. Before the Civil Court, the Petitioner has also made it clear, he ahs not interested in getting the repair or construction charges incurred by him from the Municipality for the building which was old and damaged, due to the construction made by his neighbor. 27. Perusal of the material on record shows that after the judgment of the Civil Court, a resolution has passed on 31st July, 2003, to the effect that since the lease of the shop Nos.498 & 499, had come to an end on 31.3.2003, the licence granted to the Petitioner, can be cancelled and thereafter, the shop can be restored by the Municipality. As stated supra, from the evidence let in by PWs1 & 2, on behalf of the Municipality, it could be seen that some other shop owners, lessees of the Municipality, it could be seen that some other shop owners, lessees of the Municipality, have also put up constructions and no materials have been placed by the Municipality before the Civil Court, to prove that the repair works have been done by the Municipality. On the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that there was no necessity to do repair works. 28. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, when others were allowed to make constructions/repair works, by putting up RCC roof with column, and when no action has been taken against them for eviction, on the ground of violation of lease condition, it is obvious that having failed in their attempt to obtain the relief sought for in the Suit in O.S.No.25 of 2001, dated 30.4.2002, the Municipality has passed a resolution on 31.3.2000, on the date, when the lease expired. 29. Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is per se apparent. Of course, this Court is not inclined to agree to the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the lessee can seek for immunity from eviction proceedings, despite violation of any lease condition. Subscribing to such conditions, would tantamount to issuing any order.
29. Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is per se apparent. Of course, this Court is not inclined to agree to the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the lessee can seek for immunity from eviction proceedings, despite violation of any lease condition. Subscribing to such conditions, would tantamount to issuing any order. Prohibiting the lessor from initiating any legal proceedings for eviction, if the violations of the lease conditions are noticed. 30. But on the facts and circumstances of this case and considering the evidence, stated supra, violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, apparent on the face of record, cannot be allowed to be sustained and that the same would deprive the Petitioner of his livelihood. If the lessor has initiated action for eviction of all those, who had put up construction or made repair works, then the issue would have been different. But the fact remains that action has been initiate only against the Petitioner. No materials have been placed before this Court to prove that the Municip0ality has maintained uniformity. 31. Though the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied on an unreported decision made in W.P.No.6551 of 1990, dated 24.11.1994, wherein, this Court has set aside the public auction floated in respect of a shop, instead of renewing the same, on receipt of 15% of the enhanced rent, this Court, with due respect, is not inclined to subscribe to the said view, for the reason that it is always the prerogative right of a local body to either renew the lease on receipt of 15% of the enhanced rent or go in for a public auction, augment more revenue to0 the Local Body. Local Bodies are empowered to take a decision on their own and renewal is not automatic. 32. Pleadings and the material on record shows that though the Petitioner has filed W.P. No.15581 of 2003, for a Mandamus, directing the Commissioner of Municipality to forbear from interfering with the peaceful running of the abovesaid shop, the same has been disposed on 27.5.2003, by recording the submission on behalf of the Respondents that at that time, there was no threat of dispossession. When the resolution was passed on 31.7.2003, immediately, the Petitioner has filed W.P. NO.22648 of 2003, challenging the said resolution.
When the resolution was passed on 31.7.2003, immediately, the Petitioner has filed W.P. NO.22648 of 2003, challenging the said resolution. But the Petitioner has chosen to withdraw the Writ Petition, which came to be dismissed on 13.8.2003. 33. Though the Petitioner has alleged that a over lock was put up by the Municipality on 11.8.2003, there is nothing on record to indicate, as to whether, the Petitioner had brought to the notice of this Court, about the same, when W.P.No.22648 of 2003, was withdrawn by him. Immediately, within three days, the Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition on 17.8.2003, once again for a Mandamus. No material document has been filed in the typed set of papers to show that the Petitioner has objected to the Municipality, about putting up of any lock. He said contention is not substantiated by any materials. But the fact remains that when the Petitioner has tendered a sum of Rs.8,280/- and 6,900/- for the shops bearing Door Nos.498 & 499 respectively, by way of cheques drawn on 22.7.2003 and 19.6.2003 respectively, the same had been returned along with the notice, dated 1.8.2003, on the ground that a Writ Petition was pending on the file of this Court. 34. In view of the above discussion, a direction is issued to the Respondents not to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the Petitioner, except under due process of law. It is always open to the Respondents to take a decision, which could be applicable uniformly by all the lessees, whenever violation are noticed or for any other bona fide reasons. A Mandamus is issued with the abovesaid directions. 35. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed as indicated. No costs.